2/9/12 Home / Publications / Congress & Budget www PGS Printer Friendly Page   Update on Congressional Activity Affecting U.S.-Russian Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs William Hoehn May 13, 2002 Defense Authorizations House of Representatives: The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) completed mark-up of its version of the FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4546) on May 1. The full House approved the bill, with amendments, early in the morning on May 10. Highlights: Department of Energy programs The overall Department of Energy (DOE) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request ($1.13 billion) was reduced by a total of $39.0 million. In general, the Committee expressed concern with the large unexpended balances in some of the programs, indicating doubts about whether the programs "can effectively absorb" excess funding. Program decreases were made in the following areas: Russian plutonium disposition: -$10.0 million ($98 M to $88 M) [Offset by increase to U.S. fissile material disposition (O&M): +$4.0 million ($194 M to $198 M). This increase is provided for the exploration of alternative disposition technologies and fuel cycles, with a particular emphasis placed on research into thorium-based fuel cycles.] Elimination of Russian plutonium production: -$30 million ($49.3 M to $19.3 M) International nuclear safety: -$3.0 million ($14.6 M to $11.6 M) Although the program's mission was not called into question by the Committee, the decision to cut funding for the program to eliminate Russian plutonium production was justified by the existence of large unspent program balances, and the absence of a detailed program execution plan or formal agreement with Russia regarding cost-sharing and shut-down of the reactors. The HASC bill also provided legal authority for the transfer of this program from the Defense Department to the DOE. On May 8, two amendments to restore some of these funding cuts were ruled out of order by the Rules Committee during formulation of the resolution (H. Res. 415; H Rept. 107-450) for floor consideration of H.R. 4456. The two defeated motions included: An amendment offered by Rep. Edwards to restore $30 million for the elimination of Russian plutonium production project, with an offsetting decrease in ballistic missile defense funding. An amendment offered by Rep. Spratt to restore $10 million for Russian plutonium disposition. Department of Defense/Cooperative Threat Reduction programs Funding for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was fully authorized, at $416.7 million. However, only $50 million of the $133.6 million requested for the CW destruction facility was approved, with the $83.6 million balance being redirected to Russian strategic offensive arms elimination, strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, and Russian warhead storage and transportation security. [Further information on the DOE and DOD budgets can be found in the recent RANSAC report "Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Requests for U.S.-Former Soviet Union Nonproliferation Programs" available at www.216.119.87.134] Other provisions affecting CTR programs include: A provision expressing the sense of Congress that Russian proliferation of WMD-related goods, technologies, and know-how to Iran represents a clear threat to national security. The bill requires the President to report to Congress annually through 2009 on Russian proliferation behavior. The report, to be prepared by the DOD Office of Net Assessment, is to provide detailed information on Russian WMD and dual-use transfers to Iran and other countries, the contributions these transfers will have on recipient state capabilities, the impact on U.S. and allied national security interests, and a description of the strategy the President will employ to halt Russian proliferation and the timeline by which the President expects to see material progress in Russian restraint. The original proposal recommended that 50% of CTR funding be fenced until the President had reported to Congress that Russia had made material progress in stemming proliferation to state sponsors of terrorism. A provision offering authority to the President through 2005 to waive the "arms control" certification requirement under the existing "Nunn-Lugar" law in order for Russia to continue to receive assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and Title V of the Freedom Support Act (including Science Centers, BW redirect, and export control assistance). In conjunction with this waiver authority, the President is to submit a report to Congress 30 days after exercising the waiver, which explains the arms control agreements that Russia is not abiding by, the evidence of noncommittal, why the use of the waiver is in U.S. national security interests, and the President's strategy for promoting Russian compliance. Because the CTR program was "originally envisioned as a short-term emergency effort," and in anticipation of possible action by the Senate on the subject [see the legislation introduced by Senator Lugar on March 18 in the "Other Legislation" section below], the HASC bill preemptively restricts use of any CTR funds for threat reduction projects and related activities in countries other than the states of the former Soviet Union. The bill prohibits obligation and expenditure of FY 2003 CTR funds until 30 days after outstanding reports are submitted to the Congress. The bill also adds a new reporting requirement to explain how revenue in recipient states generated by CTR activities is being utilized, monitored, and accounted for. Another requirement would fence 50% of funding for the CTR defense and military contacts project until a report is submitted on this project's activities during fiscal years 2001 and 2002. Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention project: The Committee expressed concerns on a number of points in this area, including inadequate transparency into the Russian BW establishment, risks that research supported by this project on defensive biotechnology systems could be used for offensive purposes, risks that the project activities will unintentionally perpetuate Russian BW expertise, concerns that some assistance may be diverted for other purposes, and the lack of a project exit strategy. Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility project: The HASC declined to support the full budget request for this activity, particularly when Russia is perceived as "failing to live up to its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)." The Committee underscored Russia's obligations, and observed that Russia might have the necessary resources to meet the CWC deadlines if it were to suspend or cancel other military modernization programs. The Committee noted, finally, that Russia has not yet met all of the conditions for expenditure of prior year funds for this project, especially the requirement to provide a full and accurate accounting of its CW stockpile. Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility project: The HASC supported the Administration's decision to not seek funding for constructing a second wing to this facility, and extended prohibitions on the use of any CTR funds for this purpose. In report language, the Committee noted a consistent Russian refusal to agree to transparency measures at the facility to verify weapons-origin of the material to be stored there. Russian Nuclear Weapons Storage Security project: In report language, the HASC reiterated the need for the Secretary of Defense to seek an agreement with Russia allowing U.S. access to the warhead storage sites for which CTR assistance has been provided. Other items of interest A two-part amendment offered by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) was approved by voice vote during floor consideration of the House defense authorization bill. The first part outlines a policy for greater cooperation and transparency between the United States and Russia on nuclear matters. The second part authorizes the Energy Department to conduct concept development, design, and research on low-yield (i.e. less than five kilotons) nuclear weapons, but prohibits development and testing that could lead to production of new low-yield weapons. [Originally, the second part of this amendment identified the conditions under which the existing prohibition on U.S. development of low-yield nuclear weapons would be repealed. It also would have repealed an existing provision of law prohibiting the testing of low-yield nuclear weapons. An effort to have the Weldon amendment ruled out of order by the Rules Committee failed. However, following the introduction of the original amendment on the floor, but prior to debate, the second half of the Weldon amendment was modified.] The first part of the amendment consists of three basic components, summarized briefly as follows: A statement that it is United States policy to pursue greater cooperation, transparency, and confidence with the Russian Federation regarding nuclear weapons policy, force structure, safeguards, testing, and proliferation prevention, as well as nuclear weapons infrastructure, production, and dismantlement, so as to promote mutual security, stability, and trust. A sense of Congress that the President should continue engagement with Russia and work toward the following eight objectives: (1) an agreement on the joint withdrawal and dismantlement of non-strategic nuclear weapons and provision of U.S. assistance for the accounting and security of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons; (2) a reciprocal program of joint visits by U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists to the Nevada Test Site and the Russian Novaya Zemlya test site; (3) a reciprocal program of joint visits at each nation's nuclear weapons laboratories to discuss nuclear weapons, materials, and infrastructure safety and security; (4) a program of joint visits and conferences on ballistic missile defenses; (5) a joint nonproliferation commission to review ways to prevent rogue states and other potential adversaries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, ballistic missiles, and advanced conventional weapons; (6) a joint program to develop advanced methods for the disposal of excess weapons-grade nuclear materials; (7) a joint effort to safeguard, treat, and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste; and (8) a joint program to further advance methods and techniques for nuclear warhead and materials inventory and control. A report from the President to be delivered by March 1, 2003 describing progress toward and actions taken to meet these objectives, the Russian reaction, and an assessment of Russia's commitment to a more cooperative and transparent relationship with the United States. Senate: Mark-up of the Senate defense authorization legislation was completed by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) May 10. Floor action on the bill may occur the week of May 20. Department of Energy programs Funding for all DOE nonproliferation programs with Russia were authorized at the requested level. The SASC bill also provided legal authority for the transfer of the program to eliminate Russian plutonium production from the Defense Department to the DOE. A funding cap was placed on the program, however, prohibiting DOE from spending more than $100 million on the project until an agreement is reached with Russia extending the deadline to shut-down the reactors after alternate fossil-fuel generating capacity is provided. Department of Defense/Cooperative Threat Reduction programs The entire funding request for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program was authorized, including the full $133.6 million requested for the Russian chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. In addition, unlike the HASC bill, which provides authority through 2005, the SASC bill grants the President a permanent authority to waive on an annual basis the certification requirements for states to receive assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the Freedom Support Act. Other items of interest Both of the individual bills sponsored by Sen. Lugar (S. 2026) and Sen. Carnahan (S. 2470) were adopted in full by the SASC in its legislation. [For summaries of these bills, see the "Other Legislation" section below.] Energy and Water Appropriations No action yet. Mark-up of the legislation is anticipated in June. Defense Appropriations No action yet. Mark-up of the legislation is anticipated in June. Foreign Operations Appropriations No action yet. Mark-up of the legislation is anticipated in June. Foreign Relations/State Department Authorizations House-Senate Conference: On May 1, the Senate requested a conference with the House to reconcile differences in their respective versions of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 (H.R. 1646). The Senate bill contains a provision authorizing establishment of a new "debt-for-nonproliferation" program to modify Soviet-era and food-aid debt owed to the United States by Russia in return for an agreement that a significant portion of the forgiven amounts are invested in nonproliferation projects in Russia. Other Legislation Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act of 2002 (H.R. 3836). Introduced March 4, 2002 by Reps. Tauscher (D-CA), McHugh (R-NY), and Schiff (D-CA). Referred to House International Relations Committee. The bill authorizes the President to reduce the amount of Soviet-era debt owed by Russia to the United States provided there is an agreement that a significant proportion of the funds saved by Russia is devoted to nonproliferation programs and projects. The bill prohibits implementation of this debt-for-nonproliferation program until the President certifies that Russia is making material progress in stemming the flow of WMD-related goods, materials, technologies, and know-how to states that are considered sponsors of international terrorism. Finally, the bill authorizes the President to initiate discussions with the Paris Club of creditor states to also negotiate debt-for-nonproliferation exchanges with Russia. Authorizing use of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds for projects and activities to address proliferation threats outside the states of the former Soviet Union (S. 2026). Introduced by Senator Lugar March 18, 2002. Referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Application of Cooperative Threat Reduction program funding is currently confined to states of the former Soviet Union. This bill would authorize use of up to $50 million in prior year, unobligated CTR funds for proliferation threat reduction projects and activities in countries outside of the former Soviet Union if the Secretary of Defense determines that this will assist the United States in dealing with critical emerging proliferation threats or in achieving long-standing nonproliferation goals. [This proposal was adopted in the Senate Armed Services Committee's national defense authorization bill.] FY 2002 supplemental appropriations. On March 21, 2002 President Bush submitted a request to Congress for $27.1 billion in emergency FY 2002 supplemental appropriations to support the war on terrorism and strengthen homeland security. Contained within this proposal was a request to amend existing law to allow the President to waive certification requirements for countries receiving assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and Title V of the Freedom Support Act. It is unclear whether the appropriators will address the waiver in light of the action by the House Armed Services Committee on this subject. The House Appropriations Committee is currently marking-up this legislation, with action set to resume on Tuesday May 14. Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2002 (H.R.4624). Introduced April 30, 2002 by Reps. Tauscher (D-CA) and Spratt (D-SC). Referred to the House Armed Services Committee. The bill consists of five basic components: (1) An amendment to existing law to give the President permanent authority to waive certification restrictions on assistance provided to other countries under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and under Title V of the Freedom Support Act. [The HASC defense authorization bill provides the President with limited waiver authority through 2005, while the SASC bill provides a permanent authority to waive the requirements on an annual basis.] (2) A provision calling on the U.S. to assist Russia in developing a comprehensive inventory of its nuclear weapons and related materials holdings, and to permit the reciprocal exchange of information between the United States and Russia on nuclear weapons-grade material stockpiles and warheads. (3) A requirement for an annual report to Congress on the number and posture of U.S. nuclear warheads, including data on warheads that are operationally deployed, in the responsive forces, in the reserve force, and those that are scheduled for dismantlement. The bill also requires a report on the options for achieving prior to fiscal year 2012 a posture of 1,700 to 2,200 operational nuclear warheads. [A modified version of this proposal was approved by voice vote May 9 as a floor amendment to the House defense authorization bill. The approved amendment includes the latter part of the proposal - the report on options for achieving the 1,700 to 2,200 warhead posture - but excludes to requirement for an annual report on the number and posture of U.S. nuclear warheads.] (4) A provision maintaining the underground nuclear testing moratorium through FY 2003, and requiring presidential notification and reporting twelve months before any underground nuclear test. The bill also requires the President to report to Congress on the feasibility, technical challenges, and cost of reducing the amount of lead-time required before conducting an underground nuclear test to less than 24 to 36 months. [This issue was addressed in part by an amendment offered by Rep. Spratt (D-SC), which was rejected, during the HASC mark-up of the defense authorization bill. A motion that would have made the Spratt amendment in order for floor consideration also failed in the Rules Committee.] (5) Authorization of expanded funding for international nonproliferation programs, including: $600 million for CTR programs (designating $180 million for the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye); $340 million for DOE's nonproliferation and verification R&D program; $295 million for DOE "international nuclear materials disposition"; $60 million for Russian Transition Initiatives; $25 million for international nuclear safety; and $300 million for State Department programs. Encouraging and facilitating the security of nuclear materials and facilities worldwide (S. 2470). Introduced by Senator Jean Carnahan May 7, 2002. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services. The bill consists of four basic components: A sense of Congress that the United States should adopt a comprehensive program of activities - in consultation with Russia and other G-8 countries - to encourage all countries with nuclear materials to adopt and adhere to the IAEA or equivalent standards relating to the security of plutonium and HEU stockpiles. The program should include providing assistance to countries in meeting those standards, including assisting in the conversion of research and test reactors, purchasing excess nuclear material stockpiles, and assisting in security upgrades at nuclear material storage facilities. Directs the DOE MPC&A program to conduct a study and report to Congress on the feasibility and advisability of developing a program to secure radiological materials outside of the U.S. The study should include information on estimated amounts and categories of materials around the world, the number and location of sites, and a detailed assessment of effort required to secure these materials at these sites. Directs the Department of Energy, in consultation with the IAEA and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to conduct a study on the feasibility and advisability of various actions to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks to foreign nuclear power plants. A sense of Congress that the President should encourage amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to apply to domestic and international use and transport of nuclear materials, incorporate fundamental practices for physical protection of such materials, and address protection against sabotage involving nuclear materials. [The Carnahan bill was adopted in the Senate Armed Services Committee's version of the national defense authorization act.]

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