H. Links of Interest A. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Specialists Hit Efforts To Secure Russian Arms
Bryan Bender
The Boston Globe
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON -- The US-led effort to dismantle the weapons stockpiles of the former Soviet Union is beset with bureaucratic impediments, delaying international efforts to prevent the weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, say government investigators and administration officials.
They told the House Armed Services Committee yesterday that Russian foot-dragging and US mismanagement threaten to undercut progress made in safeguarding such chemical, biological, and nuclear arms since the Cooperative Threat Reduction program began more than a decade ago.
The specialists also warned that Washington's focus on a potential war to disarm Iraq has diverted attention from what they consider the gravest security threat of the modern age: a poorly secured arsenal of chemical weapons, deadly pathogens, nuclear materials, and meagerly paid weapons scientists in Russia and other former Soviet states.
The specialists said they fear that a US-led effort to recruit other nations to dramatically expand the effort -- Washington has already spent nearly $7 billion -- is suffering as a result of American inattention and international opposition to its plans in Iraq.
Russia has the world's largest inventory of weapons of mass destruction, inheriting from the Soviet Union an estimated 30,000 nuclear weapons, 600 metric tons of weapons-grade nuclear material, at least 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, 2,100 missiles, and about 40 research centers devoted to the development and production of biological weapons.
But the progress in reducing the danger posed by these materials faces obstacles, officials said.
''US threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have consistently faced two critical challenges,'' Joseph Christoff, director of international affairs and trade at the General Accounting Office, told the House panel. ''The Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs, and Russian ministries have often denied US officials access to key nuclear and biological sites.''
At the same time, a variety of US congressional restrictions on providing money to reduce the stockpiles and a failure to fully account for how the money is spent have also eroded the effort, officials said.
For example, a series of presidential waivers required by law delayed the destruction of stockpiles of Russian chemical weapons for months. Another bureaucratic snafu blamed on both Russia and the United States was the expenditure of $100 million of US taxpayer money to construct a facility in remote Krasnoyarsk, Russia, to convert rocket fuel from nuclear missiles to commercial use, only to find that after the facility was completed Russia had diverted the fuel to its space program and that the facility was no longer needed.
Bush administration officials testifying before the committee pledged to work to rectify these problems.
''The past year has been extremely frustrating,'' said J.D. Crouch, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. ''It serves as a reminder that we need to do better internally.
''I think we have moved quickly to put better management controls in place,'' he added. ''But the past year also highlights how hard it is to pursue this type of program in a state like Russia, even if we do everything correctly.''
Crouch said that one step already being taken is to require Russia to sign formal agreements that lay out each side's responsibilities on threat-reduction projects.
But the success of the program also depends on international cooperation and consensus. Washington proposed last year a global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and materials, getting the Group of Eight economic powers to pledge $20 billion over the next decade to dismantle and secure former Soviet weapons. Such cooperation and coordination has become more difficult during the charged debate over Iraq, the specialists said.
''There is no doubt that the focus on Iraq has made it harder to get the G8 up and running,'' Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington said in an interview. The president's ''almost exclusive focus on Iraq has made it much harder to invest the time needed for the G8 initiative.''
He said he believes that the fervor over US plans for Iraq has dampened ongoing discussions with Germany and France over what G8 role they will play. ''It is already clear that in terms of the frequency of our dialogue and the overall atmosphere of those talks the war on Iraq is spilling over,'' Wolfsthal said.
Others suggested that the White House is not paying sufficient attention to what is potentially a greater threat than Iraq's suspected arsenal.
''The news is filled with debates about the cost of war in Iraq,'' US Representative Ike Skelton, a Missouri Democrat and the ranking member of the House panel, said at the hearing.
''But for approximately $1 billion a year,'' the United States has ''racked up a real success story in diminishing the threat that terrorists will get weapons of mass destruction,'' Skelton said.
Wolfsthal said he believes that priority should be given to securing weapons in the former Soviet Union.
''We're about to spend upwards of $100 billion on handfuls of weapons'' in a possible Iraq campaign, he said. ''Alternatively, we have trouble getting $2 billion a year [over the next decade] to deal with a poorly protected, poorly accounted for arsenal.'' return to menu
2. Russian Atomic Energy Minister: Funds Needed for Nuke Security
Associated Press
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - Russia's atomic energy minister said Wednesday that more funding is needed to beef up security around the country's nuclear installations, which critics say are only lightly guarded and are vulnerable to terrorist attacks or thefts of radioactive material.
Alexander Rumyantsev, in a speech to lawmakers in Russia's lower house of parliament, said the Interior Ministry has cut back on personnel guarding nuclear facilities, the Interfax news agency reported.
He said his ministry needs $203 million to improve physical protection of nuclear plants, including electronic monitors. More money also is needed to continue decommissioning Russian nuclear submarines, Rumyantsev said.
He said spent nuclear fuel would be unloaded from 11 submarines this year, down from 14 the year before. U.S. funding for the project is drying up now that many of the submarines that targeted the United States have been destroyed, he told lawmakers.
Since 1998, more than 100 submarines have been decommissioned, but there are many more awaiting dismantlement, he said.
At the same time, Rumyantsev said the United States has pledged to fund the closure of three nuclear reactors in Russia that produce weapons-grade plutonium, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported.
Rumyantsev said he and U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham would sign the deal next week, the report said.
The security of Russia's nuclear facilities, including power plants and waste storage depots, has come under closer scrutiny since the Sept. 11 terror attacks in the United States. Environmental groups also have criticized Russia for accepting nuclear waste from other countries for storage and reprocessing - as permitted under a 2001 law. return to menu
B. Russia-U.S. 1. Senate Takes Up U.S.-Russia Arms Treaty
Vicki Allen
Reuters
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON - Senate Democrats on Wednesday called a treaty to slash U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals vague and full of loopholes, but most said they would vote anyway for the deal that President George W. Bush has said heralds a new relationship with Moscow.
The Senate opened debate on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, a three-page deal struck by Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin to shrink each country's deployed strategic nuclear weapons by two-thirds over 10 years.
With a two-thirds Senate majority needed for ratification lawmakers were expected to approve it on Thursday.
The Russian Duma still must act on the treaty.
The treaty would reduce Russia's and America's deployed nuclear arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, from about 6,000 each. But it does not require the destruction of the warheads, instead allowing them to be kept in storage, and it does not cover a broad range of tactical weapons.
Democrats also said it lacked requirements to verify reductions and did not specify timetables to gradually set aside certain numbers of weapons.
"This is a baby step that must be followed by very large strides" to reduce nuclear stockpiles, Sen. Byron Dorgan, a North Dakota Democrat, said.
But Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican, called the treaty "an important step toward a safer world."
He said Bush and Putin "wanted to move quickly to capitalize on the opportunity to reduce strategic weaponry" and said it is just one part of efforts to reduce nuclear arms.
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, a Tennessee Republican, said the treaty was important for the trust it showed between the two nations, signifying an end to the Cold War.
Bush has said the nations are no longer enemies and do not need strict treaties with strong measures to verify compliance. The administration said it was set to reduce the U.S. deployed warheads anyway, even without the treaty.
The White House, in a diplomatic push to keep Russia from blocking a new U.N. resolution to pave the way for war with Iraq, has urged the Senate to ratify the deal quickly.
Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, top Foreign Relations Committee Democrat, urged the Senate to approve the treaty even though he said "there is much that the treaty does not do."
Biden also said he worried the treaty could give rogue nations and militant groups more access to weapons-making fissile material if the United States does give Russia more help to secure its stockpiled material.
He joined Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota and other Democrats in pushing a resolution as part of the treaty debate that blasts Bush's overall policies in dealing with the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
The resolution urges Bush to engage North Korea to deter it from developing nuclear weapons, boost funds for U.S. programs on nuclear security, and increase homeland defense funds.
Several Democrats said the administration's policies of voicing a right to launch preemptive nuclear strikes, calling for keeping a nuclear arsenal and considering weapons such as nuclear "bunker-busters" would escalate the nuclear arms race. return to menu
2. Democratic Senators to Back Moscow Treaty
Associated Press
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON - Democratic senators said Wednesday they would vote for a U.S.-Russian arms treaty despite misgivings that it does little to make Americans more secure.
They said the treaty will not reduce the nuclear threat because it calls for weapons only to be removed from service, not destroyed. They said it lacks verification procedures and makes it too easy for either side to withdraw.
The Bush administration and Senate Republicans have hailed the Moscow Treaty as an arms control milestone and a sign of the new, improved relations with Russia. The treaty calls for the United States and Russia to cut their strategic, or long-range, nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, to 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads, by 2012. It was signed by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin last May during Bush's trip to Russia.
Ratification of the treaty has been a top priority for Russia before a Bush-Putin summit this May. It comes as the United States is pressing Russia not to use its U.N. Security Council veto to block a resolution authorizing a war against Iraq.
"To reject this treaty in my view would in my opinion harm our national interest," said Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said the treaty was "better than nothing."
Democratic support is essential for treaty ratification, which requires a two-thirds vote. Democrats have almost half the seats in the Senate.
The committee chairman, Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., said the treaty "is not without blemishes." But he described it as "an important step to a safer world."
At just three pages, the treaty is a stark contrast to the thousands of painstakingly detailed pages that marked Cold-War era arms reduction treaties.
Lugar said the Americans and Russians could have spent years negotiating a more thorough agreement, but "both sides wanted to move quickly to capitalize on the opportunity to sharply reduce strategic weaponry."
"In my opinion, President Bush was right to conclude the treaty quickly in this form, rather than enter into a lengthy and uncertain negotiation process," he said.
But Lugar said the treaty is insufficient without a strengthening of the U.S.-funded program he co-founded in 1991 to help former Soviet republics dismantle their weapons.
Biden said without additional measures, the Moscow Treaty will not prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of U.S. enemies because the arms will not be destroyed.
"You can stockpile them, you can put them in a warehouse," he said. "You can pile them up in a barn for ready reload. You can take them back down. You don't have to destroy them."
Sen. James Jeffords, I-Vt., said the treaty was a "tragic, tragic waste of opportunity" because of its limitations.
"The shame of the Moscow Treaty is not in what it does, but in what it does not do," he said.
The Russian state Duma is expected to ratify the treaty within weeks.
In Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov said he and U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow had discussed trying to coordinate ratification. return to menu
3. Russia, U.S. May Submit Arms Treaty
Judith Ingram
Associated Press
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
A top Russian diplomat said Wednesday that the Russian and U.S. governments may simultaneously submit their latest arms control treaty to their legislatures for ratification, a sign that Moscow and Washington are searching for areas of agreement even as they differ over how to resolve the Iraqi crisis.
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov said he and U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow met Wednesday and discussed forwarding the treaty, known as the Treaty of Moscow, to the Russian State Duma and the U.S. Senate.
"This treaty, notwithstanding all the difficulties of the international situation, can be put up for ratification in the next few weeks," Mamedov was quoted as saying by the Interfax news agency. "We and the United States have agreed to synchronize ratification of the document."
The pact, agreed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Bush at a May summit, would require Russia and the United States to reduce their stockpiles of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by about two-thirds over the next decade, to between 1,700 and 2,200 each.
According to a Foreign Ministry statement, Vershbow had requested the meeting "urgently," and the two diplomats discussed ways to bring their nations' views on solving the Iraq crisis closer. It did not elaborate.
Russia has been walking a fine line in the Iraqi crisis, opposing moves toward war but taking pains to avoid a falling-out with Washington after carefully cultivating bilateral ties.
The ministry said "the Iraqi problem should not have a restraining or worse, a negative influence on the general development of the Russian-American partnership, the strategic significance of which ... was reaffirmed in the recent telephone conversation between Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush." return to menu
4. Editorial: Moscow Treaty Is Full Of Holes
Sen. John F. Kerry
The Boston Globe
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
President Bush claims that his Moscow Treaty ''will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War'' by eliminating thousands of nuclear arms left over from a bygone era when the United States and Russia faced each other across the nuclear divide. In reality, it does no such thing. The treaty does not reduce the actual number of nuclear forces -- it leaves these weapons and their lethal materials stockpiled across Russia in constant danger of falling to terrorists or rogue nations intent on doing great harm to the United States. Bush is correct that our relationship with Russia should not be driven by Cold War anxieties. But this hollow treaty misses an opportunity to address proliferation and lost or loose nuclear weapons.
Despite its stated goal of reducing the number of US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the Moscow Treaty is missing the essential components of a strong, enforceable, and meaningful agreement. It does not require the destruction of missile launchers or the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. It does not address the tactical nuclear weapons so sought after by terrorists. It does not contain verification provisions.
The treaty's most dangerous weakness is the rejection of Ronald Reagan's doctrine of ''trust but verify.'' The administration contends that verifying compliance with the treaty is unnecessary given the new strategic relationship with Russia. That view is shortsighted. Verification is a requirement to ensure American security, even in nonadversarial relationships.
The central problem with the treaty is that it could increase the opportunities for nuclear theft and terrorism by expanding Russian stockpiles of nuclear materials.
It is no secret that there are those who are eager to capitalize on a deadly market for nuclear materials held in unsecured facilities around the world. The General Accounting Office has documented numerous failed attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of Russia. Out of 20 of these incidents over the last decade, the materials involved in 13, and possibly 15, were traced back to Russian sources. The potential consequences are undeniable. In October 2001, we picked up warnings that terrorists had acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb. If detonated in New York City, hundreds of thousands of Americans would have died, and most of Manhattan would have been destroyed.
If the war on terrorism is to be fought on all fronts, we should seek verifiable reductions in Russia's nuclear arsenal and ensure the dismantlement and destruction of its nuclear weapons and the secure storage of nuclear materials.
It is troubling that this administration's approach to the menace of loose nuclear materials is long on rhetoric but short on execution. It relies unwisely on the threat of military preemption against terrorist organizations, which can be defeated if they are found but will not be deterred by our military might.
We can make our world more secure. We must create mechanisms to help those who would be responsible stewards but lack the financial and technical means to succeed. We must establish worldwide standards for the security and safekeeping of nuclear material and define a new standard of international legitimacy, linking the stewardship of nuclear materials under universally accepted protocols to acceptance in the community of nations. We must revitalize the Cooperative Threat Reduction program by giving it the sustained leadership, attention, and funding it deserves. Over the last decade, the United States has spent about $7.5 billion to deactivate 6,000 warheads and destroy thousands of delivery vehicles. We must make good on our pledge of $10 billion over 10 years to the Group of Eight threat reduction partnership and encourage the good faith participation of our allies.
But we can't stop there. A new diplomatic effort should be undertaken to fill the holes in the Moscow Treaty. The United States and Russia should agree upon transparency measures, data exchanges, on-site inspections, and eventually eliminating excess strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. We must also work with Moscow on new arms control measures designed to eliminate each nation's smaller, more portable, tactical nuclear weapons, thousands of which remain in Russia.
The legacy of the Cold War is nuclear weapons. Today's danger is that these weapons will wind up in the hands of terrorists or rogue nations. To ''liquidate'' this Cold War legacy in actions, not just words, will take more than cosmetic treaties that leave Russia's nuclear arsenal in place. return to menu
C. Nuclear Industry 1. Nuclear Power Ministry Planning Switch To New Nuclear Fuel
Galina Filippova
RIA Novosti
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - Russia's Nuclear Power Ministry is laying the groundwork for the transition to a new nuclear fuel whose reserves will be "inexhaustible," Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told the State Duma in a question-and-answer session for Cabinet members.
He said world uranium reserves are being depleted. "Out of the proven reserves - 3.5 million (metric) tons of uranium - more than a million has already been mined. That means that it is going to last the world 50-70 years, perhaps 80 years if using heat neutron reactors." Rumyantsev added uranium mining in Russia in the coming decade would be able to meet both the Russian energy sector's development needs and the Nuclear Power Ministry's export commitments.
For that reason, he said, "We are pursuing most robust research and development into the transition to fast neutron reactors, where the fuel will not be the fissile Uranium-235 isotope but the Uranium-238 isotope and then reserves of it will be inexhaustible for power generation and may number in hundreds and approximate a thousand years." return to menu
2. Russia To Sign Agreement With U.S. On Reactor Closure
Pavel Shevtsov
RIA Novosti
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - Russia's nuclear power minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, will sign an agreement with US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham in Vienna on March 11th on the mothballing of three Russian reactors that are capable of processing weapons-grade plutonium. When answering journalists' questions in the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian parliament) on Wednesday, Rumyantsev said that the reactors currently produce electricity in the "closed towns" of Zheleznogorsk and Seversk.
The minister explained that in line with the agreement, the USA would be obliged to provide "covering capacities." Rumyantsev declined to clarify the details of the deal, but pointed out that the matter concerned hundreds of millions of dollars.
According to him, these reactors cannot simply be closed, as they produce heat and electricity. At the same time, he said "the Cold War has ended and we do not need plutonium weapons. Existing arsenals are more than enough [to act] as a deterrent." Rumyantsev also reminded those present about the agreement from 2000 signed with the USA on the scrapping of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium that is already surplus to defense needs. return to menu
D. Russia-DPRK 1. Russia Warns United States Against Attacking North Korea
Associated Press
March 6, 2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - Russia's Foreign Ministry strongly urged the United States on Thursday against using force to solve a dispute over North Korea's nuclear program and reaffirmed its call for a direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.
"Russia has noted with concern the statements that have been issued recently by official American representatives that the United States doesn't exclude military means of solving the so-called North Korean nuclear problem," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement released to the media.
Tensions over North Korea's nuclear program escalated over the weekend after North Korean fighter jets briefly intercepted a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan. U.S. military officials said earlier this week that the United States was reviewing its options in response to Sunday's incident, including having U.S. fighter jets escort similar flights.
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said President George W. Bush would consult with allies to determine the best way to further protest the incident. Fleischer said Bush believes the standoff can be solved through diplomacy.
Russia believes that "there is no alternative to the peaceful settlement of problems on the Korean Peninsula through negotiations," the Russian Foreign Ministry said Thursday. "We are urging both Washington and Pyongyang to show wisdom and restraint, steer clear of actions and statements that exacerbate the situation and take real steps to defuse tensions."
Maurice Strong, a special adviser on North Korea to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, met with deputy foreign ministers Alexander Losyukov and Yuri Fedotov during a visit to Moscow on Wednesday and Thursday, the ministry said in a separate statement.
"The need for the international community to take a balanced line, aimed at de-escalating the tension using peaceful, political-diplomatic means was noted" at the meetings, the ministry said.
Russia's proposed "package agreement," which calls for North Korea to observe international nuclear agreements in exchange for security guarantees and economic aid, "could become a realistic alternative to the escalation of the situation around North Korea, first of all through the establishment of direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang," the ministry said.
The standoff between Washington and Pyongyang began in October when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted having a covert nuclear program. Washington and its allies suspended fuel shipments, and the North retaliated by expelling U.N. monitors, taking steps to restart frozen nuclear facilities and withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. return to menu
2. Russia Calls For Moderation In Settling North Korean Nuclear Problem
Alexander Smotrov
RIA Novosti
March 6, 2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - Russia is anxious about recent statements of US official representatives that the USA does not rule out use of military methods to settle the so-called North Korean nuclear problem, reads the release of the Russian Foreign Ministry's information and press department.
"Russia's standpoint implies that there is no alternative to a peaceful settlement on the Korean Peninsula through negotiations," the ministry recalled.
Moscow believes there are real opportunities to settle the current crisis via the contacts between the interested parties, first of all the USA and North Korea.
The Russian position was reflected in the Joint Russian-Chinese communique on the situation on the Korean Peninsula adopted after Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's visit to China and expressing the common stand of the two countries that border on Korea and are UN Security Council permanent members.
Moscow calls on Washington and Pyongyang to "display wisdom and moderation, not to allow statements and actions aggravating the situation, and to take real steps to remove the tension for the sake of stability on the Korean Peninsula and the Asian-Pacific region on the whole." return to menu
3. Russia Worried By Situation Around North Korea
Yelena Glushakova and Anna Bobina
RIA Novosti
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - Russia is extremely worried by the worsening situation around North Korea, Russia's deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov told a briefing on Wednesday. According to his words, "even the situation in the Persian Gulf must not distract the attention of the world community from what is happening around the Korean Peninsula."
Speaking about Russia's position on the subject, Mamedov stressed that Moscow insists it is absolutely necessary that all parties concerned return to their commitments under the Treaty of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Moreover, Russia hopes the issue will be solved by peaceful diplomatic means. In Moscow's opinion, a "direct conversation between the USA and North Korea," supported by the world community, could assist the process. The form in which the world community would support such dialogue depends on what Washington and Pyongyang would find acceptable.
Mamedov emphasized that all the elements of adjustments were closely intertwined, and admitted that Russia's position was not all that popular. "We keep believing however that there is no other decision," he stressed. return to menu
E. Nuclear Submarines 1. Fire Damages Russian Nuclear Submarine
Associated Press
March 5, 2003
(for personal use only)
A fire broke out at a ship repair facility in northwestern Russia on Wednesday, damaging a docked nuclear submarine, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. No radiation leaked, the report said.
The fire broke out at a Northern Fleet facility in Roslyakovo, near the Arctic port of Murmansk, ITAR-Tass reported, citing fleet officials. It spread to scaffolding and singed part of a rubber covering on the nuclear submarine Pskov, the report said.
It took several fire crews 90 minutes to extinguish the blaze, ITAR-Tass reported.
Navy and Northern Fleet officials could not be reached for comment.
Roslyakovo is where the wreck of the nuclear submarine Kursk was towed in October 2001, a year after it was destroyed by explosions, killing all 188 seamen aboard.
The damaged hull spent months at the dry dpck in Roslyakovo before being towed to another facility last April for dismantling. return to menu
F. Nuclear Waste Disposal 1. Liquidation of Millions of Tons of Russia's Nuclear Waste Is Priority for Ministry of Atomic Energy
Rosbalt News Agency
March 6, 2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW - The liquidation of nuclear waste is the priority for the Russian ministry of atomic energy. As a Rosbalt correspondent reports, this was announced by Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev in the State Duma on Wednesday March 5. He said that there are millions of tons of high-level and low-level radioactive waste in Russia at the moment. Most of this waste is being stored in depositories and special reservoirs.
Mr Rumyantsev emphasized that the most critical situation with storage space is at the Mayak plant at Ozersk in the Chelyabinsk Region. The minister added that there would be reconstruction at the plant, which will enable it to recycle spent nuclear fuel. There are plans to allocate USD 400 million to constructing storage space, half of which will be provided by the US.
According to Mr Rumyantsev, the ministry for atomic energy is currently working on a program to provide a security system for the nuclear plants. This is necessary to improve the current security levels and carry out technical re-equipment. return to menu
G. Announcements 1. On the Situation Around the DPRK
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
March 6, 2003
Russia notes with concern the appearance of statements by US spokesmen recently to the effect that the United States does not rule out military methods of solving the so-called North Korean nuclear problem.
In this connection we would like to recall that Russia's position is that there is no alternative to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the problems on the Korean Peninsula.
In our opinion, real possibilities exist for the settlement of the present crisis through contacts between the concerned parties, primarily the US and the DPRK.
Russia's stand has found reflection, in particular, in the Joint Russian-Chinese Communique on the Situation on the Korean Peninsula, adopted following the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the People's Republic of China and expressing the shared position of the two contiguous countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council.
We call upon both Washington and Pyongyang to show wisdom and restraint, to avoid statements and actions that may aggravate the situation and to undertake real steps toward removing tension for the sake of stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. This would fully meet the interests of North and South Korea, as well as of all the countries worried by the growth of the danger of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. return to menu
2. State Department Press Briefing on Russia and Iran (excerpted)
Richard Boucher
U.S. State Department
March 4, 2003
[...]
Question: Richard, Iran says that its uranium enrichment plant will be ready by the end of the year, working fully. Well, first of all, do you believe them? Have you seen Dr. ElBaradei's report from his trip to Iran? And do you have any updated comments on their program?
Mr. Boucher: I don't have anything new to say today. I'm not sure that the report from Dr. ElBaradei's recent trip has been given to the board of the IAEA yet. I'll have to double-check on that and see if there's been any movement there.
As far as our view of the situation, we have always made clear that we think the Iranians' programs were hiding a more ambitious nuclear program, that the facts and information that have come out in recent weeks and months about Iran's intent to seek an entire fuel cycle merely confirm in our mind that Iran's program is not purely for peaceful purposes and is not one that anybody should be cooperating with. And so we'll see how that develops.
We obviously have kept in close touch with other governments on this, including the Russian Government. As these facts have come out and things have developed, we've kept in close touch with the IAEA as well.
Question: Well, to follow up on that, Mr. Bolton, of course, went to Moscow and this is one of the things he talked about.
Mr. Boucher: Yeah.
Question: Did you see any progress from that visit when he talked to the Russians?
Mr. Boucher: I don't think I can give any particular result at this point. I'd have to double-check with him.
3. Rademaker Says Arms Control Remains Viable in the 21st Century (excerpted)
Washington File
U.S. State Department
March 4, 2003
WASHINGTON - A leading U.S. arms control official says arms control remains viable in the 21st century and, as evidence, points to the 2002 U.S.-Russian Moscow Treaty that he says will produce "the largest reduction ever in deployed strategic nuclear warheads."
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker says, however, that the Bush administration's approach to arms control "has been to proceed cautiously because we don't share the attitude that you can find elsewhere that any agreement in the area of arms control has to be a good thing."
Speaking in a recent one-on-one interview with Washington File Security Affairs Writer Jacquelyn Porth, Rademaker went on to explain that administration officials "are not prepared to sign up to negotiations just because the process of negotiating is a good thing."
[...]
Question: Has any progress been made since the G-8 (the group of seven industrialized nations plus Russia) announced last year its partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, or do you expect a progress report this June when they meet again?
Answer: Given the potential of that initiative, I'm sure that it will be discussed in June. Under Secretary of State (for International Security and Arms Control John) Bolton is going to Moscow at the end of February to continue discussions with the Russians on this issue.
The basic problem that we've encountered is that to carry out these programs in Russia, there have to be understandings reached about some practical details of implementing the programs. And we are not prepared, for example, to spend a lot of money to establish assistance programs only to have to pay taxes or import duties and pay fees in order to do what we think enhances our security as well as Russia's security. This has been a recurring problem, not just for the global partnership, but also for programs that have been in existence for years. And it's been a problem not just for the United States, but also for Japan, Germany, Canada, and the other countries that have been serious about these kinds of issues.
[...]
Question: Do you think the United States and Russia have been given sufficient credit for reducing nuclear weapons under the 2002 Moscow Treaty? And are arms control proponents making the connection between the bilateral treaty and obligations under Article VI of the NPT?
Answer: We make the point that in negotiating the Moscow Treaty we were taking significant steps in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, but I'm not sure that everyone wants to give us credit for that because I do hear complaints that we haven't done enough. I think a two-thirds reduction from the existing levels -- which is what is provided for under the Moscow Treaty -- has to be considered progress by any measure, so we will continue to make the point that we're moving in the direction required by the NPT. We can't force other countries to give us credit for that, but I think the facts speak for themselves.
Question: When do you expect the Senate to take up the Moscow Treaty and do you see Senate action as pro forma, or do you anticipate any contentious issues to crop up?
Answer: As you know the Treaty has been approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously and our understanding is that it will be on the floor of the Senate as soon as the end of February.
There is the possibility of amendments being offered and we've not seen the text of any amendments. We understand that there may be one or two amendments that are offered to the resolution of ratification. It's not possible to amend the Treaty, but it is possible to seek to amend the resolution of ratification. So, we'll have to address that. We're satisfied with the text of the resolution as it was reported by the Committee, so the administration doesn't favor amendment to the Senate resolution on the floor.
[...]
Question: You've talked a bit about missile defense in the NATO context, but what kind of cooperation is taking place with countries like Japan, the U.K., and Israel?
Answer: We're working with a wide range of countries, including Russia, on missile defense issues. The President, on December 17, outlined the initial deployment that he envisions for a missile defense system to protect the United States and our allies. This is just the initial phase of it, but even the initial phases require some cooperation by our allies. There are radars on territory controlled by the U.K. and by Denmark that we hope to upgrade as part of the initial missile defense deployment. Also, there are issues between the United States and Canada that have to do with NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and its role in missile defense. So with those three countries, in particular, we look toward close cooperation in the initial phase.
As we look at additional steps that are going to be taken further down the road, we see allies in both Asia and Europe as increasingly important. In the case of Japan, we are already engaged in joint research activities to develop technologies that we hope to incorporate into the system.
Question: What are the Russians saying? Are they seeking shared information, are they wanting to do research?
Answer: We are still in a dialogue with them about exactly how we will work together in this area under the CGSS, the Consultative Group for Strategic Security, that was set up at the last U.S.-Russian Summit in Moscow. There is a working group that focuses on missile defense issues that has been meeting over the past year. There is some joint research that we are trying to do with the Russians to develop technologies that can have applications in the missile defense area. The RAMOS (Russian American Observation Satellite) program that we have worked on for a number of years is a major research program that is under way. There is the Joint Data Exchange Center which is, in the first instance, a mechanism for exchange of early warning data on missile launches, but it could also, over time, evolve to have missile defense applications. return to menu
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