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Nuclear News - 10/6/2003
RANSAC Nuclear News, October 6, 2003
Compiled By: Matthew Bouldin


A.  Research Reactor Fuel Return
    1. Minimizing Uranium Risks , Paul M. Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington Post (10/6/2003)
    2. Loose Uranium , Washington Post (10/2/2003)
B.  Chemical Weapons Destruction
    1. RUSSIA NEEDS AT LEAST $5 BLN TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS , Andrei Malosolov, RIA Novosti (10/2/2003)
C.  Multilateral Threat Reduction
    1. Minister Rumyantsev meets EU over nuclear safety and security, Nuclear.ru (10/6/2003)
    2. Sergei Ivanov, Canadian Top Brass to Discuss International Stability , Olga Semyonova, RIA Novosti (10/6/2003)
    3. RIA NOVOSTI INTERVIEW WITH ALESKANDR YAKOVENKO, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY'S OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN, AHEAD OF BARENTS/EUROARCTIC COUNCIL MEETING , RIA Novosti (9/30/2003)
D.  Cooperative Threat Reduction
    1. Sister cities plant seeds of future hope: U.S., Russian groups identify community goals , Kara Patterson, staff writer, Post-Crescent, Post-Crescent (10/4/2003)
E.  CANWFZ
    1. Tajikistan calls for nuclear free status of Central Asia, ITAR-TASS (10/3/2003)
F.  Russia-Iran
    1. Russia doggedly at Tehran's side , Stephen Blank, Asia Times (10/7/2003)
    2. Russia has no grounds to doubt what Iranian leadership has said, Islamic Republic News Agency (10/6/2003)
    3. RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTER ACCUSES THE WEST OF DOUBLE STANDARDS TOWARDS IRAN, Olga Semyonova, RIA Novosti (10/6/2003)
    4. RUSSIA-IRAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY TO CONTINUE , Nikolai Terekhov, RIA Novosti (10/1/2003)
G.  Russian Nuclear Forces
    1. No immediate plans to put UR-100N-UTTKH missiles on combat duty, Interfax (10/6/2003)
    2. RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTER COMMENTS ON PUTIN'S STATEMENT, Olga Semyonova, RIA Novosti (10/6/2003)
    3. NEW RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE GLOBALISED WORLD , Viktor Litovkin, RIA Novosti (10/3/2003)
    4. Putin Beefs Up ICBM Capacity, Simon Saradzhyan, Moscow Times (10/3/2003)
    5. Russia considers restricted use of nuclear deterrence weapons , Nuclear.ru (10/3/2003)
    6. Russia: Putin Talks Up Power Of Nuclear Arsenal, Jeremy Bransten, RFE/RL Newsline (10/3/2003)
    7. PRESIDENT PUTIN: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FORCES ARE COMBAT-READY , RIA Novosti (10/2/2003)
    8. Putin supports nuclear deterrence system , RosBusinessConsulting (10/2/2003)
    9. RUSSIA DOESN'T RULE OUT NUKE USE: DEFENCE MINISTER , RIA Novosti (10/2/2003)
    10. RUSSIA TO PRESERVE STRATEGIC FORCES' DETERRENCE POTENTIAL , Olga Semyonova, RIA Novosti (10/2/2003)
    11. Russia warns NATO it may re-evaluate nuclear stance, AFP (10/2/2003)
    12. RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY MAY VARY , Olga Semyonova, RIA Novosti (10/2/2003)
    13. RUSSIAN HEAVY MISSILES TO FULFIL STRATEGIC ASSIGNMENTS FOR ANOTHER 20-PLUS YEARS , RIA Novosti (10/2/2003)
    14. Russian Strategic Missile Troops have 30 heavy missiles., Alexander Konovalov, ITAR-TASS (10/2/2003)
    15. Volga radar system to guard Russia from northwest , RosBusinessConsulting (10/2/2003)
H.  Nuclear Industry
    1. Kazakh-Russian-Kyrgyz uranium venture to be created in Kazakhstan, Oral Karpishev, ITAR-TASS, ITAR-TASS (10/2/2003)
    2. Launch of CIS joint venture at Zarechnoye uranium deposit announced , Nuclear.ru (9/30/2003)
I.  Official Statements
    1. Interview for The New York Times (Excerpts). The New York Times comments by Steven Lee Myers., The Kremlin (10/4/2003)
    2. Concluding remarks at a meeting with the leading personnel of the Russian Armed Forces (excerpted), The Kremlin (10/2/2003)
J.  Links of Interest
    1. A Sickening Episode: Nuclear Looting in Iraq and the Global Threat From , Andy Oppenheimer, Disarmament Diplomacy, Disarmament Diplomacy (10/11/2003)
    2. Committee of Senior Officials Assessment Report for the 9th Barents Euro-Arctic Council Foreign Ministers Meeting (10/3/2003)
    3. Joint Communiqu� of the 9th Barents Euro-Arctic Council Foreign Ministers Meeting (10/3/2003)



A.  Research Reactor Fuel Return

1.
Minimizing Uranium Risks
Paul M. Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington Post
10/6/2003
(for personal use only)


The Oct. 2 editorial "Loose Uranium" highlighted the risks posed by stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in dozens of countries. But it was wrong to accuse the Bush administration of "slowly awakening to this huge problem." The Department of Energy has taken aggressive steps to address these threats.

President Bush has increased the agency's nonproliferation budget by more than 70 percent since 2001. Our fiscal 2004 budget includes more than $225 million to secure Russian nuclear materials and weapons, speeding the process of securing 600 metric tons of Russian fissile materials by two years. We also are:

� Eliminating HEU stockpiles and encouraging countries to convert their Russian-designed research reactors to use low-enriched fuel. We plan to sign an agreement soon with Russia allowing for the repatriation to Russia of Russian-origin fuel, where it will be put into safe storage.

� Minimizing the need to use HEU in the civil fuel cycle worldwide through conversion of reactors to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Thirty-eight research reactors in more than 22 countries that used U.S.-origin HEU have been converted to LEU, keeping more than 3,300 kilograms of weapon-usable material off the market.

� Working closely with Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency on establishing priorities for HEU fuel removal operations.

Progress on these important endeavors is advancing steadily and in many areas should accelerate over the coming years.

PAUL M. LONGSWORTH
Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
National Nuclear Security Administration
U.S. Department of Energy
Washington



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2.
Loose Uranium
Washington Post
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


DESPOTS AND TERRORISTS seeking nuclear weapons need not produce their own bomb materials. Nor do they need the cooperation of a government. The frightening reality is that highly enriched uranium suitable for weapons can be found at more than 130 sites in 40 countries, many of them lightly guarded or supervised by poorly paid and demoralized officials. Last month the United States and Russia quietly eliminated one of those targets, transporting 30 pounds of weapons-grade uranium from a nuclear reactor facility in Romania to Russia, where it will be converted into a form not suitable for bombs. The secret operation, paid for by the U.S. Department of Energy, was the second such recovery mission in a little over a year, and a praiseworthy example of U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Yet compared with the overall threat, the Romania extraction was a drop in the bucket. At this rate, it will take a quarter-century to recover all the bomb-grade materials at the two dozen sites identified by the State Department as most urgent -- not to mention those scattered around the rest of the world. In the meantime, they offer a temptingly soft target to terrorists seeking a short cut to a bomb. The Bush administration has been slowly awakening to this huge problem, but it needs to accelerate its efforts and do more to overcome resistance at home and abroad.

One obstacle is in Russia, which was slow to agree to take back the highly radioactive uranium delivered to satellites of the former Soviet Union and is now slow to agree on specific "clean-out" operations. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced during a recent visit to Moscow that the two governments were close to completing an agreement that would regularize the process for clean-outs and provide U.S. funding for them. After two years of negotiations, the accord is long overdue. Even if it is completed, it will not necessarily speed up critical missions -- such as one pending for Uzbekistan, which has both unused bomb-grade uranium and spent fuel that remains highly enriched. While pressing the government of Vladimir Putin on proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea, the Bush administration has not made Russia's cooperation on uranium recovery a high priority. It should do so.

Other roadblocks lie in Washington. The United States also delivered bomb-grade uranium to a number of foreign countries, and though it is trying to get some of it back, the effort is split among different programs. These need to be better tied together and restructured so that foreign scientific institutes are offered attractive incentives to give up their material, or, better yet, to shut down aging research reactors. The administration has proposed to more than double the funding for the State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, which can be drawn on for such missions, from $15 million to $35 million; a measure sponsored by Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) and passed by the House, would add another $25 million specifically targeted for retrieving uranium from foreign sites. Congress should quickly agree on this modest investment in containing a dangerously underestimated threat.

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B.  Chemical Weapons Destruction

1.
RUSSIA NEEDS AT LEAST $5 BLN TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Andrei Malosolov
RIA Novosti
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, October 2nd, 2003 (RIA Novosti correspondent Andrei Malosolov) -- Russia needs at least $5 bln to eliminate chemical weapons. This information is provided in the documents prepared by the federal ammunition agency for the government's session to be held on Thursday, October 2.
The agency estimates Russia's chemical weapons at 40,000 tons.

The liquidation of these weapons is being supervised by the international community within the framework of the convention on banning chemical weapons, which Russia ratified in 1997. It should complete the liquidation of chemical weapons before April 29, 2012.

The federal targeted programme for the elimination of chemical weapons has had the presidential status since 2001. This question is being studied by 20 federal power bodies and six constituent members of the Russian Federation.

The USA, Germany, Italy, Britain, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Norway, France, Poland, Switzerland and the European Union are rendering gratuitous assistance to Russia in the elimination of chemical weapons.

However, the Russian ammunition agency points out, "the total volume of assistance in this sphere is no more than 5-10 percent of what Russia needs."


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C.  Multilateral Threat Reduction

1.
Minister Rumyantsev meets EU over nuclear safety and security
Nuclear.ru
10/6/2003
(for personal use only)


October 6 Alexander Rumyantsev, the RF minister of atomic energy met in Minatom Mr. Christian Cleutinx of the EU Directorate I for Nuclear Inspections, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Minatom�s press-service. The meeting discussed issues of nuclear safety and security including physical protection of nuclear power facilities.

Considering Mr. Cleutinx being the EU coordinator for the energy dialogue between Russia and the European Union, the meeting focused also on establishing and developing sustainable relations in the field of energy supplies, primarily, nuclear energy. The Minatom�s meeting was a part of Russia-EU pre-summit events, which is to be held this November in Rome.


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2.
Sergei Ivanov, Canadian Top Brass to Discuss International Stability
Olga Semyonova
RIA Novosti
10/6/2003
(for personal use only)


Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, currently in Canada for an official two-day visit, wants to take advantage of his upcoming talks with the country's political and military top brass to discuss international stability. This is what he told Russian journalists upon his arrival in Canada.

"We shall lay the emphasis on interaction in 'hot spots' [peacekeeping activities], non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the struggle against terrorism, and participation in the Global Partnership Program," Ivanov reported.

"Canada's position is often different from that of the other members of the G-8, which makes an exchange of opinions especially interesting," he added.

Purely military issues, now, won't be the highlight of the talks, the minister said. He pointed out nevertheless that Russia and Canada had been actively developing cooperation in the field of military education. "Since 1996, Canada has been offering the Russian Defence Ministry seats at the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Center - as part of the Military Training Aid Program," he said. In return, the Russian side "has been admitting Canadian servicemen to the training courses for UN military observers in Solnechnogorsk since 1997."


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3.
RIA NOVOSTI INTERVIEW WITH ALESKANDR YAKOVENKO, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY'S OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN, AHEAD OF BARENTS/EUROARCTIC COUNCIL MEETING
RIA Novosti
9/30/2003
(for personal use only)


Q.: The Barents/Euroarctic Council is reportedly holding a regular meeting one of these days. What issues will dominate the meeting agenda?

A.: The 9th meeting of the Barents/Euroarctic Council (BEAC) will take place in Umeo, northern Sweden, on October 2-3 and involve the member-countries' foreign ministers. The Russian delegation to the meeting will be led by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

The conferees are expected to exchange opinions on a wide range of issues related to the development of co-operation in the Barents region in line with the decisions the BEAC countries' prime ministers adopted at their meeting in Kirkenes, Norway, in January 2003. The upcoming meeting's agenda includes the efforts to step up trans-border and economic co-operation, to foster the development of trade and investment co-operation, enhance energy efficiency, counter new challenges and threats (including slave trade), update the border and transport infrastructures, to raise nuclear and radiation security and to further promote youth and cultural exchanges. Environment protection and rescue services' co-operation are among other key issues on the meeting agenda.

The ministers will issue a joint communique after the opinion exchange.

Q.: Could you brief us on what is the BEAC? What are the organisation's objectives? How important is the membership in the BEAC for Russia?

A.: The Council was set up at the Kirkenes meeting of the foreign ministers of Russia and Northern Europe on January 11, 1993 with the aim of promoting regional co-operation. Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Finland, Sweden and the Commission of European Communities were the Council's permanent members. Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Poland, France, the US and Japan held observers' status at the Council.

The regional countries have developed good neighbourly relations and have maintained co-operation in a number of areas of vital importance. Problems pertaining to sustainable development and trans-border trade and business exchanges, environment, transport, nuclear and radiation security, energy, efforts against dangerous diseases, culture, higher education, tourism and youth-targeted policies are all prominent on the Council's agenda.

The forum sets specific tasks and works to achieve concrete results, which is its distinctive feature. The projects implemented by the Council members are targeting, above all, the Russian part of the region. This makes the BEAC a valuable tool for settling economic, environmental and other problems facing Russia's Northwest and improving the local population's wellbeing.

There is something else that makes co-operation within the BEAC unique. The organisation is a two-level structure. This means that co-operation at an inter-state level is followed up by contacts between provinces, regions and other constituent territorial entities of the member-countries.

Q.: This year, the BEAC marks the 10th establishment anniversary. What are the organisation's achievements over this period?

A.: The organisation has admitted a new member. The Republic of Komi became a full-fledged BEAC member in January 2002. Moreover, the Council is continuing to expand the scope of its activities. The member-countries conducted a joint exercise, Barents Rescue 2001, in Sweden training interaction between their emergencies services. They agreed to conduct another exercise in Norway in 2005. Apart from that, they set up a task group to combat illegal migration. These are the new areas of co-operation for the BEAC countries.

Environment protection is one of the most briskly developing areas of co-operation. Joint efforts in this area have yielded a lot of impressive results. There have been reconstructed a series of industrial facilities, like Russia's Pechenganikel nickel producer. Industrial enterprises in Russia's Northwest have adopted "clean production" methods. A number of sanitation projects have been carried out in the environmentally sensitive areas included in the updated list of the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO). More protected areas have appeared and eco-tourism is gaining momentum. These are only a few examples of successful environment protection efforts.

The agreement on the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme for Russia (MNEPR), which was signed this May, will give a major impetus to the effort to enhance nuclear and radiation security in northern Russia.

We are pleased with the pace of economic co-operation development within the BEAC. I would note the improvement of the border and customs infrastructure (Green Corridor, the new check-point on the Russian-Norwegian border), the further development of the Barents/Euroarctic transport zone, the efforts to promote the sustainable development of forestry and carry on the International Northern Sea Programme, etc.

The regional countries are stepping up co-operation in healthcare. The joint efforts have helped dramatically reduce primary TB incidence rate and the incidence of other infectious diseases in the Barents region.

The upcoming meeting is expected to adopt a new programme of co-operation in healthcare and of relative welfare-related issues for the 2004-2007 period.


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D.  Cooperative Threat Reduction

1.
Sister cities plant seeds of future hope: U.S., Russian groups identify community goals
Kara Patterson, staff writer, Post-Crescent
Post-Crescent
10/4/2003
(for personal use only)


APPLETON � As Americans and Russians wrapped up an International Community Partnerships Conference on Friday, they celebrated that their countries are launching new missions, not missiles.
�There are the governmental contacts that will secure funding for weapons disposal. But the trust that allowed that to happen is what sister cities are all about,� said Julie Bahr of the Fox Cities-Kurgan Sister Cities Program, the organization sponsoring the three-day event.

At Friday�s luncheon, five U.S.-Russian partnerships unveiled Communities for International Development, a new grassroots program that is an extension of their person-to-person diplomacy. The conference�s 127 delegates, including nearly 40 from Russia, hope the program will become a reservoir for creative solutions to problems in the Eurasian nation.

Keynote speaker Paul McNelly of the Pentagon�s Defense Threat Reduction Agency lauded the volunteers� humanitarian efforts, saying international government aid for weapons destruction in Russia is most effective when coupled with stable community infrastructure.

�We�re trying to get the international community to help the Russians, because they just can�t afford it right now,� McNelly said.

In Shchuchye, one of Appleton�s Russian sister city regions that already benefits from Fox Cities civic, health care and education exchanges, McNelly described how people once were unaware their village is located about two miles from a chemical weapons stockpile. The site packs two million artillery shells into rickety wine racks.

Russian and American developers are preparing to construct a U.S.-funded, $888 million chemical weapons neutralization facility there, where more than 70 buildings will sit on a site cleared of birch trees.

However, McNelly said, locals are responsible for laying groundwork that includes a reliable water system and gas lines. He stressed that sister cities groups can promote Russian independence by encouraging good stewardship of existing resources.

�The U.S. (government) will train operators and then we are going to leave,� McNelly said. �It�s a Russian solution to the problem. We�ve confirmed that the Russian technology is effective and efficient.�

John Wuebben, who teaches social studies at Appleton�s Einstein Middle School, became involved with sister cities volunteers more than a decade ago, when they were searching for a Russian partner city.

�We would sit in people�s living rooms and dream about the development of friendships and things we would do that would affect how our governments operated,� Wuebben said. �To see how the average citizen can get involved � dreams can come true.�

During a final session, the Russian delegates, who attended the conference through the U.S. Library of Congress�s Open World Program, reviewed more than a dozen ideas for community development.

They identified significant goals:

� Improving relationships among levels of Russian government.

� Creating an aggressive energy management program that would save fuel and provide jobs

� Concentrating on sustainable development.

� Ensuring that any new programs respond to local needs.

Igor Kochankov, a social issues administrator in Sarov, Russia, said he�d like to see his city recycle regularly and send its young people to visit America.

�This conference has been valuable for us in terms of establishing contacts, both American colleagues and friends, and Russian as well,� he said.


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E.  CANWFZ

1.
Tajikistan calls for nuclear free status of Central Asia
ITAR-TASS
10/3/2003
(for personal use only)


DUSHANBE, October 3 (Itar-Tass) - Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmonov backs the idea of creating a nuclear free zone in Central Asia.

In his view, it is extremely important to ensure that this region be free of mass destruction weapons. Rakhmonov voiced these views in his address to the participants in the 58th session of the UN General Assembly, his spokesman Zafar Saidov told Itar-Tass on Friday.

The Tajik leader shares the mutual concern about the mounting difficulties in ensuring non-proliferation of such types of weapons in the world, including southern Asia.
He urged the international community to consistently build up collective efforts and disarmament mechanisms.

Commenting on the problem of struggle against international terrorism, the president said his country had acted for a decade as "a buffer zone" on the way of terrorism's spreading to Central Asian countries and other regions.

In his view, it is only through collective efforts that one can win this fight, and that there should be no selectiveness or double standards here.


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F.  Russia-Iran

1.
Russia doggedly at Tehran's side
Stephen Blank
Asia Times
10/7/2003
(for personal use only)


It should come as no surprise that President Vladimir Putin refused to curtail Russia's assistance to Iran's nuclear reactor at his recent summit with President George W Bush. Indeed, it would have been surprising if he had agreed to do so. Russia's unwillingness to foreclose on Iran's nuclear project is what philosophers might call overdetermined. That is, Russia, which is assisting with the construction of a light-water nuclear reactor near Bushehr, derives so many benefits from the Iranian project that it would be strange for it to forego those merely to please America.

After all, it is eminently arguable from a Russian standpoint that Russia received very little for supporting America after September 11. Not only did the US and then North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops appear in Central Asia, Georgia and Azerbaijan invited US forces to their countries to help them defend against threats, not the least of which are from Moscow.

These moves clearly contravened the Russian elite's ingrained belief in an imperial state where the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are wayward children who, unable to govern themselves, will soon return, whether they want to or not, to the Russian fold. Likewise, NATO enlarged to the Baltic states, another reminder of the end of empire. And since then American emissaries throughout the CIS have more or less overtly used their influence to retard Russian attempts at reintegrating those states under its auspices. The US also went ahead and withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty to build missile defenses, and to add final insult to injury, it disregarded Russian offers of assistance in Iraq in return for guarantees of Iraq's debt payment to Russia and a share in future oil contracts. Meanwhile, few contracts with US oil firms have materialized since 2001, despite ongoing negotiations in some cases.

Presently, Washington wants Russian assistance in Iraq, and while Putin will supposedly support sending Russian troops there pending an authoritative UN resolution, one can be sure that there is a larger payoff, presumably connected to that Iraqi debt and energy supplies. Therefore, there are few quid pro quos that Washington can offer Moscow in return for cessation of its support for Iran, Putin's rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.

To understand this fact in its full context one must remember that nuclear and other forms of proliferation are an issue that brings together domestic and foreign policy issues. Key domestic lobbies stand to benefit considerably from aiding Iran. In this case, Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minatom, is a prime example. It makes a fortune from sales abroad, including Iran, and has steadily refused to even consider not selling nuclear reactors to Iran and other potentially proliferating states like India and China. Although not a rogue elephant, as it may have been in the 1990s, it still remains a formidable bureaucratic player.

The same may also be said for Russian weapons producers. The defense industry is a shadow of what it was under communism, but on issues of direct relevance to it it has shown considerable power and ability to get its way, including major state subsidies for key projects. It, too, has large and vested interests in arms sales to Iran. Indeed, it views Iran as being potentially, if not actually, the third largest foreign market for Russian arms sales. So it will certainly oppose any Russian policy that imposes limits on Iran's ability to acquire Russian weapons and technology.

Thus these two elite blocs, and many members of the government, have habitually taken refuge in the endlessly reiterated their belief that America simply wants to take away a Russian market for itself, as it supposedly did with North Korea. Putin, too, has baldly restated this story and publicly pretended that he has no idea of the extent of Russian nuclear assistance to Iran. When one considers that in 1997-98 Russian journalist Evgenia Albats published a detailed institution-by-institution account of who was helping Iran and how, it is clear that Putin's and his acolytes' story is wrong.

But even if key domestic lobbies were silent on this issue, there are strong foreign and defense policy reasons for continuing to support Iran. Iran remains the only true friend of Moscow in the Persian Gulf and Middle East as well as a state dependent on Russian diplomatic support and arms transfers. Both of them share a common determination to keep Washington out of the Gulf and the CIS. Their leaders have at times talked in public about the virtues of a bloc with China against America in support of a "multipolar world". Therefore, Iran is a major foreign policy investment for Russia's ministries of foreign affairs and of defense.

Likewise, despite a lot of official rhetoric, major sections of Russia's foreign policy makers clearly do not take the threat of proliferation very seriously. Otherwise they would not have been proliferating to Iran, Iraq, China, India, and North Korea during the past decade. As all those cases are pretty well documented, it is hard to square protestations about the danger of proliferation with the actual policies involved.

Finally, despite many pubic fears to the contrary, Iran has, since 1991, followed an extremely circumspect policy towards the Caucasus and Central Asia. It decided when the Soviet Union was collapsing that it made no sense for it to antagonize Russia with regard to these areas, which Iran rightly appreciated would come to be seen as Russian vital interests, given America's unremitting hostility to it. Moreover, it clearly calculated correctly that Russia would be a source of diplomatic support, collaboration and arms sales to it. Moscow, for its part, had decided by February, 1992 that Iran, if it did not get arms sales, could make a lot of trouble for Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which Moscow did not need.

Thus these sales are a way of paying off Iran not to make trouble, a bargain that Iran has faithfully kept and which works very well for Russia. Ending that bargain gains nothing for Moscow, except American good will, which it has already clearly discounted.

This analysis also shows that once again Washington has fallen for one of the oldest mistakes in relations with Russia, namely the belief that good personal relations with Russia's leader overrides anything else in the bilateral equation. While such relations are vital, they go nowhere if bureaucratic support and elite support are not forthcoming.

As Nikolai Gvosdev forcefully pointed out in the Moscow Times, that is precisely the case in US-Russian relations, neither side's domestic and bureaucratic elites has any compelling interest in making presidential agreements a reality, at least as far as Iran is concerned. Thus Washington cajoles Moscow, which pretends to listen. And when Moscow shows its true colors on this issue, nothing much happens, except for some meaningless sanctions of a few small fry.

Unfortunately, Iran advances ever closer to a nuclear capability that will constitute a global threat, given its support for terrorism on a global scale, as in Argentina and Western Europe. Russian authorities know what is at stake, but clearly do not care very much. The hour of decision on Iran is fast approaching, and if Iran does succeed in going nuclear, Moscow will hardly be able to escape the ensuing threats to its position in Central Asia and the Caucasus. But by then it will be too late for both it and for America, not to mention other states.

Meanwhile, the experience of the 20th century and of current world politics tells us that if we really want to prevent someone from going nuclear, it is necessary either to physically destroy the weapons by preemptive strike, as Israel did to Iraq in 1981, or to occupy the country, as the post-1945 history of Japan and Germany tell us.

Do Moscow and Washington really want to leave themselves only these options to prevent a conclusion that they both profess to want? If so, this is a very strange way to form the strategic partnership that they both claim to want. On the other hand, as the summit in Camp David suggests, rhetoric aside, that there is probably less to this partnership than meets the eye.


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2.
Russia has no grounds to doubt what Iranian leadership has said
Islamic Republic News Agency
10/6/2003
(for personal use only)


Moscow, Oct 6, Itar-Tass/ACSNA/IRNA -- Russia has no grounds to
challenge what the Iranian leadership said to Russia about having no
program aimed at nuclear weapons capability, Russian President
Vladimir Putin said in his interview with the New York Times.
"We have no grounds to challenge what has been set to us by the
Iranian leadership. But are guided by the fact that if, as the Iranian
leadership states, they have no plans to produce weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear arms, then we see no grounds not to allow the
IAEA inspect all of Iran`s programs in the nuclear sphere," Putin
said.

He went on to say, "We have our interests in Iran. Iran is our
neighbor. We have century-old traditions of neighborly relations with
that country. But regarding the problem of non-proliferation, we have
full understanding with the United States," the Russian president
said.

"I would even assert that on this question, as well as on the
question of fighting terrorism, we are, in our view, and can be not
just partners but allies in the full sense of this word. What we seek
to achieve is that uniform and universal rules of the game be worked
out for one and all," Putin noted.

"We have been constantly hearing about certain sanctions applied
by the United States to certain Russian enterprises which are
suspected of some unsavory economic ties with Iran. But we have
information that in some no less sensitive and probably even more
sensitive areas, there are some European and American companies that
are dealing with Iran. For some reason, I have never heard of any
sanctions being applied against those companies. Why?

"We stand ready and we want to combat proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. But we are for the strict compliance with all the
non-proliferation regimes, for the fostering of those regimes, for
working out unified standards and unified rules of behavior in this
area," the Russian president declared.


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3.
RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTER ACCUSES THE WEST OF DOUBLE STANDARDS TOWARDS IRAN
Olga Semyonova
RIA Novosti
10/6/2003
(for personal use only)


OTTAWA, October 6, 2003 (RIA Novosti correspondent Olga Semyonova) - Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov has accused the West of pursuing a double standards policy in regard to Iran.

"A number of European countries deliver to Iran the materials banned by all international regimes," Sergei Ivanov told the reporters who accompanied him during his visit to Canada.

"If Russia had exported such products to that country, the toughest sanctions would have been taken against it," underscored the Defence Minister. "I mean in particular the gas centrifuges which have appeared in Iran though their export has been banned by the IAEA, because they can be used for the production of nuclear weapons," explained the Russian minister.

Sergei Ivanov said Russia strictly observed the tough IAEA regulations." "There will be no deliveries of nuclear fuel to Bushehr until Iran signs a protocol on returning spent nuclear fuel to Russia," underscored the minister.

"We are decidedly against the proliferation of the technologies which can help develop nuclear weapons," he added.

At the same time, Sergei Ivanov pointed out that "Russian-Iranian cooperation in atomic energy (without which, in his opinion, it is impossible to manage in our days) does not lead to the development of nuclear weapons." "We regard the attempts to make Russia give up its cooperation with Iran in the sphere of atomic energy as unfair competition. As to the appearance in Iran of the technologies which can be used for developing weapons of mass destruction, this does not meet our national interests," said Sergei Ivanov.


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4.
RUSSIA-IRAN COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY TO CONTINUE
Nikolai Terekhov
RIA Novosti
10/1/2003
(for personal use only)


TEHRAN, October 1 (RIA Novosti correspondent Nikolai Terekhov) - Cooperation between Russia and Iran in the sphere of peaceful uses of atomic energy will be continued, said Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi upon returning from New York where he attended the 58th session of the UN General Assembly.

According to the minister, Russia believes that the agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran's Bushehr is legitimate, and that this agreement "has been recognized by all countries." At present "there are no obstacles" for continuing the construction of this nuclear power plant, believes the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry.


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G.  Russian Nuclear Forces

1.
No immediate plans to put UR-100N-UTTKH missiles on combat duty
Interfax
10/6/2003
(for personal use only)


OTTAWA. Oct 6 (Interfax) - The Defense Ministry is not going to put UR-100N-UTTKH heavy missiles on combat duty in the Strategic Missile Troops in the near future.

"There is no rush to put these missiles on combat duty," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told journalists before leaving for Ottawa.

"We are not going to exceed the limits set by the Russian-U.S. Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty," Ivanov said.


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2.
RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTER COMMENTS ON PUTIN'S STATEMENT
Olga Semyonova
RIA Novosti
10/6/2003
(for personal use only)


OTTAWA, October 6, 2003 /RIA Novosti correspondent Olga Semyonova/ -- President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation has made a statement dealing with Russia's UR-100-N-UTTKH inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) this past Thursday. The Russian leader's statement is a signal for domestic and foreign audiences alike. This was disclosed by Russia's Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov to Russian journalists during his Canadian visit.

Replying to a question about specific reasons for making such information public at this stage, Ivanov noted that Putin's statement aimed to refute rumours about a crisis allegedly plaguing Russia's strategic nuclear forces, as well as allegations that such obsolete missiles threatened Russia itself.

There is nothing aggressive in the President's statement, Ivanov stressed. These empty missiles, which are now stored at Russian warehouses, have never been refuelled before; nor do they contain any fuel nowadays, Ivanov went on to say. According to Ivanov, nobody is going to place such missiles on combat duty posthaste.

We have no intention of exceeding specific ceilings stipulated by the treaty on strategic offensive reductions, Ivanov noted. However, this potential provides us with a sufficiently long breather, also enabling us to spend money for maintaining obsolete missiles and for developing entirely new missile complexes within the framework of state defence orders, Ivanov added. We must look 20-30 years ahead into the future, Ivanov stressed.


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3.
NEW RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE GLOBALISED WORLD
Viktor Litovkin
RIA Novosti
10/3/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, October 3 (RIA Novosti's military analyst Viktor Litovkin). Moscow no longer admits even a hypothetical possibility of a global nuclear or conventional war with NATO. This was the biggest sensation of the new military doctrine unveiled by Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov at the October 2, 2003 conference of the leading staff of the Russian armed forces in Moscow.

The minister said the Russian army had adjusted to new global realities, which is why some foundations of military planning were reviewed. In particular, a global nuclear war or a large-scale conventional war with NATO or any other US-led coalition have been excluded from the list of probable armed conflicts in which the Russian army and navy can take part. This paved the way to a major reduction of Russia's nuclear and conventional capabilities without detriment to national security. The spotlight in combat training has been shifted to peacekeeping operations, including operations to keep or enforce peace, special operations, the struggle against terrorism, and participation in local wars.

Other major changes have been made in Russia's military-political obligations to its allies and partners, which now rest on the firm basis of international law. From now on, Russia will wage hostilities and operations only in accordance with the UN Charter and in particular with the sanction of the UN Security Council. They can be launched only by decision of the president and the Federal Assembly. These decisions are also stipulated in the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS countries and other agreements, including bilateral agreements on security collaboration such as the Russo-Belarussian one or the ones that were signed by countries members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Partner military relations with the USA and NATO paved the way to the creation of additional structures and institutes that ensure global stability. These relations remain in force despite major differences on issues pertaining to the eastward enlargement of NATO and its military activities in military conflict zones. The creation of the NATO-Russia Council allowed the sides to elaborate a more comprehensive system of interaction and consultations in time of crisis situations and the procedure for creating joint groups of forces in conflict zones. Moscow and Brussels are actively collaborating (they have joint working groups) in the joint use of the air space, material supplies, technical maintenance and logistics of groups of forces, and the creation of a theatre missile defence system. In February 2003 they signed a framework agreement on submarine crew search and rescue, and there are other achievements in bilateral relations.

Today Russia not only takes part in multilateral military exercises with NATO countries but also holds joint peacekeeping operations (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Military-technical cooperation with concerned bloc members has become a fact of life. In particular, the Greek air defence force relies strongly on the Russian-made Osa-AKM, Tor-M1 and even S-300PMU air defence systems, and France and Italy collaborated with Russia to create MiG-AT and Yak-130 combat trainers. Other military items are being created jointly, sets of equipment are being standardised, and issues of operational compatibility of the military units of Russia and NATO are being addressed as vital conditions of the success of joint functions.

But Moscow is not resting on laurels, as it sees the complex and uncertain nature of these achievements. Sergei Ivanov said frankly - and this phrase is incorporated in the new doctrine: "Russia is closely watching the transformation of NATO and hopes that all directly and indirectly anti-Russian elements will be fully removed from military planning and political declarations of the bloc members." And "if NATO persists as a military bloc with its current offensive military doctrine, this will provoke changes in the Russian military planning and development principles of the Russian armed forces, including changes in the Russian nuclear strategy."

Russia has similarly complex relations with its strategic partner, the USA, says the new military doctrine. On the one hand, Moscow hopes to expand political, military-political and economic cooperation with Washington. The Russian leadership wants to continue working jointly with the USA in ensuring strategic stability and burying the Cold War heritage, guaranteeing regional stability and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fighting international terrorism within the framework of the counter-terror coalition. On the other hand, Moscow demands that these relations should rest on respect and strict compliance with international law and the domination of national (including Russia's) interests.

The new military doctrine of Russia, reflects the complexity and duality of the current military-political situation in the world. The world's nations want to create a new, fairer and more democratic system of international economic and political relations. At the same time, military force is being used more widely on the basis of unilateral national decisions without the UN mandate. And lastly, the persisting stereotypes of the period of ideological confrontation are greatly complicating the interaction of the leading world powers. The existence of modern and effective armed forces in Russia in this situation is becoming a prerequisite for its successful and painless integration into the rising system of international relations.

The new military doctrine of Russia spotlights several basic trends that aptly describe this situation. The first among them is resistance to the new challenges provoked by globalisation - the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, international terrorism, ethnic instability, the operation of radical religious communities and groups, drug trafficking, and organised crime. These challenges cannot be repelled by individual states fighting alone, said Sergei Ivanov; our task is to create a coalition of power departments, including special services and armed forces, to fight these challenges.

International military operations held on the basis of temporary coalitions beyond the framework of traditional military-political organisations are becoming a fact of life. This is objective reality and we will probably see more of such temporary alliances, say Moscow leaders. The Russian army is not against involvement in them but only on the conditions of compliance with international law and due regard for Russia's foreign policy interests.

One more trend spotlighted in the new military doctrine is the growing economic weight of foreign policy priorities of states. This means that the economic interests of states are becoming more important than their political or military-political interests, especially if these economic interests coincide with the requirements of transnational companies. As a result, the pretexts for the use of military force have become more pragmatic and even cynical, and their true essence is barely concealed by references to a direct military threat or other similarly "weighty" reasons. This means that Russia should always keep in mind the need to strengthen national defence ability and security.

The fusion of national and international terrorism is a major feature of modern reality, making it senseless to divide the terrorist threat into internal and foreign. The new military doctrine says that the world's nations must join forces in the struggle against this evil within the framework of the international counter-terrorist coalition. This faces the Russian armed forces with the task of expanding the sphere of their responsibility, including with the aim of fighting international terrorism.


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4.
Putin Beefs Up ICBM Capacity
Simon Saradzhyan
Moscow Times
10/3/2003
(for personal use only)


President Vladimir Putin told top military commanders Thursday that Russia will put dozens of multi-warhead SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles on combat duty.

In a separate development, a Defense Ministry paper released ahead of Putin's comments warned that Russia might have to revise its plans for military reform and nuclear defense strategy if NATO did not drop what it termed its "anti-Russian orientation."

Putin explained the move was to prevent further aging of the country's land-based strategic nuclear arsenal, and maintain its capacity to overcome any missile defense system.

"I am speaking here about the most menacing missiles, of which we have dozens, with hundreds of warheads," Putin told a gathering of top commanders and Kremlin officials at Defense Ministry headquarters. "Their capability to overcome any anti-missile defense is unrivaled."

Putin said the SS-19s would be put on duty to phase out hundreds of Soviet-era ICBMs that have aged beyond repeatedly extended service lives. Such replacements would give the defense industry a breathing space to develop new systems, he said.

Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush signed the so-called Moscow Treaty last May that requires the two countries to cut the number of warheads on combat duty to between 1,700 and 2,200 a side. It allows both countries to store, rather than dismantle the warheads. It is the scrapping of the START-II strategic arms reduction treaty, however, that has allowed Russia to keep SS-19s on combat duty.

Russia acquired and stored an unspecified number of Soviet-era SS-19s from Ukraine in the 1990s, according to Alexander Pikayev, a security analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center. These stored missiles can remain in service until the 2030s, deputy chief of the General Staff Yury Baluyevsky told the meeting.

In addition to the pending introduction of the modernized SS-19s, the military may also revise its own nuclear doctrine if NATO does not amend its "offensive" doctrine, according to an undated draft Defense Ministry document on the modernization of the armed forces released to the press ahead of the meeting.

The document calls for a "change of Russian nuclear strategy" and "thorough reformation of the principles of military planning," if NATO's doctrine remains offensive.

While containing warnings to NATO, the 73-page document also praises the cooperation between Russia and the Western alliance.

It is the "new level of relations" with the West, including the United States, that allows Russia to "radically cut" its nuclear forces, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said.

He added that Russia should be ready to carry out pre-emptive strikes anywhere in the world. According to the Defense Ministry, the military should be prepared to fight two "conflicts of any type" simultaneously as well as carry out peacekeeping operations.

Ivan Safranchuk, the Moscow representative of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, said Thursday that the armed forces would hardly be able to fight two regional conflicts simultaneously, let alone two "conflicts of any type."

But Pikayev said that some of the speeches, including warnings to NATO, could have been aimed at pleasing patriotic voters ahead of the State Duma elections.


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5.
Russia considers restricted use of nuclear deterrence weapons
Nuclear.ru
10/3/2003
(for personal use only)


Russia will reconsider its defense strategy, including the use of nuclear forces, if NATO remains as an alliance with offensive doctrine. The position was stated reportedly by ITAR-TASS in a reviewed national military doctrine elaborated by Russia�s Defense Ministry. The document was released October 2, followed by a meeting in the ministry headquarters where plans for modernizing national military force were discussed. The meeting was participated by RF President Vladimir Putin. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov presented a report outlining ways of reforming the armed forces.

�Russia follows closely the NATO transformation process and hopes that anti-Russian components, direct or indirect, will be withdrawn both from the military planning and political declarations of NATO members,� the doctrine says. However, it alerts, �if NATO remains as a military alliance with an offensive doctrine, it will lead to radical reconstruction of both Russia�s military planning and the principles used to form the national Armed Forces, nuclear strategy included.�

The doctrine also points out that Russia considers �warfare with restricted resort to components of strategic deterrence forces.� Speaking at the meeting, Mr. Putin stressed that nuclear deterrence forces will remain �for a long time� the basic pillar of national security. �They are in good condition and there are plans to develop them,� he said adding that Russia �has a huge amount accumulated of ground-based ballistic missiles.� Anatoly Kvashnin, Head of the General Staff specified that �it is several hundreds of warheads we are talking about.� They are, in particular, UR-100 and MUTTK missiles. �It�s a new product with considerable lifetime while their war capability in terms of penetrating any Anti-Missile System, for instance, is unrivaled,� V. Putin said.


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6.
Russia: Putin Talks Up Power Of Nuclear Arsenal
Jeremy Bransten
RFE/RL Newsline
10/3/2003
(for personal use only)


Russia's Defense Ministry has issued a document reaffirming its right to undertake pre-emptive military strikes while warning NATO that the alliance's continued military posture could prompt Moscow to conduct what it called a "fundamental reassessment of Russia's military planning and arms procurement." At the same time, President Vladimir Putin, in a meeting with top military brass, emphasized the power of Russia's nuclear arsenal. Coming so soon after Putin's visit to the United States, the saber-rattling from Moscow took some observers by surprise. Should the U.S. and NATO be alarmed?

Prague, 3 October 2003 (RFE/RL) -- Hawkish words emanated from Moscow yesterday, when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov met top military leaders to review the state of the Russian armed forces.

Putin told the military brass that after years of cutbacks, the time for attrition had ended, with Russia's armed forces now numbering an optimal one million troops.

"Since 1992, the armed forces have been reduced by more than half. It was a truly difficult and painful process. Enough. The process, as a whole, is now complete," Putin said.

Putin outlined his vision for a strong, well-funded, flexible and combat-ready Russian military. Defense Minister Ivanov, meanwhile, told the assembly of military leaders that what he called "radical" military reforms were now successfully accomplished, meaning Russia could focus on projecting its power.

Ivanov, as he has on previous occasions, reiterated that Russia retains the right to launch pre-emptive strikes against potential enemies. Both men emphasized the importance of Russia's nuclear arsenal as a cornerstone of the country's defense, with Putin announcing plans to pull dozens of SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles out of storage.

"Russia retains a significant number -- I want to emphasize this -- a significant number of land-based strategic missiles. I am talking about our most menacing missiles, the [SS-19]. I am talking about very serious potential, about tens of rockets," Ivanov said.

Putin's statement was accompanied by a report from the Russian Defense Ministry, warning NATO that Moscow would be forced to re-evaluate its nuclear missile strategy if the alliance continued to maintain an "offensive doctrine."

The saber-rattling, coming just days after Putin's friendly summit meeting in the United States with President George W. Bush, appeared to strike a discordant note.

But Aleksandr Pikaev, an arms control expert at the Moscow-based Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) tells RFE/RL that the timing was not coincidental. On the international front, Pikaev says Moscow remains concerned about NATO's aims and U.S. military expansion toward Russia's borders. Turning up the volume could be one way to get some attention.

"We can explain the harsh tone very simply. Russia is concerned by a lot of things. NATO, which has announced it is battling international terrorism, has nonetheless expanded to Russia's borders. There is no evidence that NATO's doctrine is changing. In addition, it appears American forces are going to be moved from their German bases further east and all this causes great alarm among the Russian military and the president is forced to take those concerns into consideration," Pikaev said.

Pikaev adds that on a range of substantive issues currently under discussion with NATO, Moscow feels it is making little headway.

"There are major disagreements and during the sensitive talks and consultations that are now going on, the Russian side has not been able to advance its point of view with NATO that Russia needs security guarantees, that Russia would like the Baltic states to sign up to the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe, and that the issue of intellectual property rights for Soviet weapons that remain in the armies of Central and Eastern European countries that are entering NATO must be addressed. Russia has not been able to make progress on any of these issues and yesterday's statement by the Russian authorities reflects this dissatisfaction with the situation," Pikaev said.

On the domestic front, says Pikaev, Putin and the government -- in the runup to legislative elections in December and a presidential poll next March -- are eager for support from the military and the kind of talk demonstrated yesterday was meant to appeal to this important constituency.

"The ruling party needs the military's vote since its chances don't appear as rosy as some would like. Of course, when talking about the military's support, we're not just talking about a million soldiers but also their family members, members of other military formations, and those working in defense industries, who are not indifferent to the fate of the armed forces. We are talking about millions and millions of voters," Pikaev said.

Pikaev notes that Ivanov, in particular, was keen to let the military know that the government, after years of belt-tightening demands and sometimes neglect, was now looking to take better care of its forces in uniform.

"[Ivanov] wanted to say that reforms, in the way they were undertaken previously -- that is to say reforms that were underfinanced, when the armed forces were forced to worry about mere survival -- this way of doing reforms is over and better times are coming when the armed forces are going to be better financed. And indeed, the government's budget request for the military next year has been increased by 60,000 million rubles [$2 billion], which is a significant sum for the Russian budget," Pikaev said. "Now Ivanov is trying to convince his generals and officers that things will be much better, that we will be able to think not only about survival but also about new equipment purchases, about how to train our soldiers better, about new maneuvers, about new peacekeeping operations, and how life will slowly get back into its normal groove."

Ivanov's contention that "radical" military reforms have already been accomplished is more contentious, say experts, especially in view of the fact that according to the Russian Defense Ministry itself, the switchover to a fully professional military composed of contract soldiers is not due until 2010.


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7.
PRESIDENT PUTIN: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FORCES ARE COMBAT-READY
RIA Novosti
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, OCTOBER 2 (RIA NOVOSTI) - For national security Russia relies, and will continue to do so for a long time to come, on the nuclear-deterrence forces, Vladimir Putin has said.

"These forces are combat-ready and there are plans for their development," the president told the Defence Ministry at the conference for the development and modernization of the Russian armed forces.

It is no secret that "Russia has a considerable reserve of strategic land-based missiles," he said.

"It is our most formidable weapon," emphasized the president. It is tens of missiles, said Putin.


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8.
Putin supports nuclear deterrence system
RosBusinessConsulting
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW: Russia possesses significant resources of strategic land-based missiles, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in his closing address at a meeting in the Defense Ministry devoted to the development and upgrading of the Russian Armed Forces. He stressed he meant the most powerful UR-100MUTTH missiles that had no rivals among existing anti-missile systems.

Putin stressed that nuclear deterrence would remain the basis of Russia's national security and these means were in a good state in Russia, ORT television quoted the president as saying. Putin stated that Russia would continue to observe its obligations on limiting strategic offensive potentials. At the same time, the Russian leader stressed that the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty allowed its contracting parties to keep significant weapons at their bases and Russia would use this possibility.


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9.
RUSSIA DOESN'T RULE OUT NUKE USE: DEFENCE MINISTER
RIA Novosti
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, OCTOBER 2 (RIA NOVOSTI) - Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defence, addressed a conference on the ministerial premises today to introduce an open doctrine of Russian Armed Forces modernisation.

Nuclear arsenals may regain their status of actual arms, he warned. "We have noticed attempts to use particular technological achievements so as to turn nuclear arms from a deterrence tool into theatre arms. We regard it as an extremely dangerous trend, which undermines global and regional stability," emphasised the minister.

"I have ordered to closely monitor related developments as Russia will have to reorganise its troop control system and the principles of engagement even if the nuclear arms use threshold gets lower only slightly," said Mr. Ivanov


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10.
RUSSIA TO PRESERVE STRATEGIC FORCES' DETERRENCE POTENTIAL
Olga Semyonova
RIA Novosti
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, OCTOBER 2 (RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT OLGA SEMENOVA) - The Defence Ministry is going to continue preserving the potential of the strategic deterrence forces, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said at the conference, presenting the open doctrine of modernisation of the Russian army.

"The main goal of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of strategic deterrence is the non-permission of any kind of use-of-force pressure and aggression against Russia or its allies. If deterrence fails, it is the guaranteed protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests of Russia or its allies," Sergei Ivanov stressed.

"Deterrence will base on the ability to reciprocate with a damage whose scope would put to doubt the attainment of goals of the possible aggression," said the defence minister.



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11.
Russia warns NATO it may re-evaluate nuclear stance
AFP
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


Russia delivered an abrupt warning to NATO on Thursday by saying it would re-evaluate its nuclear missile strategy should the Cold War-era body remain a military alliance with an "offensive" doctrine.

"Should NATO remain a military alliance with its current offensive military strategy, this will prompt a fundamental reassessment of Russia's military planning and arms procurement," said an internal assessment document released by Russia's defense ministry Thursday.

This re-evaluation will include "changes to Russia's nuclear strategy," the document said.

It failed to spell out how Russia's approach to nuclear weapons would change.

Russia and the United States agreed in May 2002 to slash their nuclear arsenals by two-thirds to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade.

Moscow has established warmer relations with NATO over the past two years and has joined a special Russia-NATO Council where it enjoys a broad advisory role but no veto power.

But the Russian defense ministry -- which often expresses more hawkish views that President Vladimir Putin's administration -- said it still regarded NATO as a threat as the alliances eyes expansion into former Soviet republics in the Baltic region -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

"Russia is carefully following NATO's transformation, and expects it to put a complete end to direct and indirect elements of its anti-Russian policy, which includes its military planning," the document says.

The ministry demanded that anti-Russian sentiments are also removed from the "political declarations" of NATO member states.


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12.
RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY MAY VARY
Olga Semyonova
RIA Novosti
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, OCTOBER 2 (RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT OLGA SEMENOVA) - The Russian defence minister assumes control of adjusting the strategic forces, Yuri Baluyevski, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, told journalists.

Asked about possible adjustments of Russia's nuclear strategy depending on the further development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Baluyevski said: "We closely follow NATO's reform. If an anti-Russian bias in its military planning preserves and the threshold of use of the nuclear weapons lowers, all this will necessitate changes to be made in the Russian nuclear strategy," he stressed.


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13.
RUSSIAN HEAVY MISSILES TO FULFIL STRATEGIC ASSIGNMENTS FOR ANOTHER 20-PLUS YEARS
RIA Novosti
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, OCTOBER 2 (RIA NOVOSTI) - The heavy missiles UR-100NUTTH will be able to fulfil assignments of the strategic troops until the middle 2030s, Yuri Baluyevski, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, has said to reporters on Thursday.

They are among the most powerful heavy missiles, capable of carrying up to 10 warheads each and overcoming any modern antimissile defence system, Baluyevski explained to journalists the presidential statements made at a Defence Ministry conference.

Upon further re-equipment, they will be able to fulfil combat assignments for another 20-odd years, Baluyevski said.

The first deputy chief of the General Staff said that several dozens of such missiles remain with the army since the Soviet times. "It is a good reserve preserved for Russia in the no simple times," said Baluyevski.


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14.
Russian Strategic Missile Troops have 30 heavy missiles.
Alexander Konovalov
ITAR-TASS
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


MOSCOW, October 2 (Itar-Tass) - The UR-100NUTTX missiles are classified as heavy missiles. "They can carry up to ten combat units equipped with a sophisticated system for piercing air defenses and will be able to solve the tasks assigned by the Strategic Purpose Missile Troops until the mid-2030s at least," Yuri Baluyevskiy, the first deputy head of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, told journalists on Thursday.

"This is a good stock that was made by our predecessors and has survived to the present day. The Russian Strategic Missile Troops have dozens of such missiles," General Baluyevsky went on to say.

The Russian Defense Ministry said that Russia had 30 missiles of that class which have never been put on combat duty but are, nevertheless, in good working order. They are fully prepared to fulfill their tasks," Baluyevsky stressed.


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15.
Volga radar system to guard Russia from northwest
RosBusinessConsulting
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


In the Belarusian city of Baranovichi, a Russian radar station Volga has been put in combat operation. The decision to organize the station�s stand-by duty was made according to a decree of the Russian president.

As the press service of the Russian Space Force told RBC, the station is designed to detect ballistic missiles and objects in space. Volga can detect ballistic missiles and space objects in-flight several thousands of kilometers away, as well as track these targets, identify them and find their position.

�Volga, put in effective combat operation within our armed force, has covered the gap that appeared due to the demolition of a radar station in Skrunda (Latvia) in the 1990s,� Russian Space Force Commander Colonel General Anatoly Perminov explained to journalists.

The Volga radar station is a high-potential station that provides high-precision measurements due to the use of digital computer systems. The module construction of the station enables its creators to build, develop and streamline it step by step without taking it completely off line.


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H.  Nuclear Industry

1.
Kazakh-Russian-Kyrgyz uranium venture to be created in Kazakhstan
Oral Karpishev, ITAR-TASS
ITAR-TASS
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


ASTANA, October 2 (Itar-Tass) -- In southern Kazakhstan work has begun to implement a project to create a Kazakh-Russian-Kyrgyz joint venture for uranium production.

The press-service of Kazakhstan's nuclear company Kazatomprom has told Tass the venture's co-founders are Kazatomprom, TVEL Tekhsnabexport, Atomredmetzoloto (all of Russia), and the Kara-Balta mining and ore dressing combine of Kyrgyzstan, which have 45, 20, 15, 10 and 10-percent stakes in the venture respectively.

The venture has been licensed to mine the Zarechnoye deposit in the South Kazakhstan Region, which is estimated at 19,000 tonnes of uranium.

Commercial mining is scheduled to begin by the end of 2005. The design output of 500 tonnes of uranium in the form of a chemical concentrate a year will be achieved later.

The concentrate will be shipped to the Kara-Balta mining and ore dressing combine in Kyrgyzstan for processing into oxide-protoxide. The material will be dispatched to Russia to be used by the Atomic Energy Ministry.

The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry has told Itar-Tass correspondent German Solomatin the uranium oxide-protoxide will be converted into hexofluride and enriched. Most of the former Soviet Union's natural uranium deposits are in the now independent Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while all uranium enrichment facilities are in Russia. The demand for nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants in Russia and the world over has been growing, so the creation of the joint venture will benefit Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Atomic Energy official said.


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2.
Launch of CIS joint venture at Zarechnoye uranium deposit announced
Nuclear.ru
9/30/2003
(for personal use only)


October 1, 2003, Kazakh, Russian and Kyrgyz participants of Zarechnoye uranium mining joint venture held a press-conference in Shymkent, regional center of Southern Kazakhstan, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Kazakh nuclear utility Kazatomprom�s press service. A renewed structure of the joint venture was announced as follows: Kazatomprom (Kazakhstan) - 45%; TVEL-20% (Russia), Techsnabexport (Russia) - 15%, Atomredmetzoloto (Russia)-10%; and Kara-Balta (Kyrgyzstan) -10%.

Zarechnoe deposit with its 19,000 tons of uranium is located in Otrar region. The joint venture obtained operation license from the state authorities on 19 May 2003, and will begin construction of the acidic in situ leaching mining site in 2004. Russians will invest some US$14.5 million before the mine achieves targeted commercial production of 500 tons uranium as yellow cake starting from late 2005. The project creates about 200 new jobs on site, and will employ Kyrgyz Kara-Balta capacity for production of U3O8 for eventual use by Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom).


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I.  Official Statements

1.
Interview for The New York Times (Excerpts). The New York Times comments by Steven Lee Myers.
The Kremlin
10/4/2003
(for personal use only)


Q: You and President Bush have developed good working relationship, but sometimes it seems that as though when it comes to specific policies, the United States treats Russia very much as the junior partner, that the Americans don't always listen to Russia's advice or take Russia's interests into account. I wonder if you feel that way.

Mr. Putin: I think that the talk here is not about a junior or senior partner. The talk is to establish the relations of partnership which imply the account of each other's interests. We are fully aware of what Russia is, what place it occupies in the world, what are our capabilities. But Russia, with all the problems it has, with all its traditions, with all its national interests is a country which will never serve anybody's political interests.

But Russia wants and can be a reliable partner, including for the United States. And my firm conviction is based on the fact that I see that the national interests of Russia and the United States coincide to large extent. For us, it is not a choice of tactics in order to solve some interests of expediency.

It is a strategic choice for us based on several components. First of all, on the fact that we are fully aware that the international stability is impossible without good interaction between the United States and Russia and that the United States for us is an important element of international stability. In some regions and in some directions, the United States' significance for us is such that it cannot be replaced.

I have already mentioned the strategic stability the United States and Russia remain the strongest nuclear powers. Our interests in the sphere of fight against radicalism and terrorism coincide, and we are very much concerned with radicalization of both certain countries and certain regions. And our common interest in counteracting one of the main, I think, threats of the 21st century. Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction flows out from both of these two aforementioned components.

There are other directions, minor at first glance, but very sensitive to people: the fight against drugs, organized crime. I think that both Russia and the United States are interested in development of economic relations and one of the issues lies on the surface. It is energy. Russia is interested in the realization of its potential at the foreign markets and the United States is interested in keeping stable prices at an admissible level, in the diversification of the sources of energy.

As for the style of the joint work, methods of decision-making, I think it still has to be improved and I am sure everything will occupy its proper place in time. But today, we can state that the force of inertia of the old times, of the cold war, is still quite strong. Both here and in the United States, there are still many people who are guided by outdated mentality. That is: what is bad for America is good for us. And in America many people think that everything that is bad for Russia is good for America. And this is a great misbelief, which completely ignores the current state of the world and the perspectives of its development. In this respect, our personal relations with President Bush play a very important role. I think that President Bush personally understands today's state of the world and can forecast its development and values Russian-American relations. And often his personal involvement into this or that issue allows us to maintain the level of our relations without letting them drop to a lower level.

Q.: Are there specific areas where you see that you see that the cold war inertia interfering relations between the U.S. and Russia?

Mr. Putin: I will give just one example. Some time ago the Ministry of Defense informed us that there were plans to start reconnaissance flights over the Black Sea. And as the reason, the motivation of those flights the route of which was to take place over the areas abutting Russia, over Georgia, the necessity of fight against terrorism was presented. Our Foreign Ministry, which had been informed about that and the information, contained a hidden question on what is our attitude toward it, answered negatively. We answered that we did not see any necessity in that and that those flights did not have anything to do with fight against terrorism. One should not be a military expert to understand that fight against terrorism with the help of the reconnaissance planes, which fly at altitudes of eight thousand to 10 thousand meters, is impossible. It is complete nonsense. It is not even clear why that was written at all. Complete nonsense. In principle, the United States is not obliged to inform us about it. And if they want to fly and eavesdrop on what is going on on our territory from the south to the Near-Volga region well, we do not like it very much, but we cannot ban it. Why write an obvious nonsense as an explanation of those flights? And if we are partners, it should have no ground at all. Incidentally, after the U.N. Security Council had been informed about that and as I understand that information had been presented to the U.S. president, the flights stopped, though they had begun. And I would like to draw your attention to the fact that they started during the peak of discussions of the problems dealing with Iraq right before the beginning of the war. When there is mutual understanding and partnership, one should not try such actions.

Or let's take the recent practice, the newly introduced practice of granting visas. What is the point in summoning every person for an interview from all the territory of the huge Russian Federation, which, as know is the biggest country in the world in terms of territory? And to make them answer foolish, having nothing to do with security issues questions in the questionnaire? For example, women are asked if they are prostitutes. All the rest are asked if they have been involved in terrorism. Even if a woman was or is a prostitute or a man was involved into terrorist activity, I think they are not likely to voluntarily confess in answering this question on the questionnaire. It is a complete nightmare, which has nothing to do with realistic tasks of struggle against terrorism. It is done just for people working at the special services. Since the time when I myself worked at the special services, they were called the ``foam removers.'' They just sit and remove the foam. They are still there doing this.

This has an indirect relationship with the cold war time also because today's efficient counter-action to the common threats requires an increase in the degree of trust and better cooperation between the special services. What has to be done to ensure security of the United States and, correspondingly, Russia? Better interaction between the special services has to be established; increase trust and receive, from the viewpoint of the American interests, more extensive and more complete information about the people who try to enter the territory of the United States from the Russians special services, which better than anybody else can solve the problem of security from this side. Because nobody can work better on our territory than our special services.



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2.
Concluding remarks at a meeting with the leading personnel of the Russian Armed Forces (excerpted)
The Kremlin
10/2/2003
(for personal use only)


President Vladimir Putin

The Kremlin
10/02/2003

[�]

I want to point out that so far the move to a programme method of planning military structuring is being delayed. At the same time, without this, military planning risks remaining expensive and of low effectiveness. The main foundation of national security in Russia remains, and will remain for a long time to come, nuclear deterrence forces. They are in a very good state, there are plans to develop them, and these plans are realised. I can inform you what the Minister of Defence, the head of General Staff and the commander of the strategic rocket troops know well. There is no state secret here � Russia has a significant supply of ground-based strategic rockets. These are the most impressive rockets � the UR-100 NUTTH (SS-19). This is a very serious potential, several dozen rockets. Anatoly Kvashin, how much is this in military blocs?

Anatoly Kvashin: Several hundred nuclear shells�

President Vladimir Putin:

Good. These rockets have not been on military duty for a single day, they have been kept �dry�, and though these were not created yesterday or today, in a certain sense they are new rockets, and the time frame of their possible use is very significant. But their military capabilities, including in overcoming any systems of anti-rocket defence, are outside competition.

Russia has kept to, and will continue to fulfill, its international obligations in restricting the international nuclear potential. At the same time, the treaty which I just mentioned, allows the parties that have signed the treaty to keep a significant potential in their stockpile. Russia makes use of the regulations of this treaty in full measure. The heavy rockets at our disposal will be put on military duty as the expiry date runs out for those rockets which are on military duty today.

Thus, we have enough time to work on the creation of new models of weaponry of the 21stc century, gradually, without any jumps, but persistently and systematically. I would like to note that Russia has a serious reserve in this area. I will strictly control the fulfillment of all these plans, and make arrangements for modernization based on our interests and the current situation in the world. We will work with all our state partners, including in very sensitive areas, such as creating systems of anti-rocket defence. I talked about principles of organizing this work in detail at a meeting with the President of the United States of America in Camp David several days ago.

[�]


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J.  Links of Interest

1.
A Sickening Episode: Nuclear Looting in Iraq and the Global Threat From
Andy Oppenheimer, Disarmament Diplomacy
Disarmament Diplomacy
10/11/2003
(for personal use only)
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd73/73op03.htm


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2.
Committee of Senior Officials Assessment Report for the 9th Barents Euro-Arctic Council Foreign Ministers Meeting
10/3/2003
(for personal use only)
http://www.beac.st/_upl/doc/569_doc_031003BEACassessmentreport%20final.doc


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3.
Joint Communiqu� of the 9th Barents Euro-Arctic Council Foreign Ministers Meeting
10/3/2003
(for personal use only)
http://www.beac.st/_upl/doc/568_doc_Joint%20Communiqu�%20eng.doc


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