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RANSAC Nuclear News, November 20, 2003 Compiled By: Matthew Bouldin A. Nuclear Smuggling
 A. Nuclear Smuggling 1. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR ICEBREAKERS’ SERVICE BASE TO APPEAR IN COURT Murmansk police completed investigation of the criminal case against deputy director of nuclear icebreakers' service base Atomflot Alexander Tulyakov. The case files have been transferred to Oktyabrsky district court in Murmansk. Presiding judge Sergey Alisov will hold the first session tomorrow. The hearing will be held at closed session as some documents contain state secrets. Besides, the criminal case involves proceedings against a director of the restricted access facility. Tyulyakov was apprehended while trying to sell a suitcase with uranium-235 to the Russian Security Police agents. The substance with uranium-238 was later found at his flat and garage. Return to Menu B. Sub Dismantlement 1. RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN SIGNED RADWASTE STORAGE CLEAN-UP CONTRACTS Four contracts targeted to solve nuclear and radiation safety problems in Murmansk region were signed by Minatom of Russia and the UK Department of Trade and Industry in the course of the IAEA 17-th Contact Expert Group meeting held in Murmansk. RIA Novosti reports this as said by Viktor Akhunov, the head of department for ecology and decommissioning of nuclear facilities of Minatom of Russia. Akhunov said three contracts would deal with rehabilitation of the radioactive waste and irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) storage facility in Andreeva Bay, particularly, with the construction of roof over the dry storage section, examination of room # 5, and integrated inspection of the storage as a whole. The forth contract is to develop a ground storage facility for INF, which is presently stored on board of Lotta technical support ship. The Great Britain has allocated US$ 8 million as the first tranche to cope with the Andreeva Bay storage facility rehabilitation. Akhunov thinks, it is time to switch from the retired nuclear submarine disposition problems to that of off-shipment and disposal of INF stored in on-shore bases, especially in Andreeva Bay. There are 116 nuclear submarines retired from the Russian NAVY kept in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions; 58 of this amount have been disposed of completely with another 16 being in process. “This makes a half of all nuclear submarines subject to disposal of in the region, and we will solve the problem soon”, Minatom’s official promised. With this said, he stressed that the INF off-shipment problems were more complicated than nuclear submarine disposition. Before the operations start the risk and environmental impact assessments should be done and the infrastructure and safe conditions for the storage facility personnel should be created. “We would like to have the first INF train departed from Andreeva Bay in 2005 already, but only after all safety relevant documents have approved by independent regulators and are in place”, Akhunov said. Return to Menu 2. TVER RAILCAR-BUILDING PLANT RELEASES SIX INF SHIPPING RAILCARS November 20 Tver Railcar-Building Plant (TRBP) releases for operation a new train for shipments of nuclear submarine irradiated nuclear fuel, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Minatom of Russia press-service. Six special ТК-VG-18-2 cars have been manufactured under the Russia-US intergovernmental agreements on nuclear threat reduction. The railcar-building contract was signed between Atomspetstrans – the lead Minatom’s transport enterprise – and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the USA. The railcars passed a comprehensive set of bench and field tests and were certified against the requirements of the Russian Railroad Transport Certification Register. Each railcar can accommodate two 40-ton INF containers. The new railcars will significantly facilitate shipments of INF to storage and processing sites. Until now the shipment operations have used two trains of eight railcars each four of which had been built also by Tver Railcar-Building Plant in 2001 with the Norwegian money. Minatom’s officials, representatives of other Russian ministries and agencies and the US side, will attend the inauguration of six more railcars. Return to Menu 3. IAEA CONTACT EXPERT GROUP TO VISIT INF STORAGE IN ANDREEVA BAY Russia intends to weight its nuclear and radiation safety activities with the world community's opinion, RIA Novosty cites the RF Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Sergei Antipov as saying. The Deputy Minister participates in the 17-th meeting of the IAEA Contact Expert Group (CEG) opened in Murmansk. Antipov noted that the main meeting objective was "to bring to professional community's judgment the program and actual results of our efforts" to rehabilitate irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) storage facilities in Andreeva Bay and Gremikha as well as activities under the comprehensive nuclear submarine disposal program in this region. "We want to find out whether we were right in selecting our priorities and whether the pace we are keeping is adequate. In three days we will find it out and consider the opinion in our work", the Deputy Minister said. Antipov in his opening remarks noted that now the IAEA's activities had become more complicated because "a lot of entities involved in the work on nuclear and radiation safety issues emerged world-wide". He believes that in such situation CEG has to adjust its role and, in the scope of its competence, play the role of "professional experts and consultants". According to Alexander Ruzankin, the deputy head of department of economy in the Murmansk regional administration, the radiation safety issue is extremely acute for the Murmansk region. "In Kola Peninsula there are more than 200 nuclear reactors. About 60 nuclear submarines retired from the RF NAVY Northern Fleet require disposal of", he stressed. The IAEA CEG meeting will last for three days. The group includes experts from Russia, the USA, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the UK, Italy and observers from Japan. The CEG will discuss nuclear and radiation safety problems of the North-West of Russia and next year plans. On November 20 the CEG members will visit the storage facility in Andreeva Bay. Return to Menu 4. MINATOM RELEASES SUB DECOMMISSIONING FIGURES AND ADMITS TO PROBLEMS REPROCESSING NAVAL FUEL MURMANSK - Victor Akhunov, head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy's Department of Ecology and Nuclear Installation Decommissioning, released Tuesday the most up-to-date figures yet on decommissioned submarines that are awaiting dismantlement with their nuclear fuel still on board, how many had already been destroyed, and said that reprocessing spent nuclear fuel at the Urals Mayak Chemical Combine is becoming problematic. According to Akhunov, who was speaking at the 17th meeting of the Contact Expert Group, or CEG, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, Russia has 200 tonnes of spent naval fuel that it has scant chance of being reprocessed, calling the apparent backlog Minatom's "most difficult current challenge." The CEG conference began Tuesday in this far northern city and will run through Thursday. In his statement at the meeting of the CEG—a 17-country group formed by the IAEA to coordinate nuclear waste management efforts in Russia—Akhunov seemed to be opening the door to an interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility on the Kola Peninsula, an idea advocated by Bellona and other environmental groups for years. Akhunov said that the cask method of storage for spent naval fuel on a temporary basis would be best and looked to cask pads at Atomflot—Murmansk's nuclear icebreaker service and repair company—and Severodvinsk as the most likely candidates. The casks and pads are a system whereby spent nuclear fuel is kept in specially designed casks that are then set on specially designed pads that monitor the casks for radiation leakage. Akhunov also said a cask and pad system in the Far East, for Russia's even more dilapidated Pacific Fleet could also be used for temporary spent fuel storage while submarines in that area were dismantled. As for the sheer number of submarines that have been decommissioned from the Soviet-era figure of 250, Akhunov said that 192 have been taken out of service, 116 of those in the Northern Fleet. Overall, 91 submarines have been dismantled, 58 of those being Northern Fleet submarines. Seventy-one submarines that have been taken out of active service await dismantlement with their spent fuel still on board. Of those, 36 are located in the Northern Fleet in bases on the Kola Peninsula and Arkhangelsk region. According to figures compiled by Bellona, Akhunov's figures are accurate. "Taking into account [the situation] the first time we met, we have achieved all of this with your help," said Akhunov to the assembled members of the CEG on Tuesday. "I hope this meeting will provide impetus to continue work with these countries." The scope of the current—and coming—nuclear pile up In the same optimistic note, Akhunov said that "sooner or later, Gremikha and Andreyeva bay will be taken away." He was referring to the Kola Peninsula's two notorious nuclear waste dumps, which are both littered with spent nuclear fuel, and solid and liquid radioactive waste. Andreyeva Bay, where spent nuclear fuel assemblies from submarines are kept, is the site of a notorious 1983 leak, when the site's building No5 was issuing some 30 tonnes of radioactive water a day. It is located some 60 kilometres east of the Norwegian border. Gremikha Naval Base, lies on the eastern shore of the Kola Peninsula and is used as a storage site for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel produced by Russia's Northern Fleet. The base made international headlines on August 30th when one of its rust-bucket subs, the K-159, sank in the Barents Sea while being towed to the Polyarny shipyard near Murmansk, killing nine of the 10 crew members on board. The sub, which was still loaded with spent nuclear fuel, sank in 240 metres of water. Located 350 kilometres from the Kola Inlet near Murmansk, Gremikha is not connected to the rest of the peninsula by roads, leaving boats and air travel as the only means to reach it. Gremikha houses some 800 spent fuel assemblies containing some 1.4 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel rods, as well as six reactor cores with liquid metal coolant that were taken out of Alpha class nuclear submarines. In addition to this, there are still two nuclear submarines containing their spent nuclear fuel moored at Gremikha's piers. Akhunov stressed that an effective storage for solid radioactive waste is hindered by technological shortfalls and proposed that the next CEG meeting be devoted exclusively to developing waste storage know-how and machinery. It is not yet known when the CEG will next meet. "There will be more subs coming out of service and waste builds up," he said. "That's why we are talking about compacting [solid radwaste]." According to Akhunov, this is a project—which would literally crush radwaste like a car in a junk-yard—that would be carried out with the assistance of Germany, which just signed off on a €300m deal to clean up Saida Bay—where more than 50 submarine reactor compartments filled with radioactive waste are stored afloat. Prior to the German contribution, said Akhunov, Minatom "had no hope of dealing with loose reactor compartments" that are in Saida Bay. Other items on the CEG agenda Alexander Ruzankin, first deputy economic director of the Murmansk Regional Administration, echoed this sentiment in his opening statements to the CEG gathering. "We have come together to see how we can put this group into contact with other groups," he said. He pointed to the May signing of the Multilateral Nuclear and Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation, or MNEPR—of which 10 European countries, two pan-European entities and the United States are signatories—as an example of effecting more bilateral and multilateral nuclear cleanup efforts in Russia. Ruzankin also drew attention to an underlying question about MNEPR that has lingered since its inception: Who will decide the spending priorities of the programme? With the signing of MNEPR some €62m was made available within the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, or NDEP,fund for nuclear cleanup in Northwest Russia under this European programme's "nuclear window." Since the signing of MNEPR, donations have flowed in and the current total available for nuclear cleanup projects now tops €140m. A primary task of the three-day conference, said Ruzankin, is to reach a consensus on creating an oversight group for that money and establishing funding and project priorities. Who to let in But regardless of the money that Europe is currently showering on the nuclear safety problem in Northwest Russia, Moscow and donor states will still face the dilemma of access, said Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Sergei Antipov. "It's one of out biggest problems," he said in an interview on the sidelines of the conference's opening. He said the Russian Ministry of Defence has to decide whether it is better to let donor nations into sensitive sites or not. Antipov boiled the dilema down to a simple, black and white choice. "If we let them in, we get the money," he said. "If we don't let them in, we don't get the money." Return to Menu C. Chemical Weapons Destruction 1. OVER 500 TONS OF YPERITE DISPOSED IN RUSSIA'S SARATOV REGION SARATOV, November 18, 2003 (RIA Novosti) - All the stockpiles of yperite, i.e. 622.3 tons, have been disposed of at a chemical weapons disposal facility in the village of Gorny in Russia's Saratov region, on the Volga. The facility began removing the yperite disposal line from service, the local inter-regional information and analytical centre for the safe storage and disposal of chemical weapons told RIA Novosti. The fact is of an immense importance, said the centre's experts. Moscow thereby proved that it had fulfilled the international Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons. Return to Menu D. Spent Fuel Disposition 1. ENVIRONMENTALISTS TO RAISE AWARENESS OF THE IMPORT OF NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL BEFORE ELECTIONS Action-days have been initiated by Ecodefense, Russia's national anti-nuclear group, campaigning since 1998 against the importing of nuclear waste to Russia. Ecodefense announced actions would take place in as many as 20 large cities. On November 25th, environmental activists across Russia will stage protests against the import of nuclear waste. Actions will also be focused on informing voters about parliamentarians' positions on the nuclear waste import issue. Two weeks ahead of the December 7th elections to the State Duma, lower house of the Russian Parliament. Russian environmental groups will organise protests, rallies, actions and performances aimed at informing voters across country on the candidates’ positions on nuclear waste issue. In 2001, the Russian Parliament approved legislation allowing the nuclear industry to import high-level radioactive waste (spent nuclear fuel). At the same time, nearly 90% of citizens expressed their opposition to the new legislation, holding hundreds of actions all across the country. The parliament ignored mass public opinion. More than 50 environmental groups are campaigning to inform citizens on the position of members of parliament on various environmental issues. Nuclear waste is the priority issue. The campaign is targeted at building of strong civil society by forcing parliamentarians to be more responsible. The Russian nuclear industry has announced it will import over 20,000 tonnes of nuclear waste from across the world for long-term storage in the hope of earning nearly $20 billion for new reactor construction and spent fuel reprocessing. At the same time, for the past several years the nuclear industry has been under strong public pressure, and cannot find new customers for its spent fuel services. "The new elections are coming, and we have to remind voters which Duma members voted in favour of the import of nuclear waste. Through effective public pressure we have to force the new parliament to disapprove the nuclear waste legislation as amoral and anti-democratic", Ecodefense said. Return to Menu E. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. TOO LOOSE NUKES? Efforts to secure rusting, insecure Soviet-era radioactive material got a boost recently, when Congress fully funded the administration's request for the Nunn-Lugar non-proliferation program. The House had intended to cut $29 million from the administration's funding request, but the Senate prevailed, securing the full $451 million. When this figure is combined with Department of Energy's global non-proliferation initiatives and modest spending by the State Department, the United States will contribute a total of about $10 billion over ten years to the Global Partnership, which has a $20 billion non-proliferation fund. Washington has contributed about $1 billion annually to non-proliferation efforts in the past, but funding was only committed in short-term increments. America's 10-year commitment will allow experts to form long-term plans. Other G-8 countries have pledged to match the United States' 10-year funding, with Russia committing $2 billion. This is welcome news. Still, non-proliferation experts describe a worrisome global scenario for nuclear security. Although constructive steps are being taken to secure reactors and weapons sites with fissile material, the program's success relies to some degree on good luck. According to the Strengthening the Global Partnership report, which was compiled by 21 research institutes in 16 European, Asian and North American countries, only 17 percent of Russia's 600 tons of nuclear material and 10 percent of its 20,000 warheads are in facilities which have had comprehensive security upgrades. The situation in former Soviet states outside of Russia is even more worrisome. Research reactors in Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Belarus are considered very insecure. Terrorists would have to successfully raid multiple sites to get the necessary 25 pounds of highly enriched uranium to make a suitcase bomb. But less is needed for a dirty bomb, which would combine conventional explosives with uranium. The effectiveness of a dirty bomb would depend on a wide range of factors, including weather. But the psychological impact of such an attack would be intense, and the necessary clean-up would likely be very expensive. Also worrisome is how easily transportable uranium is. Fuel rods thrown in the back of a pick-up truck would pose no real danger to its transporters. And though some border posts in the former Soviet Union have nuclear detection devices, there are numerous potential exit routes for smugglers. In Abkhazia, a breakaway province of Georgia which has been in effect run by separatists since 1993, up to 2 pounds of highly enriched uranium from an abandoned facility has disappeared without a trace. The outlook on global non-proliferation efforts is mixed. The United States, along with partners such as Norway, has made concerted efforts. These efforts are racing against cagey enemies who appear to have opportunities for considerable mischief, if not mass destruction. Return to Menu 2. WEAPONS OF MASS DISPOSAL: DESTROYING DANGEROUS ARMS MONEY WELL SPENT It's a netherworld scenario: weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. The consequences of the unthinkable finally seem to have registered with a hardheaded Congress, which after months of delay recently restored the full $451 million that the Bush administration had requested for a program to destroy nuclear and chemical weapons. While the program is aimed mostly at weapons stored insecurely in the former Soviet Union, the Congress went a step farther. Lawmakers smartly expanded the weapons disposal program beyond the countries of the former Soviet Union and earmarked $50 million to aid any foreign government destroy weapons of mass destruction. This is progress, but not a remedy to the elevated dangers of loose nukes and chemical weapons in the wrong hands. In light of known efforts by al-Qaeda to obtain weapons of mass destruction, the pace of securing stockpiles is frightfully slow. Considerable work lies ahead in Russia, where loosely secured stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons containing sarin, VX gas and other hellish brews, remain prime terrorist targets. Joseph Cirincione, a weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, now places Russia's substantial and poorly protected stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons at the top of his list of proliferation worries. The prospect of terrorists obtaining these weapons is chillingly high and the consequences exceedingly grave. The only certain way to end this threat is to have nothing for terrorists to obtain, and the U.S. commitment to this effort is woefully inadequate given the perils that terrorism poses. While a start, $451 million is a mere fraction of what is required to destroy weapons of mass destruction stockpiled around the globe. For example, about 14 percent of Russia's chemical weapons are stored in warehouses in Shchuch'ye. Destroying those weapons will cost several hundred million more. In a world where a single terrorist can do great harm to millions of innocent people, the United States must not retreat from this critical mission to eliminate the weapons that terrorists demonically crave. Return to Menu F. U.S. -- Russia 1. WORLD STABILITY HUGELY DEPENDS ON RUSSIA-US RELATIONS MOSCOW, November 18, 2003 (RIA Novosti) - The settlement of regional problems, as well as stability and predictability in the world as a whole, depend in many respects on relations between Russia and the United States. This opinion was expressed by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, when addressing the international conference devoted to the 70th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The minister reminded the audience that during the past seven decades there had been many sharp changes in relations between Russia and the USA. Depending on the situation in the world, either economic or political, or military-strategic aspects came to the foreground. "Fortunately, the logic of the Cold War is already history," said Ivanov. He underscored that today relations between Russia and the USA are entering a brand new level of trustful, mutually advantageous and predictable partnership. "In our new relations, mutual respect is combined with the understanding of each other's specific national interests," said Ivanov. He noted that it was especially important now that there are so many unsettled regional problems and real threats to security. "New threats and challenges also add to this situation, such as terrorism, extremism and the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," the minister said. "But these threats are of another kind, they have nothing to do with the nature of relations between Russia and the USA. On the contrary, the unification of Russia and the USA in the face of these threats is of an imperative character," said the minister. Return to Menu G. Russia -- Iran 1. MINATOM DENIES RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN SUPPLYING IRAN WITH EQUIPMENT FOR ENRICHING URANIUM Translated by RANSAC Staff Moscow. 20 November. Interfax – MinAtom RF denies Russian participation in supplying Iran with equipment and technologies for enriching uranium. “Russia did not supply Iran with such equipment,” – declared to “Interfax” head of the department for information politics of MinAtom RF Nikolai Shingarev, commenting on a statement appearing in the Western press on Thursday, which cites the claim of an anonymous diplomatic source. As this source stated, the IAEA thinks that Russia, China and Pakistan possibly supplied Iran with equipment and technologies for enriching uranium. In the words of N. Shingarev, in the 90’s Russian enterprises concluded agreements with their Iranian colleagues for the supplying of electronic equipment for research goals, which fully complied with existing norms of international law on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. “However, due to the decision of the Russian government these agreements were not realized,” – he emphasized. “Iran, as is regulated, notified the IAEA of these documents,” noted N. Shingarev, stating the opinion that this, most likely, is the origin of the supposition of Russian participation in supplying such equipment. He also declared that, “the discovery by IAEA inspectors in Iran of centrifuges for enriching uranium has no relation to Russia.” N. Shingarev stated that in the session of the IAEA Board of Governors on Thursday in Vienna, the head of the agency, Muhammed al-Baradei declared that, “at the current time we [the IAEA – IF] have no proof that the earlier actions of Iran were connected with a nuclear weapons program.” The head of the IAEA acknowledged in his declaration the existence of some violations on the part of Iran in the area of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, however he noted the existence of changes in the situation in the country in recent times. In his words, since February Iran has operated with full openness for the IAEA. M. al-Baradei also thinks that in order to make a final determination of Iran’s participation or non-participation in a nuclear weapons program, more effort and more time is needed. Return to Menu 2. RUSSIA ID'D AS AN IRAN ATOMIC SUPPLIER VIENNA, Austria (AP) -- The International Atomic Energy Agency has identified Russia, China and Pakistan as probable suppliers of some of the technology Iran used to enrich uranium in its suspect nuclear programs, diplomats told The Associated Press on Thursday. The disclosure came as the IAEA board discussed how to react to Iran's nuclear activities. The board is debating the wording of a resolution that would satisfy both U.S. calls for strong condemnation of Iran's past cover-ups and European desires to keep Iran cooperating by focusing on its recent openness. While Iran has acknowledged nearly two decades of concealment, it has recently begun cooperating with the agency in response to international pressure. As part of that cooperation, it has suspended uranium enrichment -- an activity that the United States had linked to what it says was Iran's nuclear weapons agenda. Iran insists it enriched uranium only to produce power. While acknowledging that some of its enrichment equipment had traces of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, it insists those traces were inadvertently imported on material it purchased abroad. Iran has said it cannot identify the countries of origin because it bought the centrifuges and laser enrichment equipment through third parties. The Vienna-based IAEA needs to establish where the equipment came from, however, to ascertain whether Iran is telling the truth about the source of the traces. The diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, declined to say how the agency established the probable origin of the equipment. For its part, Pakistan has denied all involvement in Iran's enrichment program. Moscow's public nuclear link with Tehran is a still-to-be-finalized $800 million deal to help build Iran's first nuclear reactor. The United States says the facility in Bushehr on the Persian Gulf could help Iran develop weapons. The Kremlin has said it shares some of the U.S. concerns and has prodded Tehran to accept tighter IAEA controls. The IAEA meeting lasted less than two hours, with discussions set to continue Friday. The discussions were being held behind closed doors but the Vienna-based agency released a copy of the opening remarks by Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. ElBaradei told the agency's 35-nation board of governors that he expected it to address ``the bad news and the good news.'' ``The bad news is that there have been failures and breaches. The good news is that there has been a new chapter in cooperation,'' he said. ``There is an intensive discussion right now on the draft resolution. The latest version being discussed is quite strong.'' Still, the agency doesn't know if Iran has tried to build nuclear weapons. That, he told the board, ``will take some time and much verification effort.'' But he welcomed Tehran's recent cooperation with the agency. ``The situation has changed significantly since the middle of last month, when a new chapter of implementation of safeguards in Iran seems to have begun, a chapter that is characterized by active cooperation and openness on the part of Iran,'' he said. The United States had hoped the IAEA board would find Tehran in noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at its meeting. Diplomats described Thursday's talks as ``very fluid,'' suggesting there was an effort to close the gap between the U.S. and European approaches on how to deal with Iran. On Wednesday, Washington rejected a proposed European draft resolution that would urge Iran to continue cooperation with the agency but refrain from harshly condemning it for concealing parts of its nuclear program, saying it was prepared to opt for no resolution rather than a toothless one. Drawn up by France, Germany and one of Washington's closest allies, Britain, the rough draft minimized nearly two decades of covert nuclear programs that the U.S. administration says point to an effort to develop nuclear weapons. Instead, it focused on positive steps taken by Iran over the past few weeks to deflect international suspicions, including suspending uranium enrichment and agreeing to inspections on demand by IAEA inspectors. A senior diplomat, who reported on the meeting on condition of anonymity, said a compromise resolution satisfying both sides was now in the works. Whereas the initial European wording chastised Iran for ``failure to fulfill its obligations,'' new discussion focused on stronger language -- either including past ``noncompliance'' of IAEA agreements by Iran, or finding it in ``breach of its obligations.'' Both would be more acceptable to the United States and its allies, the diplomat said. Return to Menu 3. Russia, Iran again put off pact on nuke reactor Russia and Iran have again put off the signing of an agreement that would clear the way for Moscow to complete construction of the Islamic state's first nuclear power reactor, a top minister said Wednesday. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said that the Iranian side had been "too busy" with preparing documents for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on its nuclear program to work on the agreement for the Bushehr power reactor. Russia has said it would not deliver any fuel for the Bushehr reactor until Tehran signs the agreement, under which it would agree to return all of the reactor's spent fuel back to Russia. "Fuel will not be needed at Bushehr for a while, deliveries will not begin until next year, so we have at least three months to prepare to sign the agreement," Rumyantsev told the ITAR-TASS news agency. Russia has been building the Bushehr reactor over strong objections from the United States and Israel who fear that Tehran could use it as a front for a nuclear weapons program. Rumyantsev's comments came a day before IAEA, the Vienna-based UN nuclear watchdog, is due to meet to discuss Iran's nuclear programme, amid US allegations that the clerical regime's bid to generate atomic energy is merely a cover for nuclear weapons development. Iran last month agreed to meet a raft of IAEA demands including the suspension of uranium enrichment, but insists that its pledge to suspend its controversial work on the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle is voluntary and temporary and could be reversed at any time. On Wednesday, Iran's top national security official said Tehran would refuse any further IAEA demands to halt its uranium enrichment activities. "We have said clearly that any phrase in a resolution aimed at transforming the voluntary pledge by Iran to suspend uranium enrichment into a legal obligation will be unacceptable to us," the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, was quoted as saying by the official news agency IRNA. Return to Menu H. Russia -- Korea 1. RUSSIA MINISTRY READY FOR EXPERT HELP IN 6-WAY TALKS ON NKOREA MOSCOW, November 19 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's Minister for Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev said on Wednesday that his ministry was ready to render "every kind of assistance" to the six-party commission on the nuclear problem of North Korea. That could include "possible expert opinions and assessments," the minister specified. "If requested, we are ready to render every kind of assistance," Rumyantsev told Itar-Tass. A new round of talks, bringing together North Korea, the USA, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea is expected to be held in Beijing in mid-December. Rumyantsev stressed, however, that for the past ten years Russia "has had absolutely no contacts in the atomic energy sphere" with North Korea. "Since we found out that the KEDO consortium did not need us, our cooperation was fully stopped," the minister added. In the Soviet era, cooperation with North Korea in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was quite active. The then Soviet Union helped North Korea build a nuclear power station, which was then halted. In 1992, contacts between Russia and North Korea were stopped. One of the reasons behind that was the setting up of the international consortium KEDO with participation of the USA, South Korea and Japan. The consortium declared its plans to supply North Korea with two light-water reactors, which were expected to replace the existing reactors, potentially capable to produce weapons grade plutonium. However, that project was not implemented. Return to Menu 2. RUSSIA, SOUTH KOREA WELCOME CONTINUED NUCLEAR DIALOGUE ON KOREA PENINSULA MOSCOW, November 18 (RIA Novosti) - Following an official visit to Russia by South Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yun Yong-kwan over November 16-18, the Russian foreign ministry has issued a relevant statement. Russia and South Korea welcome prospects for continued nuclear dialogue on the Korea peninsula, voting for a peaceful settlement, the peninsula's nuclear-free status and security guarantees for all the states here. The negotiators dwelt at length on Russian-Korean relations, the situation on the Korea peninsula and international problems of mutual interest. The participants noted the intensive development of bilateral political dialogue and expressed readiness to continue policies consolidating constructive partnership between the two countries. Regarding economic cooperation, encouragement was given to major joint projects, including the gas one, the reconstruction of the trans-Korea railway and its linking with the trans-Siberian railway. Moscow is also banking on Korea's wider investment in Russia who, for its part, "is ready to take further steps to impart a long-term wide-scale scope to economic bonds with the Republic of Korea", says the document. Return to Menu I. Russia -- China 1. ASE PRESENTED RUSSIA-DESIGNED VVER-1000 REACTOR IN CHINA November 17 JSC Atomstroyexport held a presentation of the Russian light water VVER-1000 reactor design in China in frames of the spinning off nuclear-power build-up program. As RF Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Vladimir Asmolov told in interview to Nuclear.Ru, Russia would participate in all new tenders to be called for by China and which are also to be participated by French, American and Japanese companies. "Now two power units are constructed to our designs in China and it is highly likely that we will build two more units at the same site", Asmolov said. He also said Minatom of Russia planned for a wider presentation in China of Russia's reactor building capabilities, in particular the light water trend. "We want to present two types of 1,000-megawatt reactors, and I am certain that within two coming years they will merge in a sort of integral design in Russia", the Deputy Minister noted adding that a certain difference in approaches should be overcome first for this to happen. In both designs the reactor installations are similar and the difference is only in the engineered solution of the sub-station. "These two units -VVER-92 and VVER-9199, which was offered for the Finnish tender - are the most advanced technologies and if we were to merge them, this would produce a perfect nuclear power unit, which would be competitive at any tender", Asmolov stressed. He also said that Minatom of Russia planned to offer in China the medium-power VVER-640 reactor, which had been designed for Leningrad nuclear power plant site. Asmolov believes that in countries and regions with underdeveloped power grids and where 1,000-megawatt reactors are unusable because of that, as in the northern regions of China, the units with lower power capacity will certainly be of interest. Lastly, the Deputy Minister said China would be familiarized with 1,500-megawatt reactor design (VVER-1500) but for another purpose, i.e. to propose to the Chinese side to jointly finalize the design. "The matter is to attract investments since neither Minatom nor Rosenergoatom have funds to develop the design as it should be", Asmolov explained. Return to Menu J. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. RUSSIA DEVELOPS MISSILE SPACE DEFENCE SYSTEM MOSCOW, November 20, 2003. (RIA Novosti). Russian space forces made six and helped conduct nine launches of booster rockets this year. Thirty space devices of various designation have been placed in orbit. Commander of Space Forces Anatoly Perminov cited these figures at a session of the Military Council. According to him, great attention was paid this year to the modernisation and development of the country's missile space defence. The commander believes the commissioning of a Volga radar station on the Belarussian territory was the most weighty achievement in this sphere. He also stressed that the numerical strength of the Russian orbital group was not reduced this year, and "a tangible step forward was made in creating new space complexes and systems." Return to Menu 2. DEFENCE MINISTER ON HIGH LEVEL OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR POTENTIAL MOSCOW, November 18, 2003 (RIA Novosti correspondent Alexei Berezin) - Maintenance of the strategic nuclear forces' potential at the level of guaranteed accomplishment of the nuclear deterrence tasks is ensured, Russia's Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov said on Tuesday in his report On the Main Results of the Formation and Development of the Russian Armed Forces in 2003 at the assembly of the Defence Ministry's command personnel. "President of Russia Vladimir Putin said about some new elements in our nuclear policy at the conference on October 2, 2003", Ivanov recalled. According to him, the further strengthening of the potential and the enhancement of combat readiness of the permanent readiness formations and units was the main priority of combat and mobilisation readiness in the general-purpose forces. "This is the strategic line in the development of the general purpose forces for the foreseeable future, and appreciable positive results were attained in this direction", Ivanov said. But he noted that, despite the measures taken, the tasks of maintaining the troops' combat and mobilisation readiness at a proper level have not been accomplished in full. Combat readiness of the permanent readiness formations and units at the level of demands made was ensured in the Far-Eastern military district alone so far. "In all the other military districts the provision of permanent readiness formations and units with officers and serviceable arms and military equipment have not been fully addressed," Ivanov stressed addressing the military districts' commanders. Return to Menu 3. IVANOV: REARMAMENT OF ARMY, NAVY REMAINS MAJOR PROBLEM MOSCOW, November 18 (Itar-Tass) - Rearmament of the Russian armed forces remains a major problem, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said at a conference of senior Russian military on Tuesday. The conference was attended by President Vladimir Putin. "Acceptable conditions have been created only for coping with the mission of nuclear deterrence and with counter-terrorist and peace-keeping operations," Ivanov said. About the country's capabilities to finance the Defense Ministry in the short term Ivanov said only gradual rearmament of permanent combat readiness units was realistic for the time being. "In general, 70-85 percent of armaments and military equipment is in proper condition, and the share of advanced military hardware is less than 20 percent," he said. Ivanov admitted that the aging of armaments and military equipment in use by the Russian armed forces had failed to be stopped to this day. Some military districts, including Moscow, North Caucasus, and Siberian districts - failed to pay proper attention to routine maintenance as the main means of supporting military equipment in combat-ready condition. Ivanov asked his deputy, chief of armaments Colonel-General Alexey Moskovsky to thoroughly revise research and development work in progress and to close down those projects that have lasted for years without yielding any practical results. Return to Menu 4. PUTIN: ARMY MUST BE READY TO WARD OFF THREATS OF TOMORROW MOSCOW, November 18 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian army must be "ready for warding off threats of tomorrow, and not for wars of the past century", president Vladimir Putin told a meeting at the Defense Ministry on Tuesday. Putin declared then that radical reforms in the armed forces turned into a process of consistent, long-term transformations with the aim to enhance the army possibilities. Putin reminded of the fact that modernisation of the armed forces alongside with the task to double the Gross Domestic Product was one of the main tasks set forth to the country. Putin said it was important to strictly observe all the parameters and schedules set and by the year 2007 Russia should complete the formation of contract army units that should be in permanent combat readiness. The structure of the army, its defence possibilities, the tactics employed should be mobile and flexible, the president said. The president also stressed that no major cuts in the Russian army were planned. Commenting on forces of nuclear deterrence, Putin reminded of the fact that Russia possesses a considerable reserve of heavy, land-based strategic missiles (CC-19) that constitute the army long-term reserve and enable to carry on a planned and systemised research for creation of weapons of the 21st century, The president declared that he would exercise strict control over the implementation of these plans. Putin said it was necessary to analyze the inventory of army property, in order to remove the non-essential facilities which siphon off the military budget. "Stock-taking and optimization of army property remains the issue which requires the most serious analysis," president said. "The army should scrap non-specialized facilities, foremost utilities, whose maintenance involves excessive expenditure, and, on the whole, siphons off the military budget," Putin noted. The president also mentioned the problems of logistics and technical support. "It is necessary to create uniform systems adequate to the demands of both peaceful and war times," he emphasized, adding that "there is no place for narrow departmental interests or ambitions here." The General Staff plays the key role in this sphere, the head of state emphasized. He said the transfer to uniform systems must not be used as a pretext for setting the army command's responsibility to lower tiers in the material and technical and medical support of the troops under their command. Return to Menu 5. RETRIEVAL OF RHSS FROM TAMPERED LIGHTHOUSES STARTED November 12 and 13 the surveying division of the Russian NAVY Northern Fleet (NF) during the scheduled inspection of navigation equipment detected tampered radioisotope (radionuclide) thermoelectric generators (RTG) in two lighthouses supporting navigation in the northern coast of Kola Peninsula and the isle of Uzhny Goryachinsky, as RIA Novosti reports citing the Murmansk regional administration's information policy department. All generators' parts and one set of the depleted uranium shielding are stolen. Vladimir Kozlovski, the nuclear and radiation safety consultant of the Murmansk region economy department, said the NF had devised a detailed plan of retrieving two radioisotope heat sources (RHS) - the energy generators for lighthouses of this type - which had been left by thieves near the tampered lighthouses. He also noted that the incident posed no hazard to the Murmansk region population mainly because there were no any settlements in the incident area. An RHS is the 1-liter-size can containing strontium-90 with half-life of 26.5 years. RHS surface temperature can be 500 degrees Celsius. On the ground the RHS radiation dose rate is up to 1,000 roentgens per hour. "Staying closer than 500 meters from the source is dangerous for humans and animals", Kozlovski explained. He said the operations to retrieve RHSs and place them into safe containers followed by shipment to one of the Murmansk region storage facilities would start on November 18 already. Eventually, the RHS containers will be shipped by special vehicles to PA Mayak for the long-term safe storage. Kozlovski reminded that this was the second incident. The first occurred near the city of Kandalaksha in 2002 resulting in three RTGs ransacked. Evidently, the ransackers are mainly attracted by non-ferrous metals used in their shells in large amounts. Kozlovski thinks the thieves were exposed to a high radiation dose and only after they have been put into custody and examined by physicians one can say to what degree it could be damaging to their health. Currently, there is a joint Russia-Norway program underway to rule out the potential threat of radioactive contamination of the environment in the Murmansk region. The program was launched in 2001 to subsequently replace RTGs with solar batteries at the rate of 20 RTGs a year. Kozlovski said 45 RTGs had been disposed of in the Murmansk region by the date with 108 more, including the two ransacked, to be done with this month. "The thermoelectric nuclear generators were designed back in the 1960s and at that time no one could foresee someone to break and ransack them", Kozlovski stressed. However, ITAR-TASS reports the Russian NAVY press-service November 18 in its statement discarded mass media publications on an alleged "severe radiation accident" occurred to the Northern Fleet due to the tampering of two RTGs. Still, the fact of generators' tamper is confirmed and the NF force is reported to secure the scene. The survey of nearby territory detected no radiation contamination of the environment. Return to Menu K. Russian Nuclear Industry 1. NEXT STAGE OF KURSK-5 CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION STARTED Rosenergoatom Concern has started the next stage of construction completion of Kursk nuclear power unit five, the Rosenergoatom’s press-center reports. In mid-2003 three major facilities were commissioned: the unit water supply channel was filled with water, and two pumping stations were commissioned – make-up and plant fire extinguishing. With these facilities in place, the construction, assembling and wiring works can be done on a wider scale, while their safety being properly maintained. 1000-megawatt Kursk-5 is one of the largest Rosenergoatom’s and Russian nuclear complex facilities close to completion (about 70%). The unit expected to join the grid in 2006 will make up for electricity deficit in Central-Black Soil region. Kursk-5 is the third generation installation having principally new neutronics and equipped with advanced control and protection systems. The unit is built to introduce the new nuclear power safety concept. Gosatomnadzor of Russia issued the license to finalize construction of the nuclear power unit in 2002. Return to Menu 2. UNPTE WILL DISCUSS NUCLEAR INVESTMENTS The Union of Nuclear Power Territories and Enterprises (UNPTE) governing board will hold its meeting in on November 21, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Minatom’s press-service. The meeting is to be attended by heads of Federal Subjects, members of the Federal Council, the State Duma and Minatom’s of Russia top officials. The meeting is expected to discuss the progress and prospects of nuclear power development and the issue of developing an effective investment mechanism for nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycle. This mechanism is necessary to keep up with the pace of nuclear power development as set in the Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020. The meeting will elect the chairman of governing board of the Union of Nuclear Power Territories and Enterprises. Return to Menu 3. NCCP FUEL PELLET RECYCLING LINE APPROACHED DESIGN CAPACITY One of the lines at Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant (NCCP) - shop # 1 - had achieved the design production capacity in "wet" recycling of fuel pellets, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by NCCP press-service. In fact, two processing lines, one of which has been commissioned this May, process recycled pellets to get ceramic-grade uranium dioxide with subsequent return of the product to the plant's process cycle. The lines guarantee 90 % good quality outcomes. The product self-cost has also reduced and now equals that of Ust-Kamenogorsk Metallurgical Works and is the lowest in Russia. Previously NCCP was assembling the fuel bundles only, now it is capable of fabricating all necessary components: from powder through fuel bundles. In addition, NCCP has declared a new quality assurance policy: the plant intends to bring its quality management system into compliance with requirements of international standards ISO-9000 and IAEA, implement on a wider scale the overall quality management principles and enhance its effectiveness. New tasks has been also set: in 2004 develop a technology and master fabrication of uranium-molybdenum fuel rods for research reactors; introduce the corporate system for collection and analysis of information for efficient decision-making with the target to improve NCCP activities; complete the transition of the quality management system to ISO-9001/2000 in the forth quarter of 2003; certify the environment management system against ISO 14001/1996 in the first half of 2004; and develop a quality cost accounting mechanism. Return to Menu L. Official Statements 1. Daily Press Briefing (excerpted) [...] QUESTION: A few days ago, you mentioned a $16 million plan for Iraqi scientists. With respect to Iran, one of the things the IAEA has in the report is that Russia, Pakistan and China were some of the suppliers to Iran. Any feelings about, now it may not be government-to-government, but it could be some criminal elements, or could be just a commercial deal? Any plan to put in the report or suggestions on a resolution to go after some of these suppliers? MR. ERELI: That would be getting into a level of detail I just don't want to get into. [...] Return to Menu 2. Transcript of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Interview with CNN, Moscow, November 18, 2003 (excerpted) [...] Question: Iran has fulfilled the requirements put forward by the US. But the US is displeased all the same. Secretary of State Colin Powell said today Iraq is still intent on producing nuclear weapons. How do you look at the situation? Foreign Minister Ivanov: First of all I know of not a single country in the world that would advocate that Iran should possess nuclear weapons. We were all against nuclear weapons appearing in Iran and for its nuclear programs bearing an exclusively peaceful nature. This was from the outset our position, to which we have adhered. IAEA adopted a resolution embodying three provisions. First, that Iran should provide full information on all the previous and current nuclear programs being implemented in the country. Second, that Iran sign the Additional IAEA Safeguards Protocol. Third, that Iraq suspend uranium enrichment. Russia together with other countries actively worked with the Iranian leadership to get the fulfillment of all these provisions. We note with satisfaction that Iran gave consent to fulfill them. It has already furnished the IAEA with information on the previous and current nuclear programs, which is now being studied by IAEA inspectors. We shall wait for their assessments. Iran has notified the IAEA in writing that it accedes to the Additional Safeguards Protocol. In Moscow the representative of the Iranian leadership declared that Iran is suspending uranium enrichment. Therefore we consider that all the conditions, set forth not by Russia or the US or France, but by the IAEA, have been met. Now our task is to see that this Iranian stand becomes consolidated. If something in Iran's position does not satisfy somebody, it is important to understand what exactly. It seems to me that there should be no artificial whipping up of tensions; it is important to ensure that Iran keeps its pledges. This requires strict control, to be exercised by the IAEA. We shall be guided by the conclusions and analyses which will come from the IAEA representatives. Question: Why then is the US still expressing its displeasure? Foreign Minister Ivanov: It's hard for me to say. I think the decisions which the Iranian leadership took came as a bit of a surprise for Washington. It is not easy for the US to readjust the line it has been pursuing for the last few years. Question: So Iran has done too much in this field? Foreign Minister Ivanov: Anyway, for some people it came as a surprise. Question: How do you see the idea of imposing sanctions against Iran? Foreign Minister Ivanov: I now see no grounds to impose sanctions against Iran. On the contrary, if it fulfills all the obligations it has assumed to the IAEA, the world community in accordance with international agreements is duty bound to render Iran assistance in developing nuclear programs for peaceful purposes. This is an obligation of the international community. Russia will continue to cooperate with Iran, including in the nuclear field. [...] Return to Menu 3. Statement at the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute Tenth Anniversary Symposium It is a pleasure to be here with you today to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. Over the last decade, the Institute has made important contributions to the policy debates surrounding arms control, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Mike Moodie and his talented staff have been allies in numerous ventures directed toward safeguarding and eliminating weapons of mass destruction. They played a vital role in our efforts to secure United States Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They have made important contributions to the efforts of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye in Russia. In addition to Mike and his staff, I would like to recognize good friends such as Ron Lehman, Jim Woolsey, Brad Roberts, Richard Haas, John Hamre, and Joe Nye. Each has played an integral role in the debates that have defined U.S. policy in responding to the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. I urge all of you to fortify yourselves, because there will be many more policy battles in the future. Even in this age of terrorism, the magnitude of the threat posed by WMD [weapons of mass destruction] is not widely appreciated in this country or around the world. Even when the threat is understood, the political will to take action does not always materialize. The War on Terrorism proceeds in a world awash with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials. Most of these weapons and materials are stored in the United States and Russia, but they also exist in India, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, Israel, Great Britain, France, China, and perhaps other nations. Throughout much of the last decade, vulnerability to the use of weapons of mass destruction has been the Number One national security dilemma confronting the United States. The events of September 11 [2001] and the subsequent public discovery of al-Qaeda's methods, capabilities, and intentions finally brought our vulnerability to the forefront. We must anticipate that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction if allowed the opportunity. I believe the minimum standard for victory in this war is the prevention of any terrorist cell from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction. We must make certain that all sources of WMD are identified and systematically guarded or destroyed. To combat the WMD threat in the former Soviet Union, our country has implemented the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Nunn-Lugar has devoted American technical expertise and money for joint efforts to safeguard and destroy materials and weapons of mass destruction. During the first 10 years of Nunn-Lugar, 6,212 former Soviet nuclear warheads have been separated from missiles. Many of the warheads have been dismantled with their fissile material safely stored. In addition, the program has destroyed: 520 ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]; 451 ICBM silos; 122 strategic bombers; 624 nuclear air-launched cruise missiles; 445 SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]; 408 SLBM launchers; 27 strategic missile submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels. Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons-free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program. Nunn-Lugar also has worked to contain chemical and biological weapons in Russia. At least 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons have been stored in seven locations awaiting destruction. Although the status of biological weapons is less certain, Nunn-Lugar personnel are working at many bio-weapons sites to establish security controls and dismantle weapons infrastructure. Despite these successes, some areas need improvement. Last year new Nunn-Lugar projects in Russia were halted for more than six months because of the administration's decision not to certify that Russia had satisfied six legislatively mandated conditions. Resumption of assistance was possible only after Congress granted, and the president exercised, limited authority to waive the certification requirements in the interest of national security. This authority will expire again at the end of fiscal year 2005. President Bush has rightly requested that Congress make permanent the waiver authority. Unfortunately, Congress has denied this request to date. This bureaucratic logjam must be corrected. I share the policy goals associated with the certification requirements, but the elimination of weapons of mass destruction must be our top priority. Despite the tremendous progress realized by the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union, the United States continues to lack even minimal international confidence about many foreign weapons programs. In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans regarding further production or destruction programs. As the United States and our allies have sought to address the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the aftermath of September 11, we have come to the realization that, in many cases, we lack the appropriate tools to address these threats. Traditional avenues of approach such as arms control treaties and various multilateral sanction regimes have met with some success, but there is still much work to do. In some cases, it is unlikely that the existing multilateral frameworks and nonproliferation tools retain much utility. In fact, several nations have announced their intention to continue to flout international norms such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This must change. The problem we face today is not just terrorism; it is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. I have no doubt that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda will use weapons of mass destruction if they are able to steal, buy, or build them. It is equally clear that they have attempted to obtain them. Congress took important steps in the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Conference Report to respond to these threats. I commend Chairman John Warner [Republican senator of Virginia] and Ranking Member Carl Levin [Democratic senator of Michigan] for a bill that expands the president's authority to confront the threat posed by proliferation. The outcome was far from certain when the Senate and House passed divergent bills with respect to the Nunn-Lugar Program. The Senate bill included a provision that I had authored, known as "The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act." This provision gives the president the authority to use the Nunn-Lugar program beyond the former Soviet Union to address proliferation emergencies. The Senate bill also authorized continuation of chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye. Unfortunately, the House took a different approach, denying the administration the ability to use Nunn-Lugar worldwide and placing additional restrictions on chemical weapons destruction. In addition, the House bill restricted efforts to address biological weapon threats. In the end, however, the House and Senate conferees arrived at a compromise that will permit Nunn-Lugar to continue its important work and, where needed, to expand the winning strategy beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. As many of you know, I have been working with colleagues in the Senate to ensure that the United States continues its assistance in the area of chemical weapons destruction in Russia. In August, I saw first-hand the progress we have made toward building the unique technologies that will be used to neutralize the chemical munitions at Shchuchye. If current projections are met, the Shchuchye project will begin to destroy live agent in 2007 and the entire complex will be transferred to Russia in 2008. Assuming a destruction rate of 1,700 metric tons of nerve agent per year, it will take six-and-a-half years to destroy the nerve agent Russia stores at Shchuchye. When that task is complete, chemical weapons will be brought from other locations for elimination at Shchuchye. Despite the obvious national security benefits associated with destroying chemical weapons stockpiles in Russia, the project has faced intense political opposition in Congress and elsewhere. Opposition is all the more perplexing when one considers President Bush's strong commitment to the Nunn-Lugar program and our efforts at Shchuchye. I have spoken to the president about this issue on several occasions, and each time he has expressed his support and directed his national security team to assist in resolving bureaucratic and legislative obstacles. Despite the president's strong backing, Congress placed six conditions on U.S. assistance for chemical weapons destruction. Current law requires that the president certify that Russia is meeting each of the six conditions. Absent such a certification, funds cannot be obligated or expended for chemical weapons destruction. Last year, the administration did not certify that Russia was meeting its arms control obligations in this area. As a result, funding for this project was stopped until a waiver was passed. President Bush signed a waiver for that condition in January 2003. We would have faced a similar prospect this year, had the Defense Authorization bill not extended this authority through September 2005. To date, the Russians have worked to satisfy five of the six conditions, leaving one remaining barrier to U.S. assistance. The remaining condition requires the full and accurate disclosure of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile. As many of you know, there is disagreement over whether the Russian declaration under the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] is complete. It is very important to reach an acceptable conclusion to this matter this year. It cannot be set aside, as some Russians have proposed. Under the Global Partnership, known as "10 Plus 10 Over 10," G-8 leaders have pledged $20 billion over the next10 years for nonproliferation projects. Of this amount, a significant portion has been identified for chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye. Specifically, Canada has committed to fund road construction and facility security; the United Kingdom will contribute funds for critical engineering infrastructure projects; Italy will fund a gas pipeline and facility security; and France will provide secure containers for the shipment of chemical weapons to elimination. I am pleased that the international community is committed to success at Shchuchye. I will continue to work to provide the president with waiver authority so that the project at Shchuchye may continue. U.S. and Russian experts also must overcome the remaining obstacles to biological weapons proliferation cooperation. I have visited numerous facilities involved in the Soviet biological weapons program, including Obolensk and Vector. Cooperation is ongoing between the U.S. government and most of the facilities involved in the BIOPREPARAT network. American officials, scientists, and contractors are at these sites every day working closely with Russian colleagues to improve security, to take accurate inventories, and to engage former weapons scientists in peaceful projects. Unfortunately, four former military facilities continue to refuse cooperation with the Nunn-Lugar program. Some Russian leaders have maintained the audacious line that concern is unnecessary because a biological weapons program never existed in the Soviet Union. Our Russian partners must get over this denial and obfuscation. We are anxious to assist Russia in transforming these facilities to peaceful purposes. But success depends on honesty and transparency. As I mentioned earlier, the Defense Authorization Conference Report also contained "The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act," which permits President Bush to use up to $50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar funds for proliferation emergencies outside the former Soviet Union. I worked closely with the administration on this important issue and received the strong support of Dr. Rice and Secretary Powell. The continuing experience of Nunn-Lugar has created a tremendous nonproliferation asset for the United States. We have an impressive cadre of talented scientists, technicians, negotiators, and managers working for the Defense Department and for associated defense contractors who understand how to implement nonproliferation programs and how to respond to proliferation emergencies. The new authority will permit and facilitate the use of Nunn-Lugar expertise and resources when proliferation threats around the world are identified. Proliferation threats sometimes require an instantaneous response. We must not allow a proliferation or WMD threat to "go critical" because we lacked the foresight to empower the U.S. to respond. Under Nunn-Lugar the U.S. has undertaken time-sensitive missions like Project Sapphire in Kazakhstan and Operation Auburn Endeavor in Georgia that have kept highly vulnerable weapons and materials of mass destruction from being proliferated. The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible everywhere. Clearly, many states will continue to avoid accountability for programs related to weapons of mass destruction. When nations resist such accountability, other options must be explored. When governments continue to contribute to the WMD threat facing the United States, we must be prepared to apply diplomatic and economic power, as well as military force. Yet we should not assume that we cannot forge cooperative nonproliferation programs with some critical nations. The experience of the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that American contractors and DOD officials would be on the ground in Russia destroying thousands of strategic systems. If we are to protect ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new nonproliferation partners and aggressively pursue any nonproliferation opportunities that appear. Nunn-Lugar expansion authority is the first step down that road. Ultimately, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program. There are always risks when expanding a successful venture into new areas, but I don't believe we have a choice. We must give the administration the ability to interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This new venture, like its predecessor, will take time to organize and to establish operating procedures, but I am hopeful that a decade from now, we will look back on this effort and marvel at the successes we have enjoyed. For 10 years the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute has been on the leading edge of new strategies to combat weapons of mass destruction. I am heartened by your commitment to this important work and your enthusiasm to enter a second decade of close cooperation with us to address the threats facing the American people and the international community. I look forward to continuing my close association with the Institute and being here to celebrate many more anniversaries. Return to Menu 4. UK and Canada Cooperate to Assist Russia in Destroying Chemical Weapons The United Kingdom (UK) and Canada today signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Moscow on co-operation to support Russia in destroying its chemical weapons (CW) stocks. Canada will provide some C$33M (£15M) which the UK will manage on its behalf to carry out work in Russia. The Canadian funding will be used to finance the construction of an 18 kilometre railway which will transport munitions from the CW storage depot to the destruction facility at Shchuch'ye (Kurganskaya oblast). The project is part of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in June 2002 by G8 leaders, that commits the G8 to raise up to US $20 billion to support cooperation projects, initially in Russia, aimed at preventing the acquisition of weapons and materials of mass destruction by terrorists or those who shelter them. "I warmly welcome this Canadian initiative as a further important step in strengthening international co-operation to destroy chemical weapons. It is a very positive development for the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, which was launched at the G8 Summit in Canada in 2002," said Adam Ingram, UK's Armed Forces Minister. "The United Kingdom's willingness to facilitate Canada's first Global Partnership contribution at Shchuch'ye exemplifies the spirit of the Global Partnership", said Canadian Ambassador to Russia Christopher Westdal, who signed the MOU on behalf of Canada. "Our agreement with the UK, which is allowing Canada to make this significant contribution to Russian chemical weapons destruction before conclusion of our own legal agreement with Russia, demonstrates the shared commitment of our two countries to ensuring the earliest possible destruction of nerve agents at Shchuch'ye". "The UK and Canada have each already undertaken a number of projects to assist Russia in dealing with the legacy of the Cold War. This will be our biggest project yet in the field of chemical weapon destruction. We look forward to working in partnership with our Canadian and Russian colleagues in implementing this project," said Sir Roderic Lyne, the British Ambassador to Moscow, who signed the MOU on behalf of the UK. The project will be managed as part of the UK MOD's assistance programme, under the terms of the UK-Russia bilateral Treaty, and will be implemented by the UK's principal contractor, Bechtel Ltd. For further information, media representatives may contact: Elena Gaisina Canadian Embassy in Moscow Tel: : +7(095) 105-6020 www.globalpartnership.gc.ca Mr. David Arkley British Embassy in Moscow Tel.: 7 (095) 956 7358 David.Arkley@fco.gov.uk Backgrounder Global Partnership Program and Canada-UK Cooperation Announcement At the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, G8 Leaders united to launch the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. They agreed to raise up to US $20 billion to support cooperation projects, initially in Russia. The initiative addresses one of the most serious security threats facing our world today by preventing terrorist groups from obtaining weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD) to carry out their campaigns. Assistance with Russian chemical weapons destruction is a key element of the G8 Global Partnership. Other priority areas include the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials, and the employment of former weapons scientists. The UK has announced that it will contribute up to US$750M over the ten years of the Global Partnership, and that up to US$100M (c.£60M) of this could, in principle, be made available to assist Russia with the destruction of its chemical weapon (CW) stockpile, on top of the £12M announced in 2000. For its part, Canada has committed up to Can$1B (approximately US $750M) over the next ten years to the Global Partnership. Several states are committed to providing support to Russia to help meet its obligations to destroy its chemical weapons stocks, including Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as the European Union. Destruction of chemical weapons stocks is a key requirement of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), not least because of the risks of proliferation. Under the terms of the Convention, Russia is responsible for meeting the costs of its destruction activities. Joint Canada-UK Chemical Weapons Destruction Assistance A priority for both UK and Canadian assistance is to support the construction of Russia's main chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, in the Urals. Shchuch'ye will be the main Russian facility for the destruction of lethal nerve agents, including over 4 million artillery munitions. This joint UK-Canada project, which will be carried out in close cooperation with the US and Russia, is a major step forward in implementing the G8 Global Partnership. UK Chemical Weapons Destruction Assistance The UK Government decided in 2000 to contribute up to £12M, phased over 3 years, for high priority chemical demilitarisation and biological non-proliferation projects in Russia. The UK's first project was the construction of the water supply for the Shchuch'ye destruction facility. This project was completed on budget in spring 2003 at a cost of some £2M. The UK's second project - the procurement of electricity supply equipment for a sub-station serving the Shchuch'ye CW destruction facility - is now underway. It is being jointly-funded by the UK, Norway, the EU and the Czech Republic at a total cost of some £8M. Canada Chemical Weapons Destruction Assistance Before the Global Partnership was formed, Canada contributed C$5.35 million to the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye, in Kurganskaya oblast. Past projects funded by Canada included construction of an access road to the site's industrial area, construction of a 10 kV power line to supply electrical power for the CWDF, and partial funding (together with Italy) of a 105km natural gas line that will supply gas service to the CWD. Return to Menu 5. RUSSIAN-US WORKING GROUP 1 HOLDS SESSION A regular session of Russian-US Working Group 1 concluded in Geneva on November 14. This group is the working body of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security chaired by the Foreign and Defense Ministers of Russia and the USA, set up in 2002. In accordance with the direction of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, given in the course of their September meeting at Camp David, the Working Group carried on efforts with a view to increasing transparency and predictability and building confidence with reference to nuclear arms reductions. The session participants concentrated, in particular, on the measures of transparency regarding the strategic factors whose influence on stability and security will increase with the deep arms cuts provided by the Moscow Agreement of 2002. The session passed in a spirit of businesslike cooperation and mutual understanding. The work of the Group will be continued in the course of subsequent meetings, the dates for which will be arranged, as usual, via diplomatic channels. Return to Menu 6. SPEECH BY RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IGOR IVANOV AT THE CONFERENCE HELD AT THE DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY TO MARK THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE USA, NOVEMBER 18, 2003 (excerpted) […] The present stage of world development shows that this is an extremely complex task. Perhaps, never before in the world were there at once so many unresolved regional problems, really threatening international security. To this are added new global threats and challenges - terrorism, extremism, the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and organized crime. But these are threats of a different order, no longer arising from the nature of relations between our countries, as was the case during the Cold War. On the contrary, in today's circumstances pooling the efforts and resources of Russia and the United States in countering and neutralizing these challenges bears an imperative character. We invariably presume that the settlement of regional problems, just as stability and predictability in world affairs as a whole, largely depend on the state of relations between Russia and the US. Furthermore, understanding between us serves as a factor of shaping an international consensus. In the final analysis, the world community's unity is in the interest of each of its members, including the US, for the realization of the individual interests of states, irrespective of their military and economic strength, in a globalizing interdependent world is objectively impossible without giving effect to the collective will of the whole international community. […] As to the priorities of our cooperation, they are well known: above all, the questions of strategic stability and nonproliferation, a joint struggle against new challenges and threats, the settlement of international conflicts. Trade-and-economic ties have been acquiring an ever greater weight in Russian-American relations over recent years. Dialogue with the US is vigorously advancing in the area of strategic stability. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which the Russian and US Presidents signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, came into force on June 1, 2003. Now there is big and complex work ahead on its practical implementation. The working mechanisms of interaction in the military-strategic field, established under the aegis of the bilateral Consultative Group for Strategic Security, are continuing their activities. Here a quest is going on for ways of specific cooperation regarding missile defense. Of course, it should not lead to the establishment of destabilizing systems, and especially to an arms race in space. Of fundamental importance to us is the partnership with the US in the fight against international terrorism. We have moved from a discussion of this problem to real cooperation, including the exchange of intelligence information and the conduct of joint operations. Of course, such cooperation presupposes a high level of mutual trust. So we are entitled to expect that it will be honest and consistent, without "double standards." Another key area is our dialogue with the US regarding nonproliferation. It is obvious that the threat of the proliferation of WMD, their delivery vehicles and dangerous technologies is a subject of common concern, because this affects the vital security interests of Russia and the US alike. Not one responsible member of the international community is interested in either the expansion of the circle of nuclear countries, or even less in such weapons getting into terrorist hands. But reliably this problem can only be solved on the basis of international law. As to our economic cooperation, energy and high technologies remain the most important fields here. Energy dialogue is a strategic and non-ad hoc field of economic collaboration, in which the business circles of Russia and the US are actively involved. It most clearly shows that the economies of our two countries can be complementary. In this connection we attach high importance to the results of the Second Russian-American Business Energy Summit held in St. Petersburg on September 22-23, 2003. Russian-American cooperation in space and information technologies merits special attention. Of course, not everything in our relations is going smoothly. The qualitative change of these relations does not mean an automatic solution of these problems. I will be frank, far from everything suits us in the US foreign policy approaches; there arises concern over the excessive infatuation with methods of force in tackling international issues and the predilection for unilateral actions to the detriment of the unity of the international community. The survivals of the Cold War era persist in our trade-and-economic relations, among them the now negatively symbolic Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the sanctions being imposed on Russian enterprises on far-fetched pleas. […] Today we are also considerably hindered by the logjams that have accumulated over the decades of confrontation between our countries. I mean the politico-ideological inertia of certain institutions and the stereotypes of thinking. This inertia we are also encountering here, in Russia, although it would seem that the revolutionary changes our country has gone through in the last fifteen years could have taught us to part more quickly with old schemes; not to speak of the US, where the latest changes comparable in scale to those that have occurred in recent years in our country took place centuries ago. However, today the whole experience which the past 70 years have taken in bear out that there is no rational alternative to interaction between Russia and the US. We are committed to common values, and on the major issues our aims coincide - the security and prosperity of our peoples and, consequently, the promotion of stability and security in the world. Here is the positive prospect for the development of Russian-American relations that corresponds to their best historical traditions. Thank you for your attention. Return to Menu 7. VERSHBOW URGES U.S.-RUSSIA TIES BASED ON COMMON INTERESTS, VALUES Nov. 18: U.S. Ambassador to Russia at Moscow State Diplomatic Academy Ambassador Alexander Vershbow called November 18 for a "fundamental transformation" of U.S.-Russian relations into "an enduring partnership based on common interests and common values." Vershbow, the U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation, was speaking at the Moscow State Diplomatic Academy on the 70th anniversary of the exchange of notes establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States and Russia, he said, "are working together now in ways that could not have been contemplated twenty years ago, based on an expanding set of common interests." However, "none of us can be fully satisfied with the state of our relations today," Vershbow said. "The U.S.-Russian partnership covers a broad range of subjects, but we have not reached the point where we consider ourselves part of the same family - in contrast with the relationships that the United States has with its traditional allies in Europe and Asia." The next steps in developing the relationship "will be a function of the political and economic choices that Russia makes," Vershbow said. "We believe that in order for Russia's relationship with the United States (or, for that matter, with Europe) to realize its full potential, both the Russian government and the people of this great country must support and promote the growth and strengthening of both the private economy and civil society as indispensable components of Russia's national power," he said. "This is the prerequisite to building a community of values that is the foundation of a true and enduring partnership." Otherwise, "Americans will be reluctant to make the kinds of investments in and commitments to the relationship with Russia that occur every day between the United States and Western Europe. And that would mean that our relations will continue to be predominantly ‘governmental,' rather than business-to business or people-to-people." Vershbow said he is "optimistic about Russia's choice," because as ambassador he has met so many Russians "who understand that the long-term well-being of this country depends upon freedom and prosperity at home, and closer partnership with the world's democracies." Following are Vershbow's remarks as prepared for delivery: (begin text) (As prepared for delivery) Moscow State Diplomatic Academy November 18, 2003 ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION THE U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, PAST AND FUTURE Remarks to the Conference on the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union It is a great pleasure - not just as an Ambassador but as a long-time student of U.S.-Russian relations - to participate in this commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the exchange of notes establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR. Of course, as all of you know very well, the U.S.-Russian relationship has historical roots that are far deeper than 1933. During our Revolutionary War, our fledgling government sent an envoy to the Court of Catherine II to plead our cause. Diplomatic relations were formally established 200 years ago, and began in earnest in 1809, when our government sent John Quincy Adams to the court at St. Petersburg. It was indicative of the importance that Americans already placed on this relationship that they sent such an important political figure to be ambassador - Adams was not only the son of our second President, but a future President himself. I am proud to be the 61st ambassador to follow in his footsteps in Russia (though I can assure you I have no plans to follow his trail as far as the White House). Despite this auspicious start, however, our relations during most of the 19th century were correct, but not particularly intense. The fact is that it was only the occasional challenge or problem that required us to work together. In one important aspect, however, we were similar. As Russia steadily developed eastward, building cities in the Siberian wilderness and constructing a railroad to tie together Russia's vast expanses, the United States was expanding westward, building its own transcontinental railroad and busily settling the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains. Where our interests coincided, Russia and the United States were able to work out a deal for the purchase of Alaska in 1867. This relieved Russia of an unproductive drain on its resources and ensured that Secretary of State Seward would be dismissed as a fool by our Congress and the public for wasting seven million dollars on a barren wasteland. As America was entering World War I in April 1917, Russia was leaving the war. Although Lenin may have declared President Wilson's Fourteen Points to be a landmark of enlightenment in international relations, the ties between our two countries quickly deteriorated. After some hesitation, the United States intervened militarily on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Northern Russia and Siberia and then withdrew in 1920. From 1921 to 1933, a series of U.S. Administrations refused to have any official dealings with the revolutionary Soviet regime. The exchange of diplomatic notes we commemorate today only came about because of both states' shared perception of the growing dangers in the early thirties posed by fascism and militarism. Our common aim of defeating Nazi Germany brought our two countries into alliance during World War II, but tensions over the post-war settlement in Eastern Europe were apparent even before the end of the war and soon led to the Cold War. Relations then between the United States and Soviet Union were driven by a complex interplay of ideological, political and economic factors, leading to shifts between cautious cooperation and often bitter rivalry over the next 45 years. The tremendous differences in our political systems often prevented us from reaching a mutual understanding on key policy issues and even, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, brought us to the brink of war. But that terrible burden uniquely shared by the United States and the Soviet Union - the burden of possessing the means to annihilate each other and the rest of the world - also imposed a special responsibility on the leaders of our two countries. They managed to find pragmatic ways to avoid disaster, despite their vigorous geopolitical competition. We are today the beneficiaries and stewards of that legacy. Having joined the Foreign Service in 1977, I spent the first decade of my diplomatic career working to manage the Cold War rivalry: participating in the SALT II, START and INF negotiations, and in dozens of complex meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko; while responding to the many unpleasant crises that confronted us in those days, whether in the streets of Kabul, the shipyards of Gdánsk, or the skies over Kamchatka and Sakhalin. Then, in the late 1980s, we all suddenly were faced with the pleasant possibility of a very different kind of relationship, based on "new thinking" in Moscow and Washington. With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the rebirth of a democratic Russia, we children of the Cold War faced the exciting challenge of un-learning much of what we had been taught about the inevitability of rivalry between our two great nations. Russia's integration as a full member of the democratic community became the watchword in Washington, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and in other capitals. Twelve years later, our relationship has, indeed, been fundamentally transformed in many ways. The center of gravity in our relations is steadily shifting from the strategic balance of power and arms control treaties to our shared economic interests and business contracts. Common threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have led us to work more closely together. This cooperation can take the form of bilateral consultations on Iran's nuclear programs or multilateral diplomacy such as the Six Party Talks on North Korea or the NATO-Russia Council. We often share similar perceptions of the security challenges we face, even though we sometimes disagree about the best means to address those challenges. In short, we are working together now in ways that could not have been contemplated twenty years ago, based on an expanding set of common interests. Yet none of us can be fully satisfied with the state of our relations today. As Russia's Minister of Defense remarked recently, we are no longer enemies, but we are definitely not yet allies. The U.S.-Russian partnership covers a broad range of subjects, but we have not reached the point where we consider ourselves part of the same family - in contrast with the relationships that the United States has with its traditional allies in Europe and Asia. President Putin lamented this when he met with President Bush at Camp David six weeks ago. So what is to be done? What can we expect for the future of our relationship? What should be our common goals for the next decade? In the short term, there are a number of economic and political objectives that we are pursuing - goals that were discussed at Camp David and are being actively pursued as we speak. Having just returned from the United States - where I talked with ordinary Americans in Philadelphia, Washington and New York - I can tell you that there is a lot of interest in America about the latest developments in Russia today and what they portend for our relationship. Today, however, is an event for historians. So rather than launch into a discussion of the current issues and challenges in the relationship, I would like to leave you with a larger, long-term question befitting of a forum on history. 20 or 30 years from now, as historians look back on our efforts today, how will they judge the success of our efforts to strengthen the relationship? Will they say that we were successful in laying the foundation for a broad-based political, military, economic and social partnership? Or will they say that the U.S.-Russia relationship, in the first decade of the 21st century, reached a plateau, with an agenda that remained dominated largely by political and geostrategic issues - certainly useful to both sides in managing specific problems and threats, but lacking the depth and breadth of America's relationship with Western Europe and Japan? In posing this question, I do not mean to downplay all that has been accomplished in the U.S.-Russian relationship over the last 15 years. We have come a very long way in a short time. On the other hand, over the last 50 years, the countries of what we used to call the "West" (the United States, Western Europe, and our major allies in the Asia-Pacific region) have done something more. They have redefined the nature of international relations, reducing the role of governments as a driving force and turning more and more of their relations over to the people. How have they done this? By radically reducing barriers to trade, investment and travel, by creating common institutions to harmonize commercial, political and military policies, by introducing common legal norms, and by fostering a sense of community among their peoples based on the shared values of individual freedom and economic liberty. One obvious result is economic: the United States and Europe enjoy $1 billion [$1,000 million] a day in two-way trade and over $1 trillion [$1,000,000 million] in two-way investment, with millions of jobs created on both sides. But the real lesson is that our relations are now so complex that governments are no longer "in control." Companies invest and trade, people travel and study, cultural and scientific counterparts interact freely, without reference to whether the political relationship is up or down, or what governments think. So the truly long-term question before us is whether Russia's relationship with the United States (and other nations) will remain one dominated by political and security questions - and one primarily managed by governments - or will it expand and evolve into the kind of relationship that we enjoy with our other allies? Certainly, the way the U.S.-Russian relationship has evolved over the last 10-15 years has been encouraging in that regard. Our business communities are getting to know each other better, and thousands of young Russians have had the chance to travel, study or work in the United States. However, the next steps will be more difficult. And to a large extent, they will be a function of the domestic political and economic choices that Russia makes. For we believe that in order for Russia's relationship with the United States (or, for that matter, with Europe) to realize its full potential, both the Russian government and the people of this great country must support and promote the growth and strengthening of both the private economy and civil society as indispensable components of Russia's national power. This is the prerequisite to building a community of values that is the foundation of a true and enduring partnership. Without this, Americans will be reluctant to make the kinds of investments in and commitments to the relationship with Russia that occur every day between the United States and Western Europe. And that would mean that our relations will continue to be predominantly "governmental," rather than business-to business or people-to-people. As a consequence, U.S.-Russian relations will fall short of the sense of family that we share with our closest allies. In the long run, I am optimistic about Russia's choice. While serving here, I have met too many ordinary Russians in every sphere - journalists, scholars, students, teachers, entrepreneurs, politicians, human rights defenders, civic activists - who understand that the long-term well-being of this country depends upon freedom and prosperity at home, and closer partnership with the world's democracies. So as we celebrate 70 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and twelve years of expanding cooperation between America and an independent Russian Federation, let us commit to an even more fundamental transformation of the relationship between our two countries: an enduring partnership based on common interests and common values. (end text) Return to Menu 8. DAILY PRESS BRIEFING (excerpted) *QUESTION:* Richard, apparently Iraqi scientists are fleeing to both Iran and to Syria, and your State Department has a new plan, supposedly spending $16 million with an 11-page draft. What can you tell us about that, please? *MR. BOUCHER:* I think, just the very basic outlines that we have been working. We've been looking at programs to redirect Iraqi scientists and technicians and engineers with expertise in weapons of mass destruction technology to peaceful civilian employment. These would be based on the kind of programs that we have in the countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union. The programs are aimed at two goals. One is to keep Iraqi scientists from providing expertise to other countries, and second, to enable them to serve the economic rebuilding of Iraq. At this point, we are coordinating with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, so I don't have any final announcements for you at this moment. Ma'am. *QUESTION:* Concerning the bombings in Istanbul -- *QUESTION:* Wait, wait -- can we stay on Iraq -- just this part for a second? *MR. BOUCHER:* Yeah. *QUESTION:* Is the $16 million figure about right? *MR. BOUCHER:* I don't know. *QUESTION:* Can you tell us how much was spent on these kinds of programs in the former Soviet Union? *MR. BOUCHER:* No. I'm sure that's available widely on the Web, but I haven't sat down to add it up over the years. *QUESTION:* Well, no, I thought maybe someone else might have done it beforehand -- asked about it earlier -- sorry. *MR. BOUCHER:* That's what spreadsheets are for. Return to Menu M. Links 1. GERMANY AND THE PROCESS OF EXCESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATION IN RUSSIA Return to Menu 2. GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP UPDATE Return to Menu 3. INTO THE 21st CENTURY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. 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