A. Radiological Dispersion Devices 1. Martin Schram: Urgent but Neglected
Martin Schram
Scripps Howard News Service
12/11/2003
(for personal use only)
Where's the necessary urgency to secure Soviet Union's nukes? By By MARTIN SCHRAM, Scripps Howard News Service December 11, 2003
Old news: Osama bin Laden declared in a 1999 interview that it is his "religious duty" to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
New news: In a startling page one scoop last Sunday, The Washington Post’s Joby Warrick reported that at least 38 former Soviet dirty-bomb warheads packed with radioactive material have vanished from a criminal-and-terrorist ridden separatist enclave that broke away from the former Soviet Republic of Moldova and has become a supplier of conventional arms to black-market dealers.
But what is even more startling is the lack of urgency by which Official Washington greeted this latest security jolt. And, for that matter, Washington’s lack of urgency ever since the Terror of 9/11 for speeding up America’s one program that was designed to lock-down and destroy the still-vulnerable former Soviet arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons — before the terrorists can acquire them.
There have been no urgent calls for action — not from President Bush. Not Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Not from any of the Democrats in the nation’s capital.
And not from the Democrats running for president. Until this week, when Gen. Wesley Clark responded to a New Hampshire debate question with a ringing call for urgent action.
More about that later, but first, the news: According to the Post, military records show that at least 38 small, thin Alazan rockets, with warheads packed with radioactive material, have disappeared in Transdniester, a onetime Soviet enclave the size of Rhode Island which broke away from Moldova a dozen years ago. Soviet engineers originally designed the Alazans as weather rockets. But, stuffed with radioactive material, the warheads could become the world’s first surface-to-surface dirty bombs. Conventional explosions could spread radioactive contamination rendering a target area uninhabitable for years.
"For terrorists, this is the best market you could imagine: cheap, efficient and forgotten by the whole world," Vladimir Orlov, founding director of the Center for Policy Studies in Moscow, said, as reported by the Post.
Terrorists and organized crime figures reportedly frequent Transdniester, transporting disguised cargoes, U.S. and Moldova officials say. Conventional weapons from Transdniester have surfaced as far away as Central Africa.
"This is one of the places where the buyers connect with the sellers," William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, told the Post. "It’s one-stop shopping for weapons and all kinds of illicit goods. Very possibly, that includes the materials for weapons of mass destruction."
After the Soviet Union collapsed, its nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals were vulnerable to thieves, terrorists and agents from rogue nations. U.S. senators, Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Dick Lugar, R-Ind., drafted the landmark Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. In one decade, that program made America’s homeland safer by securing many of Russia’s vulnerable arsenals and deactivating 6,000 warheads — spending just $700 million annually (one-fifteenth what we spend on the undeployed and problematic missile defense shield). But 60 percent of Russia’s weapons of mass destruction remain inadequately secured.
You’d think that after 9/11 the United States moved swiftly to secure all former Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals before thieves or terrorists could get there. But no. The Bush administration got bogged down in certification technicalities, froze all CTR funds — and nothing new was secured. Until this year, when Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Lugar convinced Bush to fully fund the program again.
Today, if you ask President Bush or any Democrat running for president about the Nunn-Lugar program, they’ll say all the right things. But you have to ask. Because they are not independently pushing the issue. In Tuesday’s New Hampshire debate, Gen. Clark was asked if Russian Soviet weapons could fall into terrorist hands, and if that should be a post-9/11 priority. "This is a significant national security problem," Clark replied. "We’ve been talking about loose nukes in this country for more than a decade. And Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar put together a bill ...to work this problem. But we’ve still got over 20,000 Russian tactical nuclear weapons, including some suitcase nukes ... that are, we think, inadequately guarded. ... I think we need to be putting a real sense of urgency on this."
Exactly. America’s homeland security must begin not at our shore, but halfway around the world where nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are dangerously unsecured and vulnerable to terrorists.
Today, it is 38 dirty-bomb warheads that may have fallen into terrorist hands. Tomorrow it could be a far more powerful weapon of mass destruction, targeted at us.
Are we really going to passively wait for yet another blue-ribbon commission to be formed after yet another tragedy? So it can tell all who survive, yet again, what we failed to do to protect our homeland?
Stocks of Soviet-Era Arms For Sale on Black Market
TIRASPOL, Moldova -- In the ethnic conflicts that surrounded the collapse of the Soviet Union, fighters in several countries seized upon an unlikely new weapon: a small, thin rocket known as the Alazan. Originally built for weather experiments, the Alazan rockets were packed with explosives and lobbed into cities. Military records show that at least 38 Alazan warheads were modified to carry radioactive material, effectively creating the world's first surface-to-surface dirty bomb.
The radioactive warheads are not known to have been used. But now, according to experts and officials, they have disappeared.
The last known repository was here, in a tiny separatist enclave known as Transdniester, which broke away from Moldova 12 years ago. The Transdniester Moldovan Republic is a sliver of land no bigger than Rhode Island located along Moldova's eastern border with Ukraine. Its government is recognized by no other nation. But its weapons stocks -- new, used and modified -- have attracted the attention of black-market arms dealers worldwide. And they're for sale, according to U.S. and Moldovan officials and weapons experts.
When the Soviet army withdrew from this corner of Eastern Europe, the weapons were deposited into an arsenal of stupefying proportions. In fortified bunkers are stored 50,000 tons of aging artillery shells, mines and rockets, enough to fill 2,500 boxcars.
Conventional arms originating in Transdniester have been turning up for years in conflict zones from the Caucasus to Central Africa, evidence of what U.S. officials describe as an invisible pipeline for smuggled goods that runs through Tiraspol to the Black Sea and beyond. Now, governments and terrorism experts fear the same pipeline is carrying nonconventional weapons such as the radioactive Alazan, and that terrorists are starting to tap in.
"For terrorists, this is the best market you could imagine: cheap, efficient and forgotten by the whole world," said Vladimir Orlov, founding director of the Center for Policy Studies in Moscow, a group that studies proliferation issues.
Why the Alazan warheads were made is unknown. The urgent question -- where are they now? -- is a matter of grave concern to terrorism and nonproliferation experts who know the damage such devices could do. A dirty bomb is not a nuclear device but a weapon that uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials, which could cause widespread disruption and expose people to dangerous radiation. Unlike other kinds of dirty bombs, this one would come with its own delivery system, and an 8-mile range. A number of terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, have sought to build or buy one.
While it has no nuclear bombs of its own, Transdniester is regarded by experts as a prime shopping ground for outlaw groups looking for weapons of every type. It is the embodiment of the gray zone, where failed states, porous borders and weak law enforcement allow the buying and selling of instruments of terror.
Transdniester possesses many of the trappings of statehood, including an army and border guards who demand visas and special entrance fees from visitors. But according to Western diplomats based in the region, these procedures are window dressing used to mask the activities of a small clique that runs the country by its own rules.
Much of the enclave's trade is controlled by a consortium, Sheriff, controlled by the son of the Transdniester's president, Igor Smirnov. Vladimir Smirnov also heads the Transdniester Customs Service, which oversees a river of goods flowing in and out of the country. The cargoes move through the Tiraspol airport; by truck overland to Ukraine or Moldova; and on a rail-to-ship line that connects the capital to the Black Sea port of Odessa. The Transdniester interior minister, Maj. Gen. Vadim Shevtsov, is a former Soviet KGB agent wanted in connection with a murderous attack on pro-independence Latvians in 1991.
Organized crime figures and reputed terrorists flit in and out of the region, according to law enforcement and government officials in Moldova and U.S. officials. Their cargoes are often disguised. "This is one of the places where the buyers connect with the sellers," said William C. Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. "It's one-stop shopping for weapons and all kinds of other illicit goods. Very possibly, that includes the materials for weapons of mass destruction."
The enormous Soviet-style banners stretched across intersections in downtown Tiraspol bid visitors welcome to "The People's Pride: The Transdniester Moldovan Republic." The city is locked in a Brezhnev-era time warp. Nearly every corner bears a reminder of the regime's stubborn embrace of old-school Soviet communism: a statue of Lenin, a hammer-and-sickle banner, a street named for Karl Marx.
Father, Son and Sheriff
A large portion of the population is made up Russian-speaking pensioners, many of them Soviet military retirees who served in the area and chose to stay because of the relatively mild climate. Like the elderly elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the retirees are nostalgic for a simpler, more predictable time when the socialist state took care of all their needs.
North of Tiraspol, an industrial center straddles the main rail line into town. Steam blasts from a complex of gray buildings housing the city's Elektromash works, a leading factory that describes itself officially as a producer of electrical engines. According to Moldovan and Western intelligence officials, the factory's product line includes assault rifles and machine pistols, a centerpiece of Transdniester's most profitable industry: weapons.
Once the industrial heartland of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, Transdniester has a long history as a production center for arms and weapons, including machine guns and rockets. Today, the tradition continues in at least six sprawling factories in the capital and the cities of Tighina and Rybnitsa, according to Ceslav Ciobanu, a former Moldovan ambassador to the United States and now a senior research scholar for James Madison University's William R. Nelson Institute.
Among the weapons in production are Grad and Duga multiple-rocket launchers, antitank mines, rocket-propelled grenades and multiple lines of small arms, Ciobanu said.
It's an impressive output for a country whose army, the Dniester Republican Guard, numbers only 5,000. But hardly any of the weapons are manufactured for local use, according to Ciobanu, who described the arms trade in a Nelson Institute paper released in June. "Production of armaments and illegal weapons traffic constitutes the most important factor of the economic and military policy of the Tiraspol administration, and the biggest source of revenues for its corrupt elites," Ciobanu said.
The same powerful troika that dominates Transdniester's political and economic life controls the production of weapons as well as exports abroad, Ciobanu said: "Father, Son and Sheriff."
It's a view shared by Western officials based in the region, as well as law-enforcement and weapons experts abroad. Several Moldova-based diplomats, speaking on the condition of anonymity, confirmed there is an eastern flow of arms from Tiraspol to Odessa, the Ukrainian port on the Black Sea. They also described seizures of Transdniester-made weapons in conflicts zones outside the enclave.
Last year, one such cache of pistols and other small arms was seized in the basement of the home of one of the leaders of the separatist Gagauz movement. The Gagauz are a tiny Turkik-speaking minority in southern Moldova. The weapons turned out to be poorly made counterfeits of American weapons. "The guns were stamped 'U.S. Army,' but the brand names were misspelled," said one diplomatic source familiar with the incident. Transdniester weapons exports also have been traced to the breakaway Abkhazia region, in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, and to war zones in the Congo and Ivory Coast, according to Moldovan officials and independent weapons experts.
But the largest weapons stockpile in Transdniester is located at a massive arsenal near the northern town of Kolbasna. Originally a supply depot for Red Army forces in the Black Sea region, the Kolbasna arsenal swelled in the early 1990s as troops departing newly independent Eastern European states deposited weapons and ammunition there. The arsenal currently holds an estimated 50,000 tons of munitions of all kinds, including large numbers of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles.
Moldova has pressed Russia to remove the munitions and the 2,800 Russian troops who guard them. But over the years, both Russia and Transdniester have used a variety of excuses to block or delay their departure. The arsenal, which is 600 miles from the Russian border, is one of the main sticking points in ongoing negotiations aimed at reconciling Moldova and its former province, which fought a short, bloody civil war that ended in 1992. Transdniester has opposed removing the stockpile, partly because it hopes to receive payment for the weapons, and also because the Russian presence has helped guarantee Transdniester's survival as an autonomous region.
Moldova does not formally recognize that an independent Transdniester exists. Thus, the largest border between them -- and the one most likely to be used for weapons-trafficking -- is unprotected. On the Moldovan side, it has no checkpoints, no detectors and no guards.
Hundreds of westbound trucks and cars cross into Moldova each day along the main Tiraspol-Chisinau highway, just as freely as the trains heading east along the rails to Odessa. Moldovan officials fret privately about the smuggled goods they don't catch. "Transdniester is like a cancer, and there's nothing we can do about it," said one senior Moldovan official who declined to be identified for fear he would lose his job. "We're battling our own corruption, and out there is a 400-kilometer border over which we have no control.
"Trucks cross the border every day, slip into one of the smaller roads and disappear," the official continued. "And I'm 100 percent sure of this: Some of those trucks are carrying weapons."
Western and Moldovan officials point to numerous incidents in which seized Russian weapons were traced back to Transdniester. In one well-documented case in 1999, a truck halted by Moldovan police on the Transdniester border was discovered to contain Russian-made shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles, along with plastic explosives and detonators. Driving the truck were several members of Transdniester's army, along with Lt. Col. Vladimir Nemkoff, a deputy commander of Russian peacekeeping troops in the enclave.
On the same day, Nemkoff's son, an officer in Transdniester's Ministry of Security, was arrested while driving a vehicle that contained three Soviet-made Igla surface-to-air rockets, similar to the U.S.-made Stinger missile.
Nemkoff was convicted of weapons-trafficking in a trial in Moldova, but was later pardoned and allowed to return to Transdniester. Within days, he regained his old job as a Russian peacekeeper.
Such incidents suggest the Kolbasna arsenal is a "black hole" where dangerous weapons can be obtained, if the price is right, said Iurie Rosca, leader of the Christian Democratic People's Party, a leading pro-Western opposition faction in Moldova.
"It's well known to us: If you need a Stinger and you have the money, you can get one," Rosca said. "If it's a Kalashnikov you want, you can get one of those, too."
Radioactive Warheads
The most unusual weapon in Transdniester's arsenal was never meant to be a weapon at all. The Alazan, a slender, three-foot-long rocket, was part of a broader, rather extravagant Soviet experiment in weather control. Soviet scientists believed that hail could be suppressed by firing rockets into approaching storm clouds. The idea is vaguely similar to cloud-seeding as practiced in the United States. American scientists familiar with the anti-hail program say the results are highly dubious, at best.
When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, scores of batteries of tube-fired Alazans were left throughout the Soviet bloc, including Eastern Europe. As ethnic clashes erupted in the newly independent former Soviet republics, the Alazan and a slightly larger rocket called the Alan were reactivated for war.
Potter documented 50 cases in which the rockets were used in clashes, by both guerrilla fighters and government forces. In most incidents, Alazans were fired indiscriminately at civilian targets, often crowded urban centers. They were used by Azeri forces in the war with Armenia over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, and used by separatists in South Ossetia in clashes with Georgian troops.
"Some of the reports indicated that the Alazan, which is notoriously inaccurate as a surface-to-surface missile, was used as a psychological or terror weapon," Potter said.
Since Soviet times, at least three Alazan batteries were known to exist in the Transdniester region, as documented by military inventories of the time. In 1992, there was a confirmed case of attempted smuggling of Alazans for use as weapons. On May 24 of that year, two Moldovan police were killed when they tried to stop delivery of Alazan rockets to ethnic Gagauz militants, according to local press accounts of the incident. Moldovan officials believe the source of the rockets was Transdniester.
But the existence of "radiological warheads" for the Alazan was unknown until two years ago, when military documents describing them were obtained by the Institute for Policy Studies, a research group in Chisinau, the Moldovan capital.
The documents, which were provided to The Washington Post, are a series of official letters written in 1994 by a Transdniester civil defense commander, Col. V. Kireev, who apparently became concerned about radiation given off by the rockets.
One document described an inventory of 38 "isotopic radioactive warheads of missiles of the Alazan type," including 24 that were attached to rocket. In the two other documents, the commander requested technical help in dealing with radiation exposure related to storage of the warheads. He complained that uniforms of soldiers working with the warheads were so contaminated that they had to be "destroyed by burning and burying."
"I propose to categorically ban all work with the missile . . . and to label it as a radioactive danger," Kireev wrote on Oct. 24, 1994.
Several U.S. and Moldovan government officials knowledgeable about Transdniester's weapons said in interviews that they were familiar with the reports of radioactive Alazans, but could neither verify or dispute the existence of such devices.
Oazu Nantoi, a former Moldovan government official and political analyst, sought in 2001 to trace the Alazans with radiological warheads, using contacts in Moldova and Transdniester. He said that the last known location of the weapons was a military airfield north of Tiraspol, but what happened to them after the 1990s remains a mystery.
"They are not Scuds, but clearly, the only application for these rockets is a military one," said Nantoi. "Our fear is someone, somewhere, will turn these rockets into dirty bombs."
B. Research Reactor Fuel Return 1. Mayak Plant To Receive Spent Nuclear Fuel From Soviet Designed Research Reactors
Bellona Foundation
12/6/2003
(for personal use only)
This agreement was reached during the visit to the US of the Russian Atomic Energy minister in November.
U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Russian atomic energy minister Alexander Rumyantsev issued a joint statement on November 7th pledging to cooperate in retrieving Soviet- and Russian-supplied weapons-grade nuclear fuel from 20 research reactors in 17 countries. According to Abraham, the agreement “reaffirms our common objective of reducing, and to the extent possible, ultimately eliminating the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear activity.” U.S. and Russian authorities working with the IAEA will return weapons-usable HEU from foreign research reactors to Russia. The USA will fund all the works to be done by Russian specialists. The first project will take place at the nuclear centre Ulugbek in the former Soviet republic Uzbekistan in Central Asia.
C. Sub Dismantlement 1. Thieves Plunder Russian Navy
BBC News Online
12/10/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia's nuclear-armed Northern Fleet is falling to pieces - quite literally - as scavengers plunder its ships of precious metal components.
Hundreds of naval officers and civilian contractors have joined with criminal gangs in the illegal trade targeting anything containing a few dollars' worth of gold, silver or palladium.
Millions of dollars are being made on smuggling the loot abroad, and naval equipment worth perhaps hundreds of millions is being ruined in the process, Russian TV reports.
Such thefts cause enormous damage to the ships' military capability Vladimir Mulov, military prosecutor.
Warships and submarines, both decommissioned and in active service, often find themselves missing vital components, including telecommunication circuit boards, air regeneration filters and even torpedoes.
"Expensive equipment is rendered inoperative as a result of these thefts," says Vladimir Mulov, the Northern Fleet's military prosecutor.
"Parts, for example, are stolen from anti-aircraft systems. Such thefts cause enormous damage to the ships' military capability."
Much of the trade takes place around the northern city of Murmansk, the homeport of the ill-fated submarine Kursk, which sank with the loss of all hands following an explosion during a naval exercise.
The port has become the scene of fierce turf wars between rival gangs which has claimed more than 10 lives this year alone, says its police chief Viktor Pesterev.
Face value
One Russian Granit-class nuclear-powered submarine contains roughly a tonne of silver, more than 30 kg of pure gold and 20 kg of the precious metal palladium, experts say.
Some of this potential treasure is dispersed in thousands of tiny circuit-board components throughout the ship.
A detailed diagram showing where such components can be found on a submarine, along with instructions on how best to dismantle them, was recently found during a police raid.
But just one shoebox-sized air regeneration cartridge, for example, can yield 139 grams of palladium, worth over 2,000 dollars on the black market, the TV says.
No wonder places like Murmansk are littered with booths of scrap metal dealers, and local papers are filled with advertisements offering a good price for precious metal - no questions asked.
Officers and thieves
Shipyards and naval bases have employed guards with metal detectors in an effort to keep the ships' components where they belong.
But that does not always help. One recent victim is the nuclear submarine Kazan, which lost her air regeneration filters. They were stolen by two officers who were supposed to guard them.
Still on trial for a similar offence is the chief of a naval garrison and a naval captain. Of the 147 people investigated for the theft of precious metals from the military last year, more than half were officers.
2. Victor-III Class Nuke-Sub: First Scrapping Contracts Signed
Nuclear.ru
12/8/2003
(for personal use only)
December 5 in Vladivostok the first financing and working contracts for dismantling of Victor-III nuclear submarine retired from the Russian NAVY Pacific Fleet were signed, ITAR-TASS reports. The money to do the work is allocated under the Russian-Japanese project “The Star of Hope” with DalRAO of Vladivostok being the customer and the Maritime Territory-based defense shipyard Zvezda being the performer.
The contracts were signed by the directors of said enterprises Nikolai Lysenko and Yuri Shulgan from the Russian side and by Mr. Kawakami, the director general of the Japanese MFA technical secretariat. The decision to scrap one nuclear submarine using the joint Russian-Japanese funding was made in February 2003 and the “Implementing Agreement Concerning the Dismantling of Nuclear Submarine” was signed in June. There are 41 nuclear submarines retired from the NAVY Pacific Fleet are kept afloat in the Far East of Russia (Maritime Territory and Kamchatka).
The Japanese government has allocated 20.4 billion yen (about US$ 170 million) to provide assistance to Russia in disposal of nuclear weapons. Out this amount 4.2 million yen were spent to build the Landysh liquid radioactive waste processing facility at the shipyard Zvezda. The facility is a part of the infrastructure that ensures safe handling of radioactive waste, their temporary storage on the site and shipment to permanent storages. The construction of facilities took seven years with the financial assistance provided by the USA and Japan.
D. Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention 1. Securing Uzbekistan's Lethal Labs
BBC News Online
12/5/2003
(for personal use only)
US officials are beginning work to try and secure old germ warfare labs in Uzbekistan, once home to the largest biological testing ground in the whole of the Soviet Union.
Officials state that they are acting to lessen the chances of anthrax and other pathogens being stolen as weapons by countries or groups it sees as hostile to American interests.
Although Uzbekistan's major testing site has already been dismantled, there are believed to be numerous others that could present a risk.
"Any lab in the world that has pathogens, where those pathogens are not properly secured, is a weak spot in the defence," US State Department microbiologist Geoffrey Stewart told BBC World Service's Analysis programme.
"Therefore a terrorist could walk into that site, they could acquire those strains, walk out - and because of transportation practices now, that culture could be anywhere in the world within 48 hours."
Endemic diseases
Uzbekistan was so central to Soviet bio-warfare research, largely because both anthrax and Bubonic plague are endemic to the country - the plague pandemic that wiped out nearly half of Europe in the 17th Century is believed to have begun in the mountains of Central Asia.
At the height of the Cold War, the biggest anthrax testing ground in the whole USSR was on a remote island in the Aral sea, while Central Asia was the centre of a web of disease-research stations known as the Anti-Plague System.
Any place that has veterinary diseases or human diseases is a potential source of pathogenic organisms
US State department microbiologist Geoffrey Stewart
"It consisted of six institutes - five in Russia, one in Kyrgyzstan - about 200-300 general stations and headquarters that were strategically spread over the Soviet Union," confirmed Tina Teshenko, a researcher at the Monterey Institute in Kazakhstan.
Initially, the Anti-Plague System was designed to experiment with endemic diseases and the exotic diseases in neighbouring countries.
But in the 1960s, the system became a component of the Soviet Biological Weapons programme - and it is this that is causing the US to continue to view Uzbekistan with concern.
Washington wants to include Uzbek facilities in its campaign to make safe pathogen collections all over the world.
Keep working
"We do know that there are certain institutes in Uzbekistan that maintain dangerous pathogens," Dr Stewart told Analysis.
"The Centre for Zoonotic Diseases, the former anti-plague institutes - those are all examples. Any place that has veterinary diseases or human diseases is a potential source of pathogenic organisms."
In particular, the State Department is concerned about viral diseases such as anthrax and tularaemia.
"But it's very likely that organisms like plague... are the ones that are of highest risk," Dr Stewart added.
The US is also concerned about the 4,000 specialist scientists in Uzbekistan.
The scientists earn as little as $10 a month and the Americans fear they could be tempted to sell expertise, or even pathogens, to the highest bidder.
As a result, since the mid 1990s, Washington has spent half a billion dollars keeping former Soviet scientists employed.
"There are a number of research projects that the United States Government has funded in the former Soviet states," Dr Stewart said.
"Those research projects are required to meet guidelines for pathogen security if they utilise pathogens.
"That has been our first point of contact - those individuals we already worked with and were funding. But we're beginning to branch out now, and we're continually being asked to fund additional projects."
E. G-8 Global Partnerships 1. Japan Plans For Construction Of New Fast Neutron Reactor
Nuclear.ru
12/10/2003
(for personal use only)
In near future Japan plans to construct a new breeder, Takashi Nagata, Special Assistant To President, Director Of O-Arai Engineering Center, said to Nuclear.Ru at the international forum "Fast Neutron Reactors" held in the city of Obninsk. Japan has already created the experimental reactor Joyo and prototype reactor Monju. According to Nagata, the future R&D are to be carried out by JNC "with close collaboration with the Japanese electric industry" such organizations as JAERI (Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute) and CRIPI (Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry).
"Now we are performing a certain credibility study with regard to fast reactor in order to find out what is the best combination of technologies including the reactor, reprocessing and fabrication of fuel", Nagata said noting that in the field of "fast" reactors Japan performed certain collaboratory work with Russia and that there could be "certain advanced collaboration with Russia". Joint projects are implemented in the frames of the agreement for collaboratory work between JNC and Russia in view of fast reactors but also in disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Besides, Nagata believes that the information exchange on operation of the Russian Beloyarsk BN-600 reactor could be useful for the Japanese experts.
The JNC representative reminded that the institute expects to get permit to restart Monju operation from the governor of Prefecture Fukui. "It means that we have to watch the operation in other countries including BN-600", Nagata said. Reactor Monju was shutdown in 1995 after sodium coolant leak. Eventually it underwent larger upgrades, however, this year the district court of Nagoya sustained the claim of local residents and prohibited the reactor restart by acknowledging baseless the previously issued construction permit. "We are doing a lot of efforts to get the necessary public understanding as regards the restart of Monju and myself I believe we can get the necessary agreement with the local governor and the prefecture", Nagata said.
2. New Projects For Chemical Weapons Destruction To Be Embarked On
ITAR-TASS
12/10/2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW, December 10 (Itar-Tass) - Russia sees the need for an earlier transition to new projects for the destruction of chemical weapons and utilisation of nuclear submarines with ensuring the projects' funding. This is said in the Russian Foreign Ministry's report, faxed to Tass, on the results of the meeting in Paris of senior officials of the Group of Eight that summed up the implementation of Global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.
The Russian side confirmed that the Agreement on multilateral nuclear-ecological programme in Russia is viewed as the core of the legal framework for the working out of bilateral arrangements on Global partnership, Tass learned from the Russian Foreign Ministry.
The participants in the meeting assessed the adoption by the Russian State Duma of the law on the ratification of that agreement as "an important signal that Russia is really ready to cooperate in its implementation".
The sides took a positive view of the development of Russia's cooperation in the destruction of chemical weapons with Germany and Great Britain and the beginning to the implementation of specific projects for the elimination of nuclear submarines jointly with Japan, Great Britain, Germany, and Norway.
They noted the importance of the signing of the agreements with Germany and Italy and coordinating the Russo-Swiss document in these areas. These steps by Russia were cited as the examples of successful implementation of the action plan endorsed by G-8 summit in Evian.
The Russian Foreign Ministry noted that the implementation of specific projects had been discussed in an enlarged format with the participation of representatives of Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden that joined Global partnership in the recent months.
The sides confirmed that the broadening of the range of donor-countries remained important as one of the ways to increase the funding of Global partnership.
At the same time, representatives of G-8 stressed, "the work to bring Global partnership into practical route has not yet been completed".
BERLIN, December 10, 2003. /RIA Novosti/. Russian and German Foreign Ministers Igor Ivanov and Joschka Fischer opened the first meeting of the Russian-German inter-departmental top-level security working group in Berlin on Wednesday.
The group was formed by the decision of the Russian-German summit in Yekaterinburg in October 2003.
The group is expected to work out strategic recommendations to the Russian and German leadership on the fight against international terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and strategic stability.
The group will be coordinated by the Russian and German Foreign Ministries and will involve representatives of power ministries of both countries. According to the Russian side, "the formation of a new structure in our relations is an evidence of trust in bilateral cooperation".
MOSCOW, December 10th, 2003 (RIA Novosti correspondent Maria Balynina) - Russia's Federation Council (upper house) ratified on Wednesday a framework agreement on multilateral nuclear ecological programme in Russia and the protocol on claims, legal procedures and immunity from financial responsibility.
Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the international committee of the upper house, said that this agreement had been signed in May 2003. A number of other countries - the USA, Germany, Great Britain, France, the EU and the European Atomic Energy Community - have signed up to the agreement.
The latter lays down the legal framework of practical, long-standing and multilateral co-operation for the sake of higher safety of scrapping wasted nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in Russia.
According to the document, the Russian side is to cancel customs duties, income tax and other financial obligations in regard to technological assistance in this sphere.
Margelov emphasised that according to the economic feasibility study forwarded by the government, the ratification of these documents could bring Russia up to $3bln for nuclear and radiation safety of submarine scrapping in the north-western district. "This will speed up submarine scrapping and help in handling radioactive waste," said the chairman of the committee.
5. EU To Help Russia Implement Non-Proliferation Cooperation Programme
ALEXANDER SHISHLO
RIA Novosti
12/9/2003
(for personal use only)
BRUSSELS, December 9th, 2003 (RIA Novosti correspondent Alexander Shishlo) -- During the EU Council's session in Brussels devoted to common affairs, Foreign Ministers of EU member countries approved the allocation of 5.5 million euros within the framework of EU-Russia cooperation programme on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on disarmament.
This is said in the document circulated by the EU Council secretariat after the end of the session.
The document says that foreign ministers also approved the EU-Russia 2003 cooperation in the latter's work on safe and environmentally friendly dismantling and/or re-orientation of the infrastructure and equipment connected with the weapons of mass destruction.
6. Russia, Netherlands Sign Joint Programme Of Actions For 2004-2005
Andrei Poskakukhin
RIA Novosti
12/9/2003
(for personal use only)
THE HAGUE, December 9, 2003. /RIA Novosti correspondent Andrei Poskakukhin/. Russian Vice Premier Aleksei Gordeyev and Prime Minister of the Netherlands Jan Peter Balkenende signed in the Hague a joint programme of actions between Russia and the Netherlands for 2004-2005. The programme outlines the main trends of bilateral cooperation for the next two years: political dialogue, economy, trade, finances, social issues, people's contacts, law and order, defence, peace, security and other issues.
As for the political sphere, the sides agreed to hold a routine visit to Russia by the Netherlands Prime Minister, to hold meetings between foreign ministers at least once a year, to conduct regular consultations on the issues of mutual interest at the level of deputy foreign ministers, directors of the Foreign Ministries' departments and embassies and to develop bilateral inter-parliamentary exchanges. Bilateral relations, the UN role and activities, Russia's relations with the European Union and NATO, the activities of the Council of Europe, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international security, environmental protection and other problems are on the agenda of the Russian-Netherlands dialogue.
According to the document, Russian and Netherlands Defence Ministers will maintain contacts, including the exchange of delegations, information, consultations on military aspects of security and counter-terrorism. Netherlands' assistance to Russia in the utilisation of nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons and the liquidation of chemical weapons is of particular importance, as well.
7. MNEPR Agreement Is Base For Multilateral Cooperation
ITAR-TASS
12/8/2003
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MOSCOW, December 8 (Itar-Tass) - A landmark agreement negotiated by donor countries - called the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme for Russia, MNEPR, is the base of multilateral cooperation in scrapping nuclear submarines, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said.
Commenting on the ratification of the MNEPR agreement by the State Duma on Monday, Yakovenko said the agreement “will lay the groundwork and facilitate multilateral cooperation in cleaning up Russia’s Northwest from spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste generated as a result of the Russian nuclear submarine operation in the area.”
The agreement was signed in Stockholm in May. It also includes Belgium, Britain, Germany, Denmark, the EU, Euratom, the Netherlands, Norway, the U.S., Finland, France and Sweden.
Yakovenko said the agreement “will allow us to step up the creation of the infrastructure for safe treatment with spent nuclear fuel from nuclear submarines.” In his view, “The major part of cooperation is to clean up the territories of the Russian Fleet former coastal bases in the Andreyev bay and in Gremikha (the Kola peninsula).”
The MNEPR agreement “envisions the rules and norms that are the legal groundwork for carrying out concrete projects in this field. This regards such problems as taxes and exemption of responsibility,” Yakovenko said.
The agreement creates a precedent for working out bilateral agreements on the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, he said.
F. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. More “Cooperation” Needed for Cooperative Threat Reduction, Official Says
David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
12/11/2003
(for personal use only)
WASHINGTON — Senior Bush administration officials must work harder to encourage U.S.-Russian cooperation on securing and disposing of Russia’s massive unconventional weapons capabilities, a former Bush administration official said yesterday.
Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Kuenning, who until October served as director of Cooperative Threat Reduction program at the U.S. Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, made his remarks at a DTRA-cosponsored conference in Alexandria.
The program has accomplished much since its creation more than 10 years ago, he said, listing numerous destruction activities posted on the agency’s Web site.
Most recently, this week, work will be completed on a new facility for securely storing up to 100 tons of fissile material, he said. In addition, massive work has been completed to upgrade security at two key chemical weapons storage sites and operations there will begin this week, Kuenning said.
Kuenning added, though, that the program needs greater support from senior Bush administration officials, comparable to what was received in the nascent days of the program in the early 1990s.
A level of “political support and political participation” is needed, he said, akin to “the early years of this program, [where] political appointees were involved in fostering the program and pushing this program forward.” Becoming Coercive, Rather than Cooperative Kuenning said the U.S. approach toward the program following a reported Russian breach of one agreement has been slowing cooperation.
He cited an incident reported last year in which the United States contributed $106 million to help Russia build a plant to destroy liquid missile fuel, but later discovered the fuel instead had been used in Russia’s civilian space program (see GSN, March 4).
U.S. officials have sought to ensure that such an incident does not happen again, Kuenning said.
He said, though, “The reaction to that has been that now we’re trying to get in place for everything a written precise agreement and it is clogging up, constipating cooperation.”
“It is becoming a coercive program, rather than a cooperative program. So we need to get cooperation back into the program,” he said. Biological Destruction Greater political involvement is needed in particular on biological weapons destruction activities, Kuenning said.
“On the bio side, we need to have quite frankly more political involvement to develop a relationship of cooperation with Russia. … The degree of Russian cooperation is very limited,” he said.
The Soviet Union at one point had between 40 and 70 institutes dedicated to biological weapons research and 20,000 people working for the biological weapons industry, he said.
“We need to have a diplomatic agreement that allows us to work with these various agencies to accomplish security improvement at these biological sites,” he said.
“Plus, we need to have the full gamut of those sites opened up for our cooperation,” he said.
Progress has been “relatively modest” on biological activities, he said, with more than $50 million contributed annually by the United States, up from a few million dollars prior to the U.S. mail anthrax attacks in October 2001.
Current activities center on supporting projects aimed at fostering peaceful collaboration between U.S. scientists and former Soviet biological weapons laboratories.
“The bottom line is there is a lot that has to be done,” he said.
G. Russia - Iran 1. Iran: Bushehr Unit 1 To Be Ready Next Year, Hopes Vice-President
RIA Novosti
12/11/2003
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TEHERAN, DECEMBER 11, RIA NOVOSTI - Gholam Reza Aga-zadeh, Iran's Vice-President and President of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, hopes Unit One construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant will finish next year.
"Russian experts are carrying on unit construction. Reactor equipment is being supplied and assembled. Possibly, it will take a year to finish the job," he said.
The Vice-President pointed out principal reasons for Bushehr construction prolonged-several Western-based companies who started the work had to stop it with the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. Later on, Russia had to start the job from scratch, and all but completely re-equip what had been done on the project.
The Vice-President flatly denies any link between international apprehensions concerning Iranian nuclear programmes and the prospects of nuclear fuel imported from Russia getting back to the supplier country from Bushehr after depletion.
2. Russia Pleased With Iran Signing Nuclear Protocol
ITAR-TASS
12/11/2003
(for personal use only)
MOSCOW, December 11 (Itar-Tass) - The signing by Iran of an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “makes it possible to step up Russian-Iranian cooperation in the sphere of nuclear power engineering, Nikolai Shingaryov, spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, told Itar-Tass on Thursday, commenting on the decision of the Iranian government to sign the document.
“The additional protocol ensures a possibility of sudden inspections, to be made by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is to remove all questions concerning the Iranian nuclear programme,” Shingaryov continued.
“Russia’s cooperation with Iran in the nuclear sphere is confined to the building of a power unit at the nuclear power plant (NPP) in Bushehr, which will be completed soon,” he said. “At the same time, Teheran began recently to express the desire to build the second power unit for the Bushehr NPP with the help of Russian specialists.” He stressed that the Russian nuclear fuel delivered to the Iranian NPP is sure to be sent back to Russia after use, where it will be processed.
Shingaryov said as well that Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev is going to visit Teheran in January 2004. He is going to discuss with Iranian officials some problems connected with the completion of work at the first power unit of the Bushehr NPP, as well as prospects for the development of bilateral cooperation.
H. Russia - China 1. 220 Tianwan N- Plant Staff Completed Training In Russia
Nuclear.ru
12/11/2003
(for personal use only)
The Chinese specialists who are to work at Tianwan nuclear power plant have completed their training in Novovoronezh nuclear plant’s training center of Rosenergoatom Concern. ITAR-TASS reports this as said by Alexander Ivanchenko, the training center head. According to Ivanchenko, the Chinese experts now need to get the relevant licenses directly at the nuclear plant site in China.
The 220 Chinese specialists did their training in Novovoronezh NPP’s training center for two years. They are shift supervisors, administrative personnel, power unit operators. “Chinese approved themselves as apt specialists. During the training they did their best to get to all nuances of the future work”, Ivanchenko said. He also said he had no doubts about them passing the exams to the commission, which would include the Russian and Chinese representatives. The coming licensing is for the high-ranking personnel only, for those whom the nuclear plant’s nuclear safety directly depends on.
I. Russia - India 1. India Will Go As Far As Possible To The Breeder Reactors
Nuclear.ru
12/11/2003
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The necessity to pursue fast neutron reactors is conditioned by the current situation in India. This was said to Nuclear.Ru by Shivram Bhoje, the Director of Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research, during the international science and technology forum currently held in Obninsk. “The demand for energy and the energy resources available in the country, which very clearly show that we are to go for nuclear power, Bhoje said. “As of thermal reactors, we use pressurized water reactors, but we have very limited uranium in the country. So we will go as far as possible to the breeder reactors.”
According to Bhoje, the Indian experts have gained good experience in this area operating their 40-megawatt reactor, which has been in operation for fifteen years in Kalpakkam. “We use a unique carbide fuel and the performance is much more than we expected, he said. “Based on this experience we have designed and developed a 500-megawatt reactor. The design has completed and the construction has been started by a new company last August.” Indira Gandhi Center’s Director said the construction would be completed in six years. Then another 500-megawatt reactor will be built with 1000 MW one being under design in parallel.
“The government provides very good support to nuclear power and fast breeder reactors”, Bhoje said. He believes that a large-scale transition to “fast” reactors in India could start in twenty years since this direction is incorporated in the India’s national energy strategy. He also noted that India would like to cooperate with Russian organizations, in particular, with OKBM named after A.I. Afrikantov and IPPE of Obninsk, but this cooperation is hindered by political problems. “So far we don’t have a direct collaboration [with Russia] but what has been published we use this information”, Bhoje said. “But in future when given an opportunity we would like to work with Russia”, he added.
AFTER successfully starting joint work with Russia to set up two 1,000-MW nuclear power reactors at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu, India is now working with France to explore the possibility of jointly establishing nuclear power plants in India.
An Indo-French Group is already studying the feasibility of setting up nuclear plants. The proposal is to have a cluster of six reactors of 1,000 MW each, according to Mr S.A. Bohra, Senior Executive Director (technical), Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL).
Even in Koodankulam "we expect to bring down the gestation period by 8-9 months and complete the project in 60 months, far ahead of schedule. The Russians are also now convinced of the capability of NPCIL to execute the project," Mr Bohra told newspersons here on Saturday.
"Concurrently, the Indian Government is in discussions with the Russian Government to set up another set of four 1,000-MW units at the same place. The site for the proposed expansion programme is ready," the NPCIL executive said.
On the question of private sector participation, he said the process of amending the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate such a move was on. In the meantime, there was a significant increase in the participation of the Indian industry in execution of the eight new nuclear power reactors that were being set up, he said.Referring to the Prototype Fast-Breeder Reactor (PFBR), recently cleared by the Government for construction, Mr Bohra said a separate company had been set up and the project would be completed in 60 months at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Advanced Research, near Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu.
There was enough spent fuel available from the 13 operating nuclear power reactors to get Plutonium, which is the fuel for the PFBR. The new company would take up the construction of future FBRs in the country, he said.
Armed with new design, high credit rating for resource mobilisation, industry backing and capability to shorten gestation periods to less than 60 months, NPCIL had set a target of adding at least 800 MW of nuclear power annually and reach 10,000 MW (now 2,770 MW) by 2011.
"Once we reach this figure and operate at the present average capacity factors (plant load factors) of 85 per cent and higher, we have told the Government that we don't require further funding and would sustain a programme of 1,000 MW annually through own resources," Mr Bohra said.
MOSCOW (Bloomberg) -- Nuclear exports will probably bring in $3 billion in revenue, Interfax reported Monday, citing an unidentified official from the Nuclear Power Ministry.
The country may get about $700 million this year for building nuclear generators for Iran, China and India, Interfax reported. That revenue may double in 2004.
The country also receives about $500 million per year by selling nuclear fuel and $450 million annually under an agreement with the United States covering enriched uranium, the news service said.
The government has rejected U.S. calls for it to stop building a nuclear reactor in Iran. The United States has accused Iran of trying to build nuclear weapons and has pushed the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency to declare that Iran has violated the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
2. New Atomic Projects : Floating Nuclear Power Plants
Tatyana Sinitsyna
RIA Novosti
12/8/2003
(for personal use only)
A project for a small-capacity floating nuclear power plant has been completed and passed an environmental test in Russia. The floating plant will operate in the White Sea near Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Region (northern European region of Russia). It will be moored at Sevmash, Russia's largest shipyard.
With two generators and two KLT-40C reactors, the power plant's capacity is less than one 150th of a standard nuclear power plant. Russia is building a standard plant in Bushehr, Iran. Nevertheless, the power plant can supply enough electricity to meet all of Sevmash's electricity, fresh water and heating needs. It can run on a single reactor load for three years. During its 40-year service life, it requires only two overhauls.
Floating nuclear power plants will be useful to Russia. About two-thirds of Russia's territory has no centralized electricity supply, constantly suffers from a deficit of organic fuel, and is in urgent need of a reliable independent source of electricity.
A small floating nuclear power plant can solve these problems. It can be moored close to town or industrial facility. The plant has two reactors and rooms for equipment and personnel. A compact onshore infrastructure (transformer plants, a pumping system, heating supply centers, etc.) is required for the plant to generate electricity, desalinate water, or provide heat. A floating nuclear power plant is capable of generating electricity for a town with a population of 200,000, and can produce 240,000 cubic meters of desalinated water a day.
Responding to fears of radiation, the project managers said there is nothing to fear. "The technologies used in floating nuclear power plants are reliable," said Yevgeny Kuzin, general director of the Malaya Energetika public company. "They have been tested during the 30-year operation of the civilian fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers servicing Russia's Northern Sea Route. The practice of using such ships shows they are technically reliable and have no radioactive effect on the environment. The same technology is used in a floating nuclear power plant. When such a nuclear plant is decommissioned, the place where it operated is absolutely clean."
The possibility of a terrorist attack was taken into account when the security system of the plant was being developed. Illicit access to fissionable materials on board the floating power plant is prevented by using the latest security measures, such as identifying a person by his fingerprints or by his iris. Technical damage from outside is also ruled out. For instance, even if a Boeing crashes into the power plant, it will not destroy the reactor unit. Protection against possible actions by a group of terrorist divers has also been provided for.
Small floating nuclear power plants are a boon to regions of Russia bordering on the Arctic Ocean. They are especially needed in the remote Asian areas of Russia that are not supplied by the unified system of electricity. Floating nuclear power plants are meant precisely for them.
Foreign countries, including Indonesia and China, have expressed interest in these power plants. Can Russia sell a floating nuclear power plant to anyone? "Of course, not," Kuzin said. "Russia can only sell what the plant produces (electricity, heat and desalinated seawater). This removes all questions associated with proliferation of nuclear technologies. We can tow a floating nuclear power plant to a country that has signed a contract with us, moor it in a suitable place protected from possible natural disasters, establish contact with the onshore technical services, put our reactors in action and 'let there be light!'" A single station could save 200,000 metric tons of coal and 100,000 metric tons of oil a year.
The Russian nuclear industry will maintain the floating nuclear power plants throughout its service life. The plant will be serviced on a rotating schedule. After 12 years, the plant will be towed back to Russia for repairs.
The critics of floating nuclear power plants say that in the event of a natural disaster, the plants may be a danger to the environment. The location of the plant was painstakingly selected after a thoroughly monitoring the area and observing regulations. Floating plants will not be located in a tsunami zone.
K. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Russian Submarine Test-Launches ICBM
Global Security Newswire
12/11/2003
(for personal use only)
The Russian ballistic missile submarine Dmitriy Donskoi has successfully test-launched a long-range ballistic missile, a Russian radio station reported today (see GSN, Dec. 2). The missile was fired off the northern coast of Russia to a test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula (Ekho Moskvy/BBC Monitoring, Dec. 11).
According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Dmitriy Donskoi is a Typhoon-class submarine that is serving as a test bed for a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the SS-N-27 Bulava, a version of the land-based SS-27, also known as the Topol-M (see GSN, Aug. 11; NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2003).
American pharmacist John Pemberto, who in 1886 mistook ingredients for a gastric potion and thus invented Coca-Cola, certainly deserves a monument for his brilliant error. However, there might be no one to erect monuments to errors in the combat control computer systems of modern strategic weapons and nothing to erect them of.
This thought has taken on a new urgency today, given that the Moscow-Washington dialogue on nuclear security has again become the stuff of acute polemics. In response to the Americans' decision to launch production of low-yield nuclear warheads, which in essence means returning to the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons, Russian First Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky told journalists that Russia was going to adjust the development of its strategic nuclear forces depending on US plans.
"Nuclear weapons that were seen only as a political tool of deterrent are now becoming battlefield weapons," Baluyevsky pointed out.
So far this is not quite accurate, as there is no "battlefield" per se, but the trend is nevertheless dangerous. This is especially true, if we remember that most of both countries' nuclear arsenals have historically been kept in a high state of readiness in line with the retaliation concept. Today, as in those times, Russian and US land-based missiles can be launched a few minutes after the order is received, while submarines can launch their ICBMs within 15 minutes.
Moreover, the high combat readiness, the retaliation concept and the huge destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, have given rise to a fundamentally new problem: the accidental nuclear war.
Why is it fundamentally new? The threat of an unsanctioned launch has theoretically existed ever since the first nuclear unit was put on alert.
However, today's situation is different because in the past it took far more time to prepare missiles for launch than it does now. Moreover, there was no highly automated missile warning system based on complicated radio-technical and infrared ground- and space-based complexes with many high-speed computers.
It is these systems, not Gorbachev and Reagan (as in the previous years), that decide everything today. They emit a primary signal that provides the grounds for taking a decision to launch when under attack. Experts warn that, in the event of a fatal error in the system, there will be no time to analyse the situation, which means that a nuclear war may start even against the will of the political leaders of one or another country.
The most obvious way to prevent the consequences of such an error or wrong interpretation of the system's data is mutually to lower the combat readiness of strategic nuclear arsenals, thus increasing the time necessary to take a decision on launching a nuclear attack.
There have been plenty of examples when failures in the system's work made leaders of both countries sweat with fear. The 1980s were the most memorable in this respect. For example, in June 1980 the indication system at the Strategic Air Commandment post near Omaha, Nebraska, produced a signal about a large number of ballistic submarine missiles approaching US territory. All alert crews of B-52 strategic bombers were launched with an order to attack targets in the USSR. Only three minutes later did it become clear that it was a false alarm and the attack order was rescinded. The investigation showed that the reason was a burnt out microchip worth 50 cents.
Space-based warning systems are also far from perfect. A steel spillage at a metallurgical plant can look like a missile launch from space. According to US Air Force experts, in the 1980s there were an average of six primary false signals a day.
The current situation is aggravated by the fact that the basis of Russia's warning system, the space systems, has been significantly weakened in recent years due to economic problems and is working in a reduced mode. At the same time, there is no absolute certainty that the computers are in perfect working order.
Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defence Committee Alexei Arbatov believes that a decision to decrease combat readiness will contribute to progress in strategic nuclear cuts, while simultaneously preserving the deterrent potential. He expressed this opinion in a special report in 2001. Moreover, if the nuclear arsenals of both parties are in a lower state of readiness, there is no need to maintain a large number of carriers and warheads, due to the fear that a significant part of the arsenal could be destroyed by the opponent's sudden preventive strike.
Nevertheless, another part of Baluyevsky's statement inspires a certain degree of optimism. He pointed out that the USA, with the world's most powerful army, should be the first to place the bar for using nuclear weapons at the super-maximum height. This means that Russia will not have to be convinced to make any moves in response.
L. Nuclear Safety 1. Russian, French Experts Modernise Fire Safety System At Volgodonsk APP
RIA Novosti
12/11/2003
(for personal use only)
ROSTOV-ON-DON, December 11, 2003. /RIA Novosti/. Russian and French experts have prepared a project to modernise the fire safety system at the Volgodonsk atomic power plant. This is the first Russian-French joint project within the framework of the international agreement on APP fire safety improvement, the APP information-analytical centre told RIA Novosti.
Thermatome, the leading French company producing fire safety systems took part in the work.
It took the experts eight months to accomplish the project and its direct implementation will follow soon, the information-analytical centre said.
On December 9 the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dimitrovgrad held an international paper drill to master personnel's actions in the event of a radiation accident, as Nucleàr.Ru was informed by Minatom's press-service. The drill was attended by specialists from Minatom of Russia and the Nuclear safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE). The drill was observed by the US Department of Energy representatives.
According to the drill commanders, the main task was to trial procedures for notification and information transmission about a simulated accident to the competent authorities of RF, IAEA, bordering states and to Minatom's Situation and Crisis Center; training expert groups of each level as regards the evaluation of the accident and its possible consequences; interaction with local administrations. Drill commanders concluded the drill's tasks successfully performed.
3. Russia-France Project To Be Implemented At Kalinin NPP Site
Nuclear.ru
12/10/2003
(for personal use only)
On December 9 the two-day meeting of the Russian-French working group on nuclear power cooperation started at Kalinin nuclear power plant, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Kalinin plant's information office. The French state-owned EdF and Rosenergoatom Concern have maintained close contacts in the area of nuclear power development for more than a decade. Last summer they signed an agreement covering engineering, nuclear plant operation, emergency management, staff training and management as well as inspections.
At present, they prepare to implement the bilateral industrial project "Improvement of VVER-100 Unit's Performance Indicators". The sides believe that this project will complement measures being realized under partnership agreements between EdF and Rosenergoatom. To make it a success France has agreed to finance the preliminary work on the project in the amount of 1 million euros. Kalinin-2 is the target for the main cooperative efforts under this industrial project, which is to be headed on site by Kalinin plant's deputy chief engineer for safety and reliability A. Lupishko.
Major sections of the project are "Fire Safety: priority measures to improve fire safety. Development and implementation of the Unit Fire Safety Measures Plan" and "Priority Measures to Improve Safety at Designated Power Unit". The working group members are tasked to define a detailed technical content of the project, approve the joint management structure, and design the implementation work schedule by next April. "This is a difficult task and timeframe is tough", Didier Rouse from EdF said. "But I have been working under similar programs in Russia for a decade and I am confident we will prove both countries' leaders that we are capable of successful and productive cooperation in this area".
STOCKHOLM, December 8 (Itar-Tass) - Russia makes a considerable contribution to disposing of nuclear waste, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said.
He spoke at an international conference devoted to disposing of nuclear waste currently under way in Stockholm. The meeting organised by Sweden’s SKB and the IAEA involves about 200 specialists, including from Russia.
Russia has a big potential to store and dispose of nuclear waste and is ready to receive spent fuel from the countries where it built reactors, ElBaradei said.
In his view, it is necessary to rivet special attention to creating international nuclear waste storages that will make it possible to solve the problems of the states having one or several nuclear facilities and nuclear disposal technologies.
The participants in the conference called for working out a complex approach towards the nuclear waste problem.
5. UK Pledges Cash Support For Soviet Spring Clean
E4Engineering.com
12/8/2003
(for personal use only)
The UK is to give £40 million worth of support this year to help clean up the nuclear, chemical and biological legacies in Russia and other Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries.
Key projects that the UK is funding include the dismantling of two Oscar class nuclear submarines; the construction of a spent nuclear fuel facility; and support for a number of projects which enhance nuclear security.
The UK has been working to help manage the nuclear, biological and chemical legacies of the FSU since the early 1990s. In 2002, G8 leaders pledged to provide up to $20 billion over ten years for a new Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
The Prime Minister announced that the UK would make up to $750 million available to fund projects in pursuit of the Partnership's aims.
'The nuclear legacy of the Former Soviet Union is one of the most important challenges facing the international community,' said Trade and Industry Minister Nigel Griffiths. 'The serious environmental, security and proliferation threats it represents do not respect international boundaries and could pose a direct threat to the UK and the whole world, if not managed carefully.'
M. Official Statements 1. Transcript of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov's Remarks at Press Conference at FRG Foreign Ministry, December 10, 2003
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin
12/10/2003
(for personal use only)
FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: First of all, I would like to express my profound gratitude to the Federal Chancellor of the FRG, Mr. Gerhard Schroeder, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Joschka Fischer, and our other German partners for the condolences over the recent terrorist acts in Russia. We stress that only by cooperating, only by showing solidarity, can democratic states achieve success in the fight against terrorism. We are grateful to Germany for this solidarity. In the course of today's conversation with the Federal Chancellor, as well as in the course of the talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs we thoroughly examined the course of the implementation of the important agreements which had been reached in Yekaterinburg during the last meeting between the leaders of our states. As Mr. Fischer has just informed you, we opened the work of the bilateral interagency high-level working group on security. This group's work reflects both the growing mutual trust and our growing cooperation in the struggle against new threats and challenges.
In accordance with the agreements reached in Yekaterinburg the FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs and I shall today sign an Intergovernmental Agreement on the Facilitation of the Visa Regime.
Trade-and-economic cooperation is successfully developing. For the next year we are planning to hold an energy summit, as well as a high technology forum.
We are grateful to our German colleagues for the excellent holding of the Days of Russian Culture in Germany during the year 2003. Days of German Culture in Russia will take place next year, and we shall also accord the same hospitality to our German friends.
Cooperation is also actively developing in other areas, such as science, education and culture, so that we can say with confidence that our relations with each passing year are reaching an ever higher qualitative level.
In the course of the talks with my counterpart we also examined a number of pressing international problems. In particular, we discussed the situation in Iraq and spoke for more active UN involvement in the elaboration of a scheme for political settlement. We shall continue to actively cooperate in the interests of settlement in the Middle East and of settlement in Afghanistan. We adhere to a common stand regarding the necessity to strengthen the regimes for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For my part, I want to express gratitude to the German side for the active cooperation, bilateral cooperation within the framework of the Global Partnership.
Generally, once again I want to stress that the Russian leadership is pleased with the state of bilateral relations, and we intend to continue to implement all the existing agreements, and for our part to do everything necessary to ensure that Russian-German relations, our cooperation remain an important element of European and international stability and security.
QUESTION: The United States is going to bar the countries which opposed the Iraq war from bidding for contracts for the reconstruction of that country. Does this concern Russia, as both the states were "against"?
FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: First of all, I would like to say that there are the statements of individual politicians which have appeared in the press. I do not think that from those statements one can already judge the policy of the United States as a whole.
We are guided by the well-known statement of the President of the United States, in which he repeatedly emphasized that the stay of the United States in Iraq bears a temporary character and that the Iraqi people will themselves dispose of the wealth of their country.
As to the reconstruction of Iraq, I think that this is a common cause of the international community and all the countries which are ready to lend assistance to the Iraqi people in the rehabilitation of the country after the war must have all the necessary opportunities for that.
QUESTION: China is going to become a great world power. Does it bother you that Germany wants to supply to China a nuclear plant for the production of fuel elements?
FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV: China was, is and will be a great power. China is a strategic partner of Russia. At the same time China, as a sovereign state, is developing relations with many countries and we can only welcome the development of cooperation with our other privileged partner, Germany.
I think that on the Chinese market we have many opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. The only thing that I can assure you about is that we aren't planning to create any Russia-China-Germany triangles.
*QUESTION:* Well, you give them a hearing, then. Can I ask you about Moldova? Did you -- have you noticed, has State Department noticed the report that dozens of rockets, outfitted so-called "dirty bombs" appear to be missing in Moldova in a breakaway region? Is that something State Department can credit at all?
*MR. BOUCHER:* No, it's not -- it's not something that we can substantiate. We've done some looking into it. At this point, we don't have information that would substantiate those reports. We can't confirm the existence of this material or the reported movements, but we'll continue to look into these reports and see if we can track down any of the pieces that were there.
I would point out that we work in Moldova under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We've been negotiating also a program of assistance to the Government of Ukraine to strengthen its ability to interdict traffic in weapons of mass destruction along the Ukraine-Moldova border. There are plans to strengthen that program, to strengthen the Government of Ukraine's ability to interdict illicit traffic, also through the Ukraine's Black Sea ports.
And I'd also mention the Department of Energy is constructing a secure radioactive source storage facility in Moldova. This facility will store and secure unused medical and industrial radioactive sources. Department of Energy has other projects to consolidate and secure other commonly used radioactive sources in place.
So these particular reports we can't substantiate, but in general, as regards the problem, we are doing work both to interdict any kind of movement of this type but also to gather the materials in a secure and safe storage place.
3. Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Russian Media Question Concerning the Approval by State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of a Federal Law on Ratification of the MNEPR Agreement
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin
12/8/2003
(for personal use only)
Question: How could you comment on the approval on November 28 by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of a federal law ratifying the Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)?
Answer: The MNEPR Agreement was signed in Stockholm on May 21 this year, and Belgium, Britain, Germany, Denmark, the EU, EURATOM, the Netherlands, Norway, the US, Finland, France and Sweden participate in it along with Russia.
This framework document lays a long-term groundwork for multilateral cooperation in solving the acute problem for us of the disposition of decommissioned nuclear submarines and atomic maintenance ships in the northwest of Russia. It will help to speed up the creation of an infrastructure for the safe handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in the submarine disposition. An important part of the cooperation will be reclamation of the territories of the former Russian Navy coastal bases in the Andreyev bay and at Gremikha. All of this is a practical contribution to solving the common problems of reinforcing nuclear and environment safety.
The importance of the MNEPR Agreement lies in the fact that it for the first time in a multilateral format lays down the rules and norms which are the legal basis for carrying out specific projects in this field. In particular, this concerns regulation of the issues of taxation, exemption from liability and other. A precedent has thus been created which is already being used to draft bilateral agreements under the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD.
The decision adopted by the State Duma is an important signal demonstrating in practice the readiness of Russia for partner cooperation in implementing the MNEPR Program with an outlook for its further development.
Now the Duma-approved Law on Ratification of the MNEPR Agreement is to be considered in the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.
4. Presidential Determination on Waiver of Conditions on Obligation and Expenditure of Funds for Planning, Design, and Construction of a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Russia
The White House
12/6/2003
(for personal use only)
December 6, 2003
Presidential Determination No. 2004-10 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Waiver of Conditions on Obligation and Expenditure of Funds for Planning, Design, and Construction of a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Russia
Consistent with the authority vested in me by section 1306 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136)(the "Act"), I hereby certify that waiving the conditions described in section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65) is important to the national security interests of the United States, and include herein, for submission to the Congress, the statement, justification, and plan described in section 1306 of the Act.
You are authorized and directed to transmit this determination, including the statement, justification, and plan to the Congress and to arrange for publication of this determination in the Federal Register.
5. Negotiations On The Transportation Of Used Nuclear Fuel From Vinca Institute Begin
Government of Serbia, Office of Communications
12/3/2003
(for personal use only)
Belgrade, Dec 3, 2003 - Serbian Minister of Science, Technology and Development Dragan Domazet said on Wednesday that negotiations have begun with the Russian Federation on the transportation of used nuclear fuel from the Vinca Institute for Nuclear Sciences for further processing.
Domazet told a press conference that during a Russian delegation's recent visit to Belgrade, Russia's offer for taking over the used nuclear fuel was discussed, and added that successful cooperation of the two parties during the transportation of fresh nuclear fuel in August 2003 was highlighted.
Domazet said that the final plan of the transportation of used nuclear fuel to Russia will be agreed after Russian and local experts make necessary analyses.
The Serbian Minister said that representatives of the Vinca Institute signed an agreement with the US Department of Energy, on the basis of a project "Sandia National Laboratories USA", which envisages construction of a state-of-the-art system of physical and technical security of used nuclear oil on the territory of the Vinca Institute. The American party will cover 90 percent of the costs of the project, while the remaining ten percent will be secured by the Serbian Ministry.
Domazet said that the project is expected to be realised in the next six months, and added that these activities are being carried out with the cooperation and supervision of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency.
Domazet said that the Serbian Ministry has never considered the possibility of storing low and medium-grade nuclear waste, which is now placed in Vinca's waste dump on Fruska Gora mountain. He added that the choice of location for the construction of a permanent nuclear waste damp will be the subject of research papers that will be prepared in 2004.
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