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RANSAC Nuclear News, December 3, 2003 Compiled By: Matthew Bouldin A. HEU Purchase Agreement
 A. HEU Purchase Agreement 1. GNSS denies Tenex’s claim on the breach of HEU feed supply contract The statement made by the Russian JSC Tekhsnabexport (Tenex) to Platts news agency about the contract breach with the “Globe Nuclear Services and Supply GNSS, Ltd” “is absolutely untrue”, Nuclear.Ru was told by GNSS official who refused to further comment. November 24 Platts, referring to Tenex, said that one of the factors that had driven the thing to the breach of the contract to deliver to GNSS the natural uranium (HEU feed) had been “the dwindling transparency” of GNSS. According to Tenex’s statement, GNSS “further and further diverted from the correct understanding and respect of the HEU-LEU Agreement cornerstone - the unbreakable unity of its political and commercial objectives”. Under the agreement the USA pays to the Russian side only for services to downblend highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from nuclear weapons to low enriched material. The cost of material itself is compensated to Russia through the return of the corresponding amount of natural uranium (HEU feed). Poor transparency of GNSS, as Tenex states, manifests as “no information available concerning the materials' market disposition, nor the end-users, nor the quantities committed to such end-users, nor the company's financial situation”. In the official statement made October 31, 2003 Tenex said the further sales to Globe Nuclear Services and Supply GNSS, Limited (Switzerland) of the natural uranium distributed to the Russian Federation as its federal property in the territory of the United States of America within the framework of implementing HEU-LEU Agreement are inexpedient. “The decision was made pursuant to the conclusion that the terms of the contract with GNSS are contrary to the interests of the Russian Federation and in the absence of a legal basis for its further implementation. Guided by this decision “Techsnabexport” terminates starting from January 1, 2004 sales of the subject natural uranium to Globe Nuclear Services and Supply GNSS, Limited (Switzerland),” the statement says. However, the GNSS November 7-th response claims: “TENEX has no legal basis to support its decision to terminate, since GNSS has always fully performed its obligations under its contract with TENEX (which even TENEX does not dispute). Because of TENEX's baseless actions, GNSS has demanded that TENEX retract its termination, failing which GNSS will take swift and decisive legal action to protect its contractual interests and enforce TENEX's obligation to supply GNSS with HEU feed. GNSS has informed its customers of TENEX's actions”. GNSS has the largest share of the US import quota for Russian HEU feed - 2,200 mtU in 2004, rising to 3,000 mtU in 2008 and thereafter. Until recent 38% GNSS stock were owned by JSC Tekhsnabexport. Return to Menu B. Plutonium Disposition 1. Reprocessing is cost-effective only when its products return to fuel cycle The industrial scale processing of irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) is cost-effective provided the processing products are returned to the fuel cycles. This was stated in the presentation made by advisor to NIIAR director general Valentin Ivanov “Technological Solution to Issues of NPP and NFC Enterprises’ INF and Radioactive Waste Management in the Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle” made at the international conference “Nuclear Power and Fuel Cycles”. Since the involvement of processing products into nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) presupposes a large-scale construction of fast neutron reactors planned for the mid-century, it is reasonable at this stage to consider options of long-term (up to 50 years) storage of INF, the presentation says. The conference held December 1-5 in NIKIET Institute named after N.A. Dollezhal (Moscow) and SSC RF NIIAR (Dimitrovgrad) is attended by over 200 specialists from Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Japan, China, and the Great Britain. Addressing the press-conference, NIKIET deputy director for R&D Yuri Cherepnin noted that the topic of the conference as it was formulated presented a new approach, since previously the nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycle issues had been considered separately. “Now there is an understanding that this is an inseparable process, Cherepnin said. “We are still at the stage of ideology development for fuel cycle and power generation for the coming century. Many things are still unclear, but nevertheless the ways of solution have been devised already”. According to the NIKIET official, the main conclusion of the presentations is that nuclear power can do with the pressing problems and knows how to deal with the ones in the field of waste and non-proliferation. A common methodology has not been worked out yet and the conference scientists are to discuss various conceptual approaches, “technical development philosophies”, Cherepnin said. Answering Nuclear.Ru question on prospects of setting up the international centers for management and disposition of INF and radwaste, Dr. Shigeo Nomura, the director of Waste Management and Fuel Cycle Research Center of the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC), said: “We think it is a good idea. However, as INF amounts grow annually, it is more important to minimize resulted INF, i.e. shift to the closed fuel cycle”. In Japan at Rokkasho site the INF processing plant construction is nearly completed with the “hot run” scheduled for 2006. In addition, the construction of a MOX-fuel fabrication plant with annual capacity of 130 tons is underway. Each year Japan removes from its reactors about 800 tons of INF. “Therefore we will be capable of processing up to 80% of our INF, Nomura said. “If we were pursuing direct disposal, we would still need to monitor this fuel for 10,000 years”. The closed NFC issue, however, as the JNC official said, pertains to the next generation technologies, which can be developed, in particular, under INPRO and Generation IV programs. Yevgeni Ryazantsev, the director of Institute for Reactor Technologies, Fuel and Materials within the RRC Kurchatov Institute, noted that several years ago Kurchatov Institute had put forwards a proposal to create international centers for management of INF and radwaste where the nuclear fuel and radwaste management and processing methods could be developed and improved: technologies for recovery of valuable materials and compacting technologies. “Now about 200,000 tons of INF are accumulated in the world. Each year adds some 10,000 more to that amount, Ryazantsev said. “These amounts are not comparable with waste generated by other power generation technologies – which use fossil fuels – neither in weight nor volume”. However, it is reasonable to process nuclear power waste for it contains a lot of valuable constituents. When nuclear fuel is irradiated in reactors plutonium is produced, which can be directed to the fuel cycle. “Still, the most long-lived fission fragments can be burned in “fast” reactors, Ryazantsev said. “They can be burnt down completely within two-four years, i.e. the closed nuclear cycle would leave practically no waste resulted from nuclear power. That is where it differs from other technologies”. Return to Menu C. BN-350 Dismantlement/Disposition 1. BN-350 primary sodium draining completed In the city of Aktau, Mangistauski region, Kazakhstan, the operation to drain sodium coolant from the primary circuit of BN-350 fast neutron reactor was successfully completed at 07H40M on December 1st, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by NAC Kazatomprom press-service. This unique operation was carried out in accordance with the priority measures plan to bring BN-350 reactor into safe state in terms of nuclear and radiation safety after the Kazakh government had made a decision on April 20, 1999 to ultimately shutdown the reactor. All designs of necessary equipment and draining procedure were done by the Kazakh specialists. Thus, that successfully concluded the second important stage of BN-350 decommissioning that followed the packaging of irradiated nuclear fuel undertaken in 2001. BN-350 reactor in Aktau is the world’s first fast neutron reactor. Presently, it pertains to the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Combine (MAEK) - Kazatomprom. Return to Menu D. Chemical Weapons Destruction 1. Detailed Technical Plans of Chemical Weapons Disposal to Dominate Hague Meeting Agenda Representatives of 41 countries, Russia included, will gather in the Hague to consider detailed technical plans of chemical weapons disposal. The 35th meeting of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is opening on December 2, Tuesday. The meeting will study detailed technical plans for the elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities, and discuss inspections and the way the conversion effort is proceeding at former military chemical facilities. The conferees will, particularly, look into the conversion effort at the Novocheboksarsk-based facility, Russia's Volga area, and progress of the disposal effort in Aberdeen, USA. Moreover, the meeting will discuss what are known as agreements on facilities, which elaborate, above all, on legal aspects of chemical inspections. Several draft agreements have been put on the meeting agenda for approval of the Council. These agreements deal with chemical weapons disposal facilities, as well as peaceful chemical plants. The meeting will last into December 5. Return to Menu 2. No traces of toxic agents found in White Sea An expedition mounted by Russia's Ministry of Emergency Situations has not found any traces of toxic agents allegedly sunk in the White Sea, an official told Itar-Tass on Tuesday. The expedition on the research vessel Professor Stockman probed the central part of the White Sea in August, where Soviet chemical weapons with expired shelf life were allegedly dumped after World War II, deputy head of the Ministry's Arkhangelsk region branch Elizaveta Tsyvareva. Bottom sediment samples showed that the concentration of arsenic exceeded 10 to 30 times the maximum permissible level, which could be viewed as indication of the presence of poisonous substances. But scientists came to the conclusion that it was a natural anomaly. All other chemical indicators of sea-water are within norm, Tsyvareva said. The expedition also discovered "the presence of man-made objects" on the bottom of the White Sea which required study, but no special expeditions to this end are planned within the next few Return to Menu E. Submarine Dismantlement 1. Norway pushes CEG to help restructure future nuclear aid programs to Russia MURMANSK—Several European government officials told Bellona Web during a meeting of the Contact Expert Group (CEG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Murmansk that officials from the Norwegian government had promoted safety regulations for nuclear dismantlement projects sponsored by western donors at this international gathering. According to the officials, who asked not to be identified, the CEG took up discussions—that the media were not allowed to attend—at its meeting two weeks ago about how nuclear remediation projects between Russia and other countries should be formed. According to the officials, there was a consensus that risk impact studies prior to the beginning of nuclear dismantlement work, security issues, transparency in funding, audits and regular inspections of work in progress should form the basis for all nuclear agreements with Russia. This conclusion was reached, said the official because of “the lessons learned by the experience of the inspections carried out by Norway.” These officials said that an international workshop on risk assessment on dismantling nuclear installations and submarines in Russia would be held in the United Kingdom early next year. Norway's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Traavik repeated this information in Norwegian Parliament on Monday, and repeated the need for international risk assessment for these projects. The discussion was taken up, one source said, because of recent mishaps that were made public last summer concerning Russia’s ˆ10m deal to dismantle two retired Victor class submarines. Norwegian representatives at the CEG—pressured by a stern parliament at home—put the question of risk assessment for all countries entering in to nuclear assistance programmes with Russia on the agenda. “We are hopeful that Russia and donor nations will find a basic approach,” one official told Bellona Web. “Improved environmental risk assessment has to be comprehensive.” He said that the CEG agreed to examine the impact of spent fuel reprocessing in bilateral and multilateral nuclear remediation deals with Russia. Though the source underscored that the CEG was only an information discussion group with no regulatory authority, he said that the information discussed at the meetings flowed upward to decision and policy makers who have the authority to implement plans discussed. “The CEG is a forum for information exchange, but it gives an impulse for cooperation,” said the source. “Ultimately, that cooperation resides with Russia, but [dismantlement] programmes have to be decided between donor countries and Russia.” The shadow of the K-159 One of the main problems with the Norwegian-Russian sub dismantlement deal was the fact that the vessels were towed by tugboats to their decommissioning destinations—a problem that might not have crossed anyone’s radar screen where it not for the sinking of the K-159 submarine in August. Stationed at Gremikha Naval Base—like the two Victors Norway is dismantling—the K-159 sank with 800 kilograms of spent nuclear fuel and nine sailors after its tow line snapped during transportation to the Polyarny shipyard on the northern Kola Peninsula. Towing is a common, but extremely dangerous process, and revelations that Norway had financed—or simply had neglected to examine the environmentally hazardous means that would be employed in dismantling the subs—left the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Ministry confronted by an enraged parliament and a media revealing embarrassing revelations on how little research had gone into the project. Contract money It also remains unclear as to whether any of the ˆ10m that Norway’s Foreign Affairs Ministry gave Russia for the dismantlement project is being used to reprocess the submarines’ fuel. Norwegian Parliament, however, has strict policies that forbid Norwegian nuclear assistance from paying for reprocessing. In the contract original contract brought to the Norwegian province of Finnmark by First Deputy Atomic Minister Sergei Antipov, Minatom stipulated that the Norwegian side would be paying for the reprocessing spent fuel from the two Victor class submarines it would dismantle. Norwegian Foreign Minister Kim Traavik, who was to sign the June 12 agreement for Norway, was forced to turn the deal down. Is Norway covering reprocessing anyway? But less than three weeks later, on June 30, a new contract had been drawn up and signed by both parties. By the accounts of many observers, this was a speedy redrafting of the contract, which was undertaken mostly by Minatom. The dismantlement money within the revised contract, which was obtained by Bellona Web, was redistributed in such a way as to allocate more funding to transportation of spent nuclear fuel to the Mayak reprocessing facility in the Urals. There was also more “free money” for Minatom connected to cleanup activities in Andreyeva Bay, the Northern Fleet’s notoriously contaminated dumping site located 60 kilometers from the Norwegian border. Concerns that the spent nuclear fuel from the Victor class submarines Norway is dismantling might be the reprocessed on Norwegian money were raised by Bellona and the Norwegian media. This put enormous pressure on the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign affairs after the June 30th signing of the dismantlement contract. It is unknown if any of this money shuffling could be a cover for reprocessing the fuel. During a question period in parliament, Foreign Ministry officials have been vague that such could be the case. One source said that Norwegian Parliament was “very concerned” by the transport of this fuel and said that the Parliament planned to work on improved legislation that would govern Norwegian-Russia nuclear remediation projects, and that it would also be discussed by the Parliament’s powerful Constitutional Control Committee. Return to Menu 2. Russia Allotted 2 Billion Rubles in 2003 for the Utilization of Nuclear Submarines Translated by RANSAC Staff MOSCOW, December 1. ITAR-TASS. Russian President Vladimir Putin named the State Duma’s ratification of the multisided nuclear ecological program a “serious step” toward deciding the problems of the utilization of nuclear removal in Russia. During a working meeting on questions of nuclear security he noted that the discussion in this concrete sphere is, above all, about the submarines of the Soviet Union located in north-west Russia. This opens the possibility for the beginning of practical works, said Putin. “As I am aware, we have already signed contracts with foreign partners for 100 millions dollars,” noted the President. “Russia, of course, thinks that this is above all our problem, and we have allotted those resources which we are in a position to allot for this goal. In this year 2 billion rubles were allotted.” Return to Menu 3. Russia Ratifies Accord On Foreign Help In Dismantling Nuclear Submarines Russia's lower house of parliament on Friday ratified an agreement that clears the way for billions of dollars worth of foreign donations help Russia dismantle its mothballed nuclear submarines. The State Duma voted 286-38 to ratify a framework agreement that frees foreign funds for the dismantling effort from taxation and declares that the countries involved wouldn't face legal responsibility for any accidents. The agreement was signed in Stockholm in May by representatives of Russia, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United States and the European Union. "Its implementation will allow a quicker solution of the task of ensuring nuclear and radiation security in Russia without additional budget spending," the cabinet said in a letter to the Duma asking it to ratify the deal. "It will help strengthen the international legal base in a key area of co-operation and bring an important contribution to strengthening global security and the nuclear non-proliferation regime." The deal, called the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR), will provide a legal base for the submarine dismantling effort, which Russia has estimated will cost about $5.2 billion Cdn. Russia has long pleaded for foreign assistance to help dismantle its rusting fleet of Soviet-built nuclear submarines, saying it lacks its own funds to do the job. The West, concerned about possible environmental risks and fearing that the submarines' nuclear fuel could fall into terrorists' hands, has agreed to help but urged Russia to remove tax liability and protect the donors from any legal claims. Deputy Nuclear Power Minister Sergei Arkhipov, who presented the agreement to legislators, said that all dismantling work will be conducted by the Russian personnel - an apparent attempt to assuage some legislators' fears that the deal might give foreigners unlimited access to sensitive areas. Russia has decommissioned 192 of a total of 270 nuclear-powered submarines built in the Soviet Union and then Russia, according to official data. The pace of the dismantling effort has increased from two-five submarines a year during the 1990s to 18-20 in recent years, but more than half of the decommissioned submarines still languish dockside awaiting dismantling. By the start of 2003, nuclear fuel had been unloaded from 116 submarines and 89 of them had been fully dismantled, according to official documents presented to the Duma. Return to Menu F. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Act Enables U.S. To Negate Threats - Updates to the law allow nation to go anywhere in world to seize weapons Imagine that a country in Africa, or perhaps Asia, has for years been working, secretly and illegally, on a biological weapons program. At a clandestine laboratory complex, its scientists and engineers have built stocks of deadly pathogens and a small arsenal of portable bio-weapons. The country's new government, alarmed that terrorists could seize the material from the poorly-secured facility, goes public and appeals to the United States for help in protecting the site, neutralizing the dangerous microbes and winding down the program. Can we respond? Thanks to new action by Congress, the answer is yes. The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which became law this month, authorizes up to $50 million for just such proliferation emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction outside the former Soviet Union. This is an important victory for the war against terrorism and marks the first time the Nunn-Lugar program for dismantling nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been expanded outside the Soviet Union, where it has proved its worth in helping keep loose nukes out of terrorist hands. The act, part of the Pentagon's 2004 authorization, fully funds the Nunn-Lugar program and also gives a green light for the U.S. to continue to work with Russians on destroying Russia's huge stockpile of deadly nerve gas, much of it in relatively small, ready-to-steal artillery shells. These steps are long overdue, the result of bipartisan work by the Bush administration and congressional colleagues. The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act will help make us all safer. In a world awash in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, it gives us another tool to respond to proliferation threats anywhere in the world. A new law was necessary because until now, Nunn-Lugar money could only be spent in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. That restriction reflected the times: When the original legislation was signed in 1991, the idea of cooperative threat reduction was untested and the crumbling Soviet military machine posed the greatest danger. In the past 12 years under Nunn-Lugar, U.S. technical expertise and money have helped separate 6,212 warheads from former Soviet missiles, destroyed many of the warheads and safely sequestered their fissile material, destroyed 520 ICBMs, 451 missile silos, 122 long-range bombers, 624 cruise missiles, 424 submarine-launched missiles, 27 missile submarines and 194 nuclear test tunnels. It helped three former Soviet states, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, get rid of all of their nuclear weapons. Nunn-Lugar has worked to contain chemical and biological weapons in Russia, where at least 40,000 tons of chemical weapons await destruction, and the new legislation includes an important temporary presidential waiver to allow that effort to continue. President Bush and I both want to make that waiver authority permanent. Nunn-Lugar has also demonstrated its value in real proliferation emergencies within the former Soviet Union similar to the hypothetical one I described outside it. In 1994, the U.S. helped transport more than half a ton of highly enriched uranium from an ill-guarded facility in Kazakhstan to our nuclear complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn. And in 1998, we helped move a small quantity of enriched uranium and spent fuel to Scotland from a research reactor in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. Besides building a wealth of knowledge and a corps of experienced personnel in this area, something else has changed since the first Nunn-Lugar act: September 11, 2001. That terrible day made clear to all what had been evident to experts for some time -- our greatest threat is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. I have no doubt that al-Qaida would use such weapons if they could steal, buy or build them. We know they've tried to get them. To a terrorist, the world looks like an international weapons market. Chemical, biological and nuclear programs exist in nations on six continents. We frankly know little about the weapons or materials which each country may have, the security of storage, or plans for destruction -- or more production -- of these weapons. In this incredibly dangerous environment, Nunn-Lugar expansion is an important step in protecting our country, and I am pleased that it had President Bush's strong backing. Now we need to think bigger and give the administration more authority to interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must create new nonproliferation partners in other regions and aggressively pursue nonproliferation opportunities when they appear. Countries with weapons programs that flout international norms will have to be dealt with through diplomacy, economic power and, if necessary to safeguard the United States, military force. But Nunn-Lugar proves that we can forge successful, cooperative programs with even the most unlikely partners. If we start now to address this global threat, I am confident that 12 years from now we will look back and rejoice in our foresight and our success. Return to Menu G. Nuclear Smuggling 1. Smugglers Enticed by Dirty Bomb Components - Radioactive Materials Are Sought Worldwide TBILISI, Georgia -- When police caught up with him on May 31, Tedo Makeria was headed toward Tbilisi's main rail station, his lethal cargo hidden in boxes lined with lead so thick his taxi sagged from the weight. The suspicious policeman who halted the cab had barely cracked the trunk when he noticed the boxes and the distinctive labels that warned, "Danger: Radiation." More police arrived within minutes, and a Geiger counter was produced. As Makeria smoked nervously in the back seat, the officers flipped the instrument's "on" switch and watched the needle leap off the screen. "At first we were just shocked," Maj. Leri Omiadze, the ranking officer at the scene, recalled later. "Then we all started backing away slowly." Inside Makeria's boxes were two capsules of highly radioactive metals -- strontium and cesium -- of a type that terrorism experts say can be used in a dirty bomb, a device that spews radiation but does not trigger a nuclear explosion. A third container held a vial of brown liquid that Georgian police identified as the substance used in mustard gas, one of the earliest chemical weapons. Only later did police learn Makeria's role in the affair. He was a courier for criminals trading in components and materials for weapons of mass destruction. In a scheme still not fully understood, the boxes were delivered to Makeria by another Georgian, a man with a history of drug offenses. Makeria's job was to carry the boxes by train from Tbilisi to Adzharia province, a troubled enclave on Georgia's southwestern frontier. From there, police believe, they were to be transported by other couriers across the border into Turkey or perhaps even Iran, for delivery to an expectant customer. The buyer's identity remains unknown. What is certain is that the Georgians who sought to profit from selling components of a dirty bomb are far from unique. There have been dozens of cases of trafficking in radiological materials over the past three years, along with what some weapons experts describe as a disturbing new trend. While most sellers of such materials have traditionally been amateurs -- opportunists and lone actors in search of easy profits -- authorities are now seeing a surge of interest among criminal groups. In a string of incidents from the Caucasus and Eastern Europe to West Africa and South America, gangs have stalked and stolen radiological devices to sell for profit or to use in crimes ranging from extortion to murder. The new interest in radiological material by smugglers and criminal networks complicates an already difficult task confronting governments: how to stop terrorists from obtaining any of the tens of thousands of powerful radiological sources around the world that are currently in private hands or have simply been discarded. In Georgia and other unstable corners of the world, radioactive materials are turning up on black markets alongside more traditional contraband, such as drugs or Kalashnikov rifles. They are a currency of the global gray zone, a dangerous mixture of failed states, porous borders and weak law enforcement, where the tools of terrorism are bought and sold. Crude but Effective The involvement of professional smugglers and criminals only increases the odds that some of the radiological materials will end up in the hands of terrorists, U.S. experts say. Already, the sheer volume of such materials in circulation has prompted scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to conclude, in a study released in September, that a dirty bomb "attack somewhere in the world is overdue." So serious is the threat that both the Bush administration and the International Atomic Energy Agency have launched major initiatives within the past 18 months to find and lock up abandoned radiological material across the globe. At the Energy Department, Secretary Spencer Abraham has made preventing a dirty-bomb threat a top priority, on a par with long-established programs to secure nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet Union. A dirty bomb, or "radiological dispersion device" in the jargon of defense experts, is not a nuclear weapon but rather a crude device that uses conventional explosives or other means to spread radiation over a wide area. Compared to true nuclear weapons or even to biological or chemical weapons, they are technologically simple, and well within the grasp of international terrorist groups, nuclear experts say. Documents seized from training camps in Afghanistan two years ago by U.S. forces showed that al Qaeda leaders there planned to build a dirty bomb and may have begun gathering materials for one. Iraq, which struggled in vain for a decade to master the complexities of a nuclear weapon, built and tested a dirty bomb in the 1980s before abandoning the program on the grounds that it was ineffective against military targets, according to U.N. weapons inspectors. Such a bomb would likely unleash panic and trigger economic and social upheavals. Even a moderately sized dirty bomb exploded in a modern city could contaminate large swaths of real estate with radiation, rendering some areas uninhabitable for months or years. Last year, the Federation of American Scientists conducted a computer simulation to determine the impact of exploding less than two ounces of cesium-137, about 3,500 curies, in the heart of Manhattan. (A curie is a unit used to measure radioactivity. Experts say that a device of only a few dozen curies could make an effective bomb.) In the simulation, fine cesium particles spread across an area covering 60 square blocks. Cleanup and relocation following the blast would take years to complete and cost tens of billions of dollars, the study found. Whether the radiation from such a blast would cause deaths or injuries is a subject of renewed debate. A view long held by radiation experts was that the human toll would be minimal; any deaths and injuries would be those caused by the blast effects of the explosion itself. Now scientists aren't so sure. A new analysis, drawn from medical studies of radiation accidents, sees a significant health threat in the clouds of radioactive dust thrown up by a dirty-bomb explosion. The diluted radioactivity in those dust clouds would probably be too weak to cause serious harm. But, according to a new National Defense University analysis expected to be released next month, people near the blast site could suffer serious internal injuries from highly radioactive particles that enter the body through the nose and mouth and lodge in sensitive tissues. The severity of the injuries would depend on the type of radioactive material used, how it is spread, and how quickly the victims can be treated. "If the particles are in a respirable form, they can do considerable damage -- to the lungs, to the digestive system, to the immune system," said Peter Zimmerman, chairman of the panel that produced the study. "Overall, the effects could be much worse than many of us previously thought." Guerrilla Smugglers Dozens of smuggling routes for nuclear and radiological materials have been charted over the past decade, but since 1999 a clear favorite has emerged. Judging from cases reported to police, nuclear traffickers have discovered abundant opportunity in Europe's southeastern flank: the Black Sea and Caucasus states that have long served as a crossroads linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Topping the list is Georgia, the former Soviet republic where huge crowds of demonstrators recently forced President Eduard Shevardnadze to resign. The small nation of 5 million suffers from porous borders, official corruption and rampant smuggling, problems exacerbated by three ethnic rebellions -- in the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the north, and Adzharia in the south -- and regular incursions by guerrillas in the eastern region bordering Chechnya. In the conflict zones, trafficking in contraband has gone from a sideline trade to a thriving industry that supports tens of thousands of people, including, by some accounts, leaders of the rebel movements. "Today, it's smuggling that keeps the separatist movements alive," said Aleko Kupatadze, a black-market specialist at the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center in Tbilisi. "Many of the guerrillas are really professional criminals who sometimes even switch sides. The violence you see has less to do with ethnic conflict than with disagreements over how the spoils are divided." Radioactive materials are now caught up in the illicit trade. Georgia has been a dumping ground for Soviet-era radioactive hardware and waste, some of it extraordinarily lethal. Abandoned radioactive devices are found regularly in Georgia's rugged hills, often after a villager turns up with severe radiation burns. Two years ago this month, three woodcutters in northern Georgia nearly died of radiation injuries after stumbling across a Soviet-built generator powered by strontium with a radioactivity level of 40,000 curies. Nine such devices have been found in Georgia since the mid-1990s, and as many as three more are feared to be still missing. "We inherited chaos. Radiological equipment has turned up in garbage dumps, even in sewage," said Dato Bakradze, director of international security and conflict management for Georgia's National Security Council. The possibility that Georgian terrorists or separatists might obtain one of the devices, he said, poses a "direct physical danger to our own country." Since the early 1990s, Georgian police have been intercepting radioactive flotsam from amateur sellers hoping to profit from their discoveries. Lately, the materials offered for sale have become more sophisticated, and so have the traffickers. At least three times since 1999, officials have discovered kilogram-quantity caches of uranium in vehicles leaving or entering Georgia. In the most recent case, on June 26, just over a pound of uranium was seized at the Georgia-Armenia border by guards armed with U.S.-supplied radiation detectors, according to Georgian security officials. Tests to determine the origin and enrichment level of the uranium were carried out with the help of U.S. Energy Department officials. The agency has declined to release the results. Georgian officials say they believe the material originated in Russia and was being transported through Georgia for resale in Iran. The smuggling incident uncovered on May 31 in Georgia's capital appears to have been bolder still. If the plan had unfolded as intended, the radioactive materials would have moved by public train through the heart of the country's most populous city, into the troubled Adzharia province, a center of ethnic clashes and long-simmering hostility toward Georgia's central government. Makeria, 33, the taxi driver, has told police he knows almost nothing about the origins or destination of the deadly cargo. In fact, he may not have realized the contents were radioactive, despite warning labels written in English and Russian, said Tamaz Alania, chief of the criminal division of Georgia's Internal Affairs Ministry. "It is at least possible that Makeria did not know," Alania said in an interview. "He seemed confused and nervous when we first questioned him. And when we explained what was in the boxes he became much more nervous." Makeria told police he picked up the unusually heavy green cartons from Giorgi Samkhakiuli, 29, an acquaintance of his father-in-law, who asked him to keep the boxes at his home in Adzharia until someone else came to pick them up. But Samkhakiuli, a man described by police as having a history of drug offenses, vanished after the smuggling plot was foiled. Investigators continue to pursue leads, but the search for others appears to have stalled. Police have learned that the larger of the two radiological elements, a capsule of powdery cesium, was manufactured in the Soviet Union in the 1970s for industrial use. While the cesium has lost more than half of its original potency, it still contains enough radioactivity to seriously injure or kill, investigators said. Police were baffled about the possible origin of the mustard gas substance, which was still being analyzed. Where and how the smuggled materials were to be used, police can only guess. But those responsible went out of their way to collect and package three radioactive materials with no known uses other than to terrorize or kill, said Malkhaz Salakaia, the investigations director at Georgia's Ministry of State Security. "At this point we have to assume there are other people behind Samkhakiuli," Salakaia said. "And we cannot exclude that a criminal act was envisioned." Iridium for Ransom The radiological materials coveted by criminal groups are not found only in former Soviet states. Tens of thousands of powerful radioactive devices are currently in use across a wide range of industries, from medicine to metallurgy to mining. Some of them, because of their size, potency and availability, have become popular targets for thieves -- and a nightmare for counterterrorism experts. One such device is known as a "well-logger," an instrument used by energy companies and geologists to search for underground oil fields. In well-logging, a powerful capsule of radioactive metal -- usually americium, iridium or strontium -- is lowered into a well shaft to probe for oil deposits, using beams of neutron and gamma radiation that penetrate dense rock. Then the radiation is measured to look for evidence of oil beneath the rocks. When not in use, the core is kept in a shielded canister the size of a small beer keg. Well-loggers don't pack enormous amounts of radiation. But what they carry is dangerous. "It's a neutron source," said Abel Gonzales, the radiation safety chief for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, referring to the type of deep-penetrating, tissue-destroying radiation emitted by well-loggers. If a dirty bomb is the objective, he said, "you could make something very nasty with that." They also are easy to obtain. Tens of thousands of well-loggers are currently in use around the world, often in remote areas where they are liable to be stolen or lost. One particularly worrisome criminal plot that recently came to light involved the theft of five iridium devices in Ecuador by a criminal gang that demanded -- and received -- thousands of dollars in payments for their return. It was the first known case of successful blackmail involving radiological material, and U.S. and U.N. experts fear the pattern could be repeated. In a carefully planned, nighttime burglary Dec. 9, thieves broke into a storage shed in Quininde, in the coastal province of Esmeraldas, to steal the devices, which were owned by the firm Interinspec, according to accounts by investigators at the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency and Ecuador's Atomic Energy Commission. One of the thieves knew precisely where the instruments were kept and how much they were worth. He was a former employee who had been recently fired in a job dispute, Ecuadoran officials said. Within days, the company received a ransom demand, and despite protests from government investigators, it decided to pay. Officials familiar with the case say the firm's top manager agreed to a price of $1,000 for each of the five devices. "He thought this was the best way to take control of the five lost sources," said Marco Bravo Salvador, technical director of the Ecuadoran commission. The thieves, however, returned only three of the well-loggers, apparently deciding to keep the other two. Meanwhile, the company lost a sixth source in January when it fell from a boat into Ecuador's Quininde River. A seventh device went missing when a work crew accidentally left it behind after finishing a project in a remote jungle location. After a massive search involving hundreds of army troops, the sources lost in the jungle and river were recovered. The two others, presumably still in the hands of bandits, remain unaccounted for. Another recent theft, viewed by U.S. and U.N. officials as especially grave, occurred in December when a large well-logger was stolen from a truck in Nigeria. The owner of the device was Halliburton Co., based in Houston, which conducted its own search for several weeks before notifying the U.N. nuclear watchdog of the loss. The device reportedly was stolen while being hauled through the oil-rich Niger Delta, between the cities of Warri and Port Harcourt. Initially, the truck driver told police that someone swiped the instrument from his vehicle when he stopped at a roadside motel for a nap. Later, investigators began to find discrepancies in the driver's story. "The hotel story didn't check out," said one official involved in the investigation, who spoke on condition that his name not be used. "The suspicion now is that the driver took it," apparently as part of a plot involving accomplices. The thief was apparently knowledgeable about such well-loggers because, out of several devices on the truck, he singled out the most powerful one, the official said. Months of searches using radiation detectors turned up no trace of the missing well-logger. Then, two months ago, investigators got a break. A well-logger discovered in a private scrap yard in September turned out to be the same one that was stolen nine months earlier. The scrap yard was in Germany, more than 3,200 miles from the Niger Delta. Return to Menu 2. Conviction Underscores Threat Of Nuclear Theft: Russian Fleet Official Stored, Tried To Sell Radioactive Material Seeking to prevent potential terrorists from getting hold of radioactive materials, the United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars improving security at Russia's far-flung nuclear storage sites. But a criminal case that concluded in northern Russia this week showed how state-of-the-art security might not be enough to prevent nuclear theft. A court in Murmansk on Monday convicted Alexander Tyulyakov, deputy director of the company that runs Russia's atomic icebreaker fleet, of possessing and attempting to sell radioactive substances. The first such case involving the senior management of a Russian nuclear facility, Tyulyakov's story raises the disturbing question of whether the people charged with safeguarding dangerous materials might be tempted to collaborate with terrorists. Police arrested Tyulyakov, 50, in August when he tried to sell a container of radioactive materials to undercover officers posing as buyers. Investigators said he kept more than six pounds of radioactive materials, including enriched uranium, in his car, his garage, and a summer cottage. Analysts say the Tyulyakov case illustrates how corruption and lax security procedures could make Russia's nuclear storage and reprocessing sites vulnerable to theft despite the US-funded effort to safeguard dangerous materials from potential terrorists. "These upgrades are only as effective as the people who are responsible for them," said Charles Digges, a researcher for Bellona, a Norway-based environmental watchdog. "If the guy in charge wants to steal nuclear materials, he can easily do it." Judge Sergei Alisov said Tyulyakov received an 18-month sentence. In a telephone interview, he said Russian laws passed in 1997, "before we had a serious problem with terrorism," prohibited him from meting out a harsher punishment. "It is nonsense that a person is punished less for trying to sell radioactive materials than for illegal possession of a box of bullets," Alisov said. In Russia, some 565 tons of uranium -- enough to make tens of thousands of nuclear weapons -- are in storage facilities that often lack sensors to detect when someone carries something out and cameras to monitor potentially corrupt employees, according to an October report by Matthew Bunn, a specialist on nuclear proliferation issues at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Although the United States is making progress in securing hazardous material sites around the world, terrorist groups are working faster than ever to infiltrate them, Bunn wrote. Insider thefts, the report said, "are among the hardest for any security system to prevent." Atomflot, the state-run company where Tyulyakov worked, handles tons of weapons-grade uranium from refueling and maintaining the country's nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as reprocessed nuclear waste from decommissioned submarines of Russia's Northern Fleet. In the mid-1990s, Atomflot received one of the first US-funded comprehensive security upgrades in Russia, including a double-fence system with intrusion detectors and guard towers to protect the facility's perimeter. "Even because material is secured, we have concerns about the people in charge," said Jon Wolfstahl of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., who worked on Russian nuclear security upgrades for the Department of Energy in the 1990s. "Even if it's locked up, it can still go walking." The details of what exactly Tyulyakov had, and what he was trying to do with it, are murky. Investigators say they are trying to arrest accomplices and refuse to discuss details. The three-day trial was closed to reporters. Officials close to the case said the container in Tyulyakov's car contained "yellowcake," nonenriched uranium that would be of little use to terrorists. But police and prosecutors said a search of Tyulyakov's home and summer cottage had turned up uranium-235, which could be used by terrorists to make a nuclear bomb or a "dirty bomb" -- a conventional explosive packed with radioactive materials that could contaminate a large area. In court last week, Tyulyakov admitted possessing radioactive materials, but said he was trying to hand them over to specialists for research. That did not convince the court, which saw videotape that police said showed Tyulyakov offering to sell the materials. Nuclear specialists have known since the fall of the Soviet Union about the threat of insider theft at Russian nuclear facilities. Wolfstahl described traveling to a facility in Russia that had received a US-funded upgrade. The director showed off the elaborate system. Then he showed how he could turn off detectors and other security equipment. "He was not supposed to be able to do that," Wolfstahl said. "Comprehensive upgrades only work if they are plugged in." Bunn said that the stabilization of the Russian economy in recent years has raised the reliability of Russian nuclear workers. "We no longer have guards at nuclear facilities leaving their posts to forage in the forest for food," he said. "The desperation that could lead to temptations to steal nuclear material has been much reduced." But Tyulyakov did not appear to be a desperate man. He had an expensive car and a luxurious cottage. Digges said someone in Tyulyakov's position would not have had to sneak into a nuclear facility to steal materials. "It would be easy for him to coordinate with people who were unloading nuclear fuel from icebreakers," he said. "He would be the guy to have the magic pen to be able to divert this or that shipment to wherever he wanted." Return to Menu H. Russia-Iran 1. Iran's Supreme Security Council Secretary: Russia Played Important Role In Adoption Of Iaea Resolution On Iranian Nuclear Programs On Saturday, Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hasan Rowhani stated that Russia played a very positive role in the process of adoption of the resolution on Iranian nuclear programs by the IAEA's board of governors. "Russia has played an important and positive role during the preparation, discussion and adoption of the document," Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary stated. Mr. Rowhani confirmed Iran's willingness to sign a Russian-Iranian protocol on the return of spent fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant to Russia and underlined that "there are no difficulties or problems in this area." "The timeframe for signing is being coordinated at present," he added. Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary said that during his recent visit to Russia the sides agreed to expedite the construction of the first generator of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and discussed Russia's involvement in the construction of the second generator at the same plant. Mr. Rowhani expressed hope that the construction of the first generator will be completed by 2004. At the same time, he adamantly rejected the idea of possible involvement of the United States or American companies in the construction of another five nuclear power generators on the Iranian territory. The construction is planned in the context of the program for the development of nuclear power industry in Iran. "We have no contacts with the United States in this area. We are conducting negotiations on the construction of the second generator at the Bushehr nuclear power plant with Russia, and probably will start negotiation process with other countries, for example European, on the creation of facilities generating additional 5,000 megawatts," said Mr. Rowhani. Return to Menu 2. IAEA resolution on Iran to promote Iran-Russia nuclear coop: Russian official The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution on Iran gives an opportunity to step up Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, Russian Atomic Energy Ministry spokesman Nikolai Shingaryov said. Shingaryov told Itar-Tass on Thursday the International Atomic Energy Agency resolution on Iran "gives an opportunity to step up Russian-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power engineering." "The resolution adopted in Vienna on Wednesday allows us to hope that the IAEA and Iran have no problems and that the U.N. Security Council should not consider Iran`s nuclear problem," the spokesman said. "Russia is now cooperating with Iran in the construction of one unit at the Bushehr nuclear power station. The construction should be over shortly," Shingaryov stressed. "At present, Tehran shows interest in constructing the second unit at the Bushehr nuclear power station," the Russian official said. In his words, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev is expected to visit Tehran in January 2004 "that will focus on prospects for the development of cooperation between the two countries." "The sides will discuss the implementation of a timetable to construct the first unit of the nuclear power station in Bushehr," Shingaryov said. Return to Menu I. Russia-North Korea 1. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister And Korean Ambassador To Russia Discussed Korean Peninsula Issue Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksander Losyukov met on Monday with Korean Ambassador to Russia Chung Tae-ik, the Russian Foreign Ministry Department of Press and Information disclosed to RIA Novosti. Two diplomats discussed some issues concerning the bilateral relations as well as perspectives for holding the second round of the six-sided negotiations in Beijing on the Korean peninsula issue, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported. Mutual intention to continue co-operation for the preparation of the negotiations was also expressed in the course of the meeting. According to Losyukov, Russia has concrete proposals concerning definite aspects of the negotiations. Nevertheless, Moscow does not intend the initiatives to obstruct the other ideas proposed by the other countries, first of all by the USA and Korea. Russia, as well as its partners, believe that the main task is to assist Beijing and Washington to find a point of contact and to take the necessary steps towards the compromise. Moscow believes that the package agreement on the North Korean issue should take into consideration interests of the both sides - included the guarantee on security of Korea and ceased American concern over the North Korean nuclear program. Some aspects of economical aid should be also included in the package agreement. The first round of the negotiations were held in Beijing in August of 2003. The USA, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia participated in the negotiations. Return to Menu J. Russia-India 1. Russia floats novel nuclear idea for India On November 19, the Indian news daily, The Hindu, reported a conversation between Indian national security adviser Brajesh Mishra and Russian atomic energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev on a Russian offer to India of floating nuclear plants. According to an energy spokesman, Nikolai Shingarev, Mishra showed interest in the proposal, which could circumvent a ban imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1992. That ban prohibits nuclear cooperation between NSG member nations and India and other countries that have refused to place all their nuclear facilities under international control. The meeting took place during Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's November 11-13 visit to Moscow for summit talks with President Vladimir Putin. Russia is to supply two 1,000 megawatt (MW) nuclear reactors to India for a land-based nuclear power plant, now under construction at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu, under an accord signed before the NSG clamped down in 1992. India wants to buy two more 1,000 MW reactors from Russia to complete a four-reactor cluster at Koodankulam. But being a member of the NSG, Russia cannot have any new nuclear reactor deals with India. But floating nuclear plants are altogether different because ownership of the plant remains with the supplier. The supplier also provides the operational crew, security to the plant, stores the radioactive waste, generates power and sells the generated electricity and/or thermal heat to the buyer. The buyer has no responsibility for or control over the plant, and can be anyone. In this case, the supplier is the Russian Federation, a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and a member of the NSG, and the buyer is India - neither a signatory to the NPT, nor a member of the NSG. NSG revitalized The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a group of countries that seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. The NSG first met in November 1975 in London, and is thus popularly referred to as the "London Club". It has 40 members thus far, including four of the five nuclear weapons states. Besides unofficial nuclear weapons states, such as India, China is the only official nuclear weapons state that is not a member. According to the NSG's official history, the group was established following "the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapons state, which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused". The reference is to India's peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974. But, interestingly, the principles of the NSG do not appear to have been applied uniformly. Perusing the deliberations of the annual NSG plenum sessions, one finds that many concerns were expressed over illegal and covert development of nuclear explosives by Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea. But the illegal and covert development of nuclear weapons by Israel was meticulously avoided. According to available reports, the NSG was inactive for an extended period until revitalized after the end of the Cold War. In 1990, the nuclear supplier states, now very much a part of the unipolar world, swung back into action and began identifying nations developing a "covert and illegal nuclear weapons program based on imported technologies". In 1992, the NSG extended controls to nuclear related dual-use items and strengthened information sharing and coordination among export control authorities. A full-scope safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was made a condition for the future supply of trigger-list items to any non-nuclear weapons state by an NSG member state. This is the clause that prevents Russia from supplying India with nuclear reactors for power generation. Reports indicate that Russian Minister Rumyantsev referred to the urgent need to review the NSG's guidelines, and promised to work toward exempting India from them. India's nuclear technologies are all indigenously developed, without the help of third countries. Furthermore, India has an unblemished non-proliferation record and a genuinely compelling need to depend on nuclear power to meet its energy requirements. Russia had earlier ignored American protests in supplying two nuclear reactors to the Koodankulam nuclear power plant. At this point, Moscow believes that it makes no sense continuing with these restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology. India is already a nuclear weapons state, and in November 2002 the governments of the US and India agreed to work expeditiously toward developing a new statement of principles regarding bilateral cooperation in high technology trade. In particular, trade in "dual-use" goods and technologies is to be revisited in a way that broadly advances the relationship between the two countries in this area and reinforces their mutual interest in stemming the proliferation of sensitive goods and technologies. But if Russia provides India with floating nuclear plants (FNPs), the NSG does not come into the picture. Or so the Russians believe. "We won't be breaking any NSG restrictions if we build a floating nuclear power plant and trawl it to India's shores. The plant will be operated by Russian personnel, and we'll just be selling electricity to India," Rumyantsev reportedly told Mishra. Floating nuclear plants Though the concept of building a series of floating nuclear power plants to meet energy requirements in Russia's remote territories is more than a decade old, the decision to offer floating nuclear plants to other countries was not made until 2002. From 1991 to 1994, Malaya Energetika, a publicly traded company created under the auspices of the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Minatom), conducted a competition to produce the best design for a small-capacity nuclear power plant. The winning project called for construction of a floating nuclear power plant with two KLT-40C pressurized water reactors, the type used in Russia's Arktika and Taymyr-class nuclear icebreakers. The principal design requirement was to provide electrical power in remote regions where winter temperatures are as low as minus 40 degrees Celsius. These remote regions lack the financial resources to purchase sufficient amounts of fuel or coal, and building full-scale nuclear power plants in such remote and thinly populated areas is not considered a realistic option. In October 2001, during an international seminar in Moscow on "Small Power Plants: Results and Prospects", Minatom announced that 33 towns and villages in the Russian Far North would receive small nuclear power plants, 11 of them floating plants. The floating plants are intended for Severodvinsk, Vilyuchinsk, Pevek (Chukotskiy Autonomous Okrug), Sovetskaya Gavan (Khabarovskiy Kray), Nakhodka (Primorskiy Kray), Rudnaya Pristan (Primorskiy Kray), Nikolayevsk-na-Amure (Khabarovskiy Kray), Olga (Primorskiy Kray), Dudinka (Taymyrskiy Autonomous Okrug), Onega (Arkhangelsk Oblast), and the construction site of the Trukhanskaya hydroelectric plant (Evenkiyskiy Autonomous Okru). The plan, unveiled by Russian scientists at the time, said work would begin in 2003. A spokesman for the state-run Rosenergoatom Company, which operates Russian nuclear power plants, confirmed recently that the world's first floating nuclear power plant will be constructed in the city of Severodvinsk (in the Arkhangelsk region) by Sevmash. Sevmash is known for manufacturing nuclear submarine engines. According to Yevgeny Kuzin, head of Malaya Energetika, which is developing the project, the first floating plant will not be ready before 2008. Three more Arctic and Far Eastern regions, Arkhangelsk, Chukotka and Kamchatka, have already expressed their interest and have signed letters of intent with Malaya Energetika, Kuzin added. The idea is to tow each floating nuclear plant, which would be accommodated aboard a huge barge (140 meters by 30 meters) off the coast where it will operate, providing power and heating via cables to the mainland for a planned duration of 40 years. The plant will be manned by 60 technicians and will use the 70 MW KLT-40C reactor, the same kind the Russians use to operate the Arctic ice-breakers. These plants will enrich uranium as fuel, and will cost about US$150 million, significantly higher than a nuclear plant of the same generating capacity based on land. But construction of these modular power plants would be much quicker. From available reports, it appears that India has been offered such a floating nuclear power. Reports also said that the plant would be able to generate enough electricity and thermal energy to support a town of 50,000 people, or provide enough fresh water for 1 million people. Mounted on a barge, it could be towed to any point along India's coastline and operate for four years without reloading nuclear fuel. With Candesal, a Canadian company, Malaya Energetika is now in the process of developing a special desalination platform for attachment to the floating nuclear power plants. With this attachment, the reactor would be able help desalinate sea water. According to Kuzin, such desalination plants would have wide-ranging demand in countries with dense populations along their coastlines. India, China and Indonesia are likely nations to be interested in such floating desalination platforms. FNP critics Though a potentially important solution to serious problems, floating nuclear power plants have their critics. Russian ecologists, for instance, warn that stations equipped with the same type of reactors as nuclear-powered icebreakers would be accident prone. A leak during a monsoon or earthquake, or near an Arctic ice floe, could spill radiation across the planet. According to the Center for Non Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in the United States, numerous environmental activists claim that floating nuclear power plants pose many risks to the environment and public health. They question the utility and safety of civilian electricity production through the use of a nuclear reactor designed for naval propulsion. Because there are technical limitations to implementing many of the safety features of a land-based nuclear power plant on a floating plant (for example, the reactor cannot be hidden underground or behind high-impact concrete walls as is the case with land-based nuclear power plants), the risk of a nuclear accident on a floating nuclear power plant is increased, the critics argue. The physical security of such a plant is also a big concern: how well could it be protected against a missile, torpedo or terrorist attack, falling plane, earthquake, tsunami, temperature changes and harsh weather conditions? The potential impact of the floating nuclear plants on the fragile Arctic environment through emissions of radioactivity and heat remains a major concern to ecologists. Although a floating nuclear power plant can be completely autonomous and provide storage for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste on board, environmentalists fear that if for some reason additional radioactive waste is produced and there is no room for it aboard the vessel, that extra waste will be dumped into the sea or on shore nearby. Some critics emphasize that these floating stations would be dangerous from the security point of view, especially under current conditions. They say that the Russian project does not encompass how to guard these stations against terrorists. Russian officials, on the other hand, say that exported floating nuclear power plants will comply with all security standards applied to land-based nuclear power plants in Russia. Floating plants in the US Long before the Russians got into the act of building floating nuclear power plants, it was tried, albeit half-heartedly, in the US. The MH-1A Sturgis, a naval ship, contained a 45 MW pressurized water reactor and acted as a floating nuclear power plant. It was the first floating nuclear plant to be built (and the last one built and operated by the US Army). It provided power at the Panama Canal during the Vietnam War years, allowing more boats to pass through the canal than otherwise would have been possible. According to the May 1975 Nuclear News, there were persistent attempts to realize the concept of "floating nuclear parks" in the US during the 1960s and 1970s. The US Army awarded a contract to design, build and test a 10 MW floating nuclear plant on August 3, 1961. The plant was to be installed in the hull of a reconditioned and modified surplus Liberty Ship. The $17 million contract was awarded to the Martin Company, located in Baltimore. It is not clear how the project got derailed. Later, in 1974, a joint venture between Westinghouse Electric and Tenneco Newport News Shipbuilding purchased the eastern half of the island to construct a facility that would build floating nuclear power plants. Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) ordered four floating nuclear power plants from a joint venture subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Tenneco named Offshore Power Systems (OPS). PSE&G was OPS' only buyer, and the utility paid $254 million before canceling the order. According to the PSE&G plans, the first two plants were scheduled to be located 12 miles (19 kilometers) northeast of Atlantic City off the New Jersey shore. In 1975, PSE&G requested a five-year delay in construction, and Tenneco dropped out of OPS in March 1975. In December 1977, another three-year delay was requested. The project died before OPS finished building their manufacturing facility in Jacksonville. Due to the lack of economic demand, Tenneco Newport News Shipbuilding opted out of the venture in 1976. Westinghouse closed out all construction projects in 1979. Westinghouse tried to keep the venture afloat. In May 1995, for example, it proposed that the federal government buy four floating nuclear plants, and then recover its investment by leasing or selling the plants to private utility companies. At that time, it was widely predicted that a shortfall in electric generating capacity was imminent due to a rash of cancelled and deferred new power plant construction projects. Also in 1975, a California company, Holmes & Narver, Inc, issued an "idea paper" titled "Water Based Energy Parks: A Siting Concept for the Eighties", which proposed co-locating several floating nuclear plants, along with barge-mounted reprocessing and re-fabrication facilities, in inland lagoons. This fizzled out. India and Russia, it appears from this history, will have to buck a trend of failed dreams if they are to ever get their floating nuclear power plants off the ground, both literally and figuratively. Return to Menu 2. India to acquire Groshkov warship (sic) India today struck a deal with Russia for acquisition of the much talked-about 44,500 tonne aircraft carrier "Admiral Groshkov" at a cost of Rs 3,000 crores, ending months of protracted negotiations. Announcing this, Naval Chief Admiral Madhvendera Singh said the warship, armed with a squadron of MiG-29k fighters, would be almost 70 per cent new and be ready to be inducted in four and half years time. "We have successfully concluded the price negotiations and the deal had been put forward to Government for investment decision as a composite package along with MiG-29K," Singh addressing a news conference here said. The deal will be signed later this month during the visit of the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov. The Naval Chief, however, refused to confirm or deny whether the overall package deal included India getting on lease two Russian Akula class nuclear submarines and nuclear capable TU-22M long-range maritime bombers. "Acquisition of Gorshkov would change the scene in the area," the Naval Chief said. He said it would make India capable of power projection and give the navy for the first time capability to take on even shore-based air force fighters. Speaking on the eve of Navy Day celebrations falling on December 4, the Naval Chief also outlined that the Defence acquisition council had approved the Navy's ten-year plan to acquire 23 more warships, including an indigenous Air Defence warship. The Naval Chief said that as part of the deal, Russia had agreed to freeze the price of MiG-29K during India's induction of these naval fighters which could take up to five years. To begin with, he said the Navy would buy outright a squadron of these new fourth generation fighters and later decide on buying two more squadrons to be based on shore and for India's own indigenous Air Defence Ships, which were likely to roll out by 2010. Top naval officials said after refit the Groshkov would be capable of attaining speed of 30 knots, have a flight deck of 10,800 square metres, 14 Degree Ski-jump, short take off and arrested landing facilities. The hull of the warship is reported to be "very strong" and designed to withstand attacks from frontline US and NATO warships and the carrier would give the Indian Navy capability of covering more than 1,000 km of Persian Gulf right up to Gulf of Hormuz while just berthed 100 nautical miles from Mumbai. The Navy is yet to take a decision on the missile protection for the warship with the Russian Kasthan, French Aster and Israeli Barak system in the reckoning. "We would go for a slap on system within the next two years," naval officials said. Return to Menu 3. Koodankulam N-plant top staffers completed probation at Kalinin NPP November 26 the Indian experts – Koodankulam N-plant director, plant chief engineer and project chief engineer - completed their probation at Kalinin nuclear power plant (NPP), as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Kalinin NPP information division. The Indian experts arrived at the city of Udomlya (Kalinin NPP satellite city) after they had done the probation stage one at Balakovo NPP. The probation program included a wide range of issues associated with the start-up and alignment operations (SAO), and others that involve interaction with various regulators; construction and assembly acceptance procedure; SAO organization and planning; major equipment of reactor, turbine, chemical, electric sections; powered equipment loading. The Kalinin N-plant training center had planned the training so that the guests were able to acquire all necessary information just within a month. After the training had been done the representatives of Koodankulam NPP expressed their gratitude to their Russian colleagues for the arrangements made to cover the entire agreed program in full and on schedule. The plant director noted that the India’s nuclear power, represented by 14 existing nuclear power units, was actively developing with 8 more units being under construction. The construction of Koodankulam NPP started in March last year and the first unit is planned to start-up by March 2007. At present the reactor hall, auxiliary building and administrative building are under construction. The equipment is to be assembled in 2004 followed by start-up and alignment operations. ”We have been in nuclear power for about thirty years already, Mr. Purohit, the Koodankulam director said. “But they were mainly heavy water reactors up to 220 MW of capacity. So far we have not had experience in constructing VVER-1000, therefore, everything that relates to it is new for us. The only place we can learn that is Kalinin nuclear power plant”. Viktor Ledovski, the head of Kalinin training center, noted another feature: during the probation process the Indian colleagues proposed their solutions to the challenges the Russian nuclear experts encounter with. In other words, the probation process was a sort of interactive endeavor and useful for both sides, moreover the high qualification of the Indian staff indicates the possibility of cooperation and mutual exchange of experience. In December the city of Udomlya is to receive the next team of Koodankulam experts for further training at the existing unit and that under construction at Kalinin site. Return to Menu K. Nuclear Industry 1. ECP assembles one more stable isotope production line One more S-3 process line, designed to produce stable isotopes of substances within a wide range of atomic mass, is being assembled at the Electrochemical plant’s (ECP) high-purity substances section, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by the ECP’s information and media center. The same section will house a disposal facility for all zinc diethyl to be accumulated during the production process. Both facilities are planned to commission in the first quarter of 2004. The enterprise has been successfully producing stable isotopes over years and delivering the products to the domestic and foreign markets. In different time and different ECP sections the isotope production lines were set up. Recently the work has been underway to consolidate all isotope production capacities at one section. ECP supplies to the world market about 75 types of isotopes of twenty chemical elements with the total amount being several hundreds of kilograms a year. Since the beginning of 2003 about 50 batches containing 20 types of isotopes of various enrichment have been shipped to the customers. Return to Menu 2. Russian regulators wil learn from international experience Gosatomnadzor (GAN) of Russia plans to learn from the international nuclear power regulatory experience while developing domestic regulations, Gosatomnadzor of Russia’s Chairman Andrei Malyshev said addressing on November 28 the meeting of GAN’s top officials with representatives of public organizations of the Urals and Siberia. The meeting was held in the frames of campaign for the civil dialogue between the executive authorities and public organizations on especially significant issues of the use of atomic energy, GAN press-service reports. Explaining on the situation with the adoption on July 1st the “Law on Technical Regulation”, Malyshev said that under the law “On the Use of Atomic Energy” the regulation had been exercised basing on the federal standards and regulations, which were developed and approved by GAN; the list of such regulations was subject to the governmental approval. The new system provides for one level of regulation only – so-called technical regulations. At this, Malyshev stressed, the government retains the priority of regulation of nuclear and radiation safety. The meeting held in Gosatomnadzor Headquarters also discussed the issue of safe storage of radioactive waste including the issue of the Techa water reservoir cascade at PA Mayak. In the course of discussion GAN’s top officials briefed the audience on the federal regulatory authority’s position regarding construction of new and completion of the existing nuclear power units; on the plutonium disposition program, which includes manufacturing of MOX-fuel; on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and participation of GAN in regulation of safety when nuclear power plants are built in other countries. Return to Menu 3. Russia To Run First New-Type Nuclear Power Plant In Seven Years In 2010 the first nuclear power plant with the natural-safety reactor BREST and an attached nuclear waste-processing complex is planned to be built in Russia, Vladimir Yemelyanov has said on Monday. He is in charge of the nuclear energy board of the Russian Ministry for the Nuclear Power Industry. "The first step in the development of this basically new technology was the success of the technical project of the BREST-OD-300 pilot and demonstration reactor with close-circuit fuel cycle", he said at the international scientific-technical conference Nuclear Energy and Fuel Cycles, held in Moscow. Return to Menu 4. Japan is ready to fund joint nuclear power projects with Russia Japan expands nuclear cooperation with Russia and Япония is ready to fund promising joint projects, ITAR-TASS reports this as said by Head of Nuclear Power Department of Minatom of Russia Valeri Bezzubtsev who leads the Russian delegation at bilateral consultations in Tokyo on the issues of cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy. For the coming years the national nuclear program of Japan sets the priority to the sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors – the area where Russia is undoubtedly the leader. According to Bezzubtsev, Japan has already invested US$ 7 M to the development of these technologies in Russia. In particular, the money was spent for research and tests done by the RF State Research Center – Physics and Energy Institute named after A.I. Leipunski, SRC RF Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dimitrovgrad, RRC Kurchatov Institute and others. There the top priorities were the improvement of fast neutron reactors and closed nuclear fuel cycle. These technologies open a wide window of opportunity for the use of uranium-238 as nuclear fuel, which is more common in nature than presently used uranium-235. “Moscow and Tokyo have the common strategic approaches in this area that is the basis for the cooperation”, Bezzubtsev said. Meanwhile, a delegation of Japanese experts recently visited Beloyarsk nuclear power plant – the world’s only plant operating a fast neutron reactor on the industrial scale. As Nuclear Ru was informed by Beloyarsk nuclear plant director Nikolai Oshkanov, during the one-week visit they had discussed with the Japanese colleagues, among other, the breeder operation issues. "Since Japan also has a fast neutron reactor - Monju - and BN-600 unit at Beloyarsk plant has been in operation for 23 years already, it is quite natural that the operational issues are of mutual interest", Oshkanov said. Return to Menu L. Nuclear Safety 1. Off-Site Emergency Centers’ Equipment Meeting Held At Kursk NPP In November 2003 at Kursk nuclear power plant (NPP) the experts of Rosenergoatom Concern held a meeting with representatives of the European Commission (EC) to discuss TACIS project implementation issues as regards the “Equipment of Off-site Emergency Centers of Novovoronezh and Kursk NPPs in Accordance with Modern Requirements”. The Rosenergoatom’s press-center reports, Konstantinos Kolosakos, when presenting the project, explained into main aspects of the new EC requirements for financing. The budget to equip the off-site emergency centers for Novovoronezh and Kursk NPPs is 2 million euros with about a half to be spent directly for equipment supplies to the Russian nuclear plants. However, the state-of-the-art hardware-software complexes expected from the EC must be compatible with the equipment available at emergency centers at the Russian plants. During the meeting the Russian side handed over the necessary information about the equipment in use at the off-site emergency center of Kursk nuclear plant and its planned upgrades. The meeting participants visited the center and familiarized with its actual state and new equipment needs. To continue the preparation of TACIS project it was decided to jointly compile and agree with all players a list of equipment necessary to upgrade Kursk NPP off-site emergency center (considering also Novovoronezh NPP’s needs). Head Rosenergoatom’s Crisis Center Igor Gorelov described the main requirements set for the equipping the emergency centers at Novovoronezh and Kursk plants. He said the Crisis Center would guide the development of technical specifications. The further project preparation activities will be carried out in accordance with the TACIS regulations. Gorelov stressed that the equipment technical specifications should be developed promptly to have an opportunity of concluding the equipment supply contract in 2004 already. Return to Menu 2. Public Ecology Board Discussed Mayak’s Situation At Minatom November 27 at Minatom of Russia the Public Ecology Board under the Minister of RF of Atomic Energy held its first meeting. The Board established in September 2003 is headed by Chairman – the Minister of RF of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev and consists of scientists, experts, representatives of public organizations involved in the uses of atomic energy, environmental protection, nuclear and radiation safety. The first Board meeting discussed the industry’s safety state including the progress in implementation of the “Integrated Plan of Measures to Solve Environmental Problems Related to Current and Past Activities of FSUE PA Mayak”. Alexander Agapov, the head of Minatom’s department for safety, ecology and emergencies, said in his presentation that 135 million rubles had been spent this year under Mayak’s rehabilitation program. The Integrated Plan provides not only for rehabilitation measures only but also to upgrade technologies used by the facility. “The main objective is to stop discharges of radioactive waste into the service water reservoirs”, Agapov said adding that a special program on yearly reduction of discharges had been adopted to this end. He said this year plan was progressing well. In October the mid-term results were reviewed and in December the 2003 results would be discussed. According to the program the service water reservoirs 9 and 17 (lake Karachai and Gniloye Boloto) must be fully cleaned up and discharges of medium and low activity waste to all service water reservoirs stopped completely. The Integrated Plan proposes new technology solutions for RT-1 plant, which reprocesses irradiated nuclear fuel (INF). These technologies, after implemented, will stop any discharges and releases of medium and low level radwaste beyond the plant boundaries. As regards the refurbishment of the Techa cascade (TC) dam, the program, according to Agapov, contains a separate section, which includes hydraulic engineering works which have started already. “The main problem was the higher water level in TC during the recent decade, however, it dropped this year”, he said adding that the dam would be reinforced in any case. Agapov also said that an order was nearly formalized to develop special environmental programs to be implemented at proceeds got from processing and storage of foreign INF. Last year Minatom allocated for the environmental rehabilitation programs, including Mayak, over 350 million rubles of off-budgeted funds while the budgeted allocations under the “Federal Targeted Program of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Russia” amounted 70 million rubles. The meeting also discussed the 2004 work plan and it was decided to convene the Board at least four times a year. The next meeting will discuss issues associated with construction and operation of floating nuclear power plants and nuclear submarine dismantling issues. Besides, it was decided to set up a working group on implementation of measures to rehabilitate the Techa water reservoirs cascade. Return to Menu 3. Ural Is Turning Into A Radioactive Dump Ecologists have been giving away "radioactive candies" with an appetizing label "Eat and Die!". Major pickets have been held in 25 towns throughout Russia on Tuesday, November 25. Such action organized by ecologists has been aimed against delegates of Russian government who allowed for radioactive wastes to be transported to Russia from other countries. The action received major support from Middle Ural as well. Right in the center of Yekaterinburg, next to Tatischev and deGennin monument environmentalists have been proclaiming names of particular political leaders involved in a scandal and giving away tasty candies with quite appetizing label "Eat and Die!" According to a journalist from "Novii Region," those environmental activists were wearing T-shirts revealing all the delegates" names from Sverdlovsk region. Two years ago such people as Svetlana Gvosdeva, Georgy Leontiev, Zelimhan Muzoev, Vladimir Kadochnikov, Valery Yazev, Evgeny Zyablincev, Nikolai> Ovchinnikov have all voted for transporting radioactive wastes to Russia. Ecologists express their sincere "gratitude" to Georgy Leontiev of Sverdlovsk communist party for turning Ural into an international radioactive dump. It is a known fact that Sverdlovsk region is one with an exceptionally high radiation level. Kamensk-Uralsky region is also quite dangerous. Beloyarskaya atomic / nuclear power-station situated right next to the Kamensk-Uralsk region, has been using the most toxic plutonium fuel. Nowadays, cases of illnesses are 30%higher in comparison to other neighboring regions. "The government does not have a right to conduct new experiments on humans. The country has not fully recovered from Chernobyl yet," states one of the demonstrators. Ecologists however express their hopes to make Russian State Duma admit their mistakes and be more responsible towards humanity. Return to Menu M. Official Statements 1. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov Meets with DPRK Ambassador to Moscow Pak Ui Chun On December 2 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Alexander Losyukov received the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Russia, Pak Ui Chun, at his request. During the talk, prospects for a second round of six-way talks and some issues in bilateral relations were discussed. The sides reiterated readiness to continue to cooperate with a view to resolving Korean Peninsula problems and improving the situation in Northeast Asia. Return to Menu 2. Backgrounder from Brussels, Belgium (excerpted) […] Q: On the Nuclear Planning Group, what does it mean to be rethinking deterrence given the changing threat environment? Senior Defense Official: Essentially I think, as you've heard the Secretary talk about 21st Century threats and Cold War threats, and I think our shifting focus has been from what was essentially looking at a Soviet threat to looking at proliferation and WMD proliferators -- North Korea, Iran -- which is one of the reasons why he focused on that. So just as we're adjusting our thinking in terms of threats that we face in terms of terrorism that are different than what we faced during the Cold War, our deterrence discussion is very similar. We have a different situation with Iran and North Korea. Q: Can I follow that up? Is there any implications for the changing the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe as a result of -- Senior Defense Official: I think what the Secretary said yesterday is probably the best way to put it. We're looking at our posture, our arrangements across the board, and there than that I can't really comment on that particular -- […] Q: Can we follow up on Bushehr for a minute, since that's fairly far along. The Secretary said they need nuclear power like they need sand. Can you tell us specifically what he's concerned about that hasn't been way out there before on Bushehr? It's pretty far along. The Russians have given us some indication that they are willing to cooperate in terms of the spent fuel. Where did the Secretary want that to go? What exactly is his continuing concern about that specific facility versus the other facilities in Iran which are thought to be more secretive and potentially more dangerous? Senior Defense Official: I think it's just Bushehr is an example of how thin and implausible the rationale is that Iran is doing this for a nuclear power that doesn't have energy. So I would say it's not a question of are we only concerned about Bushehr. The question is the Iranians say they need nuclear power and I think we're saying look at the plausibility of this excuse. It's not very plausible, so what is the intention? It's in that context. Q: When the Secretary said that, did his counterparts nod sagely in agreement with him, or did anybody challenge him on that? Senior Defense Official: As opposed to nodding non-sagely? (Laughter.) I wouldn't want to characterize other people's reactions, other Ministers. Q: Was there any reaction? Senior Defense Official: The meeting moves around the room and everyone makes the comments they wish to make, so -- Q: But nobody challenged him. Senior Defense Official: Right. […] Return to Menu 3. Final Communiqué - Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels (excerpted) […] 8. At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reviewed the status of NATO's nuclear forces and the work of the High Level Group. It is a long-standing goal of the Alliance to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with its requirements for collective defence and the full range of its missions. In keeping with this goal, we continue to consider deterrence requirements for the 21 st century. We reaffirmed the principles underpinning NATO's security objectives as set out in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. 9. The nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. They are maintained at readiness levels consistent with the prevailing security environment. We noted with appreciation the continuing contribution made by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces to deterrence and the overall security of the Allies, and reaffirmed the value of this capability. 10. We discussed the growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and expressed our serious concern over recent acts of non-compliance with obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which may have negative consequences for regional stability and security. We reaffirmed our full commitment to the NPT and to the goal of universal adherence to it. We recognized the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and reiterated our continuing commitment to all our obligations under this Treaty. We urge all nations to work together to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 11. We reaffirmed the importance of substantial and productive exchanges by nuclear experts under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council with a view to gaining better mutual understanding, more confidence and thereby increased security. We are encouraged by the progress achieved in these consultations, in particular the prospect of a series of field demonstrations on nuclear weapon safety and security issues. Return to Menu 4. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak Answers a Question from ITAR-TASS News Agency Regarding the Adoption by IAEA Board of Governors of a Resolution on Iran Question: Please comment on the adoption by IAEA Board of Governors of a resolution on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Iran. Answer: We feel this document could have been made more precisely reconciled. However, this is a compromise, and it reflects the common point of view. It is important that there is the process and the new character of the Iran-IAEA relations. In accordance with the international agreements further work to finally remove all the concerns about the nuclear program of Iran will proceed via the IAEA. We consider very important such cooperation, which has become possible thanks to the new quality of relations between the IAEA and Iran. Moscow welcomes the decision of Iran to transmit to the IAEA the whole of information on its previous nuclear activities. This is a major political step by a country which has decided to cooperate with the international community to ensure a maximum transparency of its nuclear program. Return to Menu 5. Statement - Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Ministers of Defence, NATO Headquarters, Brussels (excerpted) 1. We, the Defence Ministers of the NATO-Russia Council, met in Brussels on 1 December 2003. Encouraged by the concrete progress achieved to date in the NRC framework, we are determined to build on achievements and to develop the means we need to act jointly in the face of common threats and challenges. On that basis, we renewed our commitment to deepening our engagement towards a wide-ranging NATO-Russia partnership on defence and military issues. 2. On cooperation against terrorism, we welcomed the progress achieved on threat assessments. We urged further work on practical aspects of our fight against terrorism, and called for the development of concrete measures to facilitate rapid cooperation in response to future terrorist incidents, and welcomed the proposal by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation to host the third conference at senior level in this field, in Norfolk, in March 2004. 3. We look forward to the completion of a joint assessment of global trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as a first and significant step towards a comprehensive and regular exchange of views among NRC countries. We agreed to continue broadening the current NATO-Russia non-proliferation dialogue in support of efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents and their delivery means, and to further explore possibilities for practical cooperation. 4. We welcomed the Russian invitation to NRC countries to observe a field exercise on safe handling procedures for nuclear weapons, as part of the ongoing consultations on nuclear weapons issues and implementation of the NATO-Russia Nuclear Experts' Consultations Work Plan for 2004. […] 6. We noted with satisfaction the progress made in carrying forward Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) cooperation, particularly from the perspective of developing procedures for cooperation between NATO and Russian TMD forces in crisis response operations. We welcomed specifically the development of an experimental TMD concept and an experimental Concept of Operations, and the conduct of a Command Post Exercise scheduled in early 2004, and stressed the importance of a joint interoperability study launched this year, which will analyse and evaluate possible levels of interoperability of TMD systems. […] Return to Menu 6. Secretary Rumsfeld Press Availability (excerpted) […] Q: I was going to ask you about the global force posture that you referred to. Could you tell us more specifically at all what aspect of that you expect to be discussing? Will it be a bilateral discussion or just in NATO? And one more thing, it's narrowly defined in terms of conventional forces and so forth, but does it also include or will it include at some point a discussion about changing the nuclear posture of the U.S. forces in Europe? Rumsfeld: NATO, of course, has a nuclear planning committee or group and we meet every time there's a formal meeting of the Alliance at the Defense Ministerial level, and we will be having a meeting again tomorrow or the next day. That subject gets discussed there, within NATO, so the answer is yes. All capabilities get discussed. Those things will be discussed in the nuclear planning group meeting. The Defense planning group will discuss other defense issues including that. But I think the way to think about it is that we've spent the better part of two years recognizing that the security environment of the 21st Century has changed, and our country and our allies and friends need to acknowledge that fact, and then together talk through how we can best be organized and arranged and equipped to best deter and defend against the more likely threats of the 21st Century. And how can we best be arranged to do that. So we developed some concepts which we're now in the process of discussing with the Congress and among ourselves, interagency, as well as with our friends and allies, that will be a back and forth process for many months, is my guess. Then once conviction develops as to what's the best way to do things, then of course it's not something that the United States can or should or even could do unilaterally. It's the kind of thing that you need to have your friends and allies working with you so that all those changes and transformations take place together. So those types of discussions will be going on. Then there will be the question of working simultaneously with the Congress because it will require some shifts in budgeting, in funding, as to how you do things, and therefore it will very likely play out over a period of a number of years thereafter. When it's over, say sometime at the end of a decade or whenever, it will represent a fairly significant, I would think, I can't pre-judge it, but I would think it would represent a fairly significant adjustment in how we deal with ourselves. I was meeting with a group of businessmen in Korea and they raised the question about troop reduction. I made the point, I forget quite how I said it but I think I said something to the effect of look, let's say you have ten things -- ships, tanks, planes, people, whatever. Some military assets. You've got ten of them and you reduce them by five. Now superficially one would look at it and say well you've cut your capability by 50 percent. On the other hand if the five remaining have four times the capability of any of the ten, you've not cut your capability by 50 percent, you've increased it by two. You’ve doubled it. That's going to be hard for people to understand. It's going to be hard for anyone to get their head wrapped around the realities of where we are. I think the best example most recently was the example in Iraq or Afghanistan, the use of a single precision-guided smart weapon can put lethal power on targets at eight or ten times what dumb bombs could do. You look at the capability of different kinds of ships or different kinds of forces, and the same thing is true with aircraft. It's even going to be an issue with our combatant commanders who had a process of asking for X numbers of ships or X numbers of forces or X numbers of somethings, whatever, planes, and they're going to have to be thinking about not numbers of things but in fact capabilities and the ability to do things with it and what it is you really want to do. So it's going to take a period of years, I would think, for all of us to adjust to the new way of looking at the world. […] Return to Menu 7. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov Speaks to US Secretary of State Colin Powell by Telephone On November 26 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov had a telephone conversation with US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in the course of which an exchange of views on certain aspects of European security, as well as on the outcome of the consideration at the IAEA Board of Governors' session of Iranian nuclear problems took place. Return to Menu 8. On the Adoption by IAEA Board of Governors of a Resolution on the Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the NPT in Iran On November 26 the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted without a vote a resolution on the Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the NPT in Iran. The resolution expresses deep regret over the previous cases of failure by Iran to fulfill its obligations connected with the Safeguards Agreement. We share those appraisals. Simultaneously the document notes the now active cooperation and openness of Teheran with regard to the fulfillment of the requirements of the Agency. The "necessary and urgent" actions, as stipulated by the previous IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12, 2003, are being carried out. It is important that the questions of ensuring the transparency of the Iranian nuclear program will continue to be dealt with in the framework of the IAEA with reliance upon its monitoring instruments. Accordingly, the adopted resolution determines the procedure for subsequent actions to be taken by the Agency to definitively clarify the questions still outstanding. Russia expects that this work in the conditions of the new character of cooperation between the IAEA and Iran will continue to be carried out objectively, without unnecessary politicization. The Board of Governors will again return to examining the question of the transparency of the Iranian nuclear program at its next meeting in March 2004. Return to Menu 9. Canada and the United Kingdom Support Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction The United Kingdom and Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Moscow on co-operation to support Russia in destroying its chemical weapons stocks. Canada will provide some CAD 33 million, which the United Kingdom will manage on Canada’s behalf to carry out work in Russia. The Canadian funding will be used to finance the construction of an 18-kilometre railway, which will transport munitions from the chemical weapons storage depot to the destruction facility at Shchuch’ye (Kurganskaya oblast). The project is part of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in June 2002 by G8 leaders, that commits the G8 to raise up to USD 20 billion to support cooperation projects, initially in Russia, aimed at preventing the acquisition of weapons and materials of mass destruction by terrorists or those who shelter them. “I warmly welcome this Canadian initiative as a further important step in strengthening international co-operation to destroy chemical weapons. It is a very positive development for the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, which was launched at the G8 Summit in Canada in 2002,” said Mr Adam Ingram, UK’s Armed Forces Minister. “The United Kingdom’s willingness to facilitate Canada’s first Global Partnership contribution at Shchuch’ye exemplifies the spirit of the Global Partnership”, said the Canadian Ambassador to Russia, Mr Christopher Westdal, who signed the MOU on behalf of Canada. “Our agreement with the UK, which is allowing Canada to make this significant contribution to Russian chemical weapons destruction before conclusion of our own legal agreement with Russia, demonstrates the shared commitment of our two countries to ensuring the earliest possible destruction of nerve agent at Shchuch’ye”. “The UK and Canada have each already undertaken a number of projects to assist Russia in dealing with the legacy of the Cold War. This will be our biggest project yet in the field of chemical weapon destruction. We look forward to working in partnership with our Canadian and Russian colleagues in implementing this project,” said Sir Roderic Lyne, the British Ambassador to Moscow, who signed the MOU on behalf of the UK. The project will be managed as part of the UK MOD’s assistance programme, under the terms of the bilateral Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. The Chemical Weapons Convention, banning chemical weapons, entered into force in 1997 and mandated the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to eliminate chemical weapons forever, verify the timely destruction of all declared chemical weapons, monitor the non-diversion of dual-use chemicals, facilitate the mutual assistance and protection afforded to all Member States, if any Member State is threatened by or attacked with chemical weapons, and promote the peaceful uses of chemistry. The OPCW now numbers 157 Member States. Return to Menu 10. Daily Press Briefing (excerpted) […] QUESTION: Yes. It's about Iran and its nuclear program. Now that an agreement has been reached in Vienna regarding the Iranian nuclear program, are you going to continue to press the Russians to stop their nuclear cooperation with Iran for the Bushehr nuclear facility? MR. BOUCHER: Well, first let me say how pleased we are with the outcome in Vienna, that we were able to work out an agreement that was adopted today without a vote, meaning by all the members of the Board of Governors. We think it's an appropriate and effective resolution. It reflects strong concerns among the Board about Iran's past non-compliance; it reflects the international community's commitment to preserving and strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and it makes clear that we need full Iranian cooperation with the agency. Iran has been put on notice, and should there be any new information that comes to light or inaccuracies that come to light, then the Board would take up the issue again and take appropriate action under the charter and the safeguards. In sum, this resolution puts a requirement on Iran to cooperate in all the ways that it's promised and all the ways demanded by the Board of Governors. That would mean that governments who have programs or who have had programs with Iran would only want to cooperate within those guidelines. And I think you can check with the Russian Government on how they will handle that situation as Iran is implementing its promises. […] QUESTION: Can I go back to that Russia-Bushehr question, because I think you came close to saying that as long as this cooperation stayed within the guidelines, then you would no longer have any objections and that it could go ahead, right? Is that -- is that what you mean? That now that there's a framework -- MR. BOUCHER: No, I didn't say that. QUESTION: No? MR. BOUCHER: I said they would have to decide how to handle their cooperation during this particular period to see, while we're waiting to see whether Iran carries out its promises or not. As you know, Iran has talked about signing the additional protocols, and I think did so again today, but I'm not aware that they have actually signed and implemented them yet. Iran has talked about suspending enrichment programs and allowing visits and verification. Some of that may have happened, some of that not. So all the countries that may have programs one kind or another with Iran are going to have to consider how they proceed in this immediate period. QUESTION: Yes. MR. BOUCHER: And Iran would -- QUESTION: Well, no doubt they would decide how to proceed, but do you -- do you have a view on how they should proceed? MR. BOUCHER: Our view is people ought to be careful, continue to be careful about their programs, particularly at this moment, when Iran has not yet implemented all its commitments. QUESTION: Well, okay. But that's not the same as saying that they should stop their cooperation. MR. BOUCHER: We've never said they should stop the reactor cooperation. We've said that other aspects of cooperation with Iran should not be carried out, and that peaceful reactor construction should proceed only if Iran was meeting all the requirements of the international community to satisfy the international community that Iran was not conducting weapons programs on the side. […] Return to Menu 11. The Netherlands Contributes to Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction On 5 November 2003, H.E. Mr Tiddo Hofstee, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Russian Federation, and Mr Victor Kholstov, Director-General of the Russian Munitions Agency, the agency responsible for the destruction of the declared chemical weapons stockpile in the Russian Federation, signed an agreement on the contribution of 4 million Euros by the Netherlands for the modernisation of an electric sub-station for the supply of electrical power to the chemical weapons destruction facility in Kambarka, (the Udmurt Republic). As foreseen by the Chemical Weapons Convention, all chemical weapons declared to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are to be destroyed no later than 2012. In order to meet the deadline stipulated by the Convention, a number of destruction facilities are to be constructed. Due to the significant financial burden the construction poses, several OPCW Member States provide substantial funding to further the destruction of the declared chemical weapons stockpile in the Russian Federation. Funding provided by the European Union and Germany supports the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Kambarka, which is due to be completed in 2005. The Netherlands will contribute in 2003 and 2004 two million Euros for each year. The contribution by the Netherlands has been made under the auspices of the bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation, signed in 1998 and providing for a total contribution of 11.4 million Euros toward the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile in the Russian Federation. This is the second project in Russia in this field that the Netherlands has funded. In 2002, the Netherlands had contributed 2 million Euros to finance the installation of a power plant at the destruction facility in Gorny, located in the Saratov region, where the destruction of chemical weapons has begun. The Chemical Weapons Convention, banning chemical weapons, entered into force in 1997 and mandated the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to eliminate chemical weapons forever, verify the timely destruction of all declared chemical weapons, monitor the non-diversion of dual-use chemicals, facilitate the mutual assistance and protection afforded to all Member States, if any Member State is threatened by or attacked with chemical weapons, and promote the peaceful uses of chemistry. The OPCW now numbers 157 Member States. Return to Menu 12. Lugar Welcomes Canadian Assistance with Chemical Weapons Destruction Today, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Dick Lugar (R-IN), wrote to Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien to thank him for Canada’s contribution of C$33 million to assist in the important destruction of chemical weapons at a Russian storage facility in Shchuchye. The site is home to nearly 2 million modern ground-launched chemical weapons. A facility has been constructed with help from the Nunn-Lugar program to store these weapons safely and securely, and then destroy them in a controlled manner so they do not pose a further threat. The Canadian funds will be used to construct a vital link between the current chemical weapons storage area and the destruction facility. "The problem we face today is not just terrorism. It is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. There is little doubt that Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda would have used weapons of mass destruction if they had possessed them. It is equally clear that they have made an effort to obtain them,” he said. Lugar, who has traveled to Shchuchye, teamed with then-Senator Sam Nunn to create the Nunn-Lugar program. Since 1991, the $400 million a year Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 6,212 nuclear warheads. It has destroyed 520 ballistic missiles, 451 ballistic missile silos, 122 bombers, 624 nuclear cruise missiles, 445 submarine-launched missiles, 408 submarine missile launchers, and 27 strategic missile submarines. It has sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels. More than 20,000 scientists formerly employed in weapons of mass destruction programs have been employed in cooperative, peaceful endeavors. Return to Menu N. Links of Interest 1. Remarks to the Conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School’s International Security Studies Program - Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and Response Return to Menu 2. IPWG group backs need for nuclear remediation 'master plan' Return to Menu 3. Iraq's WMD Programs: Culling Hard Facts from Soft Myths Return to Menu 4. Coping With Regional Powers: U.S. Diplomacy and the Challenges of Iran and China Return to Menu 5. Creative Proliferation Solutions: Dealing with Iran and North Korea Return to Menu 6. The K-219 tragedy: The Politburo and its classified games Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@ransac.org |
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