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RANSAC Nuclear News, June 10, 2003 Compiled By: Billy Magnuson A. Plutonium Disposition
 A. Plutonium Disposition 1. MOX Eludes Mention at Evian G-8 Summit Of all the nuclear issues that came under the scrutiny of the Russian and American governments during last weekend�s Group of Eight industrialized nations, or G-8, summit in Evian, France, one important and urgent issue was almost entirely absent from the agenda: plutonium disposition through MOX fuel�an oversight some say could lead to the scrapping of the entire programme by late July. Member states did point out in the G8�s Senior Officials Group Annual Report that �significant progress can be noted in the negotiations on international support for Russia's plutonium disposition programmes, including increased pledges and substantial agreement on concepts for effective programmes management and oversight,� the statement read. �We look forward to completion of these negotiations.� The programme, however, is already three years behind schedule and several million dollars over budget. The plutonium disposition scheme, which is meant to destroy 34 tonnes of surplus weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and the United States equally, involves mixing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium oxides to create a nuclear fuel called MOX, or mixed oxide fuel. The fuel will then be burnt, in parallel progress, in specially retrofitted conventional reactors�like Russia�s VVER-1000s. The plan also requires the construction of parallel MOX fabrication plants in both the United States and Russia. The arrangement has been controversial since its inception in 1995, involving, as it does, expensively revamped reactors, and using an untested fuel. Environmentalists have also pointed out that spent MOX fuel still contains weapons-usable plutonium, which, with the right technology, could still be separated out and used in nuclear weapons�thus defeating the very purpose of the programme. But several officials and analysts in Washington and Moscow, who had spoken to Bellona Web prior to the summit, predicted a far more robust G-8 endorsement of the MOX programme. According to one Russian official, a fuller mention of the programme was needed because, unless a crucial 1998 technical agreement between Russia and the US is extended within the next several weeks, the project will grind to a halt. �The MOX agreement turned out to be a low priority [at the G-8 conference],� said one Russian source close to the negotiations. �In any case, the big thing is to negotiate the government-to-government extension of the project.� MOX Survival at Risk Over Technical Agreement Expiration This five-year long 1998 agreement was signed by former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and then Vice President Al Gore. It covers concept design, research and development, small pilot projects for fuel testing, equipment transfers, lead-test assemblies and international seminars. It also expires July 31st. Without the promise of a renewed agreement, contracts for work on the project are drying up. According to one official with the United States� National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, the agreement may get a one-year extension. But this official noted that �one more year is not attractive potential for contractors or government funders.� Both sides, therefore, are still under onerous deadline pressure to agree on a substantive extension for the technical accord�an agreement, said the Russian source, that seems unlikely, given the resources already expended on the lagging programme. If some agreement is not reached, the source said, the entire MOX plan could well unravel. �The people who are supposed to be talking to each other about it are not talking about it,� said the Russian source. As an example of this, the source pointed to lapses in communication between the US State Department and the NNSA. As of May 30th�during the last of the pre-summit talks in Washington�Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who is in charge of non-proliferation, and Ambassador Linton Brooks, Deputy Administrator for the NNSA, hadn�t even formally spoken about the future of the MOX plan. Neither the NNSA nor the State Department would confirm this. Financing for the Russian MOX fabrication plant is also not going as planned. The State Department�s point man on the MOX programme, Ambassador Michael Guhin, had said that the US would pledge $400,000 toward the construction of Russia�s $1-billion plant. Another $400,000 were pledged by members of the European Union. But nothing was said at the summit about the EU pledges, or other commitments to make up the $200,000 difference. Agreement Extension in Limbo The limbo in which the MOX technical agreement currently finds itself is �already a serious problem,� said Harvard University nuclear expert Matt Bunn. According to both Bunn and the Russian source, there isn�t even a replacement agreement in the works to extend the old one. Bunn, however, was optimistic. �One way or another, they will manage to produce a new version,� he told Bellona Web in a telephone interview from Cambridge, Massachusetts. The key to an extension on the technical agreement, said the Russian source, is to get the governments to talk to each other about it and hash out the details. But compelling the U. S. State Department to act on this, say Bunn and the Russian source, is unlikely. One of the primary impediments, said Bunn, is that extending an already overextended programme would provide a bad national precedent for other US-led non-proliferation programmes that are running over budget and behind schedule. The second, he said, is the current disagreements over liability issues that are still smouldering between the State Department, Russia, and the US Department of Energy, or DOE. The 1998 agreement adopted the provisions of the �umbrella agreement� of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, which places all liability for any accidents on Russia. However, under an agreement signed in 2000 by Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin, which codified that the project would indeed go forward, liability was �to be negotiated� between the two countries. The State Department, said Bunn, thinks that the CTR umbrella agreement is not consistent with the liability needs of the MOX programme. State Department officials would not comment about what these liability needs may be. The last opportunity to secure any extension on the technical agreement, according to Gosatomnadzor, or GAN, Russia�s nuclear regulatory body, will come at a conference to be held on July 21st to July 23rd�four days before the technical assistance agreement expires. This conference, according to a highly placed GAN official who did not wish to be named in this article, �will put licensing agencies back in charge� of the MOX programme�as opposed to the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy, or Minatom. MOX Plant Design Also a Snag Another sticking point in the MOX agreement is the design of the Russian MOX fuel fabrication plant, which will be built in both the US and Russia by American nuclear giant Duke, Cogema, Stone & Webster, or DCS. But at recent meetings in Moscow between the two sides over the design of the Russian plant, embarrassing inconsistencies and unpleasant arguments arose. While the US MOX fabrication facility has long been slated for construction at South Carolina�s Savannah River Site, or SRS, arguments have raged for years about where to put the Russian plant. First, it was slated for construction at the Siberian Mining and Chemical Combine near Krasnoyarsk. Then, the US State Department�s Guhin inked a deal with Minatom to build the site near the Mayak Chemical Combine�the most radioactively polluted site on earth. Then, at the end of May, it was decided the facility would be built near the Siberian city of Tomsk. According to the Russian official, this kind of last-minute decision-making will throw the programme far enough behind schedule and over budget that the State Department will most likely abandon the MOX project, instead of extending the deadline for technical cooperation. �The Russians need their own lead time to make their own decisions�decisions [beyond the location of the plant] that should have been made by the end of May,� he said. What Would be Lost Without MOX? It has long been Bellona�s position�as well as that of other international environmental organizations�that plutonium disposition through MOX is an environmental and economic error on behalf of both the Russian and American governments. Bellona has advocated for �immobilization� of the surplus plutonium in both countries. Via this process�which is more than half as cheap as MOX�weapons-grade plutonium is mixed with other highly radioactive substances and baked into bricks. These bricks are then stored forever at special sites throughout the world. In fact, as part of the initial discussions over MOX, between Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, a portion of the 68 tonnes of surplus plutonium was to be disposed of by immobilization. But Minatom, which sees plutonium as a viable future alternative to the world�s depleting uranium stocks, was opposed. The Bush administration�which has its own plutonium dreams�formally scratched immobilization from the plutonium disposition accord. But according to the Russian source, many important contacts and developments between Russian, European and American nuclear regulatory agencies, would be jeopardized. �Finally, the NNSA and GAN, the [US] Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and even at times Minatom, are talking to each other about, and developing, regulatory procedures that did not exist in Russia before,� said the source. �GAN has received serious training in nuclear regulation thanks to the group efforts of US and European nuclear regulatory bodies,� he said. �It would be a pity to lose that rapport,� said the source. Return to Menu B. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Canada to Help Remove Soviet Radioactive Waste from Barents Sea Canada will allocate EUR 20 million to the EBRD (European Bank of Reconstruction and Development) for the removal of radioactive waste from the Barents Sea, which has been lying there since Soviet times. According to the EBRD press office France and Great Britain will also donate money to this project in the near future, which will enable Russia and the international community to prevent further pollution of the Barents Sea. During Soviet times more than 40 thousand containers of highly radioactive waste was stored in submerged submarines in various military zones of the Barents Sea. According to Director of the EBRD Nuclear Safety Department Vince Novak, the radioactive waste is in danger of leakage and could pose a serious threat to the environment. Return to Menu 2. Japan pays to rid Russia of old sub In a Japanese-funded cleanup effort, a plant in the Russian Far East began dismantling a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine that had been mothballed and corroding for years, a top Japanese diplomat said Sunday. Japan gave the Zvezda plant, located in the town of Bolshoi Kamen near Vladivostok, 800 million yen ($6.7 million) to carry out the task, said Yoshitaka Sindo, Japanese Foreign Ministry's parliamentary secretary, on a visit to Vladivostok. He inaugurated the work at Zvezda on June 7. The project signals a rekindling of cooperation between Russia and Japan in reducing the risk of nuclear pollution in the Sea of Japan. Zvezda will remove nuclear fuel from the Victor-3 type submarine, cut out the reactor compartment and chop up the remaining hull for scrap. There are 40 more similar submarines off Russia's Pacific coast - most of them floating only thanks to special buoys - that have been rotting over the past decade and still wait to be dismantled. They threaten to leak radiation into the sea. These submarines have long been neglected unlike newer strategic nuclear submarines that went out of service under U.S.-Russian disarmament treaties and whose dismantlement received funding from the United States. Japan pledged $200 million in 1999 to help get rid of the older attack submarines but most of the money hadn't been used so far because the countries couldn't agree on how to spend it. Part of the funds paid for construction of the Landysh, a barge-mounted facility that began processing low-level liquid radioactive waste last year. It wasn't clear whether Japan would fund dismantling of the rest of the attack submarines after work to cut up the first of them is over. Zvezda has the capacity to scrap six to seven such submarines annually. Return to Menu 3. Recycling Russian Subs Offers 'Star of Hope' Engineers began dismantling a nuclear submarine scrapped from Russia's Pacific fleet yesterday as part of a Japanese-funded project, a senior Japanese foreign ministry official said. With the recycling of the Viktor-3 class submarine at the Zvezda ("star" in Russian) plant near Vladivostok, "the implementation of the Russian-Japanese project 'Star of Hope' has begun," Sindo Esitaka told reporters in this Pacific port city. While Japan has been funding a nuclear submarine recycling program for 10 years, too little has been done so far, Esitaka added. Over the past decade, "Japan has devoted 20 billion yen (US$169 million) to this program. Four billion yen have been used to set up a nuclear recycling plant, but the remaining 16 billion have not been used to this day," he said. "Not a single nuclear submarine has been recycled and only very recently has there been any progress," Esitaka said. Japan has earmarked 800 million yen for the "Star of Hope" project over the next 18 months. Esitaka expressed concern at the number of nuclear submarines taken out of service in Russia's far east and at the potential environmental hazard they constitute. "There are 41 decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Russian far east, 36 of which ... present an extreme risk of nuclear contamination," he said. The Zvezda plant is the only recycling facility for nuclear submarines in the region. Return to Menu C. Strategic Arms Reduction 1. Russia-US Arms Treaty Comes into Effect A Russian-U.S. arms treaty paving the way for dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons came into effect Tuesday after its ratification law was officially published in the Russian government newspaper, Rossiiskaya Gazeta. The treaty, signed last year by Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush, requires each country to reduce its nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, by 2012. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in March, but the Russian parliament postponed ratification because of Moscow's opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Both houses of parliament finally approved the accord last month, and Putin and Bush formally exchanged ratification documents at their St. Petersburg summit on June 1. The agreement allows each country to stockpile warheads instead of destroying them, a major shortcoming according to some arms control advocates. It also allows Russia to retain Soviet-built missiles equipped with multiple nuclear warheads. They were to have been scrapped under the earlier START II arms reduction treaty, which Russia never ratified. Return to Menu 2. Russian-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions to Enter into Force June 10 Russian-US treaty on strategic offensive reductions is to enter into force today, June 10. Rossiiskaya Gazeta publishes the text of the federal law "On Ratifying The Treaty On Strategic Offensive Reductions Between The Russian Federation and the United States Of America" today. This federal law shall therefore enter into force upon official publication. The bilateral treaty on strategic offensive reductions was signed May 24, 2002 in Moscow. According to its provisions, the Russian Federation shall maintain an adequate potential of its strategic nuclear forces needed to ensure this country's national security, with due account taken of the deployment of the NMD (National Missile Defense) system by the United States. The afore-mentioned law calls for maintaining Russia's strategic nuclear forces in a state of combat readiness during any conceivable strategic-situation scenario; moreover, it stipulates the development of the required lab facilities, testing facilities, as well as production facilities. Acting in line with this law, the President of the Russian Federation shall submit information about the main parameters of a program for the development of this country's strategic nuclear forces to both Federal Assembly (Parliament) houses not later than three months after the enactment of the treaty on strategic offensive reductions. Acting in line with this federal law, the Government of the Russian Federation shall annually inform the Russian Parliament about the treaty's fulfilment. Among other things, it shall inform the Parliament about the deployment of ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) systems by other countries of the world, as well as possible threats to the Russian Federation's national security, if space weapons are deployed. Return to Menu D. Russia-US 1. Bush: the Most Pro-Russian President The case of Martha Stewart, the queen of interior designs, is the center of America's attention. Remarkably, the reason for her indictment is not the fact that, using confidential insider information about upcoming devaluation, she sold four thousand shares of ImClone stock (which, as a matter of fact, would not have greatly affected her personal savings). Rather, the nine criminal charges filed against one of the wealthiest women in the world accused her of lying to the prosecution and the FBI, and thus obstructing justice. In other words, it is the lying that has produced graver consequences than the crime itself, which is yet unproven. Obstruction of justice is considered one of the most serious crimes by not only the legal but the moral realms of the United States. While crime can result from honest mistakes, misperception, negligence or carelessness, hiding the truth is always intentional. Bill Clinton was not accused of having an affair in the workplace, but of lying about it. This characteristic of American mentality is pervasive, manifested in all aspects of personal and political relations, including international affairs. For example, if George W. Bush has misinterpreted the information provided to him by intelligence agencies regarding WMDs in Iraq, this will hardly affect his public image. If, however, the president and his administration have secretly "edited" this information to accommodate their military plans, his political reputation will be significantly undermined. If the intelligence agencies provided the White House with apparently faulty information, we can expect a number of careers at the Pentagon and Langley to end in disgrace. It is the fact that Saddam Hussein lied to everyone made him a criminal in the eyes of Americans, not the fact that he might have possessed chemical weapons. Based on that same logic, many in Washington are struggling to understand the inadequate response by Russian intelligence to the war in Iraq. Was this a simple miscalculation, or was it an intentional manipulation of facts, designed to urge the Kremlin toward certain political decisions? The notion that Washington should punish the French, ignore the Germans and forgive the Russians for their respective stances in the Iraqi war, so concisely articulated by Condoleezza Rice, is not based on the importance of these countries to the United States nor on their military and economic potential. At its foundation is the American preoccupation with morality and truth. This is made all the more clear by the fact that such actions are not directed at the countries, but at their governments. Both European governments were deliberately vague about their real intentions toward the Iraqi issue. French leaders tried to regain their badly damaged international influence; the German government was bent on winning the elections and holding on to power. The fate of Iraq and its WMD, the war against terrorism and anti-Americanism functioned as a distraction and created a convenient political momentum. Washington viewed the Russian position, not as traitorous but the result of a simple misunderstanding and misplaced trust in the weapons inspection process - this despite Russia's certain realization of the dangers of terrorism, the criminal character of the Iraqi regime and the necessity of its removal. While Washington and Moscow argued over whether the regime of Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat, Paris and Berlin took advantage of this situation to solve their individual issues and problems. Thus, Washington felt that it was betrayed and even worse, lied to. George W. Bush, a person of deep religious convictions, stresses the fundamental importance of moral postulates in politics. At the G8 Summit in Evian, his verbal and nonverbal behavior conveyed his anger at Jacques Chirac, whom he decided to punish. Nevertheless, he expressed his appreciation to France for her support in the fight against Al-Qaeda and noted that the next meeting with the French will be at the United Nations this fall. Bush was far more obvious in his disgust for Schroeder, in whom he has lost all confidence. Schroeder did not even rate a display of Bush's ire, but instead ignored altogether. Gerhard Schroeder received no invitation, no appreciative gesture; Bush simply refused to meet him during the Summit. At the same time, Bush clearly did not feel any resentment toward Vladimir Putin. He visited Saint Petersburg, and invited President Putin for a return visit to US. Once again, the Russian leader's morale stance was put to the test, and he passed. The utter lack of personal trust between the US President and his European colleagues will continue to complicate their relations, although not to the extent that Russian-American relations would have suffered had Putin lost Bush's trust and sympathy. Bush's affection for Putin transcends the political relations of the two countries. Clinton appreciated the positive relation he had with Yeltsin, but always with an eye toward bringing democracy to Russia. Bush's attitude toward Putin is based on personal factors and does not rely on an ongoing evaluation of political processes in Russia. Bush is the most pro-Russian US President in modern history. The absence of cultural or political unity, and laudable economic cooperation between these two countries, do not endanger the mutual trust of their presidents. Washington sees the honest disagreement as a lesser evil, when compared to the covering-up of real intentions. This must be understood by the Russian President, and particularly by the subordinates who provide the essential information for his decisions. Return to Menu E. Chemical Weapons Destruction 1. Commission Requests Tripled Funding for Arms Destruction The commission responsible for overseeing the destruction of Russia's vast chemical weapons arsenal has requested that funding for safe storage and disposal be increased - in part because of the threat of terrorism - the Interfax-Military News Agency reported Tuesday. Russia committed itself in 1997 to destroying the stockpile, which at 40,000 metric tons (44,000 tons) is the world's largest, within 10 years. However, the Kremlin says it lacks the funds to complete the program on time and has appealed for increased international donations and an extension of the target date until 2012. Sergei Kiriyenko, the chairman of the oversight commission, said its members had backed a request to the Russian government by the state agency carrying out the destruction to triple funding, Interfax reported. Kiriyenko said one of the reasons more funds were needed was for "anti-terrorist security." The oversight commission has requested an increase in funding for safe storage and disposal of chemical weapons from 100 million rubles (US$3 million), to 300 million rubles (US$10 million), said Nikolai Bezborodov, deputy chairman of the commission, according to Interfax. The government had set aside a total of more than 5 billion rubles (US$161 million) for the entire chemical weapons destruction effort - including construction of new facilities - in this year's budget, according to previous reports. Kiriyenko said Russia could not depend on the United States for funding, which he said had become unreliable, Interfax reported. "We will have to build all the facilities anyway," Kiriyenko was quoted as saying. "We will decide what and how to build proceeding from three considerations: safety, compliance with deadlines, and reduction of expenses." As of April, Russia had destroyed 1 percent of its chemical arsenal. The work was conducted at a plant in the Volga River town of Gorny, which was built with the aid of Germany and the European Union. The United States has produced the bulk of funding for another site under construction at Shchuchye, in the Ural Mountains region. However, it has frozen some money due to concerns that Russia has not contributed enough or made elimination of chemical weapons a high enough priority. "Russia cannot risk noncompliance with its commitments even due to external reasons," Kiriyenko was quoted as saying. He said that Russia was preparing to use a third destruction facility, in the central Russian town of Kambarka. Return to Menu F. Russia-Iran 1. IAEA Report on Nuclear Programmes in Iran Really Exists? Moscow will give its assessment to the report of IAEA inspectors on the results of their work in Iran only after they submit it, said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at a press conference in Helsinki. Thus he commented on the information that the USA had allegedly announced that the IAEA report contained serious information on the existence of nuclear programmes in Iran. "So far it is difficult to say what report was meant," the minister said. "The report should be considered by the IAEA and only then will we give our assessment," he emphasised. Return to Menu 2. Israel Urges Russia to Save Peace 'Map' (excerpted) [�] The consultations over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were tempered by Israeli misgivings over Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Israel is growing restless with Moscow's refusal to halt construction of Iran's first nuclear power plant, and Shalom minced no words Monday as he accused Tehran of trying to develop nuclear weapons in order to wipe out the Jewish state. "Iran is an extremist state that does not recognize Israel. Iran constantly states that a Jewish presence in the Middle East is impossible and repeatedly calls for the elimination of Israel. And now it is developing nuclear weapons with this aim," Shalom said. "Iran is run by extremist forces, and many in the world are starting to understand this threat," he said. Russia last week vowed to push ahead with the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant -- but once again pushed back the date of its completion, this time until 2005. The move appeared to be an indirect concession to U.S. and Israeli concerns. Moscow also is calling on Iran to sign an addition protocol with the UN's nuclear agency to allow for closer inspections. But Russia publicly rejects U.S. claims that Iran is using its civilian nuclear program to develop nuclear weapons and refuses to link Tehran's signature of the additional UN protocol to the construction of Bushehr. Return to Menu 3. Russia Grows Wary of Iran Nukes A 'WORST-CASE SCENARIO' SAYS IRAN COULD BE CAPABLE OF BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 2006. Even as a leaked report on Iran's nuclear program cites a string of safeguard "failures," Iran is enhancing its cooperation with UN inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and trying to mollify deepening concerns in Russia and the US that it harbors secret nuclear-weapons ambitions. An IAEA team arrived in Iran Saturday to take samples to test Iran's stated policy of transparency. Revelations in the past year about swift Iranian progress in uranium enrichment and previously unknown advanced facilities are raising new questions among nuclear experts. Russia is Iran's top nuclear business partner and the builder of a controversial $1 billion reactor at Bushehr. But after years of defending Iran's nuclear program as peaceful, Russia appears to be undergoing an change in official thinking. British Prime Minister Tony Blair set off a firestorm when he announced last week that Moscow had imposed new conditions on Iran. Russia would not send nuclear fuel to Iran unless the Islamic republic signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) additional protocol, a measure that would enable stringent IAEA inspections of undeclared sites. Technical leaps Senior Russian and Iranian officials have since denied that any new condition exists. They said instead that the two nations have only to hammer out details of an accord that requires Iran to return all spent fuel to Russia. But Russia has been embarrassed and surprised by the scale of an undeclared gas centrifuge-enrichment plant at Natanz, 200 miles south of Tehran. A uranium-conversion facility is also coming on line at Isfahan, and Iran declared to the IAEA last month that it plans to build a heavy-water research reactor. And in February, President Mohamed Khatami announced that Iran was developing its own uranium deposits at mines near Yazd, in the central part of the country. "Russian officials have made a huge evolution in understanding the threat from Iran" and are making "progress toward the US position," says Anton Khlopkov, an Iran expert at the PIR Center in Moscow, a military-research institute that predicts a "worst-case scenario" of Iran building a nuclear weapon by 2006, in a report soon to be released. "Not only US but Russian experts were really surprised by the information about these two sites and these two plants," Mr. Khlopkov says of the enrichment facilities. "Russia and the US should engage with European experts to find the source of such technologies ... maybe in North Korea or Pakistan." The US has labeled Iran part of an "axis of evil," and is pushing for the 35-member board of the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the NPT when it meets in Vienna on June 16. Addressing the issue Sunday during a special session of Iran's parliament, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi declared that it was strictly forbidden for Muslims to use any weapon of mass destruction. "We have no nuclear weapons program and we have said this frankly and clearly so many times," Mr. Kharrazi said. "We have a security doctrine that is without nuclear weapons." But a tough IAEA report drawn up for the Vienna meeting was widely leaked on Friday. It found that "Iran has failed to meet its obligations ... with respect to the reporting of nuclear material [imported from China in 1991]." The IAEA also noted that the failures were being "rectified" by Iran. Though Iran dismissed the findings as out of date, headlines and speculation about Iran's nuclear intentions are cutting deeply, even with allies. A 'sophisticated' program For years, Russia stated that Iran was incapable of gas centrifuge enrichment. But during a February visit to the Natanz site - which Iran was not required to declare, according to the NPT, until 180 days before it planned to enrich uranium there - IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei found what he called a "sophisticated" program. An article in the current issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by two American experts notes that Iran has joined an "exclusive club" of some 10 nations that can build such centrifuges. Some 160 centrifuges were already operational, with parts in place for 1,000 more. Portions of the facility are being built deep underground. The complete project would include some 5,000 - enough, experts say, to create weapons-grade material for several nuclear weapons per year. 'Iran clearly got caught' Iran has also declared that it has worked with uranium metal - a substance rarely used for peaceful purposes but critical for weapons components - raising red flags for experts. The leaked IAEA report makes clear that unless Iran signs the additional protocol, its ability to "provide credible assurances" about "undeclared nuclear activities is limited." "Iraq clearly got caught, so it revealed quite a few things," says David Albright, a nuclear expert and former IAEA inspector in Iraq, who is head of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington and an author of the Bulletin article. "In total," he adds, "it looks like it was putting together a nuclear weapons program." Still, Iran is not in breach of the NPT, Mr. Albright says, and most on the IAEA board "will want to give Iran more time, to see if they really are turning a corner, or just revealing what they have to." US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher on Friday said the IAEA report was "deeply troubling." While Iranian officials have long denied nuclear-weapon ambitions, many declare their right to a create such weapons, noting that they live in tough neighborhood in which Israel, Pakistan, and India all have the bomb. Kharrazi on Sunday linked Iran's nuclear progress to national pride, calling it "the source of our power and every Iranian is proud of that." Already, many Iranians embrace the idea of being a nuclear-armed regional power. "The people of Iran actually believe that if we have a nuclear weapon, it is a good idea, because it is a deterrent ... and we would be treated much more politely by the rest of the world," says an Iranian observer contacted in Tehran, who asked not to be named. "Why shouldn't we have that?" Return to Menu 4. Russia Backs Iran�s Nuclear Program Despite International Concern The International Atomic Energy Agency is expected to consider possible action on Iran�s nuclear program at a board of governors meeting scheduled for June 16. Already, the IAEA has issued a restricted-access report that reportedly raises questions about Iran�s ability to produce nuclear arms. For Russia, which appears eager to preserve a lucrative arrangement to help develop Iran�s nuclear capacity, the IAEA report creates a diplomatic dilemma. Russia�s eight-year-old contract to supply materials for the Bushehr nuclear plant on Iran�s Persian Gulf coast appears implicitly up for debate at the upcoming IAEA meeting. Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia�s Minister of Atomic Energy, has sought to downplay any controversy, telling the Itar-Tass news agency on June 9 that he expected "hardly anything new" to come from the IAEA report. The report, according to the New York Times, is critical of Iran for carrying out undisclosed research that could bolster possible efforts to develop nuclear weapons. It also notes that Iranian authorities have seemed more cooperative about sharing details on this research in recent months. Inspectors from the IAEA arrived in Tehran on June 7 for an inspection that Iranian officials claim will vindicate its nuclear program. Depending on the outcome of that inspection, Russia could face questions about whether its business interests in Iran are blinding the Kremlin to the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East. Russia�s commitment to the $800-million Bushehr project, which entails 10 years of uranium sales starting in 2005, exerts strong influence over Moscow�s diplomacy. Russia has serviced the Bushehr project under IAEA oversight and has maintained that Iran has complied with the United Nations� Nonproliferation Treaty. The NPT pact obliges Iran to open its nuclear facilities for inspection, but restricts inspectors to sites that Iran has declared. Iran says it is honoring the treaty, and insists that it is developing a nuclear capacity to meet the energy needs of its growing population. The United States has argued that Iran intends to violate the treaty via work at secret sites, and that Russia�s technology could support the development of nuclear weapons. In recent weeks, Russian leaders have sent mixed signals on the Iran nuclear question, creating some diplomatic embarrassments. President Vladimir Putin claimed in St. Petersburg on June 1, with US President George W. Bush by his side, that "the positions of Russia and the United States on [nonproliferation issues] are much closer than they seem." But days later, Russia seemed to renege on a pledge it reportedly made at a meeting of G8 industrialized nations in France. After that meeting, British Prime Minister Tony Blair told reporters that Putin had promised to halt "all nuclear exports" until Iran agreed to a more stringent inspection regime. The next day, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman revealed that shipments to Bushehr would continue. Iran�s news agency reported on June 7 that this had always been Russia�s position, and that Blair had fallen victim to a "mistranslation" of Putin�s words. Russian authorities have repeatedly stated their intention to continue "peaceful nuclear cooperation" with Iran, and Putin reportedly said during the recent G8 summit that he would not tolerate nonproliferation steps that put Russia at a competitive disadvantage. The IAEA meeting may consider whether Iran can submit to broader inspections without signing the United States� preferred set of rules, called an Additional Protocol. Tehran has rejected this protocol, and many observers believe that Iranian leaders may try to link their acceptance to the lifting of US economic sanctions. On June 1, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov urged Tehran to open the door to tougher inspections. But Russia has not altered its basic position, that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons, despite the IAEA�s evident concern. Russia�s potential payoff from Iranian nuclear cooperation is far more than the Bushehr uranium contract. Some 100 Iranians are reportedly being trained in Russia to operate the Bushehr plant. Over 700 Iranians are due for such training before the plant�s opening, now expected in 2005. According to IRNA, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry reiterated its readiness to cooperate with Iran on building five more nuclear power plants, an offer made initially in 2002 when the Russian government released its plans for future economic relations with Iran. These plans involve arms sales, one of Russia�s most lucrative export spheres. In October 2001, Moscow and Tehran signed framework agreements for further supplies of Russian military equipment to Iran reportedly worth some $300 million each year. Russia has tried to allay Western concerns since Bush met with Putin. Rumyantsev, the atomic energy minister, said on June 2 that Iran had agreed in principle to send all spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr back to Russia. Rumyantsev also told the Interfax news agency that Iran had accepted tougher inspections "in principle." The Russian nuclear official added that Tehran would not sign a protocol that mandates broader inspections unless Iran received guarantees of "assistance in obtaining nuclear technology for civilian nuclear programs." On June 4, Rumyantsev confirmed that deliveries of uranium to Bushehr could begin by 2004, following a formalization of Iran�s promise to return all spent nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing and storage. A document covering that agreement could be signed as soon as August. Such a document could prompt sharper disagreement between Moscow and Washington. Recent Russian government statements arguably represent verbal concessions to American pressure. They also indicate that, in Moscow�s view, the promise of revenue from nuclear cooperation may outweigh concern about the emergence of a new nuclear power. Return to Menu 5. Putin's new rules of protocol Is Vladimir Putin up to his old KGB tricks? Several fellow G8 leaders swear the former spy told them over dinner in Evian last week that he would not approve the delivery of nuclear fuel to Iran until Tehran agreed to extra supervision of its programme by the International Atomic Energy Authority. But Russian officials immediately countered that Moscow would in fact make the shipment even if Iran did not agree to the IAEA's so-called "additional protocol". Did the wine flow too freely over dinner or is there another explanation? Russia has been drafting a supplementary agreement to its contract with Iran about the obligatory return of spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing. This document, ambiguously dubbed an "additional protocol", could be the deliberate or accidental reason for confusion. However, there is still no sign of Russia's home-grown additional protocol, suggesting that Putin may yet decide not to let the shipment go. Return to Menu 6. IAEA Expert on Russia's Position on Iran As regards the nuclear programs of Iran, Russia holds the optimal position and is ready to discuss constructively all the issues concerning the world public. This is what director of the IAEA department for nuclear cycles and the technology of spent nuclear fuel disposal Arnold Bonn has told RIA Novosti. Moscow has taken a number of practical steps to make Teheran sign an additional protocol to the non-proliferation treaty, which will enable the IAEA to exercise broad and profound control of all Iranian nuclear developments, the expert stressed. He further noted that Moscow was fully aware of its responsibility for the safety of all nuclear facilities in Europe or Asia, in the construction of which or in the delivery of equipment or fuel to which it participated. This fact was mentioned many times in the IAEA reports, including annual reports. As Bonn further stressed, Russia was one of the IAEA most active members; its representatives held a worthy place in that international organization and were characterized by profound knowledge and qualification on actually all the issues related in one way or another to the development of the nuclear energy sector. Return to Menu 7. Russia Faces Delicate Balancing Act in Stance Toward Iranian Nuclear Program Russian officials are taking a tougher stand on Iran's nuclear program. They are expressing concerns about its true intent and urging Iran to sign an additional protocol to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The United States has called for Iran to allow international inspections, fearing it is using Russian technology and expertise to develop a secret nuclear weapons program - a charge Iran and Russia have denied. Reports from this week's G-8 Summit in France said Russia had promised to stop selling nuclear material to Iran. Russian officials will not confirm that, and they say their nuclear cooperation with Iran will continue. But Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated twice during the week that the Russian and U.S. positions on Iran are closer than they might seem. As recently as one month ago, Russian officials were asking for proof that Iran was using its atomic energy program as a cover to develop nuclear weapons. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov told visiting Undersecretary of State John Bolton that very sound evidence was needed to prove claims by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran possessed material that could be used to enrich uranium to weapons grade. At the same time, Mr. Losyukov admitted that there were still some uncertainties about Iran's nuclear program. The Moscow Director of the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, Yevgeni Volk, says it appears those uncertainties have moved to center stage. He also characterized the shift in Russia's position on Iran as significant, but flexible, and he said it is at least in part designed to repair Russian-U.S. relations damaged by Russia's opposition to the war in Iraq. "I believe that in order to reconcile George W. Bush of the United States after Russia's nasty behavior regarding Iraq, and in order to get Congress[ional] approval to remove [the] Jackson-Vanik amendment, now Russia shows its constructive attitude toward Iran. But later on, it can change by saying that there is no evidence about Iran's [nuclear] military ambitions," Mr. Volk said. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to which Mr. Volk refers was passed in 1974 and links bilateral trade issues to freedom of emigration, in particular Jewish emigration, from the Soviet Union. At the Moscow office of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, director Ivan Safranchuk agrees that Russia's current position on Iran is "delicate." "Right now there are some questions about Russian-Iranian relations which [President] Putin is not ready to answer. And that is why I would suggest this means that he will try to preserve the status quo as it is now, without huge changes. [Additional] shifts in his position are possible because we have contradictions in Russian-Iranian relations," he said. Mr. Safranchuk notes there have been urgent appeals by the United States for Russia to end its technology sales to Iran on the grounds that the transfers add significantly to Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons. He said Russia would very much like to get the one billion dollars that is the value of its main nuclear contract with Iran, construction of a nuclear plant at the Iranian town of Bushehr on the Persian Gulf. But he said Russia does not want to risk its relations with the United States over the deal. Mr. Safranchuk also notes that Russia has said it will trade in nuclear material only with nations that adhere to international protocols. But he said that does not necessarily signal an irreversible change in Russian policy toward Iran. Aside from the value of Russia's nuclear deals with Iran, another factor limiting President Putin's ability get tough, as President Bush would like, is support for Iran in the Russian political and military establishment. Yevgeni Volk of the Heritage Foundation said because this is a parliamentary election year in Russia, President Putin may find it politically difficult to move any closer to the U.S. position on Iran. "The Russian nuclear complex is very powerful and very interested in continuing nuclear cooperation with Iran and, indeed, it will be of course a very serious obstacle on the way to implementation of the statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin. I mean the Atomic Energy Ministry of course will do its best to lobby its interests, and its multi-billion dollar deals with Iran to continue construction of Bushehr, and I believe it will not be an easy task for Mr. Putin to fulfill his promise," Mr. Volk said. President Putin and other Russian officials appear to believe the best solution is for Iran to abide by the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov recently said as much. "We believe it would be a very important step to remove the concerns of the international community as regards nuclear programs in Iran," he said. Iran has so far refused such requests. But for the short term, Russian officials, like Mr. Ivanov, said they are expecting Iran to take steps to ease fears about its nuclear program in time for a meeting of the IAEA's board of governors on June 16. If Iran does not take those steps, Russian officials will have a difficult decision to make on whether to defy the United States and continue helping Iran with its nuclear program. Return to Menu G. Russia-North Korea 1. FM: Russia Ready to Assist in N. Korea Talks Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Tuesday that Mosow is willing to help ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and create a nuclear-free zone in the region. His comments came a day after North Korea threatened to build nuclear weapons as a deterrent to what it calls a "hostile" U.S. policy. Ivanov said Russia welcomed recent talks in Beijing between the United States, China and North Korea and said his country was ready to play a "more active part" in the negotiations. "We think that this way of negotiating is the only right and possible way in order to reach results that would take into account the interests of all parties involved," Ivanov said through an interpreter during a visit to Helsinki, the Finnish capital. In April, three days of talks in the Chinese capital ended with no reported progress and no indication if they would resume. American officials said the North Korean representative told his American counterpart that Pyongyang already had nuclear weapons. On Monday, North Korea's official KCNA news agency said that if the United States doesn't stop its hostility, North Korea "will have no option but to build up a nuclear deterrent force." U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell dismissed the North Korean claim and said Washington would not change its strategy. Washington has indicated that it wants Russia to be involved in talks on North Korea. Ivanov said Moscow has already taken part in some negotiations, but did not elaborate. "We are in favor of solving all emerging problems through political dialogue and we have assisted and will be assisting such dialogue in the future," he said. Ivanov, who was in Finland for a meeting of foreign ministers of the countries bordering the Baltic Sea, met with President Tarja Halonen and Prime Minister Anneli Jaatteenmaki. He also held talks with Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja Return to Menu H. Official Statements 1. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov Interview with the Newspaper Vremya Novostei, Published on June 6, 2003, Under the Heading "There Is No Evidence of the Existence of an Iranian Nuclear Program" Yesterday US Under Secretary of State John Bolton accused Moscow of "conniving at WMD technology supplies to Iran." Katerina Labetskaya, Vremya Novostei special correspondent, asked Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Georgy Mamedov to explain the surprise demarche of the American diplomat. Answer: Our nuclear cooperation with Iran is limited to building the Bushehr NPP. And all we are doing within the framework of this cooperation is absolutely in all details in compliance with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and does not give rise to any questions on the part of this treaty's supervisory body - the IAEA. This agency has carried out more than a hundred inspections at Bushehr NPP, which is comparable with what occurred in Iraq, and there are no questions to us or the Iranians. There is no doubt that this might not be a cover for a "closed nuclear program." The inspections have been occurring regularly, therefore the data are the freshest. Question: How do matters stand with fuel for the Bushehr NPP? Answer: We have a commitment to supply fuel. But the Iranians and we have an understanding that this fuel will be supplied when our bilateral protocol is signed. It has been the word "protocol" that might have mixed things up, for there are two protocols. About the second one I shall say below. Now the talk is about the protocol which we are to sign with Iran. Question: When will you sign it? Answer: As soon as it is ready. Now our Minatom and the Atomic Agency of Iran are engaged in elaborating this protocol exactly. Its meaning is that spent fuel will have to be returned to Russia, thus ruling out the very possibility of its being processed and used for nonpeaceful purposes. With this ends all that is associated with our cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field. Some dislike it, John Bolton among them. We consider that, as our President said, Iran is our neighbor and so we will cooperate with it. The US stand, however, on Iran generally, not only on a nuclear program, differs from ours. You will recall that the leadership of the US administration was calling for the isolation of Iran. Question: What do you think about "Iran's possible nuclear program"? Answer: There are no evidences of the existence of that program, we believe. I stress the IAEA so far has identified no violations by Iran of the NPT. But certain strictly technical questions exist. We aren't discussing them at the Americans' bidding but because this worries us ourselves. For this is taking place near our borders, and we are interested in the Treaty being strictly complied with. Since there are questions some people, like Bolton, claim Iran is violating NPT, that it needs to be isolated and so on and so forth. So this calls for some additional measures to clarify the situation. On June 16, the IAEA's Board of Governors will be convened. It is being convened regularly, this won't be an "emergency get-together." But this question will also be raised there. For a couple of months now, based on inspections and the information coming in from various countries, including the US, the IAEA has been preparing a report in which the conclusion will be drawn whether Iran has been abiding by all its NPT obligations. It's hard to guess what that conclusion is going to be: maybe vague, maybe clear. We trust the IAEA and will heed its conclusions. The Agency, and Director General ElBaradei personally have acquitted themselves well and as an independent player, including on the Iraq issue. Question: What is the essence of the second protocol - with the IAEA? Answer: It has so far been signed with only 30 countries. Its meaning is that IAEA inspections can apply not only to declared nuclear facilities, but also to any facility at which, according to its information, nuclear materials may be contained. Even if that facility is not declared by the country. This is, as it were, additional transparency. In the conditions when a propaganda campaign is being conducted, when political pressure is being exerted, when totally unwarranted sanctions are being imposed, including against our enterprises, it is best for all, and for Iran too, to sign the protocol, thus demonstrating openness and goodwill. In the Declaration on Nonproliferation passed on Wednesday by the summit in Evian, it is stated that the G8 calls upon Iran without delays and conditions to sign the additional protocol. This is fully in accord with our position as well. Question: Georgy Enverovich, the Bolton "raid" came as a surprise to you? Answer: Since Bolton and I as professionals have all the time been holding negotiations on these questions I would not like to publicly take issue with him. Mr. Bolton is quite often coming to Moscow. All meet with him with whom he wants to meet, including senior officials from Minatom, the Russian Munitions Agency and other agencies. He can get an expert answer to any of his concerns. Therefore we feel that for him to make such statements without having any evidence and, most importantly, without asking us any questions in this connection was not very responsible. Especially as we met in Evian only two days ago. We were working, were expertly preparing materials for the leadership in connection with the Declaration on Nonproliferation. It was in Evian that the spirit of cooperation prevailed. First of all, thanks to, among other things, the accords reached between presidents of Russia and the Us in St. Petersburg. Question: Whence this wind of change then? Answer: Honestly speaking, we are bewildered. One may only guess what this was needed for. Maybe it's part of some overall political pressure. I told you, didn't I, that ours are different courses precisely on Iran, not on possible nuclear programs. The Americans are for the isolation of Iran, and we for cooperation with it, of course, one that is done in accordance with international agreements. It is not quite understandable why after such serious accords in St. Petersburg and Evian that so groundless statement was needed. Therefore we are expressing concern. If, however, there are some serious questions, not in terms of propaganda, but in order to ascertain the truth, then okay, we have expert channels in which Mr. Bolton himself is regularly participating. Question: What is required to resolve this "odd situation"? Answer: Nothing is required, because there is no "odd situation" at all. The only oddity is that this is being covered in the press. Actually both the Americans and we and the Iranians are perfectly aware what it is all about. Return to Menu I. Press Releases 1. USEC and Exelon Reach Long-Term Supply Agreement USEC Inc. (NYSE: USU) announced today that it has reached agreement with Exelon Generation Company, LLC, subject to Exelon�s internal approval, to supply SWU for a period of six years for the 17 nuclear power reactors operated by Exelon. Exelon President and Chief Operating Officer Oliver D. Kingsley Jr. and USEC President and Chief Executive Officer William H. Timbers agreed to the new terms at the utility�s headquarters in Chicago. The nearly $700 million agreement would establish USEC as Exelon�s primary SWU supplier from 2005 through 2010. �This agreement will strengthen and extend USEC�s long-term partnership with Exelon, the nation�s leading nuclear utility,� Timbers said. �Exelon is our largest customer and we look forward to supplying its nuclear fuel needs into the next decade and beyond.� Kingsley said, �Exelon Generation Company is pleased to move forward towards a strategic partnership with USEC. Through this agreement, we will play an important role in USEC�s Megatons to Megawatts national security program as well as its demonstration and deployment of American Centrifuge enrichment technology.� With 17 reactors at 10 sites in Illinois, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Exelon Generation�s nuclear operations produce about one-fifth of all nuclear-generated electricity in the United States. This news release contains forward-looking information (within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) that involves risks and uncertainty, including certain assumptions regarding the future performance of USEC and market pricing trends. Actual results and trends may differ materially depending upon a variety of factors, which are described in USEC�s periodic filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These SEC filings are available on USEC�s website, www.usec.com. USEC Inc., a global energy company, is the world�s leading supplier of enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Return to Menu J. Links of Interest 1. Pressure Alone will not Deter Iran from its Nuclear Path Return to Menu 2. Audit Report on "International Materials Protection, Control and Accountability Nonprofliferation Initiative" Return to Menu 3. Global Partnership Funding Commitments Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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