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RANSAC Nuclear News, May 19, 2003 Compiled By: Lauren Arestie A. Multilateral Threat Reduction
 A. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Deal 'Close' On Arms Clean-Up Help Wrangling which has blocked UK plans to help former Soviet bloc countries prevent nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands could end this week. There have been months of negotiations about the details preventing millions of pounds of cash from the UK and other G8 nations being paid towards nuclear safety in the Russian Federation. Labour MP Andrew Mackinlay is among those worried by the delays, especially as sending a strong message on weapons proliferation was one of the key reasons why he backed the Iraq war. He says failing to tackle problems in the Russian Federation could leave open a source where "despots" could get hold of chemical, nuclear or biological weapons. Foreign Office officials told MPs at the end of last month that agreement in clearing the obstacles was "close". Now the deal is due to be signed on Wednesday. The UK and other G8 countries pledged help for the Russian Federation at a summit in Canada last year. British ministers promised �466m over 10 years towards the Co-operative Threat Reduction program. In the last two financial years, �28m - from a different �84m budget - has gone to such projects. Concerns that the money might be taxed by the Russian authorities have been among the obstacles to the program. In the talks, it is understood that when national taxes issues have been addressed, fears about local taxes have become stumbling blocks. In a written parliamentary answer to Mr. Mackinlay in January, Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien said: "The continuing absence of either a multilateral or a bilateral agreement constitutes a substantial impediment to expenditure in a number of areas. "Once we have the agreements in place we will be able to spend project money very quickly. "In the interim, the UK continues to provide assistance to former Soviet Union countries in a number of areas." Those areas of help included safe storage of nuclear submarine fuel in northwest Russia, nuclear safety work in Kazakhstan, and measures to prevent nuclear weapons expertise spreading from "closed nuclear cities" in Russia. Mr. O'Brien said UK officials had taken "every opportunity" to resolve the problems and Tony Blair had raised the issue with Russian President Vladimir Putin last October. He said many other countries were not able to distribute funds until a legal framework, called the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program for the Russian Federation (MNEPR) is signed. That program is due to be signed in Stockholm on Wednesday. Mr. Mackinlay told BBC News Online he was "incredulous" that a deal had not yet been agreed. He has so far not been reassured by officials saying a deal is near. He suspected there had been "a degree of inertia" on both sides, but asked why Tony Blair had not personally taken up the issue further with Russian President Vladimir Putin. "We have had 12 wasted years while the West really has not done everything possible," said the MP. He feared that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some weapons had been lost onto an "illicit world market place". Mr. Mackinlay added: "If this money is delivered, it is possible we would at least contain the danger of things going off at reactors and also destroy material that could be illicitly used." The Russian Foreign Ministry this week told the Russia RIA news agency the MNEPR agreement carried "great significance in Russia". "This document can in the future be used as a benchmark for drawing up bilateral agreements in the context of the Global Partnership (on threat reduction)", said the ministry. Since the threat reduction programs started in the wake of the USSR's collapse, more than 6,000 nuclear weapons have been dismantled. But a report earlier this year from Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies, endorsed by 15 influential research centers in a range of countries, warned of the continuing extent of the worldwide arms control problem. The report, by two former senior arms control experts in the Clinton administration, said the G8 has made major steps but had to do more "urgently" to tackle the "grave proliferation risks" from remaining nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles. It said the political will of the G8 nations would determine whether the opportunities promised by last year's treaty were squandered or turned into concrete actions. Return to Menu 2. Finland Moves to Strengthen Nuclear Safety in Russia HELSINKI - Finland's state council has proposed that President Tarja Halonen direct acting secretary of state Arto Mansala to sign a treaty committing Finland to participate in financing and conducting engineering work to reinforce nuclear safety in Russia and in the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The treaty will involve purifying, transporting and storing spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from Northern Fleet nuclear submarines, as well as heightening safety measures at Leningrad and Murmansk Region nuclear power plants. The new treaty will lay the groundwork for international and bilateral programs for reprocessing and storage of spent fissile materials, which are financed by an environmental protection support fund in the European Union's Northern Dimension program. The treaty is due to be signed on May 21 in Stockholm by representatives of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Russia, and European Commission officials. Return to Menu 3. Agreement On Multilateral Nuclear-Environmental Program In Russia Is Expected To Be Signed In Stockholm MOSCOW - Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov will arrive in Stockholm on May 21st to sign a framework agreement on a multilateral nuclear-environmental program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) as well as a claims protocol, a high-ranking official from the Russian Foreign Ministry reported on Friday. According to him, in compliance with the agreement Russia will receive about $66 million to utilize atomic submarines in Russia's northeastern region. MNEPR participants include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, the USA, the European community as well as the European community on nuclear energy. However, the USA does not intend to sign the claims protocol, RIA Novosti has learned. Return to Menu B. Plutonium Disposition 1. MOX Fuel To Be Used By 2010 MOSCOW - Russia's nuclear power plants are expected to start using plutonium fuel extracted from nuclear warheads later this decade, the nation's nuclear authority said Monday. Russia's nuclear power plants are expected to begin using mixed-oxide, or MOX fuel, in 2008-2010, the state-run Rosenergoatom consortium said in a statement posted on its web site. It said five to eight of Russia's 30 civilian nuclear reactors would use the fuel processed from plutonium contained in nuclear weapons that are to be dismantled. The United States and Russia agreed in June 2000 that they will each dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium extracted from nuclear warheads. Washington has been carrying out its program, but Russia had dragged its feet on the project, citing financial difficulties and asking for Western financial assistance. The ITAR-Tass news agency quoted Russian nuclear ministry officials as saying that Western nations had pledged to raise US$1 billion to help Russia launch its MOX fuel program. It said that a plant to convert plutonium into MOX fuel was set to be built in the city of Chelyabinsk in the Ural Mountains. Return to Menu C. Nuclear Warhead Destruction 1. Soviet Power Lives Again HANFORD - Once they built atom bombs here, nuclear weapons that brought Japan to her knees and held the Russian bear at bay during the Cold War. Today, they're turning megatons into megawatts, loading material from eight Soviet atomic warheads into the reactor at the Northwest's only operating nuclear power plant, which can produce enough electrical power to light and heat the South Sound. "It's just great," said Charles Yulish, spokesman for U.S. Enrichment Corp., broker for the Russian Uranium 235. "These were once warheads aimed at American cities. Now they're lighting those cities." Nearly 300 fresh nuclear assemblies are being placed into the reactor core of Energy Northwest's Columbia Generating Station this month as the plant is refueled for the first time in two years. Each assembly contains some material from a Russian warhead. Refueling is scheduled to be complete June 11 at Columbia, which is located about 10 miles north of Richland in Eastern Washington's high desert near the Columbia River. The plant, owned and operated by the former Washington Public Power Supply System, produces more than 1,100 megawatts of electricity at full production. That's enough energy to heat and light more than 1 million homes. The Bonneville Power Administration finances the plant - at a cost of around $200 million a year - and sells the electricity, adding about $1 million a day to the Northwest's economy at today's market price for electricity. Columbia Generating Station supplies around 10 percent of Bonneville's power. Hydroelectric dams on the Columbia and Snake rivers have increased generation to make up the power lost while the nuclear plant is shut down. "The reason we schedule refueling for this time of year is the spring runoff," said Bonneville's Ed Mosey. This is only the second time Columbia Generating Station has been fueled to run for two years since the plant began operating on one-year fuel cycles in the early 1980s. But there's much more than just refueling going on, said John Dabney, who spends his entire time at Energy Northwest either planning for or managing the refueling shutdown. Some 8,700 "tasks" are scheduled in a 34-day shutdown, where activities are so intense that Dabney can tell literally to the minute how things are going. This year, work on the plant's electric generator was the major nonrefueling exercise. Workers - about 1,000 contract employees are added to Energy Northwest's normal complement of 1,000 workers - are taking apart and repairing portions of the generator that haven't been worked on in a decade. They'll be finished with generator maintenance and repairs perhaps a week earlier than expected, Dabney said, although the total project was about four hours behind schedule earlier this week. But new jobs - like repairing a leak in a cooling water tube - have cropped up. Most of the maintenance and repair work can be done only while the plant is shut down. While other repair and maintenance is important, refueling remains the key to the shutdown. "Refueling is a huge event," said Larry Linick, who supervises the design of fuel elements in Columbia's reactor. Workers, who carefully track the fuel strength of each 15-foot-tall, 580-pound uranium bundle in the reactor's core, plan which bundles to replace with new ones, which to relocate and which to leave alone. Bundles are moved - slowly, carefully and precisely - with a bridge crane that includes a grasping device at the end of a long metal boom. The work is so precise that even though workers can see each bundle's identifying serial number on closed-circuit television they still double-check with binoculars. Spent bundles are carried through the water that insulates the reactor's radioactivity to an underwater storage area adjacent to the reactor. New fuel is taken from the same area and placed in the reactor. The plant operates with 764 fuel assemblies encased in what resembles a giant steel and concrete vacuum bottle filled with water so pure that the bottom of the reactor is visible 70 feet down. When the plant is in operation, the reactor's nuclear fuel creates heat, boiling the shielding water, which then creates steam in a separate water system. The steam turns the generator, which revolves at 1,800 rpm. Energy Northwest didn't specify that new nuclear fuel contain radioactive uranium from Russian missile warheads when it asked for bids for this year's $39 million refueling. "They just had the best deal," fuel design supervisor Linick said of U.S. Enrichment Corp.'s winning bid. USEC has been around since the early '90s, when it was formed as a federal government corporation to be the executive agent for the American end of an agreement between the United States and Russia to dispose of 500 million tons of old Soviet warheads. "So far, we've eliminated 7,000 warheads," said USEC's Yulish. "We've got 13,000 more to go." Return to Menu 2. Russian Bombs Now Fuel Energy Northwest is stuffing 16 Russian atomic bombs into the core of its reactor. Actually, the uranium from 16 dismantled Russian atomic warheads has been shipped to the United States and processed with other uranium to end up in parts of 292 nuclear fuel assemblies being loaded into the Columbia Generating Station's reactor as part of its 34-day refueling and maintenance. There's no way to tell Russian uranium from American uranium inside the fuel assemblies. Both are mixed together, and both must meet the same Nuclear Regulatory Commission standards, said Larry Linik, Energy Northwest's fuel design supervisor. "It's kinda like putting unleaded gas in your car. It doesn't matter if it comes from Chevron or from Texaco," said Neil Zimmerman, Energy Northwest's refueling technical director. But the reactor is doing its part in destroying atomic bombs that used to be aimed at the United States. In a "Megatons to Megawatts" program, Russia removed and processed uranium from its atomic warheads to sell to the Kentucky-based U.S. Enrichment Corp. "The Russians are strapped for hard cash," Zimmerman said. USEC further processed the uranium and sent the equivalent of 16 warheads to Richland's Framatome ANP plant. Framatome processed the material some more and put it into narrow, rectangular 141�2-foot-long fuel assemblies to sell to Energy Northwest. For most of its life, Energy Northwest's 1,250-megawatt reactor went off line every spring for refueling and maintenance. However, two years ago, the reactor began its first two-year run in an attempt to provide longer stretches of continuous electricity to the Bonneville Power Administration's power grid. The reactor operated at 95 percent of its power production capacity for the past two years, including one record streak of 368 days without a shutdown. By comparison, the reactor operated at 64 percent of its capacity in the early 1990s. The reactor had three unscheduled equipment-related shutdowns during the past two years. The last occurred five days before Energy Northwest's scheduled shutdown last Saturday for refueling. Because of the complications of moving in about 1,000 outside workers five days early, last week's shutdown ultimately led to the refueling and maintenance work starting one day early May 9, said John Dabney, Energy Northwest's outage manager. That means the officially scheduled completion of the outage moved from 4 p.m. June 12, to 4 p.m. June 11. Actually, the maintenance overhaul appears on track to be finished by the evening of June 11, Dabney said. Operators will start cranking up the reactor June 10, but it will take a few days of fine-tuning and tests before it is up to full speed. Energy Northwest has $39 million budgeted for the outage work. Meanwhile, every day that the reactor is shut down, it cannot produce roughly $1 million worth of electricity. The outage is a tightly scheduled, around-the-clock effort involving about 1,000 Energy Northwest workers with another 1,000 gypsy-like nuclear workers who move from reactor to reactor to perform maintenance. A major piece of that work is about 16 days of moving and replacing fuel. Think of the reactor core as a 70-foot-deep bucket of water next to a spent fuel pool, which could be thought of as a 22-foot-deep pan of water. A short, narrow water-filled channel connects the two. The core holds 764 underwater fuel assemblies, which bombard each other with neutrons to heat the water into steam. The steam turns the plant's turbines to create electricity before being condensed back into water to return to the core. About a third of the fuel assemblies burn out each year. So during a refueling outage, Energy Northwest removes the top of the core and uses a long grappling device to pick up the brown burned-out fuel assemblies to move them underwater through the short channel to the spent fuel pool. Then workers replace the spent fuel with bright, shiny, silvery new fuel assemblies. Meanwhile, workers also rearrange the partially burnt-out but still useable assemblies in the core. Arranging and maneuvering those fuel assemblies is a complicated puzzle that takes most of a year to map out. The uranium must be evenly distributed throughout the core. But putting in too much will burn out the fuel ahead of schedule, and putting too little will keep the reactor from operating steadily at full capacity, Linik said. Actually, much of the maintenance outside of the core is more difficult. For example, workers are taking apart and examining the main generator for the first time in 10 years. One brain-teasing maintenance job is figuring out the cause of a condenser leak that shut down the reactor five days prior to the scheduled outage. The condenser operates somewhat like a radiator. One system of pipes takes turbine-turning steam from the core and runs that used steam adjacent to another set of pipes filled with cool Columbia River water. The river water cools the steam in the adjoining pipes to turn it into it water again to flow back to the core. A small hole formed between pipes in the two systems. The impure river water, which is at a higher pressure than the steam pipes' water, has sprayed into steam pipes, which must contain pure water. So Energy Northwest to shut down the reactor early. The leak's cause has not been nailed down, Dabney said. Return to Menu D. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Putin's Arms Talk Sounds The Alarm: Russia Suggests It Is Creating New Types Of Weapons A vague suggestion by Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russia may be developing a new generation of nuclear weapons raised some alarms in Washington on Friday, intensifying an already bitter debate in Congress over the Bush administration's efforts to repeal a ban on the development of certain smaller warheads. During his annual assessment of the state of the republic, Putin reiterated his call for a modern, professional military. He later said that the military was developing new types of strategic weapons. Nikolai Sokov, a former Russian arms control negotiator who is now a senior researcher at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, said that although Putin never used the word "nuclear," it was implied. But Sokov described the comments as brief and Delphic. "These weapons will be able to insure the defense of Russia and its allies in the long term," Putin said, according to Sokov's translation. But shortly afterward, his deputy prime minister for the military industrial complex, Boris Alyoshin, said he was not certain what weapons the president was referring to, Sokov said. Even so, the hints seemed deliberate, and they caused immediate concern in Washington. President Bush is fighting for a repeal of a 10-year-old law that prohibits development of smaller, more usable "low-yield" nuclear weapons, and he has budgeted millions of dollars for research into new kinds of warheads. Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Walnut Creek, has been a leader in the fight to retain the low-yield prohibition, in large part out of concern that new tactical weapons might be seen as a provocation and encourage other countries, including Russia and China, to build their own. She said that the Bush administration's tough rhetoric on the need for new weapons had undermined efforts to prevent nuclear arms proliferation. "There has been a degradation of our position on arms control, and it is making others nervous," Tauscher said. William Potter, the head of a nonproliferation program at the Monterey Institute, said he was particularly concerned about the development of low- yield weapons, which the Russians have mentioned previously, because they are more usable and because they are the type that would be of most interest to terrorists or hostile nations. Developing such weapons -- particularly in Russia, where security is not tight -- creates opportunities for them to end up in terrorists' hands, Potter said. But supporters of the administration's policies said Putin's comments only strengthened their arguments that the United States needs to increase its military readiness by at least doing research into new types of nuclear weapons. Earlier this week, the House Armed Services Committee struck a compromise in which it agreed to keep the existing ban on producing low-yield weapons in place while lifting prohibitions on research. Rep. Heather Wilson, R-N.M., supported the committee's compromise and said Putin's comments further proved that America needed at least to understand new weapons. She said the United States has known for some time that Russia still had an active nuclear weapons program and that the speech in Moscow added urgency to the matter. "It's one of the reasons why we need to research advanced concepts -- so we are not caught unprepared," she said. Return to Menu 2. President Putin Discuss New Generation of Russian Strategic Weapons MOSCOW - Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about the creation of Russian weapons of a new generation. "At the present time the work on the creation of Russian weapons of a new generation is at the stage of practical completion; specialists qualify them as strategic," the president said in Friday, delivering his state-of-the-nation address to the Federal Assembly. "These weapons will make it possible to ensure the defensive capacity of Russia and its allies in the long-term perspective," the president of Russia concluded. Return to Menu 3. Vice-Premier Comments On Presidents' Pronouncements About Russia's New Strategic Weapons MOSCOW - The point at issue was, most likely, a new space-air-surface echeloned system, Russian Vice-Premier Boris Aleshin has said in comments on the President Vladimir Putin's pronouncements about a new strategic weapon Russia is developing. The new weapon will allow control of general-purpose troops and strategic arms, said the vice-premier. In his address to the federal assembly, President Putin said a project to make a new generation weapon, which experts attribute to the strategic type, is in the phase of practical implementation. The new weapon will ensure Russia's and its allies' defense capability for a long-term prospect, emphasized the president. Return to Menu E. Nuclear Terrorism 1. Russian Minister: No Terrorist Organization Can Manufacture An Atomic Bomb MOSCOW - No terrorist organization, not even Al-Qaeda, can develop an atomic bomb, "because they do not have the potential required for this," Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said in an interview with ITAR-TASS on Monday. The Russian nuclear facilities have adequate protection systems against any possible threats, including terrorist, stressed the minister. The Ministry in conjunction with the law enforcement agencies pays enormous attention to this issue. Billions of rubles are spent to ensure the safety and security of all facilities of this kind. "No fissile materials must fall into the dirty hands, including those of terrorists," said the minister. He noted that a mere tens of grams of fissile substances have been stolen in Russia since work began with weapons-grade materials 60 years ago, and tens of kilograms have been stolen of substances that are not suitable for making weapons, Mr. Rumyantsev said. What's more, through the efforts of the law enforcement agencies, those tens of grams were returned to federal ownership. In fact there have been no cases of disappearance of fissile materials in Russia, said he. It is an indisputable fact. One-third of the stolen materials of non-weapons grade have been recovered; the rest is wanted. The minister confirmed that Russia would continue to build a nuclear-power plant in Iran. "It is our international obligation," stressed he. "Iran has not broken any regulations acknowledged in international law and has not violated the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty," said the minister. Return to Menu F. Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement 1. Japan to Begin Non- Strategic Sub Dismantling Pilot Project by Summer (excerpted) Tokyo officials are reticent about details and program future, but all involved hope for a swift and beginning to the program, whose success will dictate further Japanese funding commitments - including the decommissioning of several more submarines. After a series of postponements and often tense government negotiations, Japan and Russia will early this summer jointly dismantle a Victor-III class attack submarine as part of a pilot project to gauge costs and determine the magnitude of further investment from Tokyo for decommissioning Russia's floating stocks of retired Pacific Fleet non-strategic submarines. At stake is nearly $200 million in Japanese funding, which Tokyo put forth in 1993 to help Russia deal with its radioactive legacy in the Far East, a legacy that includes some 41 rusting and foundering non-strategic nuclear submarines - spread from Kamchatka to Vladivostok. Many of these subs were slated for destruction with Japanese funding in 1999, but Russia's concerns with secrecy eroded Moscow's commitment to the project. Some of these subs are barely afloat, and are not currently covered for destruction by the US Pentagon's Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, program, which has demolished more than 6,000 warheads and missiles and 29 ballistic missile submarines that targeted the US since its inception in 1992. Japan renewed that financial commitment in June 2001, during the Group of Eight, or G-8 conference, during which G-8 members and other states pledged some $20 billion over 10 years to help Russia and its break-away states deal with their devastating nuclear inheritance. In this sense, G-8 nations, such as Japan, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other non-G-8 states like Norway and Sweden have pledged to foot the enormous threat reduction bill for non-strategic weapons and submarines that CTR - due to current US legislative restrictions - cannot cover on its own. Part of the advantage of the G-8 agreement is that non-ballistic submarines were never on the Pentagon agenda because they posed no direct nuclear threat to the United States. The pile-up of mutli-purpose subs, like the Victor-III class, however, has recently begun to constitute even more of an environmental threat, according to Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry, than the ballistic subs ever did. The latitude for expanding dismantlement efforts bestowed by the June G-8 conference has therefore drawn a host of interested nations - mainly Japan and non G-8 member Norway, who have taken this problem seriously for decades. Japan has repeatedly expressed its desire to help Russia deal with its nuclear legacy, and in 1993, it established the joint Russian-Japanese mouthful Committee on Cooperation to Assist the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Russian Federation. The joint committee put up some $200 million to help with Russian nuclear clean up. One of the most cogent of these projects has been the contraction of the Landysh, an enormous $36 million liquid radioactive waste treatment barge anchored at the Zvezda decommissioning point near Vladivostok that, since its commissioning in 2001, has processed 800 tons of irradiated liquid waste from submarines, according to experts at the Center for Non-proliferation Studies in Monterey California, or CNS. The Landysh's capacity to process 7,000 cubic meters of low-level liquid radioactive waste a year, according to the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, or NTI, is enough to purify the annual production of liquid waste generated by Russia's entire Pacific Fleet. But the Japan-Russia Committee has experienced its share of turbulence. The funding program - which was suspended last spring and renewed in January - has been dogged by bureaucratic confusion in Moscow. But since the June announcement by the G-8 to contribute $20bn over the next ten years to Russia's disarmament efforts have redoubled. The results of the January Summit between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Russian President Vladimir Putin have seen the Kremlin commit more energy to stimulating and streamlining its non-proliferation efforts. Putin even appointed his Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov as Russia's non-proliferation czar - cabinet level post that does not even exist in the Untied States, meaning few CTR officials have direct access to President George Bush. Because of this and other efforts by the two countries such as the establishment of the 'Task Force' to effectively implement the cooperation, Japan, according to various Tokyo officials, has put the $168 million that remains in its Japan-Russia committee fund back on the table. Aside from submarine dismantlement, part of this money may be invested in rehabilitating a branch segment of Russia's impoverished Far East railroads, which are responsible for shipping of spent nuclear fuel to the Ural mountains. Japanese government sources, however, would not confirm this possibility in interviews this week, and another Japanese government source said that $168 million had not yet been allocated - even for the dismantlement of remaining retired multi-purpose nuclear submarines, which depends on the success of the Victor-III pilot project. The cost of the Victor-III project is estimated by Bellona and other expert groups to be around $5 million. A Japanese government source would not confirm this figure saying instead that the purpose of conducting the project - which will take place at Zvezda shipyard - is to determine more precisely what these costs would be. The Japanese government does have its own internal budget projections for the project, he said, but he declined to disclose the amount. "We can't disclose this because [the prices are] not fixed yet," he said. The source was also vague about the timeframe in which the pilot project would be completed, giving an estimate of anywhere from six moths to two years. The Japanese government source, said that there are "no difficulties [with the project,] and Japan and Russia are working together quite well and we would like to start the work by this summer," he said. "That is the understanding." That understanding was confirmed by members of the Russia Atomic Energy Ministry, or Minatom's staff, though many in this cadre would like to see more money from the Japanese and less concern about regulatory control. But some observers have characterized the relationship between Moscow and Tokyo over the submarine dismantlement pilot project as rocky - if not a bit secretive. Robert Karniol, Asia Editor for Jane's Defence Weekly - a long-time observer of Russia-Japan nuclear negotiations for one of the world's most respected periodicals of defense information - said that "the implementation of the [pilot] program remains unclear." "The reason it remains unclear, and that there have been disputes" said Karniol, "is that the Japanese want more oversight - they have to answer to their tax-payers." Indeed, various interviews with Japanese officials over the past few months have revealed that regulatory procedures are a true sticking point. "Just what those sticking points are, however, may never be known," said Karniol. Said Karniol: "They are dealing in sensitive areas with sensitive technologies - a certain silence would be expected." It is hoped that the Kasyanov appointment, and his non-proliferation oversight body, will defray some of these difficulties - it was, in fact, the creation of this Kremlin level position that led Tokyo to re-release its funding, Japan's Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported in January. If the Japan-Russia committee fails to meet its goals in five years, it will be disbanded, Japanese media has reported. [...] Return to Menu G. Russia-Iran 1. No Plans To Freeze Russian-Iranian Nuclear Program Russia has no plans to freeze its nuclear energy cooperation with Iran, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev said on Monday. "Iran has not violated any international agreements in this sphere so far," the minister said, commenting on statements by US authorities claiming that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. "Therefore, it is irrelevant to talk about freezing our relations with Iran in this sphere," he said. Return to Menu 2. Russia Calls For Iranian Nuclear Curbs MOSCOW -- Signaling that Moscow now shares US concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions, Russia called yesterday for tighter international controls to prevent Tehran from developing atomic weapons. Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov said that Russia wanted Iran to let the International Atomic Energy Agency closely monitor its nuclear facilities to rule out their use in a clandestine weapons program. Mamedov made it clear that Russia is not ready to do what the United States really wants, to halt its projects to build civilian nuclear reactors in Iran. But Mamedov's appeal did reflect progress on an issue that has become a major stumbling block in a Russian-US relationship already on the rocks over Moscow's opposition to the war in Iraq. The United States is convinced that Tehran is trying to develop nuclear weapons and believes that a nuclear-armed Iran would provide such weapons to Islamic terrorist groups. Russia, which signed an $800 million deal with Iran in 1995 to build a nuclear reactor in the southern port of Bushehr, has dismissed American concerns that the project would aid Tehran's nuclear weapons aspirations, citing Tehran's reassurances. US officials said it was clear after Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's meeting with President Vladimir V. Putin Wednesday that the Kremlin was taking seriously findings by the IAEA that Iran is building a weapons program. Washington expects the agency to declare next month that Tehran has secretly built a plant to enrich uranium in Natanz, a violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A discussion of Iran's nuclear program is already on the agenda for Putin's June 1 meeting with President Bush in St. Petersburg, Russia, as well as for a visit to Washington next week by the Russian defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, a senior US official told the Associated Press. Aware that Putin wants to get the Moscow-Washington relationship back on track at the summit, officials have begun saying things the Americans want to hear. ''Russia is even more concerned over nuclear proliferation than the United States,'' Mamedov said. ''These weapons can be used in acute regional conflicts alongside the Russian border, particularly in the south.'' Mamedov made it clear that Russia still did not see anything wrong in its deal to build the Bushehr plant and asserted that unidentified Western firms were helping Iran to acquire the bomb. ''There is a legend that all problems stem from Russia's peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran, used as a cover for transferring nuclear weapons technology, and we categorically deny that,'' Mamedov said. ''We are trying to attract US attention to the fact that some concerns about Iran's nuclear weapons program are related to the illegal activities of several western companies.'' US officials privately acknowledge that technology transfer is done in third-party deals involving private companies that are often set up entirely for the purpose of sending one shipment. Powell seized on the progress on Iran before departing for Bulgaria early yesterday. ''Neither the United States nor Russia would like to see a program that goes in the direction of developing a nuclear weapon in Iran,'' Powell told Echo of Moscow radio. ''We will work with the international community to persuade Iran that they should not move in this direction.'' Powell also sought to quell Russian fears that the United States might try to use force to prevent the Islamic nation from developing nuclear weapons. ''It is not a matter for the armed forces of the United States at the moment,'' he said. Return to Menu 3. Russia For Closer Control Over Iran's Nuke Program MOSCOW - Russia on Thursday gave the strongest signal yet that it shares U.S. concerns over Iran's burgeoning nuclear program and called for tighter international controls to make sure Tehran isn't developing atomic weapons. Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov said Russia would like Iran to sign an agreement with the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, introducing a close watch over all its nuclear facilities to make sure they aren't used as a cover for a nuclear weapons program. "Along with the United States, we are calling on Iran to sign the protocol," Mamedov told reporters. The statement came amid Moscow's efforts to restore friendly ties with the United States following a bitter rift over the war in Iraq. Since 1995, when Russia signed a deal with Iran to build a nuclear reactor in the southern port city of Bushehr, Moscow has shrugged off U.S. concerns that the US$800 million deal could help Tehran build an atomic bomb. "Our conscience is crystal clear," Mamedov said, denying that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran had anything to do with weapons. In turn, he accused unidentified western firms of helping Tehran acquire nuclear weapons know-how. "There is a legend that all problems stem from Russia's peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran, used as a cover for transferring nuclear weapons technology, and we categorically deny that," Mamedov said. "We are trying to attract U.S. attention to the fact that some concerns about Iran's nuclear weapons program are related to the illegal activities of several western companies." He refused to provide any details, saying U.S. and Russian intelligence and nuclear experts were closely looking at the issue, exchanging information and sharing assessments. Mamedov said Moscow still trusts Iran's assurances that its nuclear program was pursuing strictly peaceful goals. "We have no reason yet to say otherwise," he said. But, Mamedov added, "we have questions that we are putting to the Iranian side, and we hope they will be answered." The IAEA is to submit a report in June on Iran's nuclear weapons program and Washington expects the agency to declare that Iran has violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by secretly developing a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz in southern Iran. "We are going to assist the IAEA in clearing up the situation in Iran," Mamedov said. "Russia is even more concerned over nuclear proliferation than the United States. These weapons can be used in acute regional conflicts alongside the Russian border, particularly in the south." Mamedov's statement came a day after U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell held talks with President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials on rebuilding Iraq and other issues, including Iran's nuclear program. "Neither the United States nor Russia would like to see a program that goes in the direction of developing a nuclear weapon in Iran," Powell told Echo of Moscow radio in a live broadcast before leaving Moscow on Thursday. "We will work with the international community to persuade Iran that they should not move in this direction." Asked whether the United States was preparing for to move troops into Iran, Powell responded that "it is not a matter for the armed forces of the United States at the moment." Return to Menu H. Russia-India 1. Russia Ready To Build More Nuclear Reactors In India MOSCOW - Russia is willing to expand nuclear energy cooperation with India, a senior Russian Government member has revealed. "We are constructing two nuclear reactors at Koodankulam and are ready to build more," Russia's Minister for Industry, Science and Technology, Ilya Klebanov, said at the end of the 9th session of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC) on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation held here on May 15-16. "We are aware of India's ambitious program of nuclear power generation and are holding preliminary discussions on our participation." The two-day IRIGC session, co-chaired by the External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, and Mr. Klebanov, decided to try and end the stalemate in bilateral trade through joint investment projects in core and high-tech industries. The projects will be financed from rupee funds accumulated through India's repayment of old Soviet debts. Out of $10 billions of Soviet rupee debts India has been repaying to Russia under a 1993 accord, about $3 billion are still to be disbursed till 2005. So far the rupee funds have been used to finance Indian goods exports to Russia. Mr. Klebanov said the Russian side had proposed using rupee debt funds for investment in modernization and expansion of Indian steel plants built with Soviet assistance, in the Indian coal industry, transport and in high-tech telecommunications ventures. Mr. Sinha has also called for setting up a joint venture capital fund to promote commercialization of high-end technology projects developed jointly under the Integrated Long-Term Program (ILTP) of Indo-Russian cooperation in science and technology. Both co-chairmen hailed the investment plan as a road map to boost bilateral trade and economic cooperation. "Joint ventures to be set up using rupee debt funds will help end stagnation in our economic and trade relations," Mr. Sinha said, describing the plan as a "very decisive step forward." Indo-Russian trade has been fluctuating around $1.3-$1.6 billion since the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991, defying all efforts to increase it. Mr. Klebanov described the investment plan as "the main ideological thrust" of a joint protocol signed today at the end of the IRIGC session. The two sides will shortly set up a task force to draw up a list of joint investment projects and the two co-chairmen of the Inter-Governmental Commission will meet in autumn to discuss the list. Return to Menu I. Announcements 1. Transcript of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Remarks to Media on U.S.-Russian Relations (excerpted) Deputy Minister Mamedov: I would like to once again dwell briefly on the ratification of the Russian-US Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia and on some outcomes of the talks held in Moscow with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. In essence, the discussion of the Treaty in the Russian parliament had developed into a kind of referendum on just what is to be the strategic basis on which to build relations with the US. The military-technical importance of this agreement on a radical reduction in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals is thoroughly set forth in the special Foreign Ministry statement of May 14, 2003, and here I'll only remind you of one more thing, namely, the Preamble to the Treaty, which reads that the sides have decided to embark upon the path of new relations for the 21st century, based on cooperation and friendship. We consider that as a result of a very frank discussion in the State Duma the Russian parliamentarians have passed a convincing vote of confidence in the policy being pursued by President Vladimir Putin towards an equal partnership with the US. 294 deputies voted for the ratification of the SOR Treaty, 134 against. Now I'd like to touch upon the general results of the talks held with the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The media variously comments on their individual fragments. In this regard, I would like to express the general view of the professionals who took part in the talks. In our opinion, they were successful and have once again borne out that Russian-American relations, despite the serious contradictions and difficulties, as in the assessment of the military actions in Iraq, are irrevocably developing along the road of cooperation on key issues. The reception of US Secretary of State Colin Powell by Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the frank and confidential talks with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov have borne this out. It can safely be said now that the upcoming meetings of Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush first in St. Petersburg and then in Evian will, in our view, impart an appreciable new impetus to the constructive development of relations between Russia and the US and also of international relations as a whole. Our cooperation will meet the interests of reducing tension in the world and restoring strategic stability and help to solve the crisis situations that have arisen by diplomatic means on the basis of the application of the rules of law, not of armed force. Question: Georgy Enverovich, reports have appeared that Russia and the US may enter into a new agreement concerning strategic offensive potentials in development of the SOR Treaty. What is now the situation in Russian-American relations in the ABM field? Is the issue of concluding a new agreement on this problem conclusively closed or is the possibility still there? Deputy Minister Mamedov: Regarding the first question, I would like to say that our task now is not to at once begin to work out a new agreement but to come to an understanding about the most effective implementation of the SOR Treaty already signed and ratified. There is a special body for its realization - the Bilateral Commission. As soon as the ratification is completed, and this still requires the approval of the Federation Council of Russia, the President's signature and the exchange of the instruments of ratification (we hope that at one of the nearest summit meetings this exchange will take place) - the Treaty will enter into force. Whereupon the Commission will begin to work, determining the procedure for the implementation of the Treaty. There are a number of questions with regard to the implementation procedure, which deputies asked yesterday. A number of aspects remain that demand clarification. That's what we shall be dealing with. I shall permit myself to cite another, no less important document, signed by Putin and Bush in Moscow in May 2002 - the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, which states that the conclusion of the SOR Treaty is a major step in the direction of carrying out strategic offensive reductions by the sides to the lowest possible levels. That is - one more, but not the last step. I shall also mention the US Senate resolution on the ratification of the SOR Treaty, it contains a direct call upon the American administration to continue to reduce strategic offensive arms to the lowest necessary level. Let us recall that the Russian side at the negotiations had suggested the figure of 1,500; now we have settled on the 1,700-2,200 bracket. Thus, in principle both we and the American side do not regard the SOR Treaty as the last agreement, we are ready to work on a new one, but at this stage it is more important for us to achieve the most effective implementation of a specific agreement - the SOR Treaty. On the matter of our ABM dialogue I can again refer to the need to implement the Joint Declaration. It has a whole section dedicated to Russian-American cooperation in the ABM field. The two sides have now, at last, got the wish to set out these agreed-upon measures in a separate document. An ad hoc Russian-US working group on missile defense has been created. It is meeting at regular intervals. The group has come up close to the elaboration of an accord which also provides for the protection of confidential information. It would have a great significance not only for Russia and the US, so we will do our best to carry this undertaking to its logical end. [...] Question: Was the question of the number of stockpiled and destroyed warheads discussed in the course of Colin Powell's visit? Deputy Minister Mamedov: I would like to refer you to the text of the SOR Treaty. The very important Article II of the Treaty states that the START-1 Treaty remains in force. Upon unilateral withdrawal by the US from the ABM Treaty the question had also arisen of the fate of the START-1 Treaty, in which all the definitions and procedures for the reduction of strategic offensive arms are written down in detail. Now, as the SOR Treaty has confirmed, until December 2009 everything is in force that was written down in START-1 - including the counting rules and verification and reduction procedures for strategic offensive arms. What will be if START-1 is not extended until 2012? This is what we shall now discuss with the US representatives - and, by the way, are already discussing. There is already the working group for strategic offensive arms. Both sides did not want to wait until the Treaty was ratified and the implementation body began to operate. That was why the Russian-US group was created, which is meeting in parallel with the related working group on missile defense. The group incorporates the representatives of all the concerned agencies, and it is they who must discuss what number of warheads are to be stockpiled, and so on. Furthermore, we treat the US military specialists with great respect. We understand perfectly well that, like our military, for simply political aims, for the aims of propaganda they will not take chances, will not squander the money necessary for storing an excess number of warheads. When we were entering into the Treaty, we had an absolutely clear idea (from independent sources as well) how the US strategic nuclear forces will evolve and be built up to the year 2012, both with and without the Treaty. We even received certain written materials from the American side that do not bear the character of an agreement but clearly show what will be with the American strategic arms subject to reduction, including warheads, missiles, submarines, heavy bombers, and so on. It is understandable that the American side has exactly the same perception about our plans as well. It was only on the basis of such exhaustive information, predictability and transparency that that Treaty became possible. No one has ever relied "on faith" in questions of nuclear containment. Perhaps, up until now we have insufficiently clearly shown this to our public. We shall do our best to remedy this omission. Both the Russian and the US side in the course of the development and reduction of their respective strategic nuclear forces will liquidate a part of them, and will stockpile another part. This was implied by the operative START-1 Treaty and the inoperative START-2 Treaty alike, and so will it be with the SOR Treaty. [...] Question: How did Moscow react to Washington's concern over our nuclear cooperation with Iran? Deputy Minister Mamedov: We do not need to react in any way because this theme has been discussed at Russian-American negotiations for many, many years. A serious talk is going on about the threats of proliferation - and by no means about Iran only. Sometimes different emphases are being laid. But I want to stress that there is a common concern over the spread of WMDs. Maybe it is even stronger in Russia than in the United States. We have enough reason to be worried about the spread of WMDs, which may be used in regional conflicts smoldering on the perimeter of Russia's boundaries - especially in the south. The proliferation of WMDs worries the Russian and American sides alike. This applies equally to Iran and to Israel and to Pakistan with India. We have close approaches in this matter. The NPT regime and effectiveness should urgently be strengthened, we feel. The IAEA with our help is constantly concerned with this. Recently the Agency's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, was in Iran, and we are awaiting his report. The Iranian side is assuring us that its nuclear programs are all transparent and are being carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes. So far we have no actual reasons to say that this is not so. But we too have questions which we hope will be removed in the course of the inspections already in place, which the IAEA is carrying out, and under an additional protocol which the US and we are urging Iran to sign with the IAEA and which will place all the nuclear plants in Iran under IAEA control. Thus without political quarrels and, even less so, military pressure it is possible to arrive at a pragmatic solution, especially as the top leadership of Iran has solemnly declared that they are not going to create nuclear weapons, unlike some other "threshold" countries which are now saying quite the opposite, which evokes a very serious concern in us. In this case we have drawn the attention of the US to the fact that the concerns arising in connection with the nuclear program in Iran have to do precisely with the activities of a number of Western companies there. It is a legend that all the problems occur because of Russia's cooperation with Iran in building the nuclear power plant at Bushehr - under its cover military nuclear technologies are supposedly being transferred. This we categorically reject in a well-reasoned way. We have submitted to the US, including at the highest level, the necessary information on what our program consists of, what we are going to do with spent fuel at the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, and so forth. Now the IAEA is engaged in definitively clearing up the situation with nuclear programs in Iran because Iran is a member of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. For our part, we shall help the Agency in every way in order to have this issue clarified. Russia, as I already said, is no less interested in this than the United States. [...] Return to Menu 2. President Vladimir Putin's State of the Union Address (excerpted) [...] Russia seeks to and will maintain friendly, goodneighborly relations with all the countries of the world, solve common problems with them and protect common interests. The main task of the Russian foreign policy is to promote our national interests. But of course the basic principle remains compliance with the norms of international law. The events of the past year have brought another proof that in ensuring national interests one needs equally an efficient diplomacy and a reliable defense potential of Russia. In the modern world the relations among states are to a large extent determined by the existence of serious world-wide real and potential threats. Among such threats we count international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, regional and territorial conflicts and the narcotics threat. And it is extremely important that if a certain threat to the international community as a whole and to individual countries increases, a clear, transparent and generally recognized decision-making mechanism is used. Undoubtedly the most important mechanism of this kind is the United Nations and its Security Council. Yes, decisions are not adopted always easily at the Security Council, and sometimes they are not adopted at all. Sometimes the initiators of a resolution do not have enough arguments to convince other countries. Not everybody always likes UN decisions. But the international community has no other, let alone more universal, mechanism. Therefore, it must be handled with great care. Of course it is necessary to modernize international organizations and make them more efficient. Russia is open to discuss these issues. I believe such approaches toward international affairs are civilized and correct. These approaches are not directed against anyone or in favor of someone else. This is our position of principle, and we will stick to it in the future. Russia was one of the first countries that encountered the huge threat of international terrorism. As we all know, not so long ago it threatened the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. After the terrible tragedies caused by terrorist acts, an anti-terrorist coalition was created in the world with our active participation and cooperation with the United States and other countries, and it proved its high efficiency in combating the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan. Russia values the anti-terrorist community. It values it as an instrument for coordinating interstate efforts in combating this evil. Moreover, successful cooperation within the coalition on the basis of international law may provide a good example of consolidating civilized states in the fight against a common threat. I will stress again that Russia is interested in a stable and predictable world order. Only this order can ensure the global and regional stability and on the whole -- the political and economic progress. It will contribute to the struggle with poverty in the world, which is one of the major tasks. Our unconditional foreign policy priority remains strengthening the relations with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These countries are our close neighbors. We are united by many centuries of historical, cultural and economic relations. The interdependence of our development is also obvious. In addition to all else, there are tens of millions of Russians living there. And I must say it straight that we regard the CIS space as a sphere of our strategic interests. We also proceed from the assumption that for the countries of the Commonwealth Russia is an area of their national interests. Besides, our country is interested in stability and economic progress in the CIS space. I wish to stress that the uniting economic processes now at work in the CIS are linked with the integration of our countries into the world economy and are helping to implement this integration more dynamically, on conditions more advantageous for all our partners. In the process, we will be consistently deepening our cooperation within the framework of the increasingly effective Eurasian Economic Community. In addition, the events in the world confirm the correctness and timeliness of the choice we made in favor of establishing the Organization for Collective Security Treaty. In the immediate vicinity of Russia there are quite a few sources of real, not imagined threats of terrorism, transnational crime, narco intervention. Together with the OCST partners, we are obligated to safeguard the stability and security on a significant area of the former Soviet Union. One major element of our foreign policy is the broad rapprochement and real integration with Europe. Naturally, we are talking there about a complicated and long process. But this is our historical choice. It has been made and it is being consistently implemented, at this stage through more active bilateral relations, the development of strategic partnership with the European Union and active participation in the work of the Council of Europe. Together, in the interests of the Russian citizens, we have found a political compromise on the problem of transit between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of the Russian territory. It is equally obvious that our interests and the interests of Greater Europe demand new qualitative steps to meet each other. This is the interests of citizens, business, cultural and scientific communities in the European countries and in the Russian Federation. Our proposals on the prospects of the development of all European processes are known. They include free movement of citizens, the formation of a common economic space. This is not the prospect for the very near term. To achieve these goals one will have to cover a difficult and fairly long road, but the dynamic of all European processes suggests that these are absolutely realistic plans and is actively backed by many of our partners in the European Union. [...] Return to Menu 3. White House Press Briefing on Iran (excerpted) [...] Question: Scott, Russia said today, they called for a greater, more stringent IAEA control over nuclear facilities in Iran. Would that be adequate to answer the administration's concerns about the nuclear reactor at Bushehr and other Iranian nuclear facilities? Mr. McClellan: Well, IAEA is in the middle of -- they're still finishing up their report about Iran and its nuclear weapon program. And we're looking forward to seeing that report and assessing it. But the fact that Iran is pursuing -- or has a nuclear weapons program that they're pursuing is a concern to us. And it has been a concern. It's one of many concerns we have about the Iranian government. Question: The Russians didn't say that they were going to stop their cooperation with Iran. So is more stringent IAEA control adequate to address the administration's concerns about the program? Mr. McClellan: Well, I think, first, Iran has openly admitted that it is pursuing a complete nuclear fuel cycle. And we've rejected their past claims that they're doing this for peaceful purposes. They admitted that they are constructing a secret uranium enrichment plant and a heavy water plant only after it had no choice because they had been made public by an Iranian opposition group. There is no economic justification for a state rich in oil and gas like Iran to build hugely expensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. And we have made clear to the IAEA to other governments and to the public that we strongly support a rigorous IAEA examination of Iran's nuclear activities. They've been looking at this. They're supposed to bring a report forward soon, and we look forward to assessing it at that point. Question: You don't have an assessment at this point. You'll wait until the IAEA -- Mr. McClellan: We went to see the report, and we have some serious concerns about Iran's nuclear weapons program. [...] Return to Menu J. Links of Interest 1. Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. 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