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RANSAC Nuclear News, July 18, 2003 Compiled By: Billy Magnuson A. Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown
 A. Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown 1. Russia OKs Foreign Power Plants at Cities An agreement was reached Thursday between the United States and Russia on Western access to two traditionally closed Russian nuclear cities, marking another step toward shutting down Russia's last two plutonium producing reactors. The agreement signed in Moscow establishes arrangements for foreign access to the once highly secret cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk for the construction of two fossil fuel-burning power plants. The cities, part of Russian nuclear weapons complex, are among some of the most secret real estate in all of Russia. While some foreigners, with advance permission, have had access to work on joint projects, the cities remain generally off limits to anyone but those working in nuclear programs and their families. "This is one further step in what has been a long process" to get the plutonium reactors replaced, said Matthew Bunn, a researcher at Harvard University who has closely followed Russian nuclear issues. Russia, with U.S. assistance, has agreed to shut down the two plutonium production reactors located at the two cities, but not until two fossil-fuel power plants are built to replace the electricity the two reactors now produce. It still will be five to eight years before the Russian reactors will shut down and stop making plutonium. "Replacing these reactors with fossil fuel energy is critical to eliminating the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and closing these facilities," said Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. The agreement covers only access arrangements related to building the two coal-burning power plants, a sign of the political sensitivity of the access question. Access to the nuclear reactors to make safety improvements, pending their actual shutdown, still is being negotiated, officials said. Seversk, formerly known as Tomsk-7, and Zheleznogorsk, formerly Krasnoyask-26, are among ten cities that once were at the heart of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons production complex. Built in the 1940s and early 1960s, the so-called "nuclear cities" once had more than 170,000 people, both nuclear workers and their families. Those living in the closed cities once received the best of everything, but since the end of the Cold War many of the former nuclear workers have fallen on hard times. Last May, the Energy Department announced a $466 million contract for two American companies to oversee construction of the two coal-burning power plants. Most of the actual work is expected to be done by Russian companies and workers. The two reactors produce enough plutonium each week to make three nuclear warheads. They also are among the most dangerous in the world because of their design, similar to the Chernobyl reactor involved in the 1986 nuclear disaster in Ukraine. Unlike U.S. reactors, for example, they do not have concrete containment domes to hold in radiation in case of an accident or major leak. Return to Menu 2. U.S.- Russia Agree to Open Doors to Closed Russian Nuclear Cities July 17, officials from the United States and Russia signed agreements that will allow access to the traditionally closed Russian nuclear cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk to begin the important work of shutting down the last weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in operation in the former Soviet Union, the U. S. Department of Energy says in a press release. The agreement represents another major step in the U.S.-Russia Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP) initiated by U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexandr Rumyantsev. Reaching agreements on access arrangements for the former secret cities of the Russian nuclear weapons complex is an important prerequisite to begin the work of replacing the nuclear reactors with coal-fired heat and electricity plants. "Replacing these reactors with fossil fuel energy is critical to eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and closing these facilities," said Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. "Russia and the United States have enjoyed a good relationship on this program and we look forward to continued progress." At a ceremony in Vienna in March 2003, Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev signed an agreement that would reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction by stopping plutonium production at the last three Russian plutonium production reactors. As part of the agreement, the Department of Energy, working with its partners in Russia, will provide replacement fossil-fuel facilities to produce replacement energy for heat and electricity currently produced by the reactors and serving the two closed cities in Russia. In May 2003, Abraham and the Russian Ambassador to the U. S., Yuri Ushakov, announced that $466 million to two U.S. companies to begin the shutdown work. Agreeing on access arrangements ensures that the work can stay on schedule and be completed with Russian and U.S. firms working together. The three plutonium production reactors will continue to operate until the fossil-replacement plants are completed. These reactors have deficiencies in the areas of design, equipment, and materials, and are considered to be among the highest risk reactors in the world, the DOE says. To ensure reactor safety, high priority safety upgrades are being expeditiously pursued. The Department's Pacific Northwest National Lab will be responsible for necessary nuclear safety upgrades at both sites. These upgrades will not extend the life of the reactor facilities. The Access Arrangements signed today govern the provision of fossil replacement plants. Access arrangements for the nuclear safety upgrades are being negotiated separately. Return to Menu B. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Nuclear Icebreaker Arctika Equipped With Physical Protection System Against Unauthorised Entry In the beginning of June one more nuclear ice-breaker was equipped with the system against unauthorised entry, Regnum reported. The similar systems had been installed earlier at the nuclear icebreaker Sovetsky Soyuz, nuclear containership Sevmorput and nuclear storage ship Imandra. These works are carried out in accordance with the Russian Government decree from March 7, 1997, �On ratification of physical protection regulations for nuclear materials, nuclear installations and nuclear materials storage sites� and intergovernmental agreements of Russia with Norway, Sweden, Great Britain and USA. The works at the Arctika icebreaker began in December 2002. Company Escort-Centre was the general contractor, while the icebreaker�s crew adopted the standard system for the marine conditions. The system is vibration-proof and jamproof. The technical assistance was provided by the Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Agency, the UK Ministry of Trade and Industry. Nuclear ice-breaker Yamal is scheduled to obtain this system by September 10th this year. The foreign partners allocated $1.6 mln total to install the system on both nuclear icebreakers. Return to Menu 2. World Funding Pours Into Russia for Nuclear Cleanup and Sub Dismantling It may have taken more than a year to kick-start the $20-billion pledges made at the Kananaskis, Canada, Group of Eight industrialized nations conference of June 2002, but, at last, some of the international funding spigots to help Russia deal with radioactive waste from its vast arsenal of decommissioned submarines and other radioactive hazards are opening. The apparent outbreak of international non-proliferation and environmental philanthropy is comprised of five countries that over the past month have donated more than $130m toward Russia�s efforts to decommission the country�s retired and rotting non-strategic submarines, as well as for nuclear cleanup in some of Northwest Russia�s most contaminated areas. These nations also want to develop safer methods of storing spent nuclear fuel, or SNF, in both Northwest and Far East Russia, where Russia�s nuclear submarine bases are located. Nuclear experts say the upsurge of funding is due to some hard non-proliferation politicking at June�s Group of Eight, or G-8, summit in Evian, France, where France, the current G-8 president, and the United States lobbied fellow G-8 members to make good on their $20-billion pledge made at last year�s Kananaskis summit. Under this plan�known variously as the �10 plus 10 over 10� or �Global Partnership� programme�the $10 billion would be raised over the next ten years by seven of the G-8�s nations, and the United States would contribute a matching contribution of $10 billion. John Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said in a telephone interview that the nearly simultaneous funding from Norway, Britain, Japan, Canada and France was the consequence of agreements reached at the Evian summit. �It�s the result of the Evian G-8 summit,� said Wolfsthal, who was also a senior non-proliferation expert with the US Department of Energy, or DOE, during the Clinton administration. �France put forth a lot of effort, as did the United States, which is sort of the main driver of the �10 plus 10 over 10� plan, so what we are seeing now are the residuals of that.� Much of the current cash releases were facilitated by the signing of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation, or MNEPR, in May, which made possible the release of some �62m for nuclear cleanup in Russia from the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, or NDEP. The NDEP fund is held by the London-based European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, or EBRD. Due to the current spirit of G-8-driven donations, NDEP fund will climb by nearly �80m for a total of �142m earmarked specifically for nuclear cleanup projects in Russia�s Northeast. �All of this funding flows into one multilateral fund for nuclear cleanup in the Barents Sea area and in the East Coast of Russia,� Vince Novak, head of EBRD�s nuclear safety division, told Bellona Web in a telephone interview from London. �Your organisation [Bellona] has done excellent in this area.� Novak continued to say that NDEP and EBRD�thanks in part to Bellona Web publications�have �open and transparent cooperation with our colleagues at Minatom,� as the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy is called. �They fully agree that we need a master plan for dealing with spent nuclear fuel and for creating a basis for favourable programmes,� Novak said. �The whole point is to solve the problem as soon as possible.� Novak said he expected a meeting of NDEP�s contributing nations to take place in �late September or October,� after which those projects that are not already underway will begin. Aside from NDEP�s original contributors�Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden�France, the United Kingdom and Canada will also be present at the contributors� meeting. �We also expect other countries to join [NDEP] by then,� Novak said. What This Funding Will Cover Of the 191 laid-up nuclear submarines in Russia, 115 are located at the Northern Fleet bases. Of those, around 70 still have spent fuel on board, and approximately only 40 have been fully dismantled. SNF from more than 100 reactors is in storage at onshore bases and nuclear service ships, with some 130 reactor cores still on board retired submarines. Norway�the first country to get the dismantlement projects off the ground�signed off on a �10m project on June 27th to dismantle two Victor III class submarines from the Northern Fleet. On June 30th, Britain pledged $56m and France pledged $40m to help Russia scrap retired submarines that sit rusting afloat, Russia�s Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Sergei Antipov told reporters this week. Subsequently, on June 29th, Japan inked an additional and long-promised deal with Russia to dismantle one Victor III class submarine in what one Tokyo official estimated to be a $5m to $8m �pilot project� to gauge costs of dismantling more of the remaining 40 non-strategic submarines the Russian Pacific Fleet has retired. Of those 40 barely floating vessels, 36 still have spent nuclear fuel in their reactors, posing a high risk of radioactive contamination. And on July 15th, Novak said, Canada announced it would contribute another $21.3m to the NDEP fund. Combined, the contributions will result in the dismantlement of at least five non-strategic submarines that could not be covered by the US Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, programme of 1992, which is congressionally limited to destroying only ballistic missile submarines that once targeted the US. This funding will also help tackle the 248 reactor cores that are stored at Northern Fleet bases and which are equivalent to 99 tonnes of uranium in SNF. What Norway Will Do Norway, a non-G-8 country, was the first to sign a post-Kananaskis non-strategic sub dismantlement contract with the Russians. But it was a shaky start. The contract to destroy two Victor III class attack submarines was initially scheduled for signing between Russia�s Antipov and Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Traavik on June 12th. But the Norwegians balked at the signing once they discovered that Minatom expected Norway to pay for reprocessing the submarines� spent nuclear fuel. A 2002 policy adopted by the Norwegian Parliament�of which Antipov would have been expected to know�forbids that nuclear dismantlement funding from Norway pay for any reprocessing activities. The contract was sent back to Moscow for rewrites. Antipov was cited by the Minatom-sponsored website Nuclear.ru as being taken by surprise when presented�on the very day the contract was to be signed�with Norway�s negative position on the SNF reprocessing issue. Antipov said that the contract�which had been in preparation since the beginning of this year�had come at Norway�s initiative. After the events of June 12th, Antipov said, �both sides had reached a mutual understanding and signed the document.� According to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian side accepted that none of Oslo�s funds would go toward reprocessing. �In Norway�s view, the Russians are responsible for dealing with the spent uranium fuel,� said Traavik in a statement released to Bellona Web. �There is no question of our paying to reprocess it.� He added that he was �very pleased that the final pieces needed to achieve an agreement have now fallen into place. There is an urgent need to begin dismantling these submarines�many of them are in a grave state of disrepair.� He said that the dismantlement work began as soon as the contracts were signed and that the two Victor III class subs will be destroyed within the year. The new contract, much as the old one, stipulates that Norway will transfer the �10m to the Nerpa shipyard in the Murmansk region and to the Zvyozdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk in the Arkhangelsk region, both in Russia�s Northwest, said Kara Eltervag, a spokesman for the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in a telephone interview. But unlike the old agreement, the new one will only cover removing the spent nuclear fuel, dismantling the subs and shipping the fuel to a point of safe storage, both Norway and Minatom confirmed. At the same time, Norway will also increase its support for cleaning up two Russian naval bases�one at Andreyeva Bay, in the western part of the Kola Peninsula, and Gremikha, on the peninsula�s eastern edge. Eltervag could not elaborate on how Norway and Russia had managed to circumnavigate the reprocessing issue�something even US government submarine dismantlement contracts have failed to do�and Norwegian Foreign Ministry officials responsible for negotiating the new contract were on vacation and unavailable for comment. What remains in question, then, is where the fuel will be stored and whether the Russians will reprocess it�a question that will be decided by Minatom, none of whose responsible officials were available for comment this week. The fuel�s most likely destination is, at least temporarily, a storage facility at the Mayak Chemical Combine, which reprocesses�among other types of fuel�spent submarine fuel, and is the most radioactively contaminated place on earth. Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel leads to the creation of more reactor-grade plutonium, which can be enriched to weapons-grade plutonium and used in nuclear bombs. �Reprocessing is effectively a criminal act,� said Vladimir Kuznetsov, an ex-nuclear regulator in Russia who now heads up the nuclear and radiation safety division of Russia�s Green Cross environmental organisation. �All the spent nuclear fuel must be buried in proper storage facilities that must be located near where the subs are located now.� Japan�s �Pilot� Project on Sub Dismantlement According to the highly placed government official in Tokyo, Japan will not be paying for reprocessing the fuel it extracts from the Victor III class submarine it will be destroying as part of its pilot project. Norway does not reprocess nuclear fuel from its two small research reactors�one of which is used for medicinal study�electing instead to bury its SNF in adherence to the �open fuel cycle� philosophy, which prohibits the recycling of radioactive waste for plutonium. Japan, on the other hand, supports the �closed fuel cycle.� But in the case of its dismantlement project in Russia, Japan said it will depart from its reprocessing policy. �We will not be paying for the reprocessing of any spent nuclear fuel in this project,� said the Japanese government official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. The official said the contract for dismantling the sub is expected to be fulfilled within 18 months. A spokesman for Minatom confirmed this. Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi visited the Russian Far East on June 28th and 29th for the ceremonial signing of the contract for the project, which is dubbed �Star of Hope.� �Russian submarines taken out of service in the Sea of Japan, where the Pacific Fleet is located, represent a risk of environmental contamination and a security threat,� Kawaguchi said, according to Agence France Presse. �That is why this project to dismantle the submarines must be carried out conscientiously.� According to the high-ranking Japanese official, the pilot project has been estimated to cost �between $5m and $8m.� But although he said the government has a more concrete figure in its budget for the project, he would not be more specific. Japan has been deeply involved in Russian nuclear cleanup and disarmament projects. In 1993 Japan established the joint Japan-Russia Committee on Cooperation to Assist the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Russian Federation, and pledged $200m to help Russia decontaminate its Soviet nuclear legacy. Part of that $200m went to the construction of the Landysh, an enormous $36m liquid radioactive waste treatment barge anchored at the Zvezda decommissioning point near Vladivostok. Since its commissioning in 2001, it has processed 800 tonnes of irradiated liquid waste from submarines, according to experts at the Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, California. Russia and Japan have had their fallings-out, however, and last spring, Japan suspended funding for nuclear remediation projects in Russia�s Far East over bureaucratic sluggishness and confusion in Moscow. But the Japanese committee reopened its funding gates after a January summit between Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizuimi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. �Since the G-8�s announcement, everyone is trying to implement projects with Russia, and not just with submarines,� the Japanese government official said. �We are taking the same approach�we are willing to work on various projects with Russia.� Among projects that Japanese officials have long considered is investing in the rehabilitation of a branch segment of Russia's impoverished Far East railroads, which are responsible for shipping spent nuclear fuel to Mayak in the Ural Mountains. Others may include building safer temporary land-based storage facilities, as well as further submarine dismantlement, Japanese officials have said. They have stressed, however, that the Japan-Russia Committee�s remaining $145 have not yet been allocated to any particular projects. Tokyo invited Russia to avail itself of the remaining money. Britain Pledges $56M for Sub Cleanup and Joins AMEC Perhaps the widest-ranging environmental funding announcement came from Great Britain, on June 27th. Britain is not only contributing $36m to dismantle the Northern Fleet�s two remaining retired Oscar I class cruise missile submarines, but also to pay for improved and safer storage facilities for tonnes of SNF in the Arkhangelsk region. Some of the funding will also be channelled into cleaning up the notorious Andreyeva Bay, where SNF and other radioactive waste from submarines lay in an open dump. �Tackling weapons of mass destruction proliferation is one of this government�s highest priorities,� Britain�s Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said of the new commitments�which were finalised during Russian President Putin�s state visit to Britain earlier this month�in a statement to Bellona Web. �Our cooperation with Russia on dealing with its nuclear legacy is a crucial part of this.� As in the contracts with Norway and Japan, Britain stipulated that Russia bear itself any reprocessing costs associated with the submarines� dismantlement, said Jane Stevens, a spokeswoman for the British Foreign Office in a telephone interview with Bellona Web. The submarines will be dismantled at Severodvinsk�s Sevmash shipyard, she said. Britain also donated $16m to NDEP, Trish O�Donnell, also of the British Foreign Office, said in a statement provided to Bellona Web. Britain�s financial outlay comes as part of its commitment to the G-8 Global Partnership programme, both Minatom�s Antipov and the British Foreign Office�s O�Donnell said. Britain has also joined the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation, or AMEC, programme, which addresses military-related environmental concerns in Russia�s Arctic region. AMEC�s current members are Russia, Norway and the United States, and its key focus since its inception in 1996 has been to develop nuclear waste storage technologies to improve the overburdened process of storing the tonnes of solid radioactive waste produced by dismantling submarines in Russia�s Northern Fleet. �Our entry into AMEC will provide significant cooperation and opportunities for the [British] Ministry of Defence-sponsored naval cooperation [with Russia] and will enable further projects providing practical assistance to address the nuclear legacy of the Cold War,� O�Donnell said in her statement to Bellona Web. The new agreements also come at a propitious time for the debt-ridden, state-owned nuclear giant British Nuclear Fuels, or BNFL, which runs Britain�s nuclear cleanup operations as well as reprocesses nuclear fuel. Last week, British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Patricia Hewitt abandoned plans to partially privatise BNFL on the grounds of its poor management and mounting billion-dollar debts caused by reprocessing problems. In response, BNFL�s chairman Hugh Collum said the company would seek more involvement in the nuclear cleanup sector. �Dismantling nuclear submarines and making safe spent nuclear fuel are among Russia�s highest priorities in dealing with the legacy of the Cold War. This is difficult, complicated work, in which the UK can offer real experience,� Hewitt said in a statement to Bellona Web. �Not only does this project offer proliferation and environmental benefits,� she added, �but it also presents future business opportunities for UK companies with nuclear cleanup experience.� France and Canada France�s donation of $40m to the NDEP account at EBRD is earmarked exclusively for Northwest Russia�s nuclear cleanup projects. But Bernard Soyer, advisor on nuclear issues at the French Embassy in Moscow, reached this week by telephone, said he would not comment on how France would dictate that the money be spent�be it on submarine decommissioning or SNF cleanup and storage. �All the funding is intended for nuclear projects in Russia�s Northwest,� he told Bellona Web through an interpreter, �but that is all I can say.� EBRD�s Novak said that Canada�s formal drafting of its $21.7m donation to the NDEP fund was still in the works, but expected by week�s end. Novak said that Canada, too, has not earmarked any of its contribution for specific projects, and that the new donations will be channelled at the September or October meeting of the contributors. Because of all this funding activity, said Novak, �we will now see other bilateral [nuclear cleanup] agreements and more G-8 agreements to rid Russia of its nuclear contamination.� Return to Menu C. Strategic Arms Reduction 1. No Need For New Russian-US Nuclear Arms Cut Treaties, Says US Envoy Alexander Vershbow, the US ambassador to Russia, believes that in the light of their new relations, Russia and the United States do not require any additional treaties to reduce their nuclear arsenals to the lowest level needed to ensure their national security. Asked by Interfax whether the Russian-US Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) is final and whether there may be new treaties envisioning larger nuclear arms cuts, Vershbow said: "I do not know whether it is the last treaty on strategic arms reductions. Maybe [it is] the last one we need, because our relationship is evolving from being adversaries to being allies, and it may become less necessary to regulate our relationships through treaties of this kind." "We do not have nuclear arms treaties with the UK or France," the ambassador noted. He recalled that the SORT treaty is intended for ten years. "I think one should be very optimistic about where Russian-US relations would be by the end of this decade," he said. "But I think with or without treaties, we will continue to share a common interest in reducing nuclear weapons to the lowest possible level consistent with our security, our security interests," Vershbow added. Russian and US Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush signed the SORT treaty in Moscow on 24 May 2002. The document requires that the two countries reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,000 by 31 December 2012. [Passage omitted.] The SORT treaty was ratified by the US Senate in early March 2003 and the Russian State Duma on 14 May. Putin and Bush exchanged instruments of ratification in St Petersburg on 1 June. Return to Menu D. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. A Group of Men-of-War of the French Navy Leaves Russian Northern Fleet Base A group of men-of-war of the French Navy has left the base of the Russian Northern Fleet in Severomorsk and headed towards the exit from the Kola Bay. Captain first rank Igor Dygalo, assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, said this to reporters. Frigate Latouche-Treville and the nuclear multi-purpose submarine Casabianca took part in the Russian-French naval exercises which were going on in the Norwegian Sea from July 7 to 11," Dygalo reminded the reporters. According to him, during these exercises the ships practised joint manoeuvring, ways of communication and co-operation in solving different problems at sea. After the completion of the manoeuvres on July 11, the group of French fighting ships entered the port of Severomorsk where the results of the exercises were summed up. The French sailors saw the sights of Severomorsk and Murmansk and took part in the competitions with the sailors of the large anti-submarine ship Severomorsk. The French and Russian sailors visited each others' ships. Return to Menu 2. Russian navy captain disputes paper's claim that nuclear subs stopped for 1 year Russian nuclear submarines have never stopped patrolling the world ocean, an aide to the Navy commander-in-chief, Captain 1st rank Igor Dygalo said, following a Washington Post publication. The newspaper quoted the U.S. Navy intelligence service as saying that Russian nuclear submarines will resume their duty in 2003 after a one-year break but the number of their trips in the open seas remains insignificantly small. "In reality, the Navy has stepped up its activities this year because we have received sufficient funding for combat training," Dygalo explained on Wednesday. He recalled the joint tactical exercise of the Baltic and Northern fleets in the Baltic Sea at the end of June, and a joint Russian-Indian naval exercise, and spoke of the upcoming large-scale manoeuvres in the far East on August 27, which will involve Pacific Fleet ships. For the first time, invitations to the exercise have been sent to the U.S., Canadian, Chinese and other navies in the region to attend not as observers but as participants, the officer said. Return to Menu E. Missile Defense 1. US Ambassador Urges Russia to Sign Missile Defence Agreement U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow has suggested that Russia and the United States might sign an intergovernmental agreement on missile defense. "I do think it is possible that we could develop a very different kind of agreement between our governments that would be a framework for collaboration in the area of missile defense," Vershbow said in a Wednesday interview. The ambassador believes that "this could take the form of some kind of agreement on military-technical cooperation". "That could be a way of facilitating cooperation between the American and Russian defense industries on specific missile defense projects," he said. Vershbow recalled that during a meeting in St. Petersburg on June 1, Russian and U.S. Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush adopted a joint statement, in which they noted that "we had made some progress on identifying some of these areas of missile defense". "There will be working-level meetings during this summer on this subject, and we hope there will be additional progress that the presidents can discuss when they meet at Camp David," the ambassador said. At the same time, Vershbow said: "I do not think that a treaty of the type of 1972 is likely." The United States unilaterally pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) on June 13, 2002 to be able to start building a national missile defense system. The 1972 ABM Treaty allowed the parties to deploy strategic missile defense systems only in one area (around Moscow in Russia and the Grand Forks intercontinental ballistic missile base in the United States). Return to Menu F. Nuclear Terrorism 1. Nuclear Terrorism Poses the Gravest Threat Today What is the gravest threat to the lives and liberties of Europeans and Americans today? Europeans and Americans differ profoundly in their answers to this fundamental question. Recent conversations with 100 security experts at NATO in Brussels and in Berlin, London and Athens underscored for me just how profoundly. The American security community is unanimous. Democrats as well as Republicans agree with the Bush administration that the gravest threat to civilization as we know it is the marriage of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The specter is not just 9/11, but a nuclear 9/11. Europeans disagree. Many express a mixture of skepticism and bemusement with what they imagine is a peculiar Bush fixation. Even as good a friend of America as Czech President Vaclav Klaus summarized his own view of the matter in what he called "a fundamental question: Was 9/11 an isolated act, or typical of phenomena the world will face in the first half of the 21st century?" Beneath the headlines, deeper trendlines point to the latter. The relentless diffusion of deadly technologies allows progressively smaller groups to wreak increasingly greater destruction. Globalization has enhanced terrorists' ability to travel, communicate, and transport weapons. America's overwhelming dominance on all conventional battlefields drives rational adversaries to asymmetric responses like WMD terrorism. In 1993, an al Qaeda-linked terrorist, Ramzi Yousef, tried to collapse the World Trade Center by exploding a truck filled with fertilizer-based explosives. Had that same truck carried an elementary nuclear weapon, the blast would have vaporized not just the World Trade Center, but also the entire New York financial district. Two miles from ground zero, only the shells of buildings would remain. Imagine an equivalent explosion in Paris at the Eiffel Tower -- a terrorist target, as demonstrated by the 1994 attempt to crash an airliner into it. The result would be absolute devastation out to the Arc de Triomphe, with substantial destruction out to and encompassing the Louvre. How likely is such an event? No one knows. But if we followed the methodology of Sherlock Holmes in analyzing crime, we would examine "MMO": motive, means and opportunity. Before 9/11, experts debated motive. Conventional wisdom concluded that terrorists sought not to maximize victims, but rather publicity that could engender sympathy for their cause. Post 9/11, bin Laden's spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, announced that al Qaeda had "the right to kill four million Americans, including one million children," in response to casualties perceived to have been inflicted on Muslims. If motivated, could terrorists acquire the means for a nuclear attack? Because of the vastness of its arsenal and stockpile of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, Russia remains the most probable source of a nuclear weapon or material from which one could be made. Despite a decade of significant improvement, many of these weapons remain vulnerable to theft by a serious organized effort. Pakistan is next on the list, given close historical links between elements in its security services and al Qaeda. Next comes North Korea, the world's most promiscuous proliferator. Were al Qaeda terrorists to acquire a nuclear device, could they successfully seize an opportunity to bring it to Paris, London, Berlin or Rome? As a colleague of mine has noted, they could always wrap it in a bale of marijuana. Reviewing this evidence, the world's most successful investor, Warren Buffett, has concluded: "It will happen. It's inevitable." September 11 awakened Americans to existential vulnerability. The Bush administration has led the American security community to one profound conclusion: The status quo is fatally flawed. The U.N.-chartered, rule-based international security order that was accepted pre-9/11 leaves America or Europe vulnerable to a series of nuclear 9/11s. Such conditions are incompatible with our survival as free nations whose fundamental institutions and values are intact. The assault on the World Trade Center shocked Americans into recognizing that the leading nations were essentially standing by and letting this happen. In an Afghan sanctuary, behind the accepted shield of sovereign immunity, al Qaeda trained thousands of terrorists for attacks like 9/11. The West's perceived helplessness emboldened groups like al Qaeda. In Osama bin Laden's apt metaphor, the West had become the "weak horse" that could be defied with impunity. What President Bush surely has right is the conviction that the U.S. and other civilized nations can no longer allow the presumption of sovereign immunity to permit developments inconsistent with our common survival. In a process of fits and starts the Bush administration is seeking to invent a new "new" world order. Confronting both Iran and North Korea's aspirations for nuclear arsenals, the administration has been enlisting European Union support to just say no. What the Bush administration has not yet fashioned is a coherent strategy for combating WMD terrorism. Such a strategy will have to be multi-layered, from detection at borders to denial of weapons and materials; all-azimuth, from space to container cargo on ships; and root-and-branch, addressing motivations as well as means. For Europeans committed to partnership with the United States, this unprecedented threat presents a grand opportunity. Europeans should not simply enlist in the American-led campaign. Rather, they should marshal their own intelligence and strategic sense to design and create an international order in which such catastrophic threats can be prevented. Return to Menu G. Radiological Dispersal Devices 1. IAEA to Assist Georgia in Revealing Radioactive Sources in Mountains The delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which arrived in Tbilisi on July 16, is holding talks with the representatives of the Radioactive Safety Service of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Georgia. It is anticipated that the sides will sign an agreement, implying funding of one of the projects, due to which Georgia will be able to reveal radioactive sources in mountainous regions of Georgia. The project is supposed to be implemented in the Pankisi gorge as well, however the Radioactive Safety Service does not comment on this issue so far. The members of the delegation will also discuss the issue of supplying the Oncology Hospital in Tbilisi with special equipment to help irradiated people undergo treatment. Return to Menu H. U.S.-Russia 1. US Ambassador To Russia: Axis of Evil is Iran and North Korea There are only two countries of the axis of evil left in the world; they are Iran and North Korea. Iraq is gradually moving "from dictatorship to a democratic regime." The opinion was voiced at a Thursday press conference in Vladivostok by US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow. "North Korea now presents the biggest threat to peace and stability in the world," he announced. The USA hopes to solve the North Korean problem in a peaceful way and is ready for multilateral talks, the ambassador emphasized. Washington hopes that Russia will assist in persuading Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons and return to fulfillment of international agreements, the diplomat pointed out. Touching upon Iran, Vershbow said that the USA was anxious about Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. "Iran supports international terrorism, hinders establishment of peace in the Middle East and violates the rights of its citizens," the ambassador stated. Alexander Vershbow arrived in Vladivostok from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, where he had attended the 8th business meeting of the Russian-American Pacific Partnership. Return to Menu I. Russia-Iran 1. Diplomat: Iran should be given time to think about nuclear protocols A senior Russian diplomat warned Thursday against putting pressure on Iran to sign an additional protocol allowing for closer inspections of its nuclear facilities, but added that Moscow continued to urge Tehran to take the step. "I don't want to make a prediction, but we continue to actively call on Iran to join this protocol," Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said, according to the Interfax news agency. But he warned, "Iran should be given time to think and make a decision." Russia has repeatedly said that by signing the additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran could eliminate international concerns that it is trying to develop a nuclear program. Iran insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful means only and that it respects its commitments under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Meanwhile, Losyukov said that he expected Russia to sign an agreement with Iran soon that would allow shipment of uranium to an Iranian nuclear power plant. The agreement covers the return of the spent fuel to Russia for reprocessing and disposal, a mandatory Kremlin demand before the shipments will begin, according to Russian officials. "I have no doubt that such an agreement will be signed in the near future," Losyukov was quoted by Interfax as saying. On Wednesday, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev suggested the agreement could be signed by the end of July, the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. Plutonium for use in nuclear weapons can be derived from spent fuel rods, and the Russian demand is aimed at assuring other countries that Iran would not be able to obtain fissile material for weapons. Russia is helping Iran construct a 1,000-megawatt, light-water reactor nuclear plant in the southern port city of Bushehr, in a US$800 million deal that has been a major irritant in relations between Moscow and Washington. Return to Menu 2. Iran's Envoy Calls Talks With Russians As "Positive, Constructive" Visiting Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Gholam-Ali Khoshrou said here on Friday that he had had "positive and constructive" talks with Russian officials, and stressed the need for Tehran and Moscow to promote cooperation in resolving regional and international issues. Khoshrou, talking to IRNA before leaving Moscow for Tehran, said the cooperation of Iran and Russia in Bushehr Power Plant is important and transparent, stressing that Tehran welcomes the expansion of Iran-Russia nuclear relations. He said that Iran is ready to cooperate with Russia in fighting terrorism, adding that he had discussed the ways for the two countries to have a more active role in fighting terrorism in his meetings with Russian officials. Khoshrou said Russia is considering to present a draft resolution to the United Nations for fighting drugs in Afghanistan, adding that Moscow had agreed to coordinate its positions with Tehran in that area when presenting the draft to the UN. Elsewhere in his remarks, the Iranian deputy foreign minister said Iran's position toward the issue of signing an additional protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is positive. Khoshrou said Iran had always advocated an unbiased treatment of its nuclear programs by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stressing that Tehran is ready to cooperate with the Agency in line with its commitments. "Iran has always been against production of nuclear weapons and is pursuing no program in that connection," Khoshrou said. "We only want to use the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," he added. The Iranian official further said that Iran-Russia common stances on international affairs have had an influential and constructive impact on expansion of bilateral relations and cooperation in other fields as well. Khoshrou arrived in Moscow on Monday for talks with Russian officials on issues of mutual concern, most notably on mutual cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. Return to Menu 3. Asset or Liability? Of late, mounting international concern over Iran's nuclear efforts has once again made Russia the center of attention. More than a decade after its inception, the strategic dialogue between Moscow and Tehran has blossomed into a major partnership. Militarily, Russia has become Iran's main international ally, principally responsible for its rapid rearmament and regional re-emergence. Ideologically, the two countries have drawn closer on an array of geopolitical issues -- ranging from opposition to U.S. influence in the Middle East to security in Central Asia -- under the guidance of the political leadership in both Moscow and Tehran. This status quo, however, may not hold for much longer. Growing evidence suggests that Iran is emerging as a serious threat to Russian security. Take nuclear cooperation. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has launched a major effort to assist Iran's nuclear aspirations, most prominently through the construction of a massive $800 million light-water reactor at Bushehr. Although both countries publicly deny that this cooperation is intended for anything other than civilian energy development, international worries abound that Moscow's assistance has been a boon to Iran's military capabilities. And amid mounting pressure for Iran to submit to more intensive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, work on Bushehr -- which Western officials worry could provide Iran with substantial weapons-grade nuclear material -- is now nearing completion. Though domestically touted as a major success, this partnership could have ominous consequences for Russia. According to a recent report by the respected Moscow-based PIR Center, Tehran's aggressive pursuit of an offensive atomic capability, coupled with its advances in ballistic missile development, could allow it to field a nuclear-capable rocket by 2006 -- far sooner than previously expected. With that kind of a capability -- the policy center predicts -- Iran would be able to threaten some 20 million people in the south of Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Even without nuclear weapons, Iran is likely to pose a long-term strategic challenge. Fears of Iranian meddling in the Caucasus were among the Kremlin's principal rationales for cooperation at the start of the strategic partnership. Moscow, worried about the destabilizing potential of an Iranian presence in places like Chechnya and Dagestan, moved quickly to secure Tehran's good behavior in exchange for arms and nuclear assistance. That gamble has paid off: Iran has consistently steered clear of the Chechen conflict, despite repeated calls from regime hardliners to assist co-religionists in Central Asia. Still, Tehran may not stay on the sidelines indefinitely. At some point, Iran's mullahs might not be able to resist playing the Chechnya card, particularly if they feel threatened by Russia's strides toward Europe or the United States. A shift toward support for Central Asian terrorism could also become a distinct possibility if Iran perceives the Kremlin to be scaling back its nuclear assistance as a result of pressure from the international community. With this kind of leverage, and plagued by ongoing unrest in Chechnya, Moscow might one day find itself no longer in the driver's seat of the relationship between the two countries. A growing rift over the demarcation of the resource-rich Caspian Sea, meanwhile, hints at the potential for a major confrontation. Russia's efforts to establish a regional consensus on the Caspian Sea's delineation have increasingly pitted Iran against a trilateral Russia-Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan bloc, prompting Tehran to expand its regional military presence and assume a belligerent posture toward ongoing energy projects. In response, Moscow held massive military exercises in the Caspian Sea last summer, and Astana has since aggressively pursued the establishment of its own navy. If Russia and Iran are overtly seeking a diplomatic solution, covertly both are preparing for the possibility that negotiations may fail. Small wonder, then, that the Russian consensus regarding cooperation has begun to crumble. In response to Iran's expanding WMD capabilities and its mounting international ambitions, a domestic chorus of concern is beginning to emerge. Prominent policymakers like former secretary of the Security Council Andrei Kokoshin and Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the State Duma defense committee, now worry publicly about the Iranian threat. Nevertheless, a Russian-Iranian divorce may still be far off. Shrugging off domestic and international worries, President Vladimir Putin has recently made clear that he has no plans to abandon cooperation with the Islamic Republic. What is increasingly undeniable, however, is that the Moscow-Tehran partnership has become a perilous enterprise. Blinded by the benefits of alliance, the Kremlin has ignored the growing threat posed by Iran. The competing interests of the two countries, coupled with Iran's nuclear advances, meanwhile suggest that strategic ties could fall by the wayside in the not-too-distant future. If that happens, Moscow is likely to find its substantial military and political investment in Tehran to be a distinct liability, rather than an asset. Return to Menu 4. Minister Rumyantsev: The INF Return Supplement to Agreement With Iran is to be Signed Shortly July 16 speaking at the press-conference Minister of RF for Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev said that the supplement to the agreement with Iran concerning the return of irradiated nuclear fuel would be signed shortly. According to the Minister, last week the positive statement on the environmental impact assessment was submitted for the Minister�s of Natural Resources approval, however, the document has not been received in Minatom yet. �As soon as we receive the signed order, we immediately approach the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of Russia to invite the Iranian ambassador for exchange of diplomatic notes�, Rumyantsev said explaining that such exchange of notes, according to the existing procedure, would mean that the agreement comes into force. The Minister stressed that there are �no any political implications� in the situation with the signing of the INF return supplement. �It is a routine work and shortly the agreement will be signed�, he said. He also informed that after the supplement on INF return is signed, the corresponding alterations must be introduced to the existing contract since it provides for supplies of fresh fuel only. �We must make a linkage: fresh fuel supply and subsequent return of INF�, noted the Minister adding that it is a rather lengthy process because it is necessary to agree on prices for 8 or even 11 years from now on. Meanwhile, it is unclear so far what scheme is to be employed, for the situation is unprecedented. According to the Minister, Iran states that since INF is its property it intends to sell it to Russia, however, all countries where Russia supplies fresh fuel to pay extra for its handling when it is returned. Rumyantsev believes that such position of Iran is fair because in fact INF will be its property. �Therefore, in the contract we must reflect this �addition� to the fresh fuel price�, he said adding that at present the Russia-Iran negotiations has entered the stage of discussion of commercial issues. Return to Menu 5. Minister Says Nuclear Deal With Iran Could Be Signed This Month Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said Wednesday that an agreement with Tehran that would allow shipment of uranium to an Iranian nuclear power plant could be signed by the end of July, a news agency reported. Rumyantsev said that ecological experts had completed their examination of an agreement about the return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia from the Bushehr plant, removing the last barrier to the delivery of nuclear fuel to Iran. "For a long time the Iranian side has had no objections to the signing," the ITAR-Tass news agency quoted Rumyantsev as saying. Russian officials have said that fuel delivery to Bushehr depends on Iranian guarantees to ship all spent fuel back to Russia for reprocessing and disposal. Plutonium for use in nuclear weapons can be derived from spent fuel rods, and the Russian demand is aimed at assuring other countries that Iran would not be able to obtain fissile material for weapons. Russia is helping Iran construct a 1,000-megawatt, light-water reactor nuclear plant in the southern port city of Bushehr, in a US$800 million deal that has been a major irritant in relations between Moscow and Washington. Iran insists the plant is solely for generating electricity, but the United States has expressed fears the project could help Ira develop nuclear weapons. Return to Menu J. Russia-North Korea 1. Atomic Minister Concerned About N. Korean Nuclear Program The Russian Atomic Ministry does not have objective evidence of North Korea having enough weapons grade plutonium to create nuclear weapons, Russian Atomic Minister Alexander Rumyantsev declared at a news conference in Moscow today commenting on information of some mass media sources that North Korea has enough material to create 6 nuclear bombs. However, he admitted that such statements should be taken very seriously. The minister stressed that North Korean activities aimed at creating nuclear weapons contradicted all international agreements and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Return to Menu 2. Russia Expert Says North Korea Can Produce Plutonium Only in Small Quantities North Korea can produce plutonium from available 8,000 irradiated nuclear rods "only experimentally and in small quantities". This opinion was expressed on Monday in an interview with Tass by vice-president of the Russian research centre Kurchatovsky Institute Nikolai Ponamarev-Stepnoy, commenting on information from an American spy satellite (circulated by the press of various countries) on alleged discharges of krypton-85 gas in the area of the Korean Peninsula. "This gas could get into the atmosphere from Russian Far Eastern regions, conducting work with worked-out rods of nuclear power plants," the academician claimed. According to the vice-president, laboratories, available to North Korean nuclear physicists, can only hold experiments with radiated rods". "Industrial production of plutonium to manufacture nuclear charges is virtually impossible under such conditions," he noted. The Russian researcher claimed that "it is now impossible to estimate real volumes of work on plutonium production in North Korea, since North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and does not permit IAEA inspectors to work at its nuclear facilities". Ponamarev-Stepnoy said that the Kurchatov Institute "had no scientific contacts with North Korean physicists for over a decade". Return to Menu K. Spent Fuel Imports 1. RF Government Adopted Procedures for IFA Importation July 11 Russia�s Chair of the Government Mikhail Kasiyanov signed the ordinance # 418 �On Importation to the Russian Federation the Irradiated Fuel Assemblies (IFA) of Nuclear Reactors�, reportedly by the Government information office. The document states that INF importation and reprocessing under the contracts signed before entering into force of this ordinance should be executed in accordance with the procedures which were in force at the moment of signing. Besides, it cancels the RF Government�s ordinances of July 29, 1995 and July 10, 1998 which determine the procedure for receipt for further reprocessing at the Russian enterprises the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from foreign nuclear power plants (NPP) and return of radioactive waste and materials resulted from its reprocessing. The Ordinance has been developed in accordance with the federal laws �On Environmental Protection�, �On Special Environmental Programs for Rehabilitation of Radiation Contaminated Territories� and �On the Use of Atomic Energy�, and establishes the procedure for importation to the RF of IFA and for return of these INF or products resulted from their reprocessing (including radioactive waste) to the supplier-state proceeding from the basic principles determined by para 4, Article 48 of the Federal Law �On the Environmental Protection�. The Ordinance states that the IFA importation contracts should be concluded for: temporary technological storage of the irradiated fuel assemblies followed by binding return to the supplier-state or technological storage of irradiated assemblies followed by reprocessing. The SNF importation, as well as exportation from the RF of previously imported irradiated fuel assemblies, should be done basing on the international agreements and external trade contracts signed by the authorized entities. The IFA importation is executed provided there is a positive statement of the State Environmental Expertise and in accordance with a unified project developed by the authorized entities and concurred with Minatom of Russia, the Ministry of Natural Resources, as well as provided the authorized entities have the relevant licenses issued by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and Gosatomnadzor of Russia. The unified projects positively reviewed by the State Environmental Expertise are submitted to the special commission on the issues of importation to the territory of the Russian Federation of foreign-made irradiated fuel assemblies. The Ordinance also states that the liability for losses and damages resulted from a radiation impact during IFA importation or return of the assemblies of reprocessing products to the supplier-state is determined in accordance with the Russian legislation and international agreements. The IFA importation is done on the basis of quotas to be annually determined by the Government basing on Minatom�s proposals. A INF importation contract must contain obligations and guarantees of the supplier-state as regards the receipt of IFA exported from the Russian Federation territory when the period of temporary technological storage ends. The period is to be established during contracting and must not exceed the technically feasible period of time proceeding from features and condition of fuel assemblies and their storage way and conditions. A foreign-made irradiated fuel assemblies� importation contract should provide for conditions of subsequent return of radwaste to the supplier-state if the RF international agreements provide for otherwise. In addition, the supplier-state may be rendered with reprocessing product management services is this corresponds with nuclear weapons non-proliferation principles that is especially provided for in the relevant RF international agreements. The amount of reprocessing products subject to return is determined by the methodologies agreed upon by the sides proceeding from the condition of equivalency of activity of previously imported IFA for reprocessing and the activity of reprocessing products being returned considering the natural decay of radionuclides during temporary technological storage of assemblies and reprocessing products, as well as during the IFA reprocessing. Minatom of Russia must inform the special commission on the issues of IFA importation (for development of the Annual Status Report) on importation of foreign-made fuel assemblies and on return of these assemblies and reprocessing products to the supplier-state. Return to Menu L. Nuclear Industry 1. American Martian Expedition Uses Russian Isotopes Two US unmanned stations- the Spirit and the Opportunity-are on their way to Mars. Each has a Martian vehicle on board, whose gadgets will use Russian radioisotopes to study the chemistry of Martian minerals, reports the Rosaviakosmos, Russia's federal aerospace agency. Curium 244 isotopes come from the Nuclear Reactor Research Institute, based in Dimitrovograd near Ulyanovsk on the Volga. Its laboratory is one of the world's two to work with curium isotopes. The other is in the USA. Its reactor has been stopped for updating, so American scientists had to appeal to Russian colleagues for help. Each of the vehicles has six radiation sources. It took the Russian institute twelve months to make them, with subsequent tests in extremely high and low temperatures, after which the sources were passed to the USA. After landing, Martian surface minerals will be curium-irradiated to cause response radiation, its own for every substance to gauge their chemical composition. Electronic devices will transmit the results to the stations, each on its Martian orbit, and on to Earth. The stations are expected to reach Mars next January. Return to Menu 2. Russia Bid to Remove Rods A Russian proposal to remove deformed uranium rods from the Paks nuclear power plant, caused by a technical fault in April, is being evaluated by Paksi Atomer�m� Rt (Paksi), the firm which operates Hungary's sole nuclear power station. Attila Asz�di, the government commissioner appointed to handle the affair, said that Russia's TVEL (the company who supplied the uranium rods) submitted their proposal following a bid by the French-German consortium of Framatome ANP, who Paksi blame for the initial fault. "If both proposals are equal then it will be the price that matters," said Asz�di. "Special underwater cameras (monitoring the cleaning tank) have confirmed what we had already expected, that all 30 fuel rods in Paksi's block-2 are severely damaged. "The pictures do not show anything new, but they are very useful to confirm all that was seen earlier," Asz�di said, adding that equipment to remove the rods, which would have to be specially made, would be very expensive. Return to Menu 3. EU to invest 10 mln euros in Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant The European Union will invest 10 million euros as part of its TACIS program in the modernization of the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant, the plant's general director, Nikolai Oshkanov, told Interfax. The three-year program is slated to begin at the end of 2003 - beginning of 2004, he said. Electricity de France/SOGIN, a French-Italian consortium, will act as the project's curator. The EU is holding talks with the consortium on a service contract for the project. A European equipment supplier will be selected at tender, which will be announced when the talks are completed. Return to Menu 4. Russia To Supply USA With Space-Effort Plutonium A landmark Russian-US contract has been made, Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia's Minister of Nuclear Power Industry, reported to federal President Vladimir Putin. The contract envisages exports from Russia of non-weapon-grade plutonium 238 for US spacecraft, said the minister. Return to Menu M. Official Statements 1. Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak Meets with Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Galiamali Khosru A meeting took place on July 16 between Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak and Iranian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Galiamali Khosru, who was in Moscow for consultations on the issues of cooperation between the two countries in international organizations. Special attention was paid to problems of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Iranian side reiterated its strong commitment to the obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and briefed on the development of cooperation between Iran and the IAEA. It was stressed on the Russian side that Iran's early signing of the additional protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA would be welcomed by the world community as an important step bearing out the openness and transparency of the Iranian nuclear program. The sides confirmed the arrangement for the next Russian-Iranian consultations on the issues of disarmament, nonproliferation and export control to be held in Teheran in September. Return to Menu 2. U.S. - Russia Agree To Open Doors To Closed Russian Nuclear Cities Allowing Shutdown Work To Begin on Russian Plutonium Production Reactors Elimination of Plutonium Production In Russia Important Step In U.S.-Russia Nonproliferation Program In Moscow today, officials from the United States and Russia signed agreements that will allow access to the traditionally closed Russian nuclear cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk to begin the important work of shutting down the last weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in operation in the former Soviet Union. This agreement represents another major step in the U.S.-Russia Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP) initiated by U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexandr Rumyantsev. Reaching agreements on access arrangements for the former secret cities of the Russian nuclear weapons complex is an important prerequisite to begin the work of replacing the nuclear reactors with coal-fired heat and electricity plants. �Replacing these reactors with fossil fuel energy is critical to eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia and closing these facilities,� said Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. �Russia and the United States have enjoyed a good relationship on this program and we look forward to continued progress.� At a ceremony in Vienna in March 2003, Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev signed an agreement that would reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction by stopping plutonium production at the last three Russian plutonium production reactors. As part of the agreement, the Department of Energy, working with its partners in Russia, will provide replacement fossil-fuel facilities to produce replacement energy for heat and electricity currently produced by the reactors and serving the two closed cities in Russia. In May 2003, Abraham and the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Yuri Ushakov, announced that $466 million to two U.S. companies to begin the shutdown work. Agreeing on access arrangements ensures that the work can stay on schedule and be completed with Russian and U.S. firms working together. The reactors, although originally designed to produce weapons-grade plutonium, also provide heat and electricity required by the surrounding communities in Siberia. The EWGPP program is providing fossil-fueled energy plants to supply such heat and electricity to the surrounding communities, facilitating the shut down of the reactors. The three plutonium production reactors will continue to operate until the fossil-replacement plants are completed. These reactors have deficiencies in the areas of design, equipment, and materials, and are considered to be among the highest risk reactors in the world. To ensure reactor safety, high priority safety upgrades are being expeditiously pursued. The Department�s Pacific Northwest National Lab will be responsible for necessary nuclear safety upgrades at both sites. These upgrades will not extend the life of the reactor facilities. The Access Arrangements signed today govern the provision of fossil replacement plants. Access arrangements for the nuclear safety upgrades are being negotiated separately. Return to Menu N. Links of Interest 1. Chaillot Paper 61: EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia Return to Menu 2. Handbook on Nuclear Law Return to Menu 3. MIPT Terrorism Database System Return to Menu 4. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment Return to Menu 5. Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Mat�riel Return to Menu 6. Letter to Congress on Cooperative Threat Reduction and FY04 Defense Authorizations (H.R. 1588) Return to Menu 7. U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space: Its Tensions With Nonproliferation Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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