A. Russia-Iran 1. Iran Assures Putin Over Nuclear Weapons
Gillian Tett, Judy Dempsey and Guy Dinmore, Financial Times
Financial Times
6/20/2003
(for personal use only)
Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, said on Friday he had received assurances from Tehran that it was not producing or trying to procure nuclear weapons.
Following a telephone call with Mohammad Khatami, Iran's president, Mr Putin said there was a clear indication that Iran was willing to sign any protocols required by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Russia has been at pains to preserve a US$800m contract to build a nuclear power plant in Iran.
On Thursday Iran's representative at the United Nations nuclear watchdog ignored international pleas for restraint and insisted Tehran would press ahead with plans to introduce nuclear materials into a controversial uranium enrichment plant.
The 35-member board of the International Atomic Energy Agency called on Iran "unconditionally" to accept an additional protocol to permit full inspections of its nuclear activities and to refrain from introducing nuclear material into a pilot uranium enrichment project at Natanz "as a confidence-building measure".
But before Tehran reacted formally, Ali Salehi, the Iranian ambassador to the IAEA, rejected calls for more inspections. Following the US's failure to secure a forceful condemnation at the IAEA meeting, he said: "Iran is already being fully co-operative. We are very happy that the board did not yield to pressure to adopt a resolution [condemning Iran]."
The IAEA statement, approved by consensus, steered a careful line between urging Iran to be more transparent and refraining from saying Iran was in breach of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Mr Salehi said: "The US is probably not very happy with the outcome because they wanted a resolution and they were not able to get [it] . . . The reason the resolution failed is that everyone knew there were political motivations behind it."
Despite what analysts called US disappointment at the failure to secure a resolution condemning Iran, the White House said President George W. Bush welcomed the IAEA report, which it said raised serious questions over the country's nuclear intentions.
It remains unclear whether the Bush administration is willing to wait for the IAEA's slow path of consensual diplomacy to unfold, given that the Iran issue has taken on a new urgency among some in Washington.
Ari Fleischer, presidential spokesman, repeated Mr Bush's comments from Wednesday that the international community "will not tolerate" Iran's development of nuclear weapons.
The US administration may press ahead with its own actions, such as stopping and searching suspect Iranian shipments, if it does not get satisfaction through the IAEA.
Tehran has always insisted its nuclear programme is peaceful.
The US and the European Union are now pressing the IAEA to speed its investigations into Iran's activities and present the findings by September. The US hopes this next report will prove Iran is in breach of the NPT and that the IAEA will then refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions.
"If the Iranians continue on the path they are on, there is only one direction that it can lead," said one senior western diplomat.
The EU is warning that trade negotiations with Tehran could be suspended unless Iran accepts full inspections and will call on Iran to sign the IAEA's additional protocol.
Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA director, still hopes Iran will sign the latest protocol and is reluctant to condemn it until the watchdog has finished investigating. "The jury is still out," he said.
2. Khatami Assures Putin that Tehran does not Produce Nuke Arms
Associated Press
6/20/2003
(for personal use only)
Russian President Vladimir Putin said Friday that his Iranian counterpart had assured him that Tehran was not producing or trying to procure nuclear weapons.
Putin told a news conference that Iranian President Mohammad Khatami had assured him in a telephone call two days ago that his country does not strive to have any nuclear weapons and that it was prepared to sign any protocols required by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"The Iranian leadership is ready to fully meet all the IAEA's demands regarding control over its nuclear program," Putin said.
Russia has a US$800 million contract to build a nuclear power plant in Iran and insists U.S. fears that the project could help Tehran develop nuclear weapons are unfounded.
Under U.S. pressure, Russia has urged Iran to open itself up to broader nuclear inspections, but it has not made fulfillment of the power plant contract contingent on Tehran's signing of an additional IAEA protocol that would provide the U.N. organization with greater access.
Putin warned against pressuring Russia to abandon the Bushehr contract, saying that Russia was against "using the nuclear card in unfair competition on the Iranian market."
3. Vladimir Putin: Iran Assures Russia That It Doesn't Plan Developing Nuclear Weapons
RIA Novosti
6/20/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia has been assured by Iran that it had no plans to develop nuclear arms, President Vladimir Putin said.
"Two days ago I spoke over the phone with [President of Iran Mohammed] Khattami on his request, and he confirmed to me once again that Iran had no plans to develop nuclear arms," the Russian president said at a news conference in Moscow.
Moreover, he said, the Iranian leadership is prepared to join in full measure all IAEA protocols and demands that would require control over its nuclear programs.
Vladimir Putin said that Russia's position was not new to the Iranian leadership, "there is nothing new in it." "We will be building our relations with any country, Iran included, proceeding from its openness in relations with the IAEA," the Russian president stressed.
Vladimir Putin said that no resolutions condemning Iran had been adopted at a session of the IAEA board of directors just over. "A decision was taken to continue joint work with the Iranian leadership to make all Iranian programmes more transparent," the president said stressing that this corresponds with the position of the Russian Federation.
"The Iran problem was a subject of our talks with President Bush in Petersburg and Evian," Putin recalled.
According to him, "the positions of Russia and the US on the issue are closer than they look on the face of it." "We proceed from our position of principle condemning categorically the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on our planet. We would like the non-proliferation regimes to be enhanced," Putin said. According to him, this concerns "all members of the international community, mostly those who signed the Non-proliferation Treaty." "It's an open secret that Iran is such a country and it did sign the treaty," the head of state emphasised.
At the same time, Vladimir Putin said that "we come out against the use of the nuclear map for starting unfair competition on the Iranian market."
4. Russia Refuses to Abandon Nuclear Program with Iran
Agence France-Presse
6/19/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia has brushed off increasingly loud US demands to halt its nuclear cooperation with Iran, remaining the foremost world power helping the Islamic regime develop what many fear is a nuclear weapons program.
US and European demands that Iran come entirely clean on its nuclear program have fallen on deaf ears, prompting the West to turn its criticism on Russia's construction of Iran's first nuclear power plant at Bushehr.
Yet they have made little headway there too.
Russia insists it will complete the Bushehr plant, supporting Iran's claim that it is part of a plan to develop nuclear energy for peaceful means.
Yet many in the West wonder why oil-rich Iran -- which produces around 3.6 million barrels of crude per day -- needs to turn to nuclear energy.
Faced with increased criticism, Moscow has stepped up its calls that Tehran sign an additional Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) protocol allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect all suspect sites, not just those declared by Tehran.
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov again urged Iran to sign the protocol on Monday following the IAEA's meeting in Vienna in which IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei released a report saying Iran had failed to report certain nuclear activities.
Yet the same day, another Russian official called on IAEA governors in Vienna to take a "measured and non-politicized" decision after analyzing the report.
"We believe the reaction of the council of governors to this report must be measured and non-politicised, and take all aspects into account," Deputy Foreign Minister Yury Fedotov said.
And foreign ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said Monday that a wave of anti-regime protests sweeping Iran were the country's "internal affair" -- in a thinly-veiled swipe at US support of the demonstrations.
Russia has clearly been seeking to avoid stirring up tensions with the United States, with relations still on the mend following a bitter conflict over the US-led war in Iraq.
Yet it is also seeking to defend an important market -- the Bushehr contract alone is worth 800 million dollars (700 million euros) -- and show its public that it does not bend to Washington's every whim.
These conflicting goals have led Russia to engage in a somewhat confused policy over the crisis, which heated up Wednesday with Iran's rejection of the charges made in the IAEA report.
Different Russian officials make varying -- and sometimes conflicting -- statements almost daily. In late May, Western officials -- including British Prime Minister Tony Blair -- said Russian President Vladimir Putin had pledged at a G8 summit in France that Russia would not sell Iran nuclear fuel until it signed the additional protocol.
But Yakovenko and Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev later said
Russia would go ahead with the nuclear fuel shipments even without the protocol.
The shipments are not due to begin until Tehran and Moscow sign a deal on the return of spent fuel.
The document has been ready since August, but logistical problems -- including Russia's call for experts to carry out an environmental study -- have slowed its signing, prompting some analysts to call the delay a hidden concession to Washington.
Russia earlier this month delayed Bushehr's launch until 2005, another move seen as an indirect concession.
But Putin himself has insisted Russia will not sever ties with Iran, reiterating both at the G8 meet in France and at a series of summits held with European and US leaders in Saint Petersburg last month that the cooperation would continue.
Yet adding further to the confusion, he told US President George W. Bush in Saint Petersburg that "the position of Russia and the US on the issue are much closer than they seem."
5. Russia Welcomes IAEA Declaration on Iran Nuclear Programs
Associated Press
6/19/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia, which is building an atomic power plant in Iran but urging Tehran to be more open about its ambitions, welcomed what a top diplomat called a "carefully thought out" declaration by the U.N. nuclear agency on the tension-fraught issue of Iran's nuclear programs.
Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov said Russia was pleased that the International Atomic Energy Association did not condemn Iran in a declaration by its board Thursday, the Interfax new agency reported.
"The IAEA executive board did not take the path of adopting strict resolutions censuring Iran," Interfax quoted Fedotov as saying. "Russia is satisfied that following consultations a carefully thought out declaration by the chairman was made."
In a statement endorsed by the United States and other agency members, the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency said it expected Iran "to grant the agency all access deemed necessary by the agency" to defuse suspicions that Tehran was operating a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
It was a compromise designed to satisfy both Iran, which has denied that it was planning to make nuclear weapons, and the United States, which accuses Tehran of such activity.
Fedotov said the IAEA declaration "takes note of the fact that Iran has not accounted for all its nuclear material and programs, but on the other hand takes into account steps by the Iranian side to correct the situation."
Russia has a US$800 million contract to build a nuclear power plant in Iran and insists U.S. fears that the project could help Tehran develop nuclear weapons are unfounded.
Under U.S. pressure, Russia has urged Iran to open itself up to broader nuclear inspections, but it has not made fulfillment of the power plant contract contingent on Tehran's signing of an additional IAEA protocol that would provide the U.N. organization with greater access.
6. EU, Russia and US Urge Iran to Sign Inspection Protocol
Charles Digges
Bellona Foundation
6/18/2003
(for personal use only)
With Iran facing growing pressure to be more open about its nuclear programme, the United Nations� top nuclear weapons inspector, the Russian foreign minister and a group of European Union ministers earlier this week urged the Islamic Republic to sign a protocol that would give inspectors the right to conduct more intrusive examinations of its facilities.
The call came after the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, which is meeting this week in Vienna, formally reviewed a recent report on the Iranian issue that was widely leaked to the media last week. This report gave new details about Iran�s wide-ranging experimentation with uranium hexafluoride gas enrichment centrifuges and also revealed the country�s plans to build a 40-megawatt heavy water research reactor. Both the uranium and plutonium projects could be used in the production of nuclear weapons.
In interviews with Bellona Web, US officials said they are pushing for a vote to censure Iran at the IAEA meeting of the board of governors, which began on Monday. If that fails to produce results, they said, the next step could be for the board to refer the dispute to the UN Security Council, possibly in the autumn.
The Bush administration says Iran is using its Russian-supported civilian nuclear programme as a cover for secretly developing nuclear weapons, an assertion denied by Tehran. Moscow, too, has until recently denied that Iran has the capability to build nuclear weapons, but, in light of recent discoveries, backed off its defence of Tehran. It has, however, stuck�and will stick�by its assertion that none of Moscow�s exports to its civilian reactor project in the Iranian city of Bushehr may be used for military purposes, a spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said this week.
US officials say their suspicions have been stoked by the findings of the IAEA General Director Mohamed ElBaradei�s report. The US State Department responded to the developments by calling on the agency�s board to formally urge Iran to �answer all outstanding questions about that programme� and to sign the IAEA�s Additional Protocol, which would give UN inspectors the right to short-notice searches of Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that are only suspected of being nuclear installations. The protocol is an addition to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.
ElBaradei�s Remarks to the IAEA Board of Governors
Speaking Monday at a meeting of the IAEA�s 35-member governing board, ElBaradei formally addressed many of the suspicions raised by the leaked report. He called on Iran �to permit us to take environmental samples� at the Kalaye site�an electric company, alleged recently by Iranian opposition to be a secret uranium enrichment site�and to allow inspectors greater access �to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran�s nuclear activities.�
The agency�s report had concluded, in part, that Iran had not met its obligations in terms of �the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.�
But the report also indicated that the very disclosures of the previously concealed activity and plans might be a sign of an improved and more transparent approach.
�The report points out that Iran has failed to report certain nuclear material and activities and that corrective actions are being taken in cooperation with Iranian authorities,� ElBaradei said, according to a copy of his speech obtained by Bellona Web. �The report also explains that work is still ongoing with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran�s declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards.�
�[We are] continuing our efforts, through technical discussions, inspection and environmental sample analysis, to understand all aspects of Iran�s nuclear programme, including the research and development work relevant to its uranium conversion and enrichment programme and its programme for the use of heavy water,� ElBaradei concluded.
But the report left many questions unanswered, according to a Western diplomat who spoke with Bellona Web on the condition of anonymity. The uranium enrichment plant near the city of Natanz, as well as the construction of a heavy water facility near the city of Arak, were initially revealed to the media by an Iranian opposition movement called the National Council for the Resistance of Iran�an umbrella group for several dissident organizations that includes the People�s Mujahedin, which is listed as a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.
Earlier this month the National Council revealed to the media that the People�s Mujahedin�which had made the initial discoveries about the Natanz site�said they had discovered two more secret uranium enrichment facilities in Iran.
According to the Western diplomat, the IAEA is anxious to investigate these sites, and said a final report on them�and several other items left unaddressed by ElBaradei�s speech�will be presented in a September report from the agency. ElBaradei would not comment further on the present or upcoming report when reached by telephone.
The Facts Behind ElBaradei�s Statements
According to a diplomat from a nation on the IAEA�s governing board, who requested anonymity, ElBaradei�s report did not delve into a number of more disturbing questions about Iran�s nuclear programme.
For instance, since the leak of the IAEA report last week, Iranian officials have turned down the request of inspectors to take �environmental samples� at the Kalaye Electric Company. Intelligence agencies and exile groups have alleged in interviews with Bellona Web that the plant was used to test Iran�s centrifuge apparatus�which would constitute a direct violation of the NPT, which Iran signed in 1974.
If Iran is found to be in violation of its obligations under the NPT, the diplomat said, then the controversy will likely go to the UN Security Council. �It will be up to the Security Council to act,� the diplomat said. �Let�s hope they will act.�
Additionally, in 1991, Iran imported 1.8 tonnes of natural uranium and failed to report it to the IAEA. Iran said it was not legally required to report it. The IAEA said Iran must declare all such imports �as soon as possible.� Why this uranium was not reported, said the diplomat, �is anyone�s guess�what if there were more imports that went unreported?�
Iran also informed the IAEA in May this year that it intended to build a heavy water research reactor at Arak, although the IAEA had learned about the existence of this site already in December last year from media reports. This plant would yield weapons-grade plutonium.
At Natanz, there is a small pilot uranium-enrichment plant that will have around 5,000 enrichment centrifuges when completed. Iran also has plans to build a large commercial-scale enrichment facility there with more than 50,000 centrifuges�which could produce some 20 nuclear bombs a year. Similar to the case of the Arak project, the IAEA found out about the construction of these facilities, which could produce arms-grade material, from media reports.
�These facilities are now out in the open, and that is distressing enough,� said the diplomat. �But what is more distressing is that the IAEA learned about them by just reading the papers. Iran itself may never have declared them otherwise.�
Iran has also admitted�though it did not officially report it at the time�to converting once natural uranium into uranium metal. The Institute for Science and International Security, a security think tank, says uranium metal has few civilian uses but is a key ingredient in nuclear weapons. According to the Reuters news agency, the IAEA says that �the role of uranium metal [...] needs to be fully understood, since neither [Iran�s] light water reactor [under construction in Bushehr], nor its planned heavy water reactors, require uranium metal.�
Iran says it has not tested its enrichment centrifuges with nuclear material. The United States and other countries, however, say it would make no sense to build expensive enrichment plants without full testing. Under IAEA provisions, Iran would have to notify the IAEA if it tested centrifuges with nuclear material. The IAEA has �a number of questions regarding Iran�s research and development on centrifuges,� ElBaradei said in his report.
According to one of Bellona Web�s sources, IAEA inspectors, during their recent visit to Iran, found out at a uranium storage facility that a container of uranium hexafluoride gas�processed uranium used in the enrichment process�was lighter than had been declared by Tehran. Iranian authorities said the uranium was missing due to leaky valves.
Iran Shows Signs of Giving in � on Certain Conditions
On Tuesday, Reuters reported that Iran�s Atomic Energy Organization had said Tehran might be willing to sign the protocol, but reiterated that it wanted access to Western nuclear technology in return. �We have not yet decided about signing the Additional Protocol, but we are studying it with a positive view,� Khalil Mousavi, the organization�s spokesman, told the news agency. Iran�s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamiz Reza Asefi reiterated this position to Bellona Web that same day.
Both the European Union, Iran�s main trading partner, and Russia, which has sent over 1000 of its engineers to help Iran build an $800m, 1000-megawatt civilian nuclear reactor at Bushehr, called on Tehran to provide the necessary cooperation. European governments have been more circumspect than Washington in accusing Tehran of conducting a secret nuclear weapons programme, but have expressed concern about the unexplained discrepancies in the reports Iran has submitted to the IAEA. Earlier this week, European Union foreign ministers linked Iranian cooperation on nuclear inspections to progress in implementing a trade and cooperation agreement currently under negotiation between Europe and Iran.
Mixed Messages From Russia
Last month, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev said that the Bushehr reactor would become operational in 2005�a clear concession to Western pressure after the previously slated opening date of December this year. Analysts believe that this delay was imposed to allow more time for Iran and the IAEA to continue negotiations over the NPT Additional Protocol.
They also say this will give Tehran more time to sign a long-awaited agreement to return the spent product of the uranium fuel that Russia will be supplying to the Bushehr reactor so that it cannot be separated by Iran for plutonium. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, has since last summer promised it would strike a deal with Iran to return Bushehr�s spent fuel, and has several times reported that it had. The latest report indicated that Minatom was ready to go as far as buying the spent fuel back from Iran. In fact, however, no deal to return the spent fuel has yet been concluded.
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, speaking during a trip to New Delhi, India, expressed the hope that Iran would sign the additional IAEA protocol and agree to more intrusive inspections. Moscow�s ambassador to the IAEA, Grigory Berdennikov, added that �we hope that our point of view is heard in Iran,� the Associated Press news agency reported.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has, nonetheless, pledged to continue supplying nuclear materials�including fresh uranium fuel shipments�to the Bushehr site.
This decision by Russia followed a recent BBC broadcast�after the IAEA report on Iran was leaked during the Evian Summit�saying that Putin had told British Prime Minister Tony Blair that all shipments to Bushehr from Russia would be ceased until Tehran signed the Additional Protocol. The BBC broadcast, however, was almost immediately contradicted by Russia�s foreign ministry, which has led some observers to conclude that the Russian government is no longer running the show at Bushehr.
Who Is in Charge of Bushehr?
Putin�s pledge to Blair would have been pointless in any case: Viktor Kozlov, the head of the state-run, Minatom connected Atomstroiexport company, which is in charge of the Bushehr reactor�s construction, said that in April last year, a total of 5,000 metric tons of equipment, including the reactor�s body, had already been shipped to Iran, according to the Associated Press. Shipments of uranium fuel assemblies began in May this year, according to Minatom.
In his recent commentary, defence analyst and Moscow Times columnist Pavel Felgenhauer wrote that the Bushehr project has fallen out of the hands of the Russian government and into the lap of a handful of Russian oligarchs who dabble in arms trading�though Felgenhauer would not say who they were. He said the US would not stop Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation by talking to Moscow.
B. Russia-North Korea 1. Russian and US Standpoints on North Korea are Close - Vladimir Putin
RIA Novosti
6/20/2003
(for personal use only)
Russian and US standpoints concerning North Korea are becoming closer, Vladimir Putin stated at a press conference in the Kremlin on Friday.
"We support a nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula," he said. According to him, the North Korean problem must be resolved by negotiations taking into consideration the country's "interests and concerns." "If North Korea is concerned about its security, it should be provided with security guarantees," the President stressed.
When answering a question, he also added that as far as he knew from his conversations with the US President, the US Administration had no intention to use military force in resolving the North Korean problem." "This problem will be resolved jointly with participation of all interested parties - South Korea, Japan and China," the Russian Head of State said.
He is convinced that "there is a good basis for resolving the problem and there is a good will of the process participants."
C. Nuclear Cities 1. V. Sadovnikov, �As 55 Years Ago, Mayak Today Ensures the Defense Order is Fulfilled That Means Security of the State is Ensured�
Nuclear.ru
6/19/2003
(for personal use only)
June 19 the Production Association Mayak celebrates its 55th anniversary. In 1948 in the city of Ozersk, Cheliabinsk Region, the first defense plutonium production complex was commissioned to lay the foundation of the present PA Mayak � a large-scale nuclear industry enterprise. Director General Vitaly Sadovnikov sending by Nuclear.Ru request its best regards to the employees noted that this anniversary date is significant for those who 55 yeas ago founded the enterprise and fulfilled the super challenge of the State � to create the nuclear shield and cease nuclear expansion. �Can we be proud of that? I think, we certainly can. Those must be proud who started this business and those who continue it. It means that this is our celebration also�, Sadovnikov said adding that the celebration would remind once again about the veterans� merits and their heroic efforts contributed to meet the State�s challenge.
He also stressed that Mayak belonging with the nuclear defense complex continues to fulfill the state defense order, thus ensuring security of the State. �Regretfully, today Mayak is not in its better days, Sadovnikov said. �Still, we full of hope that we will overcome our problems and will progress.� He also noted that during 55 years Mayak educated a great number of experienced staff who eventually found employment at Siberian Chemical Combine, Mining and Chemical Combine, in research institutes and other enterprises of nuclear industry. �Each of them believes Mayak his or her home-enterprise and the 55-anniversary � his/her celebration. So, I would like to greet all who have ever worked and work at Mayak with this jubilee of science and technology and heroic effort�, Sadovnikov said. The celebrations are to take place on June 27-29 in Ozersk will include a rally on the Central Square, sports events, fests, fireworks and street performances. �Today we can, even must afford this celebration paying our tribute to those who call this celebration their own�, the Mayak Director General concluded.
D. Export Controls 1. NPCC Held a Joint Russia-US Seminar on Nuclear Export Control
Nuclear.ru
6/17/2003
(for personal use only)
The US delegation headed by Mark Shoyer, the international matters expert with the US National Nuclear Security Administration, participated in the seminar held June 10 at the JSC Novosibirsk Plant of Chemical Concentrates (NPCC). The seminar was to address international and internal industry nuclear export control issues, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by NPCC press service. Minatom of Russia has been carrying out such seminars for six years already. This year the host was NPCC that demonstrates the high profile of the plant as regards the physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials.
The seminar noted that the weapons of mass destruction proliferation issues had become the top priority of the international policies of nuclear powers including Russia and the US. By present, Russia has nearly completed the state-level systems in the area of non-proliferation: the system of physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials and export control system while the issues are still open regarding the improvement of efficiency of these systems, training of qualified personnel, development of methodologies and training materials. The Minatom's Department for International and External Economic Cooperation and Industry Export Control Laboratories identified a range of practical issues to be addressed to improve the export control system.
E. Nuclear Security 1. Raid in Georgia Triggers 'Dirty Bomb' Fears, Police Seize Radioactive Materials
Anna Badkhen, San Francisco Chronicle
San Francisco Chronicle
6/17/2003
(for personal use only)
In a sign that the clandestine market in nuclear materials is thriving despite the war on terrorism, police in the former Soviet republic of Georgia seized two metal containers filled with radioactive material that could be used to make a so-called dirty bomb, Georgian authorities said Monday.
The containers, which held cesium-137 and strontium-90, were discovered during a raid near the country's capital, Tbilisi, on May 31, Russia's Ria- Novosti news agency reported. Police also found a glass capsule containing Yprite, or mustard gas, Reuters reported. A chemical used in World War I, mustard gas causes blindness, blistering of the skin and lungs and, often, painful and slow death.
The deadly substances were found in boxes with writing in Russian and English in the back of a taxi headed for Tbilisi's central train station, Ria- Novosti reported. The taxi driver, who told investigators he was unaware of his dangerous cargo, said he was supposed to turn over the boxes to two men at the train station.
Police released the taxi driver but said they had arrested two men on charges of plotting to traffic the radioactive material to Adzharia, a district in southern Georgia on the border with Turkey.
"The most likely version is that the containers were intended to be transported on to Turkey and to be resold," police spokesman Givi Mgebrishvili told a news conference in Tbilisi.
Strontium-90, a radioactive substance used in small quantities in Soviet- made generators as power sources in remote areas, and cesium-137, commonly found inside X-ray machines and in spent nuclear fuel, cannot be fashioned into a nuclear bomb, the way highly enriched uranium would. But if attached to a conventional explosive, these radioactive materials could be turned into one of the most feared terrorist weapons since the September 11, 2001, attacks: a "dirty bomb."
These bombs, which combine conventional explosives and radioactive material, are capable of producing a dangerous blast and long-lasting radiation effects.
Mustard gas in such a bomb would make the effects of the fallout even more deadly and frightening.
"You could . . . blow it all over the place, make a whole lot of people ill and thousands more very scared," said Charles Digges, a researcher for a
BBC reported that the boxes contained three curies of cesium and 12 microcuries of strontium. Even a tiny fraction of a curie of strontium, if inhaled or ingested, can cause cancer.
Digges suggested that the detained suspects might have wanted to sell the containers to rebels in the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya, whose border with Georgia, just north of the remote Pankisi Gorge, is porous. The United States and Russia contend that Islamic militants linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist group have gathered in Pankisi.
Chechen rebels, who are locked with Russia in a nine-year conflict that has killed thousands on both sides, have repeatedly stated their eagerness to obtain and use nuclear materials for terrorist purposes. In 1995, rebel leader Shamil Basayev planted a container holding cesium-137 in a Moscow park and then tipped off Russian reporters.
Safety measures at Soviet nuclear warfare facilities in modern-day Russia and its former republics are so lax that last year, a Russian lawmaker accompanied by a television crew walked into the heart of a restricted area in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, where 3,000 tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel are stored.
Security of radioactive substances used in equipment unrelated to the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons programs -- such as X-ray machines or generators -- often is nonexistent, making the former Soviet states a perfect source of "dirty bomb" material.
No one knows how much radioactive material disappears in Russia each year, but Digges said there were "a lot of substandard nuclear thieves" who scavenged hospital equipment and lighthouse batteries for substances they hoped to sell.
They "don't know really the value of what they have, and usually what they have is junk, garbage," Digges said. The suspects in Georgia are "probably also people who don't know what they have and want to sell it to someone like the rebels in Chechnya," he said. "Sooner or later, they will probably turn up at some hospital with their hair falling out."
The boxes of strontium-90 and cesium-137 are not the first containers with radioactive material recovered in Georgia. Eighteen months ago, three hunters gathering firewood in the country's snowy mountain forests stumbled upon two abandoned flashlight-sized canisters of strontium-90 and unwittingly used them to warm up. The hunters suffered severe burns and later died from the exposure.
The largest known seizure of nuclear weapons-grade uranium from the former Soviet Union was also in Georgia, where police arrested three men in 2001 who they said were trying to sell nearly four pounds of uranium-235 to buyers in Turkey.
F. Nuclear Business 1. Armenia: Russian Fuel Arrives as Hopes Rise for N-Power Exports
Nuclear.ru
6/20/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia says it has delivered 103 fuel assemblies to Armenia's sole operating unit, Metsamor-2 (Armenian NPP), NucNet reported. The Russian VVER-440 reactor unit has been off line since 4th April, and the plant says that loading of the fuel will begin in "the near future". The fuel was purchased by Russia's non-nuclear power company and grid operator RAO EES.
The head of the RAO EES export department, Yuri Sharow, said the fuel purchase was part of an arrangement by which his company would take over the management of Metsamor's financial affairs. Russia announced towards the end of last year that firm arrangements had been made to supply nuclear fuel to Armenia � following talks over Armenian debts to Russia for past fuel deliveries.
Armenian energy minister Armen Movsisyan said the transfer of the plant's financial management to Russia was linked to his country's "economic expectations". As well as meeting the country's own domestic electricity supply needs, Metsamor is capable of generating additional electricity that could be exported. Armenia's government hopes that Russia will help to arrange exports to countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkey. Metsamor-2 increased electricity production in 2002 to 2.2 TWh - from 1.9 TWh in 2001. The nuclear share of overall electricity production last year was nearly 42%.
G. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Russia Intends to Keep All Components of its Nuclear Triad � Baluyevsky
Interfax
6/19/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia's General Staff said the nation will maintain all components of its nuclear triad (ground, naval and air) after 2012, the deadline for fulfilling the Russian-U.S. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions.
"Russia will definitely keep its nuclear triad by the date set for the fulfillment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and in the following years," Colonel Yury Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, told Interfax.
"The strategic component of Russia's defense potential has been set for the period until 2016-2020," he said. "Corresponding documents outline the development of the three components: ground, naval, and air. Of course, this does not mean that the decision cannot be changed. Everything will depend on the situation in the world. However, in any case, we are not inclined to change the current balance of these three components of our strategic nuclear forces," he said.
Baluyevsky said he does not doubt that Russia will fulfil the treaty by the expected date. "We will definitely fulfil this document," he said.
�The Russian-Norwegian contracts to dispose two multipurpose nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet have to be somewhat refined because the draft contracts did not accounted for the spent nuclear fuel management, which is to be removed from the disposed nuclear submarines�, Sergei Antipov, the Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, said to Nuclear.Ru commenting on the Russia�s refusal to sign the contracts. In early 2003 Norway, in frames of the cooperation on radiation and environmental safety, turned to Minatom to provide assistance in disposing of multipurpose nuclear submarines in the North-West region. According to Antipov, Minatom appreciated the proposal and identified two n-subs meeting the Norwegian criteria and the respective shipyards (Nerpa in the Murmansk Region and Zvezdochka in Severodvinsk). Minatom also suggested negotiating the specific contract terms and conditions with the participation of the shipyards� officials. �At this, it was preliminary agreed with the Norwegian side that it is to finance the whole disposition process including management of the irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) removed from the submarines� reactors�, Antipov stressed.
�However, nearly on the day of signing we received for agreement the prepared text of the contracts which did not take the proper care of INF management issues and, thus, the contracts were just for cutting metal leaving the fuel issues for Minatom to deal with�, Antipov said. Certainly, Minatom is ready to solve these problems, but it needs time to identify a place for storage and find a source of finance. �The interpretation of the matter we got in the contracts was unexpected and we could not sign them as they were�, the Deputy Minister explained adding that the final text of the contracts had been worded without Minatom�s participation and contained, besides this, other technical drawbacks. �All technical details had to be refined and both sides took a time out though we were eager, as well as they were, to sign these contracts�, Antipov stressed.
He also said that three-day work of the Russian-Norwegian Commission on cooperation in nuclear-related matters comprised several rounds of negotiations on the contracts to result on agreement between the sides on the ways of improving the contracts and on possible signing within next two weeks. Presently, Minatom communicates with the Rossudostroenie owned enterprises to agree on all positions of the contracts. �As soon as this work is done we will invite the Norwegian side to discuss and sign the contracts�, he said and noted that, regretfully, it is not only in the west but also in Russia there is a wrong understanding of the Minatom�s role in disposing N-subs. �Many take the disposition problem as the cutting the submarines, however, the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel are the critical issues here�, Antipov stressed. He also noted that the situation with the signing of the Russian-Norwegian contracts had been to a great degree contorted by the Norwegian mass media who attended the press-conference in Kirkeness where the positions of both sides were described, and by some of the Russian media who refereed to the Norwegian colleagues.
In this connection Antipov mentioned the progress with the Russian-Japanese The Star of Hope Project to dispose the Pacific Fleet retired n-subs, which implementation, reportedly by the Russian ITAR-TASS, had already started at Zvezda shipyard in Bolshoi Kamen. In fact, Antipov said, the implementing agreement for this project is yet being worked on. Early June, Parliamentary Secretary of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Shindo Yesitaka, while visiting Vladivostok, paid a visit to Zvezda shipyard which is to dispose Victor-3 N-subs under The Star of Hope Project. According to Antipov, the agreement is under review by the Russian agencies and only after it is cleared with them the contract may be signed and the work can start. But now the negotiations with the Japanese side are progressing and close to completion.
H. Strategic Arms Reduction 1. Russia to Allocate $2 Bln to Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction
Bellona Foundation
6/20/2003
(for personal use only)
Russia will allocate at least $2 billion within 10 years for a programme of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 3, 2003.
The programme was adopted at the previous G-8 summit in Kananaskis, he said. This year, at the summit in Evian, the G-8 leaders analyzed the progress of its fulfilment. G-8 adopted serious decisions related to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Russian leader said. "This is especially topical in connection with attempts of terrorist organizations to gain access to weapons of mass destruction," Putin emphasized. "We should not forget that non-proliferation regimes play a key-part in ensuring regional stability," he said. "Main efforts aim at strengthening legal regimes and mechanisms of their fulfilment," the Russian president believes. Russia has created a special mechanism to coordinate the work on the programme of global partnership headed by the Russian Prime Minister. The international legal basis has also been formed and includes the Agreement on multilateral nuclear-ecological programme of the Russian Federation and a number of bilateral agreements, Putin pointed out. Russia welcomes "our partners' statements on a possibility to allocate funds for projects envisaged by the Kananaskis agreements," he said. "We believe that these statements should be substantiated by practical action, first of all by a quick coordination of projects in priority directions of global partnership, elimination of chemical weapons, decommissioning of outdated and scrapped nuclear submarines," the Russian President announced.
I. Missile Defense 1. Moscow Concerned About TMD Deployment in Pacific Rim
Anna Bobina
RIA Novosti
6/18/2003
(for personal use only)
Moscow is concerned about the deployment of theatre missile defences (TMD) in Southeast Asia on the alliance basis, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said while addressing the ASEAN Regional Forum in Cambodia.
According to the minister, "the attempts to build a regional security system primarily on the basis of bilateral alliances does not promote unification tendencies in the region. Moreover, they contravene the complicated process of developing multilateral mechanisms of dialogue in the sphere of politics and security." According to Ivanov, "the destabilising effect may become even more tangible as such acute problems as the proliferation of mass destruction weapons (WMD) and missile technologies are still relevant." The minister pointed out that enhancing the regimes of WMD non-proliferation which are currently subjected to severe tests is a task facing the entire international community. "We believe it should be solved on the strict basis of international law," Ivanov stressed.
According to him, ensuring the universality of the NPT (Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) remains an important issue.
Ivanov pointed out that Russia was undertaking consistent measures in that sphere and was ready to take up cardinal steps. Its recent particular contribution to the non-proliferation regime was the ratification of the Russo-American Strategic Reductions Treaty.
2. Topol-M Missile Can Break Through US Anti-Missile Defence (excerpted)
RIA Novosti
6/1/2003
(for personal use only)
In an interview with Nezavisimaya newspaper, General Moskovsky discusses the plans of Russian hardware modernisation After the USA withdrew last year from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the conditions for the maintenance of strategic stability have changed radically. Russia is urgently reviewing the programmes of the developments of all types of armaments. This is what deputy defence minister and chief of armaments of the Russian Armed Forces Alexei MOSKOVSKY said for the first time in an interview with Nezavisimaya's correspondent Igor KOROTCHENKO. Question: What is the situation with the introduction of new armaments? Does the Defence Ministry adjust the plans of the development of strategic systems depending on the change in the level of threats? Answer: Naturally, this is what we do. After the USA withdrew from the ABM Treaty and Russia and the USA signed a treaty on strategic offensive reductions, we supplemented the state armaments programme with some documents taking into account the new geo-political realities. Measures have been taken already this year. The 2004 plans for the development of armaments have been adjusted accordingly. Question: However, the producers of the Topol-M mono-unit ballistic missile complain that the absence of funds, which the Defence Ministry does not allocate, makes it impossible for them to equip this missile with three MIRVed warheads. Answer: This assertion does not correspond to reality. Question: Does it mean that progress has been achieved in this direction? Answer: It can be said that movement in that direction never stopped and certain progress has been achieved. Question: Which service of the Armed Forces or arm of service enjoys a priority in the plan of the troops' provision with the latest hardware? Answer: Among the services we pay attention to the land troops, in the first place. Among the arms of service we attach priority to the Space Troops. However, we need outer space in the interests of the Armed Forces as a whole. It is necessary to employ the possibilities of the military outer space - information, navigation and communication possibilities - even at the tactical level. Question: When will the necessary equipment appear in the troops? Answer: I believe that we shall be able to show the programme's practical implementation at the section-platoon-company level already in 2004. Question: What can you say about the sea-based strategic nuclear forces? Answer: Last year the Severodvinsk shipyard launched after repairs the Akula class strategic missile submarine cruiser to be equipped with a new sea-based solid fuel missile system. The construction of the new Yuri Dolgoruky missile-bearing submarine proceeds according to the schedule. Question: What other innovations will the Armed Forces receive? Answer: This year we expect the completion of the state testing of the Iskander high-precision missile system.
J. Official Statements 1. Regarding the Completion of the Examination by IAEA Board of Governors of the Question of the Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Iran
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin
6/20/2003
(for personal use only)
On June 19 the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency completed the examination of the question of the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in Iran. At its end the chairwoman of the Board in her summary expressed gratitude to the IAEA Director General for his report on this question and for the Agency's vigorous monitoring activity in Iran. She also noted the steps taken by Iran to resolve the problems that have arisen in the implementation of the safeguards agreement, and expressed satisfaction with Iran's reaffirmed commitment to the full transparency of its nuclear activities. In addition, hope was expressed that Iran would give the Agency full access to Iranian nuclear facilities. The chairwoman also appealed to Iran immediately and without any conditions to sign and enact the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.
In the course of the discussion of the Iranian problem the Russian delegation stressed that the signing by Iran of the Additional Protocol would meet its own interests in the first place, as well as the interests of strengthening the nonproliferation regime and would contribute to the invigoration of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. We also drew the attention of the members of the Board of Governors to the need to consider and solve the questions associated with the implementation of the safeguards agreement in Iran in the atmosphere of cooperation, dialogue and mutual understanding, without any attempts to bring in elements of confrontation.
2. Transcript of the Interview Granted by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov to Russian Media Following the Plenary Meeting of the Tenth Session of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (excerpted)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin
6/19/2003
(for personal use only)
Question: Esteemed Igor Sergeyevich, what would you name among the main outcomes of the Forum's work?
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There is another acute problem worrying the region - the problem of the Korean peninsula. Most speakers pointed out - and it should be noted that the representative of the DPRK was present at the meeting - that a solution of the Korean problem could only be achieved via dialogue. The participants in the meeting therefore welcomed the start of negotiations, the first round of which had taken place in Beijing, and spoke in favor of continuing the talks in this or other format. The common opinion of the meeting participants: the Korean peninsula should be free of nuclear weapons, it is necessary via dialogue to develop confidence-building measures so as to bolster security on this peninsula.
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Question: What would you name among the main outcomes of the present discussion for Russia?
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But, of course, a very important problem is the Korean peninsula. Russia here plays an active role in the search for a political resolution of the situation. And it was important that the efforts which Russia has been making were understood and supported by the participants of this forum. Question: Today Pyongyang, as has become known to us, said it has defensive nuclear weapons and refuses multilateral talks. What are the prospects for resolving this issue and do you think it can be submitted for discussion to the UN Security Council? Answer: You know, on these problems and on other matters associated with nuclear problems, many different statements of various kinds are being made. They are sometimes contradictory in nature, therefore one has to treat them with sufficient discretion. The most important thing is to continue the efforts of the international community: the establishment of dialogue in the course of a political settlement. This question may, of course, be considered in the UN Security Council, but we have repeatedly stressed that methods of pressure and threats complicate the atmosphere of the negotiations. That is why Russia welcomed the beginning of the trilateral negotiations, and we consider that these negotiations should be continued, whether in the trilateral or other format which the participants in the negotiations may deem necessary. Only such negotiations can lead to the solutions and accords which would take into account the interests of all the concerned parties. When I say the concerned parties, I mean the United States and the DPRK and Japan and South Korea and the other countries of the region which are interested in stability and in the settlement of the problems which still exist on the Korean peninsula.
3. Address by Igor S. Ivanov at the 10th Session of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (excerpted)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin
6/18/2003
(for personal use only)
[�]
At the same time, in the Asia-Pacific region there still remains a considerable conflict potential, created by the influence of global military and political processes, as well as by the existing intra-regional clusters of contradictions. The situation is aggravated by the new "movable" transboundary threats flowing in among others from adjacent regions.
It is vital to solve these contradictions within a political process, to ensure further progress where it has already been achieved and to avoid slithering to unilateral measures and revitalizing latent territorial, ethnic or other disputes.
We are also convinced, that the attempts to base the system of regional security mainly on bilateral military alliances do not contribute to strengthening unifying trends in the region. Moreover, they run contrary to the already complex process of developing multilateral dialogue mechanisms in the political and security areas. The destabilizing effect can become even more tangible taking into consideration that urgent problems such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies are still relevant. In this regard, activities aimed at TMD deployment in the Asia-Pacific region based on bloc-affiliation cause particular concern.
The consolidation of WMD non-proliferation regimes which are currently subjected to very serious tests, including in our region, should be a task for the whole international community. In our opinion, it should be addressed strictly on the basis of international law. Rendering the NPT and CTBT universal remains another essential problem. Its solution, as we see it, would guarantee stability both in the regional and global perspective.
In the disarmament sphere Russia takes consistent measures and is ready to make radical moves in real terms. We came out with a set of initiatives aimed at preventing the arms race in outer space, among others, a proposal to declare a moratorium on placement of weapons in space until the international community reaches a comprehensive agreement. The latest concrete contribution has been the ratification of the US-Russian Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Capabilities.
We are in favor of the establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones in various parts of the world, including in South-East Asia. We regard them as a real contribution to consolidate the non-proliferation regime and regional security. We count on finding mutually acceptable solutions enabling us, as well as the other nuclear states, to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in South-East Asia. We support in principle the idea of continuing direct consultations between the G5 and ASEAN.
The fight of the Asia-Pacific nations against international terrorism and the related set of challenges and threats has firmly joined the ranks of strategic priorities. The building of a regional front to counter terrorism has served to consolidate the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. In our view, ARF should be given much credit for that.
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Within the whole complex of the Korean Peninsula problems, one of the most important tasks is still to prevent escalation of tensions around the North Korean "nuclear issue" and to reach its settlement through peaceful political and diplomatic means.
Russia has consistently opposed "nuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula and has advocated a solution that would meet the interests of all the parties concerned, first of all Pyongyang and Washington. We equally reject both the achievement of military nuclear potential by North Korea and any solution of the "nuclear issue" through the use of force. In both cases, the consequences for the Korean states' neighbors, let alone themselves, would be most negative.
Russia is resolved to contribute actively to a peaceful settlement of that problem relying upon its potential in our relations with the USA and North Korea. We stand ready to discuss and participate in the negotiation formats that are currently proposed by various parties.
K. Links of Interest 1. Conference Proceedings from the Pre-G8 2003 Summit Seminar on �Strengthening Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Northern Region�
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