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RANSAC Nuclear News, July 30, 2003 Compiled By: A. Bellona Foundation
 A. Bellona Foundation 1. Technical Agreement for Plutonium Disposition Allowed to Lapse by US In a long-anticipated act of inaction, the US Government let expire a 1998 US-Russian agreement on technical cooperation for plutonium disposition over concerns that the agreement did not provide sufficient liability protections for US officials and contractors involved in the project, the National Nuclear Safety Association, or NNSA, and Russia�s nuclear regulatory agency confirmed. As a result, all new plutonium disposition planning under the Clinton-Yeltsin era agreement�known as the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement�legally has to be halted. The agreement provided for scientific and technical cooperation between the United States and Russia on the development of methods by which to destroy surplus weapons-grade plutonium in each country. Both the US and Russia have agreed to each eliminate 34 tonnes�of the hundreds of tonnes both have in stockpile�of surplus weapons-grade plutonium in so called �parallel� progress. The method by which this plutonium will be destroyed is in the creation of a nuclear fuel called MOX, which is a mixture of weapons-grade plutonium oxide and uranium oxide. This fuel is to be burned in specially retrofitted conventional nuclear reactors, similar to Russia�s VVER-1000s, which will produce spent nuclear fuel of such high radioactivity that, according to MOX proponents, it will be impossible to extract the weapons-grade plutonium from it. The programme envisions billions of dollars worth of fuel fabrication plant construction and environmentally risky reactor retrofitting. It is Bellona�s opinion that, although safe methods of securing surplus weapons-grade plutonium must be found quickly, the MOX option is dangerous and ill-suited for this purpose. With the right technology, experts contend, weapons-grade plutonium in MOX spent fuel can, in fact, be extracted. Furthermore, because the MOX fuel includes uranium, burning MOX breeds even more plutonium than was in the fuel assemblies to begin with�undermining the very purpose of the enterprise. In Bellona�s opinion, adopting the MOX approach is irrational against a background of cheaper and safer options like immobilisation. �I cannot understand why the administration would let key aspects of the programme to get rid of so much weapons-grade plutonium lapse. Keeping fissile material out of the hands of terrorists seems a critical step in the war on terrorism,� Ellen Tauscher, a US House of Representatives Democrat from California, and a vocal proponent of maintaining threat reduction programmes, told the Global Security Newswire, or GSN last week. A US Department of State spokesman confirmed Monday that a provisional three-month extension had been given to the 1998 agreement, but that all new projects within this period would be �evaluated on a strict case-by-case basis.� The expiration follows the announcement last week by the US Department of Energy, or DOE, that another 1998 threat reduction measure, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, or NCI, agreement, will be allowed to expire in September unless Russia agrees to similar changes in liability provisions. The DOE-run NCI programme aims to retrain Russian nuclear weapons scientists for work in the commercial sphere. Tauscher and five other Democrats wrote the US President George Bush administration this week to protest the move, congressional officials said this week. The Plutonium Science and Technology agreement�signed by former US Vice President Al Gore and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin�covered MOX concept design, research and development, small pilot projects for fuel testing, equipment transfers, limited testing of lead-test assemblies, and international seminars. The 1998 agreement, did not, however, adopt the liability provisions of the �umbrella agreement� of the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, programme as it did not envision any actual construction, but only research. The umbrella agreement places nearly all liability for any accidents that take place during US-funded nuclear dismantlement and cleanup efforts in Russia on Moscow. This is a position that the US Department of State apparently will not compromise on, but that Russia finds untenable�especially given the May signing in Stockholm of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation, or MNEPR. The MNEPR agreement provides more latitude for Russia on liability issues when entering into bilateral nuclear disarmament and cleanup projects with other�particularly European�nations, and a spokesman at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, said Tuesday that the Russian side would prefer future liability agreements with the United States to be modelled on MNEPR�s liability policies. But this would be an unlikely concession from the United States: Although Washington is a signatory of the MNEPR agreement, it refused to sign MNEPR�s liability protocol, which, at the insistence of the US, had been separated from the main text of the agreement. According to the State Department spokesman, that position has not softened. In addition, according to a European Union official who is close to the plutonium disposition negotiations, and who requested his name not be mentioned in this article, there are some European nations that agree with the United States�though he did not name which ones, or whether they were signatories of the MNEPR accord�and think MNEPR liability guidelines are not stringent enough. In Europe, the MNEPR agreement was signed by Belgium, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, as well as the European Community, or EC, and the European Atomic Energy Community, or Euratom�all of which signed the MNEPR liability protocol. NNSA Says Impasse is �Short Term� Bryan Wilkes, a spokesman for the NNSA�which is participating in several exchanges with Russian nuclear regulators�said in a telephone interview from Washington that the liability problem was �a legal issue for the State Department to work out.� �We just want to proceed with our programmes, essentially, and we don�t want to get bogged down in these legal issues, but � the State Department is insisting on some legal changes on the liability issues,� Wilkes said. Wilkes said no new projects could be started under the 1998 technical agreement now that it has lapsed, but he noted that �there�s a lot that�s already in the pipeline that�s been planned. This will have no impact in the short term.� He added, however that �if [the disagreement over the liability terms of the 1998 agreement] becomes longer term, it could be a problem.� One Programme Allowed to Continue American and Russian officials, who had convened in Moscow this and last week under the aegis of the 1998 agreement to discuss regulatory issues for plutonium disposition plan, were said by one official to be in a �depressed mood� over the lapse of the agreement. �Few people showed up at the seminars and everyone is uncertain about their job security,� said the official. Only one programme has been allowed to continue operation after the lapse of the 1998 agreement without special State Department and US National Security Council, or NSC, approval, US officials and representatives of Russia�s nuclear regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor, or GAN, confirmed in interviews this week. This programme is a regulatory exchange project run by the DOE�s senior project manager for the GAN regulatory and licensing infrastructure development project, Sotirios Thomas, and Andrei Kislov, head of GAN�s 3rd Directorate, or fuel cycles division. This programme, according to Russian, European and American officials, which seeks to unite the experience of US nuclear regulators such as the NNSA and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, with Russian regulators to transform the ever marginalized GAN into a truly independent nuclear watchdog, goes beyond the scope of the plutonium disposition programme. The project is advancing US foreign policy as it relates to developing the licensing of nuclear activities in Russia, and is meant to help make GAN an expert regulatory agency free of state pressure�something the US Congress truly wants, said officials in conversations with Bellona Web in the weeks leading up to the lapse of the 1998 agreement. Working Around the 1998 Agreement Several US and European observers noted, however, that the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement, signed by former US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin, may provide a map out of the current impasse over the 1998 agreement. The 2000 agreement�which does make reference to actual destruction of plutonium and contains provisions for facility construction�was vague on issues of liability and put off their resolution until a future date. That date, the Bush administration apparently decided, has arrived. "What the administration would like is to negotiate a liability provision for the 2000 plutonium disposition agreement that conforms to the CTR umbrella agreement," William Hoehn, Washington office director of the Russian American Nuclear Safety Advisory Council, or RANSAC�a Washington-based NGO that advises the Russian and US governments�said in a telephone interview this week. "That way, everything that needs to be done could be performed under the 2000 agreement, and the 1998 agreement would no longer be required." The European official agreed with Hoehn. �The 2000 agreement provides a political basis with which both sides can work,� the European official told Bellona Web. The CTR umbrella agreement, however, has never been ratified by Russia�s Parliament, the State Duma, but according to some reports, the US is hoping that the Duma may soon ratify the umbrella agreement. Although Hoehn noted that many Washington experts were enthusiastic about Duma ratification for the CTR liability structure, he said the issue may not be as high on the Russian Parliament�s �to do� list as some US specialists think. "Politically, [. . .] I am not sure, with parliamentary elections coming up in December, that ratifying the umbrella agreement is a high priority for the Duma right now," he said. "If they do manage to ratify it, it would be a major achievement." Whether or not the ratification comes, said the European official, �Russia and the United States have gone so far along the plutonium disposition path and exerted so much political pressure that I don�t think the whole programme will just disappear.� �They have a three-month extension in which to establish the needed legal principles,� he added. �I jut cannot see that this programme will come to an end.� Other factors that the European Union official noted which will buy some more negotiating time is the disparity between the US and Russian MOX programmes. Under the 2000 agreement, both countries are to proceed in parallel progress. But, said the European official, �the US work is far advanced and Russia is lagging far behind.� He noted, for instance, that Russia would require approximately $2 billion for its MOX fabrication plant that is slated to be built near the town of Tomsk in Central Siberia. So far, $800,000 has been collected in international donations, the official noted, and it is unknown how much more can be expected. The European official said, therefore, that even if all the liability structures were in place, Russia would face the dilemma of waiting until it has all the money it needs in the bank to start construction, or committing to the project with the money it does have�but then it may financially never be able to complete it. Nuke and Environmental Experts Register Opposition to MOX on Capitol Hill An open letter by a group of respected US nuclear and environmental experts sent to US Senator Pete Domeneci, who heads the Senate Appropriations Committee, confirmed the EU official�s analysis. Domenici will be responsible for whether a $402m appropriation to begin construction of the US MOX fabrication plant at the DOE�s Savannah River Site in the 2004 fiscal year will be granted. The experts, in their letter, urged him against it. Aside from US-side construction authorisation for the plant�which has yet to be granted by the NRC�as well as the DOE�s failure to accurately clarify the budget for the facility, the letter noted: *Technical and licensing plans for the Russian MOX programme are at a preliminary point and lag far behind the US programme, and thus will not be at a place where congressionally mandated �parallel� construction of MOX facilities in Russia can begin in the 2004 fiscal year; *Funding for the Russian MOX programme has not been secured from either the US or G-8 [Group of Eight] countries, with the most recent failure to secure sufficient funds coming at the G-8 summit which was held from June 1st to June 3rd in Evian, France; *No agreements with Russia have yet been reached concerning the critical issues of liability of Western vendors or �monitoring and inspection� to confirm Russia�s adherence to control and accounting of plutonium and inspection of facilities, as stipulated in the US-Russia plutonium disposition agreement of September 2000. Based on the United States� own cost analysis documentation of the MOX programme, the letter�which was posted on the Washington-based Nuclear Control Institute�s website at www.nci.org�went on to say that �it is quite clear that the Russian MOX programme is at a preliminary stage. In addition to lack of clarity about which reactors would be used for Russian MOX irradiation, whether one or two MOX facilities would be constructed has not been decided.� �Accordingly, the cost estimate for the Russian programme has increased dramatically from the 2001 estimate of $1.7 billion to a range of $2.1 to $2.7 billion, and the [cost analysis] document states that the estimates presented are �preliminary� and actual costs will �most likely� be greater than costs presented in the document,� the letter continued. DOE and NNSA insiders, in conversations with Bellona Web, said that the views expressed in the letter were widely shared within the corridors of their agencies. NCI Letter Urges Immobilisation Over MOX The letter also touched on the ongoing debate of MOX versus immobilisation�another way to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. One method of immobilisation involves melting plutonium oxide with high-level radioactive waste and specially fabricated sand, thus making glass bricks, and burying the bricks in a permanent repository. The other, called the �can-in-canister� approach, would compress weapons-grade plutonium into pucks and store them in canisters filled with molten glass containing high-level radioactive waste. These canisters would then likewise be placed in a permanent repository. �The DOE acknowledged in its 2002 plutonium disposition report to Congress that the cheapest disposition option for all 34 metric tonnes of surplus US plutonium was its immobilisation in high-level waste, yet the DOE prematurely ended development of this option in 2002,� read the letter. In 2002, the Bush administration abandoned any plutonium disposition agreements that would involve immobilisation altogether. The letter concluded that former US President Ronald Reagan�s Undersecretary of Defence had testified before the House Committee on International Relations in 2003 that the US-Russian MOX programme �could do great harm to non-proliferation� and that the programme �will encourage other expanding uses of plutonium,� which �could well mean the death knell for non-proliferation.� The letter was signed by NCI President Paul Levinthal, US Greenpeace�s top representative Tom Clements, Tom Cochran of the Natural Resources Defence Council, and 17 other nuclear and environmental experts. Pete Domenici�s office had no comment on the letter when reached on Tuesday. Return to Menu B. Global Security Newswire 1. U.S.-Russia: Cooperative Plutonium Disposition Activities Held Up While Liability Concerns Negotiated Following last week�s termination of a U.S.-Russian agreement to examine scientific and technical issues affecting the disposition of plutonium removed from Russian nuclear weapons, the U.S. State Department said yesterday that activity under a subsequent agreement on the actual disposition of the material is being put on hold (see GSN, July 25). Last week, the 1998 Plutonium Science and Technology agreement was allowed to expire because of State Department concerns that its liability provisions would not sufficiently protect U.S. officials or contractors in case of injuries or damages occurring during activities carried out under the agreement. Some experts indicated last week that certain projects carried out under the defunct 1998 agreement could continue under the more comprehensive 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement, which in its current form contains no liability provisions. U.S. officials are now saying, though, that activities under the latter agreement � which lays out terms and timetables according to which the United States and Russia are each to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium � will be put on hold until a liability protocol is negotiated. �Industrial-scale disposition activities will not go forward under the Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement of 2000 until adequate liability protections are agreed,� State Department spokeswoman Tara Rigler said yesterday. A U.S. official said not only actual disposition � which was not scheduled to begin for several years � but also design and construction of facilities are on hold. The official added that some activities that had begun under the 1998 agreement have stopped since it expired last week, but stressed that �intense� U.S.-Russian talks are under way in a bid to break the logjam over the 2000 agreement and allow activities to continue. Washington is aiming to reach an agreement by late this year to preserve the existing timetable for the U.S.-Russian plutonium disposition program, officials said. Meanwhile, some disagreement has become apparent between the State Department and the Energy Department�s National Nuclear Security Administration over the status of activities under the 2000 agreement. �I�m not sure how it can be on hold, because it doesn�t expire, and we are continuing our programs under that agreement,� NNSA spokesman Bryan Wilkes said today. U.S. Looking for Umbrella Agreement-Style Liability Language The United States is seeking, as a general standard in threat reduction texts, to obtain protections �commensurate with those in the [1992] Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement,� Rigler said. The State Department has decided to renegotiate liability protections in agreements with protections it deems insufficient as those agreements come up for renewal, according to U.S. officials familiar with the situation. One major objection the State Department has to the 1998 agreement�s liability provisions is that they exempt Russia from liability in cases of �premeditated� acts leading to damage or injury. The 1992 umbrella agreement has no such exemption for Russia. The State Department�s main focus now is on negotiating a liability protocol to the 2000 agreement, according to U.S. officials. Agreement on such a protocol could render the 1998 text essentially obsolete, since the newer agreement provides for research and development activities in addition to actual plutonium disposition. The 1998 agreement includes provisions under which, according to the officials, some activity governed by existing contracts can continue. However, no new projects will be undertaken under the agreement, officials said. In explaining the new liability focus, the U.S. State and Energy departments have repeatedly cited guidelines that Group of Eight countries agreed on last year at a summit in Canada. A third U.S.-Russian agreement, the Nuclear Cities Initiative agreement, will also be allowed to expire later this year unless the same liability questions are resolved in the text, the U.S. Energy Department announced last week (see GSN, July 23). Return to Menu 2. U.S.-Russia: Washington Allows Plutonium Disposition Agreement to Lapse WASHINGTON � As expected, a 1998 U.S.-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition was allowed to expire this week because of U.S. concerns that the agreement had insufficient liability protections for U.S. officials and contractors, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration confirmed today. Known as the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement, the measure provides for scientific and technical cooperation between the United States and Russia on the withdrawal of plutonium from nuclear military programs. �I cannot understand why the administration would let key aspects of the program to get rid of so much weapons-grade plutonium lapse. Keeping fissile material out of the hands of terrorists seems a critical step in the war on terrorism,� U.S. Representative Ellen Tauscher, who has been a vocal proponent of maintaining such programs, said today. The expiration follows the announcement Tuesday by the U.S. Energy Department that another 1998 threat-reduction measure, the Nuclear Cities Initiative agreement, will be allowed to expire in September unless Russia agrees to changes in liability provisions. Tauscher and five other Democrats wrote the Bush administration this week to protest the move (see GSN, July 23). The source of U.S. insistence on the liability language changes is the State Department, according to NNSA spokesman Bryan Wilkes. �We just want to proceed with our programs, essentially, and we don�t want to get bogged down in these legal issues, but � the State Department is insisting on some legal changes on the liability issues,� Wilkes said. Wilkes said no new projects could be started under the plutonium agreement now that it has lapsed, but he added that �there�s a lot that�s already in the pipeline that�s been planned.� �This should have no short-term effect, because we fully support the program, and we have not stopped. � We are continuing work,� he added. In any case, he added, �We anticipate this issue is going to be resolved.� The Washington director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies� Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Leonard Spector, called it �unfortunate that there is this perturbation in the plutonium disposition program� but added that it �appears that, in this particular case, the impact of the agreement lapsing will not have a significant impact overall.� The Energy Department indicated Tuesday that it expects to reinstate the NCI agreement once the liability concerns are resolved, and Wilkes said the same sequence of events is possible in the case of the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement. Some aspects of the plutonium agreement are also covered by the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement, and experts have said activities carried out under the auspices of the 1998 agreement could conceivably continue under the 2000 text. Wilkes said today, �There�s maneuverability room, I guess, between the two agreements.� A liability protocol to the 2000 agreement has yet to be negotiated. The Bush administration has been seeking a single liability standard for all threat reduction programs that would be similar to the one established in the 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction �umbrella agreement.� The provisions in that agreement assign Russia near-total liability for damages and injuries that occur in the context of activities carried out under the agreement. Return to Menu 3. U.S.-Russia: Legal Issues Threaten Nonproliferation Programs (*Corrected Version*) A U.S.-Russian legal dispute is threatening to end two nonproliferation agreements intended to help convert Russian nuclear weapons materials and facilities into peaceful uses. U.S. officials say the dispute centers around protecting U.S. personnel working in Russia, but critics say the Bush administration policy could end these and other cooperative programs. One agreement is set to expire tomorrow, and the other will probably run out in September unless Moscow grants sweeping liability protections to U.S. workers and companies operating in Russia. The Energy Department announced yesterday that it will not renew the 1998 Nuclear Cities Initiative agreement unless Russia accepts changes to the agreement, which is due to expire Sept. 22. Under the program, the United States has supported scaling back activities in Russia�s nuclear weapon research and production sites and converting some remaining facilities to peaceful purposes. According to the Energy Department�s Web site, the initiative �is the only U.S. government program whose primary aim is to help downsize the Russian nuclear weapons complex.� Yesterday�s announcement, however, said that U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham has informed his Russian counterpart, Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev, that the NCI agreement will not be renewed �until the Russian government approves legal provisions intended to protect American workers and companies working on projects in Russia.� Abraham expressed hope that Russia will accept new liability language in time for the agreement to be renewed in September, but he said that if the agreement lapses, the two countries should nevertheless be able to continue existing projects. In such a case, Abraham said, �We look forward to reinstating the NCI agreement once broader issues of liability protection have been settled.� The announcement came only one day after U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration spokesman Bryan Wilkes said the NCI program �is not being canceled; it is not being stopped.� �We fully support the program. � The secretary is not canceling the program,� Wilkes said Monday. Plutonium Science and Technology Agreement Runs Out Tomorrow The Energy Department�s announcement yesterday may signal not only that the NCI program is in jeopardy, but also that other threat reduction efforts are threatened, as the Bush administration makes a priority of obtaining broad liability protections in all such agreements, according to congressional and nongovernmental organization observers. Immediately threatened is another 1998 U.S.-Russian initiative, known as the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement, that is set to expire tomorrow. The agreement provides for U.S.-Russian scientific and technical collaboration related to the withdrawal of plutonium from nuclear military programs. Aspects of the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement are also covered by the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement, and activities carried out under the auspices of the 1998 agreement could conceivably continue under the 2000 text, according to Leonard Spector, who directs the Washington office of the Monterey Institute of International Studies� Center for Nonproliferation Studies. A planned liability protocol to the 2000 agreement has yet to be negotiated, while the language of the older plutonium agreement contains liability language similar to that of the NCI agreement � language that the Bush administration has consistently sought to replace with provisions such as those in the 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction �umbrella agreement,� Spector said. Among other differences, the 1998 texts would exempt Russia from liability in cases of �premeditated� actions causing damage or injury, while the 1992 language contains no such references, leaving it entirely up to Russia to deal with all liability issues arising under activities governed by the agreement. House Members Write Bush Writing ahead of the Energy Department�s announcement on the NCI agreement, six Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives wrote U.S. President George W. Bush yesterday to express �deep concern that the United States is contemplating the possible nonrenewal of two key U.S.-Russian nonproliferation agreements that provide the legal basis for important cooperative threat reduction efforts with Russia.� Referring to the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement, the representatives � Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), John Spratt (D-S.C.), Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Chet Edwards (D-Texas) and Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) � said they �understand that the administration may be prepared to allow� the agreement to lapse tomorrow. �Beyond the national security and nonproliferation concerns of allowing the plutonium disposition program in Russia to stall or terminate,� the six lawmakers added, �there might also be significant negative domestic impacts on the activities associated with the plutonium disposition activities in the U.S. The U.S. plutonium disposition effort is a multibillion-dollar program that is designed to operate in tandem with the Russian plutonium disposal activities, and support for the effort could falter if the Russian program stalls.� Duma Endorsement Sought for Broad Liability Provisions Spector said the Bush administration is consistently championing what it sees as the �tried-and-true, clean approach of the CTR agreement.� �Whether or not that is the good approach is not the issue any longer. The government has decided that that is the approach that they want,� he said. According to Spector, the U.S. Defense Department views the liability language in the 1992 text as �perfection.� The Russian Duma, however, has never ratified the 1992 agreement or a later extension of the agreement, and it has been applied only provisionally. Meanwhile, some agreements signed in recent years � including bilateral arrangements between Germany and Russia and the 12-country Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program for Russia (see GSN, May 22) � do not match the 1992 umbrella agreement�s broad liability provisions. In light of these developments, the desire to see the Duma ratify the liability provisions of the 1992 text is the key to U.S. insistence on similar language in the 1998 texts, according to Spector, who cited hopes the Russian legislature could ratify the umbrella agreement soon despite the fact that it is unlikely to sit for more than two months over the rest of this year. �The Americans think that once the Duma acts� on the 1992 agreement, Spector said, �the Russian objections will die off.� Even critics of the Bush administration�s approach, he said, agree that Duma action on the older text would �kind of cut the Gordian knot,� allowing the United States to hold up the 1992 agreement as a model of what the Duma is willing to ratify in the hope that such language can become the standard for agreements such as the plutonium disposition protocol. Spector and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute�s Douglas Brubaker wrote an article in the Monterey Institute�s Nonproliferation Review supporting reform of liability provisions in nuclear nonproliferation assistance agreements with Russia. Spector, a former assistant deputy administrator in the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, said yesterday that he opposes terminating the NCI program but supports the principle of liability reform in the interest of facilitating future nonproliferation assistance to Russia. �Whatever the next agreement is going to be, this is a humongously difficult headache every single agreement. And if you could get one of them locked in and endorsed, it would really streamline all future work,� Spector said. Spector and Brubaker argued in their article that none of the existing liability language models for cooperative threat reduction agreements sufficiently addresses the question of victim compensation. While Russia may be fully liable under umbrella agreement-style provisions, they said, Moscow is unlikely to be in a position to actually pay out compensation. The two researchers advocated two approaches to resolving the compensation problem. In the first approach, Russia would be liable for a certain amount of compensation, the cost of which could be covered by insurance taken out by Moscow for the purpose, and donor countries involved in nonproliferation aid programs in Russia would pay the rest of the compensation under a pooling system. The second approach envisions a bond issue in which bondholders would stand to make money on their investment unless a catastrophic accident occurred � in which case their money could be used to compensate victims. In announcing its stance on the NCI liability language yesterday, the Energy Department cited agreements reached last year at the Group of Eight summit in Canada, where the world�s leading industrialized countries and Russia launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The department indicated it would seek the same liability protections in a wide variety of other agreements. Critics Assail Focus on Liability Language Critics said the administration�s liability focus could lead to a broader series of moves to shrink or end threat reduction programs. �It�s entirely possible this is going to be a chain reaction over these issues of liability,� Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Executive Director Kenneth Luongo said. Luongo, who initially wrote top Bush administration officials July 2 to plead in favor of keeping both programs, said yesterday in a statement, �Allowing these agreements to expire is wrong and unnecessary at this time. It sends a terrible signal about the importance of securing the largest stockpile of weapons of mass destruction on Earth as rapidly as possible.� �This issue has been debated in the dark, without any public involvement,� he said, adding that an �impression is being left that arguments will be used to kill programs and not debate them publicly.� �At a time when the president is running around the country talking about the intersection of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism,� Luongo said, terminating NCI activities �doesn�t make any sense.� �The point is, this is a terrible decision from a policy perspective,� Luongo said. �If this was a new agreement � that�s a separate issue than, �These agreements have been in operation for five years and, in some cases, 10 years, and now we think the liability provisions are inadequate.� Well, you have to show why they�re inadequate,� he added. Rose Gottemoeller, senior associate for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said allowing NCI to lapse not only would concern the U.S. Energy Department and the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, but also could damage U.S.-Russian relations more broadly at a crucial moment. �It is a bigger issue than a DOE-Minatom issue,� Gottemoeller said. Return to Menu C. Contra Costa Times 1. Feds press Russians on work liability The Department of Energy said Tuesday it will cancel a program to help isolated Russian nuclear weapons cities if the country does not adopt new liability provisions. Nonproliferation advocates say the move is so onerous it will essentially cancel the Nuclear Cities Initiative, which since 1998 has helped make the transition for the flailing cities to non-weapons work through job creation and infrastructure development. "These are just the first dominos in something that could seriously undermine very important programs," said Raphael Della Ratta with the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. DOE officials say the concern is exaggerated, and they want the programs to continue, but with new rules to protect U.S. workers. "We hope that the Russian Federation will accept our broad proposal on liability in time to allow for the extension of the ... agreement," Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in a statement. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is coordinated by the three U.S. nuclear weapons labs, including Lawrence Livermore. And, Livermore is a sister city of Snezhinsk, one of the formerly closed nuclear company towns that was devastated when the Soviet Union collapsed. Some cooperative programs between the two cities were sponsored through the nuclear cities program. According to a DOE statement, Abraham sent a letter to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy this week saying they will likely pull out of the program if the new rules that expand Russia's liability for joint work between the two countries are not approved. Existing projects will be allowed to continue if an agreement is not reached by September, when the current agreement expires. Several members of Congress, including Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Alamo, sent a letter to President Bush on Monday asking that the programs be preserved. "Given the concern that a terrorist organization or rogue nation seeking to develop their own nuclear arsenals would actively recruit these scientists, it only makes sense to continue with the very program that helps them transition into peaceful alternative careers," Tauscher, who has worked to support nuclear programs with Russia, said in a statement. The DOE's move attempts to match liability provisions in other joint nuclear agreements with Russia, including those to dispose of nuclear weapons and build power plants. The focus on the nuclear cities fund and another, which funds research on the safe disposal of plutonium, is paradoxical because the programs pose almost no risk to the United States compared to those other programs, said Leonard Spector, deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. A compromise would extend the program for six months or a year, until the Russian parliament gets a chance to vote on other provisions. "The hard-liners in the administration seem to have rejected that approach," Spector said. "The sad part is that some very important programs may be victimized." Return to Menu D. Tri-Valley Herald 1. Bush May Abandon Weaponeer Program The Bush administration has warned Russia's nuclear-weapons chief of plans to let lapse an agreement turning Russian weapons scientists, labs and factories to nondefense work if Moscow fails to expand liability protections for American scientists and corporations. Nonproliferation advocates in Congress called the move a "dan-gerous and unnecessary development" that is contrary to U.S. security interests in keeping Russian weapons, materials and expertise out of the hands of terrorists. Six House Democrats urged the White House on Tuesday to reconsider and renew the agreements for another year, saying "Few objectives are as central to U.S. national security as eliminating these threats as soon as possible." Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham has cautioned Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexandr Rumyantsev that the United States will not renew the 1998 Nuclear Cities Initiative unless Moscow shields Americans from lawsuits based on premeditated acts that cause injury or death to Russian workers. Due to expire Sept. 22, the $20 million-a-year Nuclear Cities Initiative has been a perennial target of fiscal conservatives and Cold War-style hawks, who point to its only modest success at diverting unemployed Russian weaponeers and unused nuclear facilities to new jobs. So far, the program has removed 500,000 square feet from nuclear-weapons assembly work and redirected roughly 400 Russian scientists and engineers to fuel-cell research and the manufacture of artificial limbs. But those achievements seem meager against the monolith of the Russian nuclear-weapons enterprise of 75,000 workers, of whom an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 are considered unemployed or underemployed. Since the late 1990s, the Pentagon and Energy Department have run a family of "Cooperative Threat Reduction" programs to prevent the migration of Russian weapons, materials and skills into the black market and the hands of terrorists, driven by wrenching economic adjustments and poverty. The earliest of these programs required the Russian government to fully indemnify American scientists and corporations against any liability, including from intentional, "premed-itated" acts. "The Russians are being put in a position where they're being told that even if a U.S. contractor performs a harmful act intentionally that you, Russia, are on the hook," said Raphael Della Ratta, a coordinator at the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a non-profit research group in Washington, D.C. "Of course, the Russians don't like that." The Energy Department has not released Abraham's correspondence with Rumyantsev, but the secretary's staff said he was urging the Russians to allow current Nuclear Cities projects to continue even if the agreement expires. The lapse, however, would not allow any new projects to expand employment of Russian weaponeers. "Given the concern that a terrorist organization or rogue nation seeking to develop their own nuclear arsenals would actively recruit these scientists, it only makes sense to continue with the very program that helps them transition to peaceful, alternative careers," said Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Alamo, who joined fellow Democrats on House Armed Services Committee and the California delegation in writing to President George W. Bush about the agreement. "A lackluster commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons seems to be a pattern with this administration," she said. Joe Davis, an Energy Department spokes-man, took issue with Tauscher's characterization, noting that the administration recently concluded a pact with Russia to phase out plutonium-producing nuclear reactors in favor of energy plants powered by fossil fuels. "We would just like to see some of those workers that the congresswoman represents protected," Davis said. Return to Menu E. Washington Post 1. Letter to the Editor: Reinventing the Arms Race At the same time Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham was penning a piece for your paper about the Bush administration's work to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, he was carrying out the administration's plans to end two of our most successful nonproliferation programs. This week the secretary sent a letter notifying the Russians that the United States will terminate the Nuclear Cities Initiative. Also this week, an agreement governing key aspects of the effort to eliminate 34 metric tons of weapons-grade Russian plutonium was set to lapse without U.S. action. The Nuclear Cities Initiative is dedicated to shrinking Russia's nuclear weapons complex and finding jobs for scientists outside the weapons industry. Given Russia's plans to close several facilities and concern that a terrorist organization or rogue nation will actively recruit unemployed scientists, it is in our national security interest to continue the program that helps them make the transition into peaceful careers. At the recent G-8 summit, administration officials and G-8 members called the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons "the preeminent threat to national security" and expanded their commitment to fight it. But while some administration officials were in France saying one thing, others were working to relax a ban on the research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, or "mini nukes," to fund research on a powerful "bunker buster" nuclear weapon and to accelerate the time frame to resume underground nuclear testing. These new nuclear weapons are of highly questionable wisdom and utility. They were not asked for by the military. And they will end the notion that nuclear weapons are weapons of last resort. Low-yield nuclear weapons are for battlefield use. "Bunker busters" will never surgically destroy targets, they offer no guarantee against releasing chemical and biological agents into the atmosphere, and they hinder our ability to gather intelligence from bunkers they would irradiate. The Republican chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water expressed concern that the administration is planning to spend millions of dollars to build new nuclear weapons before there is a need for them. The committee wrote in its report that the Department of Energy "is proposing to rebuild, restart, and redo and otherwise exercise every capability that was used over the past forty years of the Cold War and at the same time prepare for a future with an expanded mission for nuclear weapons." This fundamental change in our country's nuclear weapons policy deserves serious thought. For the United States to have any credibility, the administration cannot preach nuclear disarmament on one hand and start a new nuclear arms race on the other. Return to Menu F. Associated Press 1. Putin participates in pilgrimage at closed Russian city, then heads to nuclear center President Vladimir Putin visited the closed city of Sarov on Thursday and paid homage to its unusual double history _ home of one of the Russian Orthodox Church's most revered saints and heart of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons program. Patriarch Alexy II met Putin inside the newly restored Cathedral of St. Seraphim of Sarov, giving him a guided tour of the majestic building tucked inside the barbed-wire-enclosed city of about 80,000. The church has been restored for four-day festivities celebrating the 100th anniversary of the saint's canonization. "Russia has known many bright feats in the service of God, the people and the fatherland, but Seraphim of Sarov, his life and studies are one of the brightest," Putin told thousands of pilgrims gathered in the hot sun in Sarov, where the Soviet leadership turned the cathedral into a museum and largely destroyed the small room where the saint once lived and prayed. "Today's celebration is possible thanks to the rebirth in Russia of religious, spiritual freedom," Putin said. Alexy, who has called for closer ties between his dominant church and the government, called it "a sign of the unity of the church, the people and the authorities." But while Putin's participation in an Orthodox pilgrimage symbolizes the changes ushered in by the collapse of Communism, the rows of metal barricades and gun-toting officers on the road into Sarov are a stark reminder that many Soviet habits have not been shed. The city 400 kilometers (250 miles) east of Moscow is still closed both to foreigners and to Russians without special permission. An Associated Press reporter traveling as part of Putin's press pool was turned back at the gates. "Not a single Sarov resident may come or go without permission _ in essence, they are all state serfs," Russia's Kommersant newspaper wrote, referring to czarist-era peasants tied to their master's land. Under Communism, Sarov never appeared on official maps. The reason was the Avangard nuclear weapons plant. Andrei Sakharov, who later became a leading dissident, was once among the team of Sarov scientists developing the hydrogen bomb there. Today, the center's employees are among the highest-paid state workers in Russia, and secrecy persists. Meeting with workers at the center later Thursday, Putin said Russia "must and will remain a great nuclear power," the Interfax newspaper reported. He also said that Russia would continue refraining from nuclear tests only if other nuclear powers do the same, Interfax and the ITAR-Tass news agency reported. While Putin did not single out any country, his statement appeared to be a warning to the United States, which has declined to ratify a global nuclear test ban and kept the door open on a possible resumption of nuclear tests. Most of the pilgrims didn't make it into Sarov and were concentrated in Diveyevo, a picturesque village about 20 kilometers (12 miles) away. After the consecration of the restored Sarov cathedral, priests in bright green robes led a procession bringing St. Seraphim's remains back to the gleaming white convent in Diveyevo. "For 70 years, it was so hard to worship," said Irina Lyushina, 60, of Nizhny Novgorod, who wore a small icon around her neck. "But today ... it is our duty as believers to restore the church, to not lose any more time." Russian media have said the government's focus on the festivities, in particular Putin's attendance, may be a nod to this fall's parliamentary elections and next year's presidential vote. The overwhelming majority of Russians identify themselves as members of the Orthodox Church. Putin's visit to Sarov also comes amid threats by the United States to not renew an initiative that aimed to retrain Russian scientists in an effort to keep them employed and prevent their know-how from falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. Alexander Pikayev, a top nuclear analyst for the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow office, said that the program's end would significantly increase proliferation risks at the time when Russia's Nuclear Energy Ministry is planning massive layoffs. Putin sought to ease concerns, saying that "in any reorganization of the Nuclear ministry's structures, whatever changes occur, this whole complex will remain unified, integrated and able to work," Interfax reported. Return to Menu G. ITAR-Tass 1. US Seeking Revision of 2 Nuclear Security Agts with Russia U.S. Administration has no plans of slashing cooperation with Russia in nuclear security and non-proliferation, but it thinks they sides should review the agreements regulating that activity, Brian Wilkes, a spokesman for the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, told reporters. He indicated that the U.S. Department of Energy hoped to continue contacts with the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry and to settle eventually all the issues pertaining to legal responsibility of the sides. The U.S. is seeking a revision of an intergovernmental agreement on utilizing excessive weapons-grade plutonium and the so-called Nuclear Cities initiative, Wilkes indicated. Russia and the U.S. signed both documents, effective over a period of five years, in 1998, but their prolongation has not been possible so far as the U.S. is insisting that American experts be relieved of any responsibility while working on those projects. Some Congressmen and independent experts have urged the White House to prolong the documents for at least a year and to continue talks with Russia at the same time. The U.S. Department of Energy says it is unwilling to break up cooperation with Russian counterparts, too, but it resolutely insists that certain provisions of the two documents be revised. The weapons-grade plutonium agreement envisions that each side must downgrade 34 tons of plutonium into fuel for nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Cities program stipulates U.S. aid for converting the Russian defense industries to civilian manufacturing, as well as for providing jobs to the specialists becoming redundant in the process of conversion. Return to Menu H. USA Today 1. Liability Issues Threaten Nuclear Security Programs U.S. Seeking Better Terms in 2 Agreements With Russia The Bush administration has decided not to renew two U.S.-Russian agreements that form the basis for cooperative efforts to cut plutonium stockpiles and keep Russia's nuclear weapons material -- and expertise -- out of terrorists' hands. The administration wants stronger liability protections than the 10-year-old agreements provide for U.S. agencies and contractors that work in Russia on the security projects. It is trying to negotiate new terms. The decision not to renew the agreements may provide leverage to get the Russians to accept new terms. The impasse threatens to derail two programs that send Russia hundreds of millions of dollars to secure nuclear material and employ weapons scientists in peaceful jobs. President Bush has hailed those efforts as a key tool to prevent enemy states and terrorist groups from obtaining nuclear arms -- or luring cash-strapped Russian scientists to help them. ''This is a big deal,'' says one administration official who is involved in the negotiations. The affected programs will continue to run at least through the end of this year even though their agreements will have expired, he adds, but ''this has to be resolved for these programs to proceed'' in the long term. Officials at the White House and State Department declined to comment on the record. At issue are: * The plutonium disposition program. This program aims to have Russia and the United States convert 34 tons each of excess plutonium into mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel for civilian nuclear power plants. The United States has agreed to contribute $400 million to help Russia build storage and conversion facilities, which will cost $2 billion to complete and run over 20 years. A similar U.S. operation is to be built at the Energy Department's Savannah River nuclear weapons facility in South Carolina. The program agreement expired last week. * The Nuclear Cities Initiative. This program helps Russia shut down nuclear weapons production sites that operated as closed cities during the Cold War. The U.S. program spends about $20 million a year to upgrade infrastructure at Russia's nuclear cities and shift weapons experts into new work. It helped close the Avangard nuclear warhead plant at Sarov, Russia, and is slated to help shutter another facility in coming years. The program agreement expires in September. U.S. officials want to ensure that Russia will not take legal action against the United States or its contractors if something goes wrong on one of the projects. This might include an accident in handling nuclear material that could cause injuries or environmental damage. But there has been little headway in three years of negotiations, according to several administration and congressional officials. Russian officials could not be reached over the weekend for comment. Some supporters of the programs want the administration to renew the legal agreements as they exist now. New liability protections could then be negotiated later without risking a shutdown of the programs, they say. In a letter to Bush last week, Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri, senior Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, warned against setting up a situation in which the nuclear security programs could collapse. ''We urge your administration not to adopt a position so rigid,'' said the letter, signed by four other Democratic members of Congress. The stakes are especially high on the MOX project, perhaps the most ambitious and costly of the various ''threat reduction'' initiatives run by U.S. agencies to help stop the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons technology from former Soviet states. If an agreement isn't reached and funding stops for the Russian part of the project, work on the U.S. MOX plant also would stall. It is supposed to be built at the same time as the plant in Russia. ''That's precisely why we're continuing work under these programs'' while talks continue, says Bryan Wilkes, spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which runs the programs. ''We believe these legal issues can be worked out.'' The administration wants the programs covered by the same liability terms that govern virtually all other U.S. threat-reduction initiatives in Russia -- language that gives U.S. agencies and contractors blanket protection from lawsuits. The two agreements in question allow Russia to take legal action if there is a problem. Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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