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RANSAC Nuclear News, August 7, 2003 Compiled By: Billy Magnuson A. Plutonium Disposition
 A. Plutonium Disposition 1. �Rogue� MOX Negotiations Possible After Expiration of 1998 Technical Agreement Following the expiration on July 24th of a 1998 agreement governing the US-Russian technical exchanges and cooperation on plutonium disposition�after which bilateral talks about the future of the programme have no legal basis�some nuclear regulatory officials are dumbfounded as to why a US Department of Energy MOX fuel negotiator was in Moscow for apparent talks with contractors and representatives of Russian nuclear fuel giant TVEL. The negotiator, Brian Cowell, is a MOX fuel envoy from Tennessee�s Oak Ridge National Laboratory, or ORNL, which is owned by the US Department of Energy, or DOE, and does nuclear energy and materials research. His presence at Gosatomnadzor, or GAN, regulatory meetings, say Russian and American nuclear industry insiders, may indicate that plutonium disposition talks are continuing despite the expiration of the agreement that granted the US and Russia the right to hold such talks, indicating that a backdoor deal is perhaps in the works. Including and beyond July 24th, the only meetings allowed by US officials were those that concerned licensing issues, GAN and US officials said. The majority of US and Russian officials questioned about Cowell�s presence in Moscow last week either refused to comment or denied knowledge of his visit. But Yury Kolotilov, deputy project engineer at Russia�s State Specialised Design Institute, or GSPI, which is TVEL�s engineering contractor for the MOX project, did confirm Cowell�s visit to Moscow. Kolotilov said Cowell�s visit to Moscow did not involve official discussions of plutonium disposition�s future. The 5-year-long accord�called the Plutonium Science and Technology Agreement�was not renewed because of liability disagreements between the US Department of State and Russia�s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Atomic Energy. The agreement had been signed by former US Vice President Al Gore and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The 1998 agreement never contained any liability structure because no construction was actually envisioned under it�only research, US-Russian technical cooperation and seminars. But now the State Department is insisting all further accords in the plutonium disposition programme follow strict liability guidelines that place practically all potential accident compensation costs on Moscow. Plutonium Discussions Officially Put on Indefinite Hold After the lapse of the technical agreement, both Russian and American plutonium disposition experts and negotiators were officially forbidden from discussing further research and technical projects concerning US and Russia�s bilateral agreement to each destroy 34 tonnes of plutonium that both sides have flagged as surplus to their military needs�although each country has dozens more tonnes of weapons plutonium in stockpiles. Any such conversations or negotiations after the agreement�s termination on July 24th�the day Cowell was first seen at the meetings and on which they effectively ended�would have had no legal basis, according to sources from both sides. Cowell left Moscow, according to one knowledgeable source on Saturday, August 2nd. The 1998 agreement, a State Department spokesman said this week, was given a strictly monitored three-month extension during which all new projects initiated under the aegis of the 1998 agreement would be �evaluated on a strict case-by-case basis.� But the spokesman would not comment on whether Cowell�s trip to Moscow had been authorised on this basis. The GAN meetings, until July 24th, concerned the regulatory structure of the plutonium disposition programme, and US government structures�the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or NRC, and the DOE�s National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA�had sent representatives, GAN sources said in recent interviews. Only one programme has been allowed to continue operation without special State Department and US National Security Council, or NSC, approval after the lapse of the 1998 agreement, US officials and representatives of GAN confirmed in recent interviews. This programme is a regulatory exchange project run by the DOE�s senior project manager for the GAN regulatory, licensing and infrastructure development project, Sotirios Thomas, and Andrei Kislov, head of GAN�s 3rd Directorate, or fuel cycles division. This programme, according to Russian, European and American officials�which seeks to unite the experience of US nuclear regulators such as the NNSA and the NRC with that of Russian regulators to transform the ever marginalized GAN into a truly independent nuclear watchdog�goes beyond the scope of the plutonium disposition programme. Who Authorised the MOX Negotiator�s Trip? Like the rest of the US and Russian plutonium disposition teams following the July 24th expiration date, the ORNL negotiator should have had neither the support of the 1998 government-to government agreement, nor liability coverage for his journey, and no authorisation for meetings�except licensing meetings. His arrival raised the eyebrows of many plutonium disposition insiders in Moscow and has led them to question precisely who, on the American side, authorised Cowell�s travel. John Baker, director of the technical programme for the DOE�s plutonium disposition project, who�according to DOE officials�is typically in charge of giving the go-ahead to plutonium disposition related travel to Russia, would not return calls about who might have authorised the ORNL negotiator�s trip. When interviewed, one Russian nuclear industry insider said that, without all of the necessary US Government approval, �we have a guy on a rogue mission.� Another source said: �There�s a loose cannon, the question is who fired the shot.� What the purpose of this �rogue mission� was�if in fact it was one�is difficult to discern, as officials from Washington, the American Embassy in Moscow, Russia�s Ministry of Atomic Energy, known as Minatom, and TVEL, Minatom�s fuel production wing, all refused to comment, in some cases adamantly so. Questions About Cowell�s Presence Draw Contradictory Comments Whatever the purpose of Cowell�s journey to Moscow was, questions to relevant authorities from Bellona Web struck a nerve. Cowell�s presence in Moscow was confirmed by himself when he was reached by Bellona Web in his hotel room in Moscow. He would not, however, discuss the reasons for his visit, saying only: �You�ll have to talk to public relations about why I am here. I�m not supposed to do that.� Public relations, in Cowell�s case, is NNSA spokesman Brian Wilkes. Despite several calls requesting comment, Wilkes did not respond. ORNL�Cowell�s employer�likewise would not respond to numerous requests for comment. GSPI�s Kolotilov acknowledged in a telephone interview with Bellona Web that he had spoken to Cowell while Cowell was in Moscow�but that their conversations had not concerned any official negotiations about MOX fuel or its fabrication. The controversial MOX fuel, which is a mixture of uranium and weapons-grade plutonium oxides, is the method by which Russia and the United States will each dispose of 34 tonnes of surplus weapons-grade plutonium in parallel progress, as mandated by US congress. The new and thus far untested fuel will be burned in specially retrofitted commercial reactors, like Russia�s VVER-1000s, producing spent nuclear fuel of such intense radiation that it becomes what is called �self-protecting� and the plutonium, say MOX adherents, could not possibly be extracted for weapons use. If the liability disagreements between the United States and Russia are smoothed out, and the project continues, Kolotilov�s GSPI will be responsible for engineering Russia�s MOX fabrication plant, the construction of which is slated to begin near the Central Siberian city of Tomsk in 2004�at the same time the US breaks ground for its MOX fabrication plant at the DOE�s Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Kolotilov said he and Cowell had spoken at an organisational meeting�one of the many taking place under the aegis of the GAN nuclear regulatory conference after the 1998 agreement�s expiration�prepared for Duke, Cogema, Stone & Webster, or DCS, the US nuclear firm that was formed to build, in parallel manner, the MOX fuel fabrication plants in Russia and the United States. �[Cowell] came under the aegis of the 1998 agreement,� said Kolotilov in a telephone interview from Moscow. �He was there because the working agreement had expired and he was wrapping things up.� Kolotilov did not elaborate on what business relative to the agreement Cowell was concluding, but said he and Cowell had not had any official discussions about the future of the MOX fabrication plant, MOX fuel, or its engineering. For Others, Cowell a Ghost at the Meetings According to the sources interviewed by Bellona Web, Cowell also spoke with TVEL representatives while in Moscow. Despite repeated telephoned, e-mailed and faxed requests, TVEL would not answer any questions at all about Cowell�s alleged conversations with their representatives. But one Russian nuclear industry official who said she was at the meetings Cowell was said to have attended denied seeing the ORNL negotiator there when questioned directly about his presence. Officials with DCS referred inquiries to one of their representatives, Peter Hastings, who was in Moscow while Cowell was there. Hastings said he would not disclose who he had�or had not�seen at the meetings. Because the GAN-hosted meetings were sponsored by DOE funding, however, Bellona Web plans to file a Freedom of Information Act inquiry with the US government to obtain a full list of attendees. Andrew Bienawski, director of the US Embassy�s DOE office in Moscow, and its Deputy Director Nick Carleson�both of whom would presumably have been apprised of Cowell�s presence and marching orders�offered no comment. Bienawski was away on vacation, but Carleson, when reached on his cell phone by Bellona Web, made no attempt to conceal his irritation. �I have been instructed not to talk to the press at all,� he responded curtly before cutting the connection. It is not known if Carleson attended meetings Cowell was said to have attended or what knowledge he had of Cowell�s business. Viktor Pshenin, a high-ranking TVEL official, also became cross when directly questioned about Cowell�s presence and doings in Moscow. �I have nothing to say to you. I cannot help you at all,� he said before slamming down his telephone receiver. The disparity in tone and information offered by officials� comments raises the obvious question: If the ORNL negotiator�s presence in Moscow was legitimate within the terms of current international agreements�as GSPI�s Kolotilov implied�then why won�t these officials simply say so? Will the MOX Programme Continue? At present, the Russian plutonium disposition programme is far behind the American one, and it is a widely held belief in the corridors of GAN and Minatom that Russia�s role in the project will never get beyond the talking stage. For one, technical and licensing plans for the Russian MOX programme are, at best, at a preliminary point and will take several more months, if not years, to codify. Furthermore, funding for Russia�s MOX fabrication facility�estimates for which have grown from $.1.7 billion in 2001 to $2.1 billion to $2.7 billion this year�has not been secured from either the US or the Group of Eight industrialised nations, or G-8. The most recent failure to secure these funds came at the Evian, France, G-8 summit held in June. The US State Department let the 1998 deal run out over concerns that the accord had no liability language. The State Department insisted a full extension of the agreement fall under the so-called �umbrella agreement,� which governs legal accountability for the Pentagon-run Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, programmes�and which the State Department views as bedrock to any threat reduction programme authorisation with Russia. Liability Negotiations at Loggerheads The �umbrella agreement� places nearly all liability for any accidents that take place during US-funded nuclear dismantlement and cleanup efforts in Russia on Moscow. This is a position that the US Department of State apparently will not compromise on, but that Russia finds unacceptable�especially given the May signing in Stockholm of the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation, or MNEPR. The MNEPR agreement provides more latitude for Russia on liability issues when entering into bilateral nuclear disarmament and cleanup projects with other�particularly, European�nations. A Minatom spokesman in a recent interview said that the Russian side would prefer future liability agreements with the United States to be modelled on MNEPR�s liability policies. But this would be an unlikely concession from the United States: Although Washington is a signatory of the MNEPR accord, it refused to sign MNEPR�s liability protocol, which, at US insistence, was separated from the main text of the agreement. According to the State Department spokesman, that position has not softened. The 2000 Plutonium Disposition Agreement a Possible Way Out? The Plutonium Management and Disposition agreement�a later accord signed by former US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin, in 2000�does make reference to actual destruction of plutonium and contains provisions for facility construction. But the agreement was vague on issues of liability and put off their resolution until a future date. According to some US experts, the administration of US President George Bush will try to keep the MOX programme chugging along by plugging the liability hole in the 2000 accord with the umbrella agreement. But it is dubious that the Russians would agree to such conditions. Russian Parliament, or the State Duma, for its part, has never ratified the umbrella agreement, and it is unlikely that the corresponding bill will cross its radar screen any time soon with December Duma elections looming. With the MNEPR structure on the table as a liability model, plus the Russians� known difficulties keeping pace with US MOX developments, the prospect of the umbrella agreement�s ratification by the Russians is even less plausible, thus grinding the MOX programme�at least officially, and in the absence of �rogue missions��to a halt. Return to Menu B. Submarine Dismantlement 1. Farewell Ceremony Given to K-19 Nuclear Submarine The K-19 nuclear submarine was bidden farewell at a ceremony held at the Nerpa ship-repair factory in Snezhnogorsk yesterday. The submarine will soon be destroyed. The K-19 submarine became world-famous after the Hollywood production of K-19: The Widowmaker, which showed the heroics of the submarine's crew. The plot was based on the real events of 42 years ago. On July 4, 1961, while K-19 was in the North Atlantic for training purposes, the reactor's emergency control system suddenly came on and the crew began a desperate battle to save the submarine and its crew. Several submariners' lives were sacrificed in preventing a nuclear catastrophe. During its years of service, the K-19 experienced several accidents including fires and collisions both on the surface and under water. It was nicknamed Hiroshima as a result of these misfortunes. Only 15 people were present at the farewell ceremony including former crew members of the ship. The US is financing the destruction process of the K-19. Russia made this request during US Senator Al Gore's visit to the Murmansk Region in 2002. He has initiated such financial projects before. Return to Menu 2. Minatom to Build Radioactive Repository on Kola Peninsula The Russian Atomic Ministry decided to construct repository for solid radioactive waste on the Kola Peninsula, ITAR-TASS reported. Russia has decided not to construct a nuclear waste storage facility on the island of Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean. Scientists and geologists conducted an analysis of potential changes of the region's climate and came to the conclusion that rising temperatures over the next 150 to 200 years are threatening to thaw the region's permafrost. This could lead to leaks of the radioactive materials. Rumyantsev said that the ministry is looking into building a storage facility in a remote part of the Kola Peninsula. He added that the issue was almost resolved. The Atomic Energy Ministry had approved the construction of a USD 70 million nuclear waste storage facility on Novaya Zemlya in June 2002. The project had also been approved by experts from Finland, France, Germany, Norway and the UK and had undergone a government environmental analysis. The Russian Research Institute of Industrial Technology spent 10 years and $2 million to develop the design of the future storage facility on Novaya Zemlya. Such situation can also raise concerns among western donors who partially had financed this research, which turned out to be useless. Return to Menu C. Russian Nuclear Forces 1. Missile Regiment to be Put on Alert by Late 2003 Strategic missile regiment 5, armed with a Topol-M complex, will be put on alert in the missile division deployed in Tatishchevo, near Moscow, by the end of 2003. Anatoly Grebenyuk, Russian deputy defence minister, said this Wednesday. "The construction effort to deploy the regiment is proceeding on schedule and will be completed by the year's end," said Mr Grebenyuk. He then reported on yet another enterprise. A launching site for heavy Angara boosters is being built at Russia's Plesetsk cosmodrome in the south of the Arkhangelsk region. "The project will be completed on schedule and a heavy version of the booster will be launched into space no later than in 2005," said the deputy minister. Besides, the cosmodrome's airfield is being rebuilt and its airstrips lengthened. The Plesetsk complex will soon be able to receive aircraft of all types, said Mr Grebenyuk. Return to Menu D. Nuclear Safety 1. Russia is One of the World Leaders in Nuclear Plant Safety Today, judging by nuclear power plant (NPP) safety indicators, Russia is undoubtedly one of the world leaders. According to experts, the safety control systems at NPPs and regulations used to this end in Russia are nearly the most stringent in the world even as compared to the leading nuclear powers of Europe and America. As Nuclear.Ru was informed by the Rosenergoatom press-center, the results achieved in maintaining NPP safety are due to the attention paid by the Concern Management to training and retraining of operating and maintenance personnel of NPPs. According to Rosenergoatom�s Technical Director Nikolai Sorokin, the regulators pay close attention, in particular, to the so-called human factor as regards safety ensurance. They check on efficiency of scheduled operations conduct, psychological and physical conditions of plant employees including periodic medical examinations, compulsory medical examinations when a person is hired, daily medical check of key operating personnel. The utility and plant managers arrange for ad-hoc unannounced alcohol and drugs tests of employees at nuclear power plants. The nuclear plant personnel who are licensed by Gosatomnadzor of Russia to execute work associated with atomic energy must undergo annual psychological and physical examinations. Results of such examinations and inspections carried out by the Concern�s Inspectorate General fully confirm: the NPP personnel meet the highest international requirements. Russia�s nuclear power has created, successfully operate and develop the system for training and retraining of NPP personnel, which is based on modern training centers, industry�s retraining centers and educational institutes. In addition, at NPPs there are scheduled shop and plant emergency drills and exercises including antiterrorist actions. As nuclear power units are operated the plants implement modern methods of personnel checks. Rosenergoatom does a good deal of work to ensure NPP safety, namely, decreasing personnel�s erroneous actions, implementing of automated process control systems, etc. The funds being allocated are sufficiently large and constitute nearly half of all operational expenditures of the Concern. Return to Menu E. US-Russia 1. Russians See International Terrorists, US Equally as Nuclear Threat: Poll Russians are equally divided as to who, between international terrorists and the United States, is the most likely to resort to using nuclear weapons, according to a survey published Wednesday on the 58th anniversary of Hiroshima. Thirty-two percent of respondents saw international terrorists as a nuclear threat, with the same number seeing the United States in the same light, with just seven percent seeing North Korea as a nuclear threat, the ROMIR Monitoring institute said. China was seen as a nuclear threat by six percent of those questioned, India and Pakistan by four percent, and Britain, France and Russia each by two percent, the poll showed. Forty-one percent of respondents believed the threat of war had increased over the past 10 years (26 percent saw a slight increase, 15 percent a considerable increase), with only 19 percent seeing a reduction in the threat, ROMIR said, as quoted by the Interfax news agency. Overall, 65 percent of the 1,500 Russians questioned on July 24-28 said there was a threat of nuclear war, with just 28 percent seeing no threat. August 6 is widely marked around the world as the anniversary of the day in 1945 when a US airforce plane dropped an atomic weapon on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, killing around 140,000 people. Japan capitulated nine days later, bringing World War II to a close. Return to Menu 2. Majority of Russians are for Nuclear Disarmament � Poll Over half of Russians (57%) are convinced that Russia should work together with the U.S. on reducing their nuclear potentials. Over one-third of Russians (35%) believe it is important for Russia to maintain this potential at the same level as the U.S., and 8% of the respondents were undecided on the matter. The poll was conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center, it was given to 1,600 Russians in late July. Fifty years ago on August 5, 1953, the first Soviet hydrogen bomb was blown up on the Semipalatinsk testing grounds. An estimated 18% of Russians said North Korea's nuclear program does not pose a threat to the world or security on the Earth and that no special actions are needed to curtail it. However, 36% of the respondents believe the situation surrounding North Korea's nuclear program should be resolved through negotiations between all interested parties. Twenty-four percent of the respondents suggest putting "diplomatic pressure" on Pyongyang or imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. Two percent of the respondents believe that a military operation is needed to cause North Korea to curtail its nuclear program. One out of five respondents (20%) was unable to suggest a solution for this issue. Return to Menu F. Russia-Iran 1. Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb (excerpted) Tehran's reactor program masks strides toward weapons capability, a Times investigation finds. France warns against exports to Islamic Republic. After more than a decade of working behind layers of front companies and in hidden laboratories, Iran appears to be in the late stages of developing the capacity to build a nuclear bomb. Iran insists that like many countries it is only building commercial nuclear reactors to generate electricity for homes and factories. "Iran's efforts in the field of nuclear technology are focused on civilian application and nothing else," President Mohammad Khatami said on state television in February. "This is the legitimate right of the Iranian people." But a three-month investigation by The Times � drawing on previously secret reports, international officials, independent experts, Iranian exiles and intelligence sources in Europe and the Middle East � uncovered strong evidence that Iran's commercial program masks a plan to become the world's next nuclear power. The country has been engaged in a pattern of clandestine activity that has concealed weapons work from international inspectors. Technology and scientists from Russia, China, North Korea and Pakistan have propelled Iran's nuclear program much closer to producing a bomb than Iraq ever was. No one is certain when Iran might produce its first atomic weapon. Some experts said two or three years; others believe the government has probably not given a final go-ahead. But it is clear that Iran is moving purposefully and rapidly toward acquiring the capability. Among the findings: � A confidential report prepared by the French government in May concluded that Iran is surprisingly close to having enriched uranium or plutonium for a bomb. The French warned other governments to exercise "the most serious vigilance on their exports to Iran and Iranian front companies," according to a copy of the report provided by a foreign intelligence service. � Samples of uranium taken by U.N. inspectors in Iran in June tested positive for enrichment levels high enough to be consistent with an attempt to build a nuclear weapon, according to a foreign intelligence officer and an American diplomat. The Reuters news service first reported the possibility that the material was weapons-grade last month. � Iran is concealing several weapons research laboratories and evidence of past activity at a plant disguised as a watch-making factory in a Tehran suburb. In June, U.N. inspectors were refused access to two large rooms and barred from testing samples at the factory, called the Kalaye Electric Co. � Tehran secretly imported 1.8 tons of nuclear material from China in 1991 and processed some of it to manufacture uranium metal, which would be of no use in Iran's commercial program but would be integral to weapons production. � As early as 1989, Pakistani generals offered to sell Iran nuclear weapons technology. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist regarded by the United States as a purveyor of nuclear secrets, has helped Iran for years. "Pakistan's role was bigger from the beginning than we thought," said a Middle Eastern intelligence official. � North Korean military scientists recently were monitored entering Iranian nuclear facilities. They are assisting in the design of a nuclear warhead, according to people inside Iran and foreign intelligence officials. So many North Koreans are working on nuclear and missile projects in Iran that a resort on the Caspian coast is set aside for their exclusive use. � Russian scientists, sometimes traveling to Iran under false identities and working without their government's approval, are helping to complete a special reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium. Moscow insists that it is providing only commercial technology for the civilian reactor under construction near the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr, an assertion disputed by Washington. � In recent months, Iran has approached European companies to buy devices that can manipulate large volumes of radioactive material, technology to forge uranium metal and plutonium and switches that could trigger a nuclear weapon. European intelligence sources said Tehran's shopping list was a strong indication that Iran has moved to the late stages of weapons development. [�] Iran's civilian nuclear energy program started in 1974 and was interrupted by the Islamic Revolution. It got back on track in 1995, when Russia signed an $800-million contract to complete the commercial reactor at Bushehr, which is scheduled to come online next year. Russia also promised to sell Iran the uranium fuel to power the reactor. But Iran maintains that it wants to develop its own nuclear fuel-making capability, a position that has roused international suspicions. [�] Diplomacy has proved an imperfect solution in the past. The Clinton administration persuaded China not to sell nuclear items to Iran in the mid-1990s. Administration officials later used sanctions and negotiations to convince Russia to curb technology transfers to Iran's civilian program that U.S. intelligence believed were being diverted to weapons work. But Russia is committed to the Bushehr reactor, which generates 20,000 jobs for its beleaguered nuclear industry. The project also allows hundreds of Iranians to train in Russia, raising concerns within the intelligence community that knowledge and hardware for weapons work will slip through. Officials in Moscow, outside experts and foreign intelligence officials said economics are driving continuing Russian assistance to the Iranian weapons program and that it is probably occurring without government approval. They said thousands of Russian physicists, mathematicians and other scientists are unemployed or paid a pittance at home, pushing them to sell their expertise elsewhere. "Russian scientists are freelancing, leading to a leakage of expertise, and you can't control that," said Bobo Lo, a former Australian diplomat and associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. "That's where it gets really messy with the Iranians." Multiple Sites "Iran has made tremendous progress during the last two years, and according to our estimates it could reach a technical capability to create a nuclear device by 2006," said Anton Khlopkov, a nuclear expert at Moscow's Center for Policy Studies in Russia. "The problem is neither Russia nor the U.S. nor the IAEA had a clear understanding about real Iranian achievements in the nuclear field." [�] Iran first tried to buy heavy-water reactors as turnkey projects from China and India in the mid-1990s, according to a previously undisclosed dossier prepared by a foreign intelligence agency and provided to The Times. Blocked on that front by the United States, according to former U.S. officials, Iran decided to build its own and turned to two Russian institutes. The United States learned of the cooperation through telephone intercepts and imposed sanctions on the Russian institutes in 1999. The sanctions remain in effect, but officials with foreign intelligence agencies and the CIA said there is evidence that Russian scientists are still providing expertise for the project. Khlopkov, the Russian nuclear expert, said he thinks it is unlikely that Russian scientists are helping Iran with any of its weapons programs. Still, he said, the recent disclosures about the Iranian program surprised Moscow and might cause Russia to cancel a second planned reactor unless Iran agrees to stricter international inspections of its nuclear facilities. [�] Return to Menu G. Russia-North Korea 1. Another Road Map for North Korea? North Korea may need its own road map analogue, Yuri Fedotov, Russia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, said to the Japanese-based NHK television. There is an opportunity to get North Korean settlement into a channel similar to the Mideastern, to tie in North Korea's moves with security guarantees, economic assistance and humanitarian aid-just what a 1994 framework agreement boils down to. As the agreement has it, North Korea must freeze its nuclear projects in exchange for the USA building two light water reactors for it. When asked whether the agreement will get a new lease of life or the situation demands a new one, Mr. Fedotov said that, to app appearances, another agreement will be necessary, with an account for experience gained as the previous was made. The North Korean issue demands political settlement, and Moscow will promote it as best it can, stressed the deputy minister. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries Yuri Fedotov's NHK interview on its web site. Return to Menu 2. North Korea Not to Declare Itself Nuclear Power North Korea will not declare itself a nuclear power. This opinion was expressed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov to reporters in Kuala Lumpur. "I don't thing that it will be made", he stated. The diplomat noted that it would be illogical to do so on the eve of a six-party talks on settling the North Korean nuclear problem. Losyukov claimed that Pyongyang aims at achieving real results at the talks. "If North Korea agreed to talks, it means they are inclined to conduct talks," the diplomat emphasised. The Russian side has no full understanding so far what North Koreans want from talks. "If general idea is understandable - to defuse tension in the Korean Peninsula and to remove a chance of using nuclear weapons, -- all this should be talked over in details," he added. Six-party talks on settling the North Korean problem with the participation of North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan may start in August, Losyukov reported. The diplomat noted that it is necessary to hold consultations before the start of talks so as to set a date for talks and initial topics. Six-party talks on normalising the situation in the Korean Peninsula will be held in Beijing. This was said in Washington by U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Ricker at a briefing for reporters on Tuesday. However, according to a Tass dispatch from Washington, the diplomat refused to tell any additional particulars on a date of multilateral consultations and composition of its participants. Return to Menu 3. Pyongyang not to Declare Nuclear Status? North Korea is unlikely to become a nuclear power, Moscow believes. "I do not believe this will happen," said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov in an interview with Russian information agencies. "It would be an illogical thing to do now, ahead of the hexalateral talks /on the North Korean problem/," he said. "If the situation continued to aggravate, there was no hope of negotiations, I do not rule out that such sharp statements could be made," he admitted. Yet now, ahead of talks between six countries /North and South Koreas, Russia, Japan, China and the USA/ there is no sense in making sharp statements for any of the members, including North Korea itself," Losyukov explained. Return to Menu 4. What Can be Outcome of Multilateral Talks on North Korean Issue? Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov cannot forecast the outcome of multilateral negotiations on the North Korean issue but describes the fact that they will be conducted as "positive." In his interview with journalists Alexander Losyukov said that "anyway it is better than a confrontation." At the same time the Russian diplomat refused to forecast the outcome of the talks. "Of course, one round of talks will not be enough," Alexander Losyukov said. "I think we will have to conduct several rounds perhaps it will all be a very long case, but anyway it is better than a confrontation," the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister underscored. Return to Menu 5. Russia Calls U.S. Stance on N.Korea Talks Constructive Russia called Washington's approach to forthcoming talks aimed at ending the North Korean crisis as constructive, and said on Tuesday there should be no military aspect to Pyongyang's nuclear programme. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said he expected the six-nation talks in Beijing, aimed at ensuring a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, to be difficult considering the depth of misunderstanding between the United States and North Korea. Losyukov also said he expected the talks involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, the United States and Russia to take place in late August or early September, and was encouraged by the way Washington was approaching the meeting. "The current position of the United States allows the talks to start in a constructive way," Losyukov told Reuters in Kuala Lumpur where he was accompanying President Vladimir Putin on a visit to Malaysia. Losyukov said he could not comment on North Korea's approach as Moscow and Pyongyang had not held direct talks this year. "We need to put the North Korean nuclear programme under close control. First of all there should be no military aspects," Losyukov said. "Secondly, their civil or non-military programme should be taken under international control," he added. "Probably we should discuss the return of North Korea under the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It will be very desirable." The Russian deputy minister also stressed a need to appreciate Pyongyang's worries. "We should react in a proper way on the North Korean concerns about their security," he said. The nuclear crisis escalated early this year when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled IAEA inspectors, and restarted its mothballed reactor at Yongbyon, north of the capital. Return to Menu 6. Russia, China Hold Similar Positions on Nuclear-Free Status of Korean Peninsula The positions Russia and China hold on the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula are exactly similar, Sergei Mironov, speaker of the Russian Federation Council, told a briefing in Beijing after his meeting with Chinese Chairman Hu Jintao. Moscow and Beijing proceed from the fact that "North Korea must have a nuclear-free status providing that the country's safety is guaranteed," said the head of the Russian parliament's upper house. He described North Korea's recent consent to participate in multilateral talks on the problem as a victory scored by Chinese and Russian diplomacy. Return to Menu 7. Russian Official Calls for Security Guarantees for North Korea Russia is prepared to participate in security guarantees for North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang's renunciation of its nuclear program, Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov told reporters on 5 August during a working visit to Beijing, Russian media reported. "We believe the non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula should be preserved and we proceed from the view that North Korea, in return for renouncing its nuclear program, can count on guarantees of its security," Mironov was quoted by ITAR-TASS as saying. "Russia is ready to take part in creating such guarantees." Mironov also praised Russia and China for their diplomatic efforts to convince North Korea to agree to six-way talks to resolve the current crisis. Return to Menu 8. FC Speaker Mironov to Discuss North Korea's N-Program in China Russian Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov has arrived in Beijing on a two-day visit at the invitation of the head of China's National People's Congress Wu Bangguo. Among other themes he plans to discuss North Korea's nuclear program. "This is a very serious problem and it will certainly have our attention. The whole range of international issues will be discussed that cannot but concern our countries as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council," Mironov said upon arrival. On Tuesday Mironov will meet with China's Chairman Hu Jintao and Premier of State Council Wen Jiabao. "Relations between Russia and China have been developing in a very dynamic, positive fashion. I have come here to get acquainted with China's new leaders and discuss the full complex of inter-parliamentary relations," Mironov said. Before his departure from Moscow Mironov had told the Moscow correspondent of the Xinhua news agency in an interview (published in today's edition of Renmin Ribao) it would be very important to lend a new, specific meaning to the Russian-Chinese treaty of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation signed by the heads of state. Return to Menu 9. Six-Partite Talks on North Korean Issue Can Begin in August-Formin The six-partite talks on the North Korean nuclear issue can begin as early as this August, Russian deputy foreign minister Alexander Losyukov told reporters in Kuala Lumpur. "I do not exclude this variant," said he. According to Losyukov, the talks will be held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The Russian diplomat noted, "A number of contacts must come" before the actual beginning of the talks. The Russian side, for its part, plans bilateral talks with North Korean officials. "I do not rule out possible contacts with the Americans," Losyukov said. "Before getting down to the six-partite talks, it is necessary to have a common vision, and such vision can only emerge in the process of bilateral consultations," Losyukov said and added that Russia is already conducting preliminary consultations with China. He stressed, "There is no point so far in holding talks with North Korea at a higher level." "This is out of the question," said he. Losyukov also spoke out against holding talks at a lower, specialist level since "the negotiators must have certain authority." Losyukov said preliminary consultations "must determine the time when the future talks can begin and the initial range of subjects for discussion." Return to Menu H. Russia-Libya 1. Libya: Russia to Increase Nuclear Cooperation Russia plans to increase its nuclear cooperation activities with Libya, Interfax reported Monday (see GSN, Aug. 5). The two countries have agreed that Russian experts will help resume work on the earlier-planned Sultan nuclear power plant at the Gulf of Sidra, as well as upgrade the Tajura nuclear research center, a diplomatic source in Moscow said. Russia also welcomed Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi�s recent suggestions that he is willing to allow international inspectors to visit Libyan sites, a high-ranking Russian diplomat said (Interfax, Aug. 4 in FBIS-SOV, Aug. 4). The Tajura facility houses a 10-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor and currently operates under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace�s Deadly Arsenals. The Sultan nuclear plant was originally intended to be a 440-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor, but was suspended (Mike Nartker, GSN, Aug. 7). Return to Menu I. Nuclear Industry 1. Russian Economy Minister in Favour of Nuclear Heat Supply in Cities Russian Minister for Economic Development and Trade German Gref has described a possibility of using nuclear energy instead of natural gas for heat supply in cities as "promising". A corresponding project was submitted to the minister on Thursday in Obninsk, a city 75 km south-west of Moscow, where he held a session on development of the scientific city, RIA Novosti learned from the ministry's press service. Mr. Gref took interest in the project, the press service pointed out. He described it as very interesting and promising. In the north such projects can start paying after one or two years after introduction, while increase in their numbers will reduce their cost, the minister believes. At the session scientists told Mr. Gref about the use of neutron therapy to treat cancer. Such a project should be financed, the minister said, adding that "the Economic Development Ministry will consider a possibility of allocating funds for its fulfilment". A base for such projects should be financed from the federal budget, but it is also necessary to attract investment in their commercial part, he pointed out. The programme of developing Obninsk as a scientific city is designed for the period till the end of 2004. Its goal is to recover the city's economy on the whole. In Obninsk the world's first nuclear power plant was built and put into operation in 1954. Return to Menu 2. Russia to Deliver New Type of Nuclear Fuel to Ukraine The nuclear fuel delivery should take place according to a supplement of the contract between the Russian TVEL company and Ukrainian Energoatom signed on July 11th. TVEL, a Russian corporation specialised in nuclear fuel supplies, together with Ukraine's Energoatom, the national nuclear energy generating company, signed a supplement to contract on supplies of nuclear fuel for new power units in Khmelnytsky and Rivne nuclear power plants. The supplements provide for new arrangements under which Energoatom will pay TVEL $100m lent by Alpha-Bank to Ukraine, a TVEL official told Interfax. The new type fuel rods are made of new alloy and better quality cladding, which provide better air-tightness, maximum heat transfer and reliability. Aside from that, usage of new type fuel rods reduce refuelling time and radiation . The TVEL corporation has been delivering nuclear fuel for one billion dollars to Ukraine during the past five years. All operating nuclear power units in Ukraine use the Russian fuel. They generate 75 billion KW/h, which is more than 50% of all electricity produced in Ukraine. Return to Menu J. Nuclear Cities 1. Commentary: Closed Towns Open Their Doors to Everyone Russia is making increasingly energetic attempts to integrate into the modern global community and is therefore lifting the veil of secrecy from many of its classified facilities. The formerly closed towns of Novouralsk, Snezhinsk, Angarsk, Zelenogorsk, Zheleznogorsk and others have already appeared on ordinary maps. Moreover, these towns are now open to visitors, though they need the appropriate authorisation. Sarov and Los Alamos, nuclear centres of Russia and the US, are twin towns today, something which could only be dreamed about only relatively recently. However, Sarov has not been opened up completely. The town recently hosted the festivities dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the canonisation of Seraphim of Sarov, the most revered saint of the Russian Orthodox Church. Few pilgrims were allowed into the town to pray in the church built where St Seraphim's monastic cell once stood. Sarov, formerly Russia's classified town Arzamas-16, is home to 86,649 people the majority of whom are nuclear specialists working for the Russian Nuclear Centre, one of the country's top secret facilities. The town is still surrounded by a barbed wire fence, while you have to present a special pass at one of the several checkpoints to enter or leave it. The locals, however, do not feel like changing the status quo, as the town's closed status is a guarantee of comfort and security. The pilgrims were aware that Sarov was a closed town. They patiently waited in a field near Sarov for the procession with its holy relics in a cedar coffin to pass by. Closed towns (and there are ten of them in Russia) are a fact of life in any civilised society. The US has classified towns of its own, for example, Los Alamos in New Mexico. This is, probably, the most impressive example of secrecy. An ordinary cattle ranch lost in cornfields was a good disguise for the first underground laboratory for atomic physicists. Construction began during WWII. It would have never occurred to anyone that a simple shed was a disguised entrance to a super secret elevator, taking future Nobel Prize winners to brightly lit underground labs. The fact that the existence of such classified monsters and their inmates is being brought into the open somewhat eases international tension. Atomiad, or the all-Russian Games for athletes from Russia's closed towns, is held near Moscow every autumn. In 2002, Novouralsk launched an international campaign, the Young Generation Against a Nuclear Threat, which involved over 100 students and professors from American closed towns. Moroever, Russia's Nuclear Energy Ministry has repeatedly promised to gradually ease secrecy around such towns, and eventually lift the classified status from major nuclear centres completely. Russia makes no secret of the amount of plutonium and enriched uranium it possesses. A total of 192 tons of the substances are stockpiled in 115 well-guarded facilities. Openness pays off. It was Baghdad's closed position and lies that gave the Bush administration formal grounds to start the war. Indeed, North Korea's closed position is provoking a new conflict today. Return to Menu K. Official Statements 1. In Connection With the 40th Anniversary of the Signing of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water On August 5, 2003 it is 40 years since the signing of the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, which is also known under the name of the Moscow Treaty. The years that have elapsed since the signing of the agreement have fully vindicated its historic significance. The Treaty, the membership of which now includes over 130 states, was one of the first steps made by the international community to contain the race of nuclear arms. The Treaty prevented further radioactive pollution of the Earth. The significance of the Moscow Treaty is that it opened the way for signing further major international agreements in the sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear arms and their non-proliferation in the world. It is this Treaty that created conditions for subsequent agreements to ban nuclear tests which culminated in 1996 in the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Ban of Nuclear Tests which also banned the underground nuclear explosions. Being a consistent supporter of full ban on nuclear tests, Russia is actively working for an early entry of this Treaty into force and ensuring its universal character. The Moscow Treaty, whose 40th anniversary we are marking, is a bright example of joint solution of the most difficult problems faced by the international community of nations. Return to Menu L. Announcements 1. New Report Released on Russian Nuclear Complex Downsizing and Redirection The Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) today released the results of a workshop that it jointly sponsored with the Department of Energy�s Russian Transition Initiatives (RTI) program. The report, titled Strategies for Russian Nuclear Complex Downsizing and Redirection: Options for New Directions, details the proceedings of a March 25-26 workshop held in Washington, D.C. The report�s topics and recommendations cover a range of issues, including: linking nuclear cities conversion projects to the national and regional economies in Russia; highlighting key issues for improving commercialization projects in and around nuclear cities; refining the workforce downsizing targets; identifying new approaches to transitioning weapons scientists and workers to peaceful, sustainable careers; examining the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) program�s successes and challenges; and broadening cooperation with other international initiatives and non-governmental efforts. The text of the report includes the major findings of the meeting, detailed recommendations for future action, and concise summaries of each presentation made at the workshop, and is available at RANSAC�s re-designed web site, www.216.119.87.134. CONTACT: Raphael Della Ratta (202) 332-1412 Return to Menu M. Links of Interest 1. Iran�s Missile and Nuclear Challenge: A Conundrum for Russia Return to Menu 2. Interview with Jessica Stern: Terrorism Expert Says Chances of New Attack in U.S. 'Very High' http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=6165 Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. To be automatically removed from our mailing list, click on the following link: Remove Me From The List If you have questions/comments/concerns, please reply to news@216.119.87.134 |
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