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RANSAC Nuclear News, September 23, 2003 Compiled By: RANSAC Staff A. Research Reactor Fuel Return
 A. Research Reactor Fuel Return 1. Faster pace needed on uranium removal The removal of some 30 pounds of highly enriched uranium -- HEU, the simplest material in the world from which to make a nuclear bomb -- from Romania a few days ago represents a significant victory in the global struggle to keep the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands. The move follows the airlift of three times as much HEU -- enough for two to three nuclear bombs -- from an insecure facility in Yugoslavia one year ago. The governments, organizations, and individuals who got the bomb material out of these facilities deserve the world's heartfelt thanks. Getting hold of this kind of material is the hard part of making a crude nuclear bomb; with enough HEU in hand, terrorists might be able to turn the downtown of any city in the world into a modern Hiroshima. But there is much more to do. When the Yugoslavia operation -- known as "Project Vinca," after the institute where the material was located -- took place, the State Department estimated that there were 24 other sites around the world where similar operations were needed. And those are just the most worrisome ones. There are at least 130 operating research reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium in more than 40 countries. Many of these do not have enough nuclear material on hand for a bomb, but some do, and most are secured by little more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence. Unfortunately, if we maintain the one-per-year rate of these two successes, it will be a quarter-century before even the 24 facilities on the State Department's list have been adequately addressed. After 9/11, we simply cannot afford that kind of delay. We need a focused "global cleanout" program targeted on getting rid of bomb material from as many sites as possible around the world as quickly as possible and then effectively securing the sites that remain. The surest form of prevention of a nuclear catastrophe is to ensure there is no bomb material left to steal at these insecure sites. The US government already has a plan in place to remove the potential bomb materials from these sites -- or rather, it has several programs dealing with parts of the overall issue, each with different management and approaches. The effort we propose would broaden and tie together the programs that already exist and add incentives to persuade those who run these facilities to give up their potential bomb material. Incentives are crucial: While many of these sites have no genuine need for bomb material anymore, their managers are concerned over what would happen to their facility and its scientists if the material is removed, which in some cases might mean shutting down an aging research reactor that is no longer needed. Today we have a program to convert research reactors to use fuels that cannot serve as the core of a nuclear bomb -- but that program has no instruction to give aging, unneeded reactors incentives to shut down rather than converting, and it has only limited incentives to offer for conversion (which is largely why there are still 130 research reactors around the world using HEU). Similarly, the US effort to take back the tens of tons of HEU it unwisely provided to foreign research reactors in the past offers only limited incentives for facilities to take us up on the offer -- with the result that enough US-supplied HEU for hundreds of nuclear bombs will remain abroad when the program comes to its planned end in a few years. An effective, fast-paced global cleanout program would need the flexibility to tailor incentives to the needs of each site. In the Romania case, for example, the key to unlock the deal was US agreement to pay for a load of fresh low-enriched fuel (which cannot be used as the core of a nuclear bomb) for the research reactor at the site. For the Yugoslavian facility, the essential incentive was help cleaning up the radioactive mess the research reactor had made over the years before it was shut down. Fortunately, some in Congress have recognized the need to supplement existing efforts to remove these vulnerable bomb materials. Both the House and the Senate Appropriations Committee have approved bills that call for the establishment of such a "global cleanout" effort to remove these deadly threats to world security. Despite the successes in Romania and Yugoslavia, the nuclear clock is still ticking. Return to Menu 2. Romania Confirms Weapons-Grade Uranium Evacuated to Russia Lucian Biro, chairman of the National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activities (CNCAN), confirmed on 22 September that 15 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium has been evacuated to Russia from Romania's Pitesti Institute of Nuclear Energy, Mediafax reported. Biro said the uranium was transported in special containers from Pitesti to Bucharest airport and flown from there to Russia. He said the operation was financed by the United States. "The Washington Post" reported on 21 September that the evacuation is part of a long-planned secret operation aimed at preempting possible terrorist strikes by eliminating sites whose security is doubtful. The daily reported that more than a year ago, 50 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium was evacuated from an aging Soviet-built research reactor in Yugoslavia. The uranium from the Pitesti facility has been flown to Novosibirsk, where it is to be converted into a form of uranium that cannot be used to make weapons, according to "The Washington Post." Return to Menu 3. Russia receives highly enriched uranium fuel from Romania September 21 JSC Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant (NCCP) received fresh highly enriched nuclear fuel from the Institute for Nuclear Research in Pitesti, Romania, as Nuclear.Ru was informed by Minatom�s of Russia press-service. In total, 50 fuel assemblies of shutdown research reactor IRT-2M (80% enriched with regard to uranium-235) and 150 separate fuel rods S-36 (36% enriched) were brought from Romania to Russia. Total amount of uranium-235 in the products is 9,703.04 grams with total uranium isotopes is 14,166.58 grams. The transfer of nuclear fuel from Romania to Russia was done at the IAEA request and was funded by the US Department of Energy. The consignor is the Romanian Authority for Nuclear Activities. Minatom of Russia was the chief coordinator of the operation. By present the nuclear fuel has been delivered to NCCP where it will be re-fabricated into reactor fuel. This operation is the second of the kind where Minatom�s enterprises participate. The development follows the delivery to the NIIAR Institute of Dimitrovgrad, on August 22, 2002, of TVR-S fresh high enriched nuclear fuel from the Nuclear Science Institute Vinca (Belgrade, Yugoslavia). Return to Menu 4. Russia Takes Back Uranium From Romania - U.S. Paid for Move to Avert Threat Russia took back control of 30 pounds of weapons-grade uranium from an insecure Soviet-era nuclear reactor facility in Romania today, carrying out a long-planned secret operation that was paid for by the United States in a preemptive strike against the threat of nuclear terrorism. The uranium -- potentially enough to make a nuclear bomb -- was taken from its storage site at the Pitesti Institute for Nuclear Research, west of Bucharest, Romania's capital, and flown tonight to the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, where it will be converted into a form of uranium that cannot be used to make weapons, according to U.S. officials. U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, whose department provided the $400,000 necessary for the operation, called it "a major accomplishment" for eliminating a terrorist threat posed by "one of the top sites that needs securing." During an interview on a visit to Moscow, he also welcomed the mission as an indicator of newly cooperative relations with Russia, which built dozens of research reactors in allied countries during the Cold War but had been reluctant to accept responsibility for such Soviet-era nuclear material. Several outside experts said that today's move, while welcome, also underscored how slowly international authorities have moved to deal with an obvious terrorist threat. Little more than a year ago, the United States and Russia participated in the first such joint operation when 100 pounds of weapons-grade uranium was removed from an aging Soviet-built research reactor in Yugoslavia. "I give them two cheers," said former Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who with billionaire Ted Turner co-founded the Nuclear Threat Initiative group that put up $5 million last August to remove the weapons-grade uranium from the site near Belgrade. "But we just need to realize that the pace at which we're moving is not nearly rapid enough." Following the Yugoslav operation last summer, State Department officials compiled a list of 24 other overseas reactors that use weapons-grade nuclear fuel and are considered vulnerable. Despite assurances of quick action, efforts to persuade host governments to surrender the uranium have progressed slowly, according to experts. Also complicating matters has been a U.S. proposal that would spell out terms under which Russia would agree to receive fuel from Soviet-era research reactors built in other countries. Russia has not yet approved the agreement, according to Energy Department officials, and until it is signed, each operation like the one in Romania today will have to be negotiated separately. "Even if we succeed at the current rate of once a year, it would take a quarter-century to get this done. Since 9/11 we don't have that kind of time," said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard University nuclear nonproliferation expert. He said there are more than 130 research reactors in 40 countries that use highly enriched uranium fuel like the kind in Romania -- a serious threat because of the vulnerability to theft. "Highly enriched uranium is the easiest type to make a bomb for terrorists," he said. Several bills pending in Congress would establish a more comprehensive program to secure weapons-grade uranium at such vulnerable facilities. "If we spend about $50 million a year for five years, we could eliminate some of the most urgent nuclear terrorism threats we've faced," Bunn said. In the interview, Abraham said he recognized that some critics would not be satisfied with the pace of cooperation with Russia on nonproliferation. "Naturally, there are going to be people who say, 'It's still not fast enough, you're not moving fast enough.' Sometimes it seems no matter how fast you move, someone will move the goal post." In the operation today, eight canisters containing the 80 percent enriched uranium were transported to the Bucharest airport and loaded on a Russian IL-76 cargo plane as U.S. technical experts looked on. The Romanian weapons-grade uranium was targeted because there was a significant amount of it and because of the ease with which it could have been transported by a terrorist, U.S. officials said. Spokesmen for the Romanian and Russian governments could not be reached for comment tonight. "You could throw it in the back of a truck and drive away with it," said Paul Longsworth, the Energy Department's deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation. Because it is "fresh fuel" that has not been irradiated in a reactor, the uranium could be carried off with relatively low risk to handlers, he said. Longsworth said the operation had been planned for the last several months with the Romanians, the Russians and the International Atomic Energy Agency. To seal the deal with the Romanians, the United States agreed to help pay to convert the Romanian research reactor at Pitesti to handle non-weapons-grade uranium fuel. The Russians, meanwhile, won the transport contract and will be able to sell the recycled uranium once it is blended down to non-weapons grade at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, part of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. "It's win-win," said another senior U.S. energy official. "The Russians wanted the [highly enriched] uranium, the Romanians wanted a new [low-enriched uranium] core for their reactor and to be seen as helpful in the nonproliferation world, and we've wanted to get this done for a long time and remove this threat." But Longsworth said Russia's delay in approving a broader agreement on take-backs poses an obstacle to future successes. "We're really encouraging Russia to approve that agreement. Then we can start doing many, many more operations," he said. Added the other official, "We've been told by the Russians that they're finally at the last hurdle they need to jump over, but each last hurdle is followed by another one." Return to Menu B. Nuclear Cities Initiative 1. U.S.-Russian Liability Dispute Could Bode Ill for Threat Reduction Programs As a key U.S.-Russian measure to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation expires today, observers are concerned the thorny legal questions that sank the agreement could have broader repercussions, ultimately increasing the risk that Russian nuclear technology, materials or know-how could fall into the wrong hands. Washington is refusing to renew the Nuclear Cities Initiative agreement, which expires today, because of concerns that liability language in the agreement is inadequate to protect U.S. officials or workers in case of injuries or damages arising from activities carried out under the initiative. The move follows the related expiration in July of the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement, another U.S.-Russian threat reduction measure (see GSN, July 25). NCI is a vehicle for the United States to help Russia decrease activity at nuclear weapon sites, converting some of them to other uses. The U.S. Energy Department has described the program on its Web site as �the only U.S. government program whose primary aim is to help downsize the Russian nuclear weapons complex.� Sixty-nine NCI projects will continue until completion, despite the end of the pact itself, under an agreement signed Friday in Moscow by U.S. and Russian energy officials (see GSN, Sept. 19). No new projects envisioned by the initiative will begin, though, and U.S. officials expressed concern that the liability dispute could drag on, ultimately affecting Washington�s ability to reduce the Russian proliferation threat. �It�s significant,� a U.S. official said of the liability dispute, �but you won�t see the effects in NCI. � If we don�t resolve the liability, you will begin to see the impacts at some time.� The NCI agreement and the Plutonium Science and Technology agreement, both reached in 1998, stipulate broad liability exemption for Moscow, including in cases of �premeditated� actions causing damage or injury. The United States is seeking to have a tougher approach � such as the one taken in the 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction �umbrella agreement,� which does not protect Russia against liability for premeditated acts � accepted as a standard for threat reduction texts. The dispute is relevant not only to bilateral measures such as NCI but also to the Group of Eight�s Global Partnership for nonproliferation, an ambitious multilateral counterproliferation program launched in June of last year at a G-8 summit in Canada (see GSN, June 6). U.S. officials have said G-8 countries generally favored umbrella agreement-style liability protections when they launched the Global Partnership last year. Deeming its position to be bolstered by the G-8 agreement, Washington has been pushing for ratification this year by the Russian Duma of the CTR umbrella agreement, an event that could presage the acceptance of U.S.-sought protections as a template for liability language in threat reduction texts. A U.S. official said today that President George W. Bush�s administration expects the Duma eventually to ratify the umbrella agreement and that the NCI agreement is no longer a priority for the United States. According to another U.S. official, NCI�s demise is of relatively little significance because of Friday�s extension of ongoing projects under the initiative and the existence of various other mechanisms for advancing the same nonproliferation goals. Democratic members of Congress and nongovernmental organizations have nevertheless opposed terminating both 1998 agreements. In a statement issued in July as it became clear that the agreements would expire, Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council Executive Director Kenneth Luongo said that �allowing these agreements to expire is wrong and unnecessary at this time� and �sends a terrible signal about the importance of securing the largest stockpile of weapons of mass destruction on Earth as rapidly as possible.� At a PIR Center-Carnegie Endowment for International Peace nonproliferation conference over the weekend in Moscow, U.S. and Russian participants disagreed over how best to address the liability impasse. Russian Ambassador-at-large Anatoly Antonov said the United States has been unwilling to compromise, seeking simply to impose U.S.-style legal standards on the international stage. Citing the possibility of an al-Qaeda strike on a Russian nuclear facility, Antonov criticized the United States for seeking to make Russia liable for the results of premeditated acts. �Why should Russia be held liable for something somebody else did intentionally?� Antonov asked. Carnegie Endowment Senior Associate Rose Gottemoeller, a former nonproliferation official in the U.S. Energy Department, said there is �good reason to be looking at some new and innovative approaches to tackling the liability problem.� Gottemoeller added, though, that the Duma should �release the steam� that has built up over the dispute by ratifying both the CTR umbrella agreement and the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program for Russia, signed in May of this year by Russia, European Union countries and the United States (see GSN, May 22). A U.S. official today said the Duma has made MNEPR its priority and is unlikely to ratify the CTR umbrella agreement soon. Center for Nonproliferation Studies Washington Director Leonard Spector, a former assistant deputy administrator in the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, called for an international pooling of resources to pay any liability claims under the threat reduction agreements. Spector, who along with the Fridtjof Nansen Institute�s Douglas Brubaker has published an article in the Monterey Institute�s Nonproliferation Review supporting reform of U.S.-Russian liability arrangements, said asking Russia to accept liability is illogical, since the existence of the threat reduction agreements presupposes financial need on Moscow�s part. Both Antonov and Natalya Kalinina, an assistant to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, said that, because of stumbling blocks such as the liability dispute, the West is not making good on its Global Partnership promise of increased nonproliferation aid to Russia. �Realistically, funding has not begun for many of the projects,� Kalinina said. Return to Menu C. Cooperative Threat Reduction 1. Abraham considers RF-US coop in nuke technologies impressive. U.S. Energy Secretary Spenser Abraham describes cooperation with Russia in the WMD non-proliferation and nuclear technologies as impressive. After his meeting with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev on Monday, Abraham said both sides have a series of nuclear projects for further successful cooperation, in particular in the field of uranium. Commenting on the WMD non-proliferation, he stressed that each country has the right to promote its technologies on the world nuclear market. Among the U.S.-Russian nuclear material safe handling projects, Abraham named the beginning of a joint project on science, a research reactor in Romania. Return to Menu 2. Putin: Russia, US - partners on nuclear non-proliferation President Vladimir Putin believes that Russia and the United States are strategic partners and allies on the problem of nuclear non-proliferation. He said so on Sunday at a meeting with Russian Minister of Fuel and Energy Igor Yusufov and U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, who are co-chairmen of the Russian-American Energy Forum. The meeting was attended by Russian Minister of Trade and Economic Development Gherman Gref and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans. President Putin described the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as "one of the most important problems for humanity in the 21st century," and pointed out in this connection that much had changed in this respect in Russian-American relations. "On some issues we became partners and, as President George W.Bush said, never again shall we become enemies. At the same time, on some issues we are becoming strategic partners and allies," he said. In his opinion, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of such issues. Spencer Abraham said, in his turn, that Russia and the United States had achieved good results in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation, so that now they would be able to concentrate their attention on a peaceful use of atomic energy without worrying that it would be used by terrorists. Return to Menu D. Multilateral Threat Reduction 1. Putin on High Level of Russo-Canadian Interaction Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that the visit by Canada's Governor General Adrienne Clarkson is a "milestone event in bilateral relations." The Russian leader said this during expanded negotiations with the Governor General in the Kremlin Tuesday. "It testifies to a high level of interaction between our nations," Putin said. "We seem to be far away from each other, but we are neighbours by the Arctic Ocean," Putin continued, stressing that "the role of distances is decreasing in the modern world, while the unity of views on the key problems of modernity is becoming increasingly crucial." Adrienne Clarkson said in turn that she saw her visit as a chance to deepen the Russo-Canadian relations. She stressed that the Canadian delegation included representatives of indigenous peoples of the North and experts in environmental problems. The North is the region where we learn to live and do live, and increasing our knowledge in this respect is very important, Clarkson said. We should heed to the North with its numerous riches and regard it not only as a sphere of extracting resources, but also in terms of preserving healthy environment, Clarkson believes. Referring to the members of her delegation, the Governor General said they played a special role in the development of the federation of Canada. Clarkson also pointed to the importance of Russo-Canadian interaction as the G-8 members, emphasising the process of global partnership launched at the 2002 summit in Kananaskis (Canada). Return to Menu 2. Farewell to Arms: Britons Focus on Decommissioning Russian Subs Another stage of negotiations on financing of dismantling and decommissioning of two nuclear submarines is over at the Sevmashpredpriyatie enterprise (the Russian city of Severodvinsk, the Arkhangelsk Region). In the framework of the program "Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction" approved by the G8 countries, Great Britain following Norway finances decommissioning of non-strategic submarines. The negotiations started at the beginning of August with participation of Russia's Atomic Power Ministry. Deputy Director of the Nuclear Programs Department in the British Chamber of Commerce and Industry Steven Traswell visited Sevmashpredpriyatie for the second time already. David Field RWE NUKEM project director from Germany was the contractor's representative. Sevmashpredpriyatie was represented by Chief Engineer of the enterprise Vladimir Pastukhov, experts in military technique production, people from the foreign economic activity department, the design bureau, the scientific technological department and the pricing department. During the negotiations the parties have reached similar opinions and agreed that the next meeting scheduled for the beginning of October will be devoted to signing of a contract. Both sides are interested in speeding up of the project realization that is why it was decided to attract the Zvezdochka municipal enterprise to realization of the project. Foreign partners demand that realization of the project must be maximally transparent so that they could have an opportunity to report money spending to their tax-payers. Two nuclear submarines of the 949 Project ("Granite", that is OSCAR-1 in the western classification) meant for decommissioning have been staying at the Sevmashpredpriyatie since November 1999. The spent nuclear fuel was unloaded from the submarines in 2001-2002, as it is provided by the contract concluded with Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry. The problem is that as far as the ministry doesn't finance the decommissioning process the submarines have been staying at the enterprise longer that they should have to. It means that there is some danger of keeping the submarines save afloat. If the two submarines are decommissioned soon, this will allow the Atomic Energy Ministry to spend financing on utilization of other submarines and the enterprise will have more free space at the wharf for realization of other important projects. Now the two submarines are being prepared for placing into the dock and for unloading of the equipment. It is planned to start the works this year already. This is always a hard task for shipbuilders to destroy what they have done themselves. The above mentioned nuclear submarines belong to the third great generation of domestically produced submarines; they were produced at Sevmashpredpriyatie at the threshold of the 1980s. They were given the names "Arkhangelsk" and "Murmansk" in the Northern Fleet. This is still not clear why the second-generation submarines just served for 20 years while first-generation submarines served even twice longer. However, there is another opinion explaining this peculiarity of utilization. For decades submarines that served their time were stockpiled at fleet bases which was certainly a concealed fact. At that very period it was more important to create more nuclear submarines to keep up the nuclear parity with the USA. Nobody cared about safety of nuclear submarines that had served their time. In 1992, the government issued a decree on experimental utilization of nuclear submarines and it was the beginning of the problem solution. Unfortunately, Russia couldn't solve the problem alone. Since 1997, Americans have been helping Russia with decommissioning of strategic nuclear submarines. In 1997, the Cooperative Threat Reduction project (CTR) developed by US senators Nunn and Lugar starts. The project is meant for liquidation of strategic nuclear submarines which ballistic missiles threat US's national security. In this case, Americans are not interested in utilization of multi-purpose submarines. However, the problem remains still burning for European countries, Canada and Japan that are anxious about the environmental situation in the North and the Far East. According to Steven Traswell: "There are two basic components that are essential for Great Britain. First, we must rule out any possible access of terrorist structures to nuclear materials of any kind. The second issue we care about is ecological protection." Return to Menu E. US-Russia 1. Putin to have "very full program" during visit to US (excerpted) [�] In the evening of September 26, Putin is to leave by air for Washington, DC. Talks between Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush are to begin at the US President's Camp David country residence on the same day. The agenda of the upcoming talks provides for "a continuation of the substantive discussion of matters concerning Russia-US interaction in the military-strategic sphere, including work to put into operation the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and interaction in the sphere of anti- ballistic missile defence," Prikhodko said. In Russia, the forthcoming summit at Camp David "is associated with hope for invigorating the positive impulse, sensed from George W. Bush, in Russian-US relations," Prikhodko said. The two-day talks between Putin and Bush are to be held in different formats. At first, the two Presidents are to meet without their assistants. Later on, they will exchange views in a broader format. After a press session on September 27 the two presidents are to carry on the talks at a working luncheon. At the close of the meeting with the US President, Vladimir Putin will complete his visit to the US and leave for Moscow by air on September 27. Return to Menu 2. Putin, Bush to discuss non-proliferation at Camp David Matters concerning non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the mounting threat that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may get into the hands of terrorists will be discussed at the upcoming Russian-US summit meeting at Camp David. The two presidents will discuss this subject in detail, Sergei Prikhodko, deputy head of the Kremlin administration, has told Itar-Tass. "The mounting threat that WMD may get into the hands of terrorists and the growing number of countries that seek to possess them require further joint moves by Russia and the US to increase interaction in efforts to combat proliferation of the WMD," Prikhodko said. This concerns, primarily, the need "to raise the effectiveness of the existing multilateral mechanisms," he emphasised. On the eve of the summit at Camp David, non-proliferation issues were discussed at the Russia-US energy forum in St.Petersburg. US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham referred to the Russian-US cooperation in this sphere as impressive. Bilateral portfolio contains a number of joint projects for successful work, particularly that concerning uranium, he emphasised after a meeting with Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy. The discussion dealt, in particular, with a joint operation on a research reactor in Romania. A container with 13.5 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium, which is enough to develop one nuclear bomb, was kept at the Nuclear Research Institute in the Romanian city of Pitesti. It has been brought to Russia for reprocessing. The highly enriched uranium had been brought to Romania in Soviet times from the Novosibirsk-based chemical concentrates facility, which is now to reprocess uranium into fuel for nuclear power stations. Improper conditions of the keeping of weapons-grade plutonium in Romania had given rise to apprehensions that terrorists might get hold of it. This is why an operation to bring uranium back to Russia at IAEA request was paid for by the US Department of Energy. Expenditure on the safe delivery of uranium by a specialised plane amounted to 400,000 US dollars. Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush are also likely to touch upon the subject of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. In an interview with US media on the eve of the summit, Putin emphasised that Russia, by cooperating with Iran, does not violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty in any way. At present Russia discusses with Iran a version of an additional protocol to the agreement on cooperation in the nuclear sphere. Under the protocol, "all nuclear fuel reprocessed by Iran should be returned to Russia", President Putin stated. The protocol is necessary, since the Russian side "considers correct our partners' arguments that fuel supplies may be used as a base for producing nuclear materials." Putin said Russia's intelligence service has information available that "very many West European and American companies maintain cooperation with Iran, including that on dual-purpose technologies". He pointed out that he would not like suspicions about Russia's cooperation with Iran in the weapons sector to be made use of as a pretext for unfair competition on the international market. Putin emphasised that Russia and Iran are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Everything that is done on the part of Russia fully accords with international agreements, Putin stated, calling for not politicising the question of Russia's cooperation with Iran in the nuclear sphere. Return to Menu 3. Bush plans to discuss dispatch of Russian peacemakers to Iraq President George Bush is planning to discuss at the Camp David summit the possibility of sending Russian peacemakers to Iraq, U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow told Itar-Tass Monday, on the eve of the Russo-American summit. The ambassador stressed that Washington wanted more countries to take part in the peacemaking operation in Iraq under the aegis of the United Nations and under U.S. command. However, he noted, it is up to Russia itself to decide on participation in it. Moreover, Vershbow noted that the situation on the Korean Peninsula would also hold pride of place at the Russo-American summit since North Korea now ranked among the biggest menaces to world security. The summit negotiations, Vershbow believes, will give the two leaders an opportunity to coordinate their steps in the effort to settle the Korean problem. The American diplomat noted that the United States appreciated the fact that North Korea had agreed to take part in the sexpartide negotiations and to hold their second round. He hopes Moscow will be able to persuade Pyongyang that it is necessary to give up the work on the development of mass destruction weapons. Return to Menu F. Missile Nonprolliferation 1. Missile Proliferation Must Be Stopped A powerful noise was replaced with a terrible thunder of an explosion in the evening of September 8, 1944 when the first German V-2 missile exploded in Chiswick, London. That thunder announced the appearance of a novel weapon, ballistic missiles, on the global battlefield. Less than 60 years later, ballistic missiles have become not only the deadliest but also the crucial factor in any military conflict. And we don't mean only strategic nuclear missiles, as everyone knows that strategic or tactical nuclear missiles cannot be used without provoking a global military, economic, political and ecological catastrophe. This is why the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons has been limited by international agreements and norms, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is a voluntary agreement whereby its members, i.e. the seven industrialised states, restrict the export of delivery systems and related technology for systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometres. Russia joined it in 1995. But no limits are set on the proliferation of tactical ballistic missile systems with non-nuclear warheads and a range of under 300 kilometres, as well as exo-atmospheric defence missile systems, which have become the main destructive factor of the latest military conflicts. The reason for this is that modern military conflicts are clearly regional and even a small number of tactical ballistic missiles can quickly change the balance of forces on a small theatre. Moreover, unlike the USA, the Middle Eastern and Central Asian states such as Iran and Pakistan, as well as North Korea and China cannot supply their armed forces with air- and sea-launched precision-guided weapons. Consequently, small- and intermediate-range missiles and air defence systems are for the Moslem World, North Korea and China the only (though weak) alternative to the US Tomahawk cruise missiles and smart bombs. Today many military experts and politicians call for establishing effective international control over the proliferation of operational-tactical and air defence missiles. The easiest way to do this is to turn the MTCR agreement into a universal international legal document that would stipulate sanctions for the violation of its provisions. However, this step is hindered by a group of issues that have the common name of "arms trade." Trade in ballistic missiles is today one of the most promising segments of the arms business. Twenty-two countries of the world have ballistic missiles and seven countries are capable of manufacturing them. It is one thing when missiles are sold by such politically stable regimes as Russia and the USA, which are signatory of the non-proliferation treaty and other agreements on weapons of mass destruction. But it is quite another matter when they are sold by countries that are ready to deal with anyone who pays enough, disregarding military and political consequences of such actions. Of great concern in this connection is the stand of North Korea, which has no international arms control obligations and plans to build up missile technology deliveries. In early August 2003 Japan's Sankei Shimbun cited its North Korean sources as saying that the Pyongyang authorities planned to export its Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile with an assessed range of 4,000-6,000 km by the end of this year. It is apparent that the uncontrollability of North Korean weapons programmes turns the elaboration of an acceptable international regime of preventing the proliferation of missile systems to dangerous regions into an extremely difficult undertaking. The issue calls for the application of new thinking by at least the largest powers. It needs trust more than anything else, and trust is a delicate thing. For example, Russia and the USA seriously differ on the evaluation of combat characteristics of tactical missile systems. One example. Only Russia and the USA can create precision-guided ballistic tactical missiles. But the main US missile of this class, ATACMS army tactical missile system, based on 30-40 year old technology, is a poor rival to the modern Russian Iskander-E precision-guided missile system. Nikolai Gushchin, head and chief designer of the Kolomna KBM Engineering Design Bureau, said in the summer of 2003 that when the 480-kg warhead of the missile with the range of 250 km hits the target with a CEP of 2 metres, the effect is comparable to a nuclear blow. The complex is fully autonomous in target acquisition. "Its optical target acquisition system is completely failsafe and can operate unerringly in fog, on moonless nights, or in conditions of active electronic warfare. No other system in the world can do the same," said Gushchin. And all existing active means of radio-electronic warfare are powerless against such warheads. Since the trials of the Iskander-E (where E stands for export) are nearly over, Russia can soon become the leader in the export of new-generation missile systems. It is rumoured that the USA wants to try to spread the MTCR provisions to this Russian system. This prompts the question: What is the MTCR? An instrument of international security and the prototype of a future comprehensive treaty? Or do our partners view it only as a weapon in the struggle for legitimate arms markets? Money certainly counts. But international security appears to be more precious. Return to Menu G. Russia-Iran 1. Russian Expert for "A Tougher Approach" to Russia-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Russia should display "a tougher approach" to cooperation with Iran as regards the use of nuclear energy, Sergei Rogov said at a RIA Novosti press conference on Tuesday. He is the director of the Institute of US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. "The Bushehr nuclear power project has long been in the making but to this time Iran has not signed the agreement on return of the nuclear fuel," said Rogov. "We do not violate international commitments cooperating with Iran on the Bushehr project. But we fail to notice Iran's other nuclear programmes, such as on creating ballistic missiles behind our back." In this light, Rogov opined that Iran can be the main reason for the worsening of relations between Russia and the United States. To him, Iran "stands out among the states on 'the axis of evil'" and the Bush administration "will not neglect Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear sphere." "Damage that such cooperation with Iran may inflict on Russian-American relations will be incomparable with the commercial advantage the Russian Nuclear Ministry will get from the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant," Rogov warns. Return to Menu 2. Iran's Bomb Iran Now Faces an Oct. 31 deadline from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to give inspectors full access to its nuclear facilities and programs. If it does not meet a series of conditions intended to ensure that it is not developing nuclear weapons, it will risk being declared in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. It's not clear how Tehran will respond. Its representatives angrily walked out of the IAEA meeting where the deadline was set, and some hard-liners have called for an open break with the treaty. On the other hand, Jordan's King Abdullah said last week that senior officials had told him that they are eager to reach an agreement. What is clear is that the world faces its own Iranian deadline. If work at the extensive nuclear facilities uncovered around the country during the past year is not frozen, the fundamentalist Islamic regime will soon have the capacity to manufacture the key elements of nuclear weapons. Israeli officials say this "point of no return" could be reached by the middle of next year. U.S. analysts are more cautious but still project an Iranian bomb by the latter part of this decade. Time is running out for the Iranian program to be stopped by diplomatic or political means. The Iranians understand this: They have been stalling the IAEA and its inspectors for months and likely will continue to do so even if they formally agree to the agency's demands. Their strategy has a good chance of working unless the United States, Europe and Russia quickly start doing a better job of coordinating a common response. The transatlantic differences over Iran are not as great as those on Iraq. The United States and the European Union have agreed that the Iranian nuclear program is a serious threat and that Tehran's acquisition of a bomb should not be allowed. Russian President Vladimir Putin, too, seems to have grudgingly accepted the idea that recently disclosed Iranian activities, such as the construction of a massive facility for enriching uranium, are problematic. Yet Russia's atomic energy agency has insisted on continuing work on a large nuclear power plant at Bushehr that would give Iran a potential source of plutonium. And European governments persist in a failed policy of "critical dialogue" with the Iranian regime; according to one report, the governments of Britain, France and Germany recently dangled an offer of technological cooperation before Tehran in exchange for its acceptance of stepped-up inspections, ignoring objections from the White House. European governments make the point that the Bush administration's policy of shunning the Iranian government while encouraging a pro-democracy opposition movement also has failed to get results. Russia's atomic bureaucrats ludicrously claim there is no proof that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. Such arguments miss or dodge the main point: Unless Iran's rulers are confronted with a broad and coherent international coalition that is prepared to apply painful sanctions -- through the United Nations or, if necessary, independently -- they will not stop pursuing a bomb. An opportunity -- maybe the last one -- to begin forging such a common front will open with Mr. Putin's visit to Washington and Camp David this week. Mr. Bush should press Mr. Putin to state clearly that further Russian cooperation with Iran, including supply of fuel to the Bushehr plant, will depend on full and unambiguous Iranian cooperation with the IAEA. Mr. Putin and European leaders should also join the United States in planning a strong and immediate response in the event of noncompliance, on Oct. 31 or afterward -- one based on sanctions, not bribes. The time to address Iran by multilateral and nonmilitary means is now; those governments that want the Bush administration to embrace such an approach must step forward. Return to Menu 3. Russia Hardens Stance Toward Iran Prospects of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation dimmed over the weekend as President Vladimir Putin questioned Tehran's reluctance to agree to more comprehensive UN inspections and the nuclear power minister said a key nuclear agreement with Iran would not be signed any time soon. Putin said he sees no good reason why Iran should not sign an additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that would allow the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct thorough inspections of suspected nuclear sites without notice. "If Iran is not striving to develop nuclear weapons, it has nothing to hide. I see no grounds for refusing to sign these additional protocols," Putin said Saturday at a meeting with U.S. reporters ahead of a summit with U.S. President George W. Bush at Camp David. Putin also said Russian intelligence has information that West European and U.S. companies "are cooperating with Iran directly in the atomic sphere." IAEA's board of directors convened earlier this month to again urge Iran to sign the nuclear protocol and, more important, give Tehran until the end of October to prove that it is not pursing a covert nuclear weapons program. If Iran fails to do so, the IAEA may refer the issue to the UN Security Council, which could impose sanctions on the country. Moscow has repeatedly urged Tehran to sign the protocol and at the same time insisted that Russia will continue to build a nuclear reactor in Bushehr even if Iran does not sign the document. But Moscow also has made it clear that it will not complete the reactor unless Tehran signs an agreement to return spent reactor fuel. Nuclear Power Minister Alexander Rumyantsev acknowledged Friday that the agreement was nowhere close to being signed, a development that could delay the scheduled 2005 completion of the Bushehr reactor. "Our talks could last a long time," Rumyantsev told reporters after talks with visiting U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. Russian and Iranian officials had promised that the agreement would be signed by October. However, the Nuclear Power Ministry said earlier last week that the signing was being delayed by Iranian demands that Russia pay for the spent fuel, contrary to existing international practice. Addressing a nonproliferation conference Friday, Rumyantsev said he believed the Iranians made the unusual demand because they have yet to "learn" the intricate standards of nuclear cooperation, rather than because they would like to keep spent fuel that could be used to make nuclear bombs. "The delay is of a learning nature rather than a bureaucratic one," Rumyantsev said. He hinted that Tehran may have put the agreement on the backburner to focus instead on how to respond to the IAEA's October deadline. An Iranian diplomat repeated Tehran's denials that the country was seeking to develop nuclear arms. "We say no to atomic bombs and weapons of mass destruction and yes to peaceful atomic technology and to peaceful atomic research and development," Akham Khoseini said at the conference. Meanwhile, Rumyantsev and Abraham on Friday signed an agreement to continue projects under the Nuclear Cities Initiative, including a new $9 million partnership to provide the city of Snezhinsk with state-of-the-art cancer diagnosis imaging equipment. Abraham told the nonproliferation conference that the U.S. Energy Department and the Nuclear Power Ministry would work together with the IAEA to return highly enriched uranium from a research reactor in Romania to Russia to burn off weapons-grade material. The two-day nonproliferation conference, which ended Saturday, drew more than 300 experts from 36 countries Return to Menu 4. Veliki Novgorod Manufactures First Batch of Equipment for Iranian Nuclear Power Project The engineering corporation Splav, based in Veliki Novgorod, has manufactured the first batch of pipeline equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. It will be shipped to Iran before the end of September, RIA Novosti learnt from the works' administration. In 2002 Veliki Novgorod mechanical engineers won a tender for equipment supplies, in which Czech and German factories participated. Under the contract, the volume of supplies will exceed $20 mln. In all, over 4,000 products will be sent from Veliki Novgorod to the Bushehr project in 2003-2005. Return to Menu 5. Iran, Russia cooperate in atomic energy: ambassador Iran and Russia are developing the atomic energy cooperation, Iranian Ambassador to Russia Gholam-Reza Shafei said on Friday. "The cooperation has always been under the IAEA control," he said at the second international conference on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which is currently underway in Moscow. "Iran has been cooperating with the IAEA beyond commitments within the past few months, and it will develop the cooperation in line with international norms," the diplomat said. Iran, being guided with the Islamic belief, thinks that weapons of mass destruction are "inhuman and illegal," the ambassador said. Thus the Iranian defense doctrine does not include weapons of the sort. Iran, a signatory to the Convention on the Non-Proliferation of Biological, Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and a country that has been affected by chemical weapons, is actively cooperating with related international organizations and institutions, Shafei said. Return to Menu 6. Moscow Surprised Over State Department Sanctions Against Tula Design Bureau The sanctions imposed by the US Department of State against the instrument-making design bureau in the city of Tula "can evoke nothing but bewilderment," Anatoly Baranov, press secretary of Deputy Prime Minster Boris Alyoshin, said on Saturday. The State Department imposed the sanctions "in connection with deliveries military equipment deliveries to Iran," allegedly made by this facility, he said. Baranov denied the reports of some media that Boris Alyoshin during his stay in Tula on September 18 and 19 unexpectedly cancelled a visit to the instrument-making design bureau after a report about the US sanctions. "In the first place, the visit to the design bureau had not been planned and, second, Alyoshin did pay a visit to the bureau after the sanctions against it were reported," the press secretary pointed out. He said Alyoshin examined the military equipment produced by that facility. The Tula Design Bureau is "one of the best Russian facilities producing conventional arms," Baranov said. It is not for the first time, he recalled, that the US State Department has imposed sanctions against it. "First it was charged with arms deliveries to Iran, which has not been proved," Baranov noted. The Kornet anti-tank guided missile systems produced at the Tula Design Bureau "have excellent characteristics, which corresponding arms manufactured in the NATO countries do not have," a source in the Russian military-industrial complex told RIA Novosti. "Perhaps this annoys the lobbyists of the US military-industrial complex," the source suggested. Return to Menu 7. Putin Says Russia May Send Troops to Iraq (Excerpted) [�] U.S. officials say Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran is on the agenda at Camp David. The United States believes Iran is secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons and that Russia's work on the Bushehr nuclear plant could help Iran achieve that goal. Russia slowly has moved closer to the U.S. view, and Putin said Saturday that there is no good reason Iran should not sign an agreement with the U.N. nuclear watchdog allowing unfettered inspections of the country's nuclear sites. "If Iran is not striving to develop nuclear weapons, it has nothing to hide. I see no grounds for refusing to sign these additional protocols," Putin said. He said Russia was working to assure its cooperation does not let Iran develop anything other than a peaceful nuclear program. "The appearance of another nuclear power on our southern borders does not correspond to our national interests," he said. [�] Return to Menu 8. Putin Won't Send Russian Troops to Iraq (Excerpted) [�] Putin also maintained his opposition to U.S. requests to halt support for Iran's nuclear program, which Washington considers a front for trying to produce an atomic bomb, and repeated Russian accusations that Western states have failed to stop their companies working in the Islamic Republic. Iran has come under pressure in recent weeks to show that its nuclear program is peaceful and U.S. officials have been lobbying Russia to stop working with Tehran. "Many western firms are working with Iran in the atomic technology sector, including dual-use technology," Interfax news agency quoted Putin as saying, referring to atomic technology that can have peaceful or military applications. Return to Menu H. Official Statements 1. Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly (excerpted) [�] A second challenge we must confront together is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Outlaw regimes that possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- and the means to deliver them -- would be able to use blackmail and create chaos in entire regions. These weapons could be used by terrorists to bring sudden disaster and suffering on a scale we can scarcely imagine. The deadly combination of outlaw regimes and terror networks and weapons of mass murder is a peril that cannot be ignored or wished away. If such a danger is allowed to fully materialize, all words, all protests, will come too late. Nations of the world must have the wisdom and the will to stop grave threats before they arrive. One crucial step is to secure the most dangerous materials at their source. For more than a decade, the United States has worked with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union to dismantle, destroy, or secure weapons and dangerous materials left over from another era. Last year in Canada, the G8 nations agreed to provide up to $20 billion -- half of it from the United States -- to fight this proliferation risk over the next 10 years. Since then, six additional countries have joined the effort. More are needed, and I urge other nations to help us meet this danger. We're also improving our capability to interdict lethal materials in transit. Through our Proliferation Security Initiative, 11 nations are preparing to search planes and ships, trains and trucks carrying suspect cargo, and to seize weapons or missile shipments that raise proliferation concerns. These nations have agreed on a set of interdiction principles, consistent with legal -- current legal authorities. And we're working to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative to other countries. We're determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies. Because proliferators will use any route or channel that is open to them, we need the broadest possible cooperation to stop them. Today, I ask the U.N. Security Council to adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution. This resolution should call on all members of the U.N. to criminalize the proliferation of weapons -- weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict export controls consistent with international standards, and to secure any and all sensitive materials within their own borders. The United States stands ready to help any nation draft these new laws, and to assist in their enforcement. [...] Return to Menu 2. Fighting Catastrophic Terrorism I thank those who have made this event possible, especially Prime Minister Bondevik, Elie Wiesel, and the International Peace Academy. Their efforts have produced an important discussion of terrorism and its causes. In the two years since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States has begun reshaping its military, creating a new Department of Homeland Security, improving airport and seaport security, reconfiguring military weapons and tactics, and scrutinizing the efficiency of intelligence services. But even as the United States has greatly improved its ability to fight the war, we have not developed a plan or demonstrated the political will to win the war. Taking military action against terrorists and improving homeland defense are not the same as executing a global strategy designed to win the war on terrorism. Military action may be necessary to de-construct serious and immediate threats to our national security, but the war on terrorism will not be won through attrition - particularly since military action might sometimes breed more terrorists. In Shakespearean terms, our dilemma is that �to end one doubt by death revives two greater in the heirs of life.� To win the war against terrorism, the United States must assign to U.S. economic and diplomatic capabilities the same strategic priority that we assign to military capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War, our ability and will to exert U.S. leadership outside the confines of a military crises have been eroded by inattention, budget cuts, and an increasing partisanship that afflicts foreign policy decision-making. The September 11 attacks jarred the country out of its complacency toward foreign threats. But what is still missing from American political discourse is support for the painstaking work of foreign policy and the commitment of resources to vital foreign policy objectives that lack a direct domestic political constituency. Americans do understand that we have a moral responsibility to foster the concepts of political and religious freedom, economic opportunity, free enterprise, the rule of law, and democracy. They understand that these values, which have been the basis of our own society, are the hope of people all over the world. The United States cannot lift every person out of poverty, cure every disease, or stop every conflict. But the United States must be present to help organize the world to overcome the threats to peace and prosperity in the 21st Century. Chief among these threats is terrorism. Earlier this year, I published an article that outlined five campaigns that we must undertake to win the war on terrorism. I argued that the United States must improve diplomatic capabilities, enhance international trade, strengthen our alliances, support democracy and development worldwide, and expand our efforts to control weapons of mass destruction. Each of the campaigns is essential. But I believe that the campaign to control weapons of mass destruction stands out as the most urgent. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just the security problem of our time. It is also the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the coming age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But even the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. Given economic globalization, there will be no safe haven from an instance of catastrophic terrorism. Distance from the site of a nuclear blast, will not insulate people from the economic and human trauma that would result. Beyond the horrific loss of life, proposals to advance the standards of living throughout the industrialized world would be undercut by the uncertainty and fear that would follow a catastrophic terrorist attack. Investment would plummet, global equity markets would be depressed, the financial viability of transportation industries could collapse, real estate in major cities would lose value, and the exchange of people and ideas would be further encumbered. The bottom line is this: for the foreseeable future, the international community will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Addressing this situation will require an unwavering commitment to organizing the world to prevent this intersection. Hopes for a peaceful world that will accommodate human progress and development rest squarely on the will of the United States and other nations to undertake this commitment. Terrorist organizations have demonstrated suicidal tendencies and are beyond deterrence. We must anticipate that they will use weapons of mass destruction if allowed the opportunity. The minimum standard for victory in this war is the prevention of any of the individual terrorists or terrorists cells from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction. The Cold War was an unconventional war, as is the war on terrorism. The irony of our situation today is that victory in the current war depends very much on cleaning up the remnants of the previous war. We cannot guarantee that terrorists will not strike, but we are not helpless. We can develop the international practices and norms that can almost guarantee that terrorists will not have access to nuclear weapons. In doing so, we can transform our world into a place that is more secure and more connected than it has ever been. In an important article in The National Interest in 2002, Graham Allison and Andrei Kokoshin, former high-ranking Defense officials for the United States and Russia, respectively, made this very point. They wrote: �Though the world�s stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials are vast, they are finite. The prerequisites for manufacturing fissile material are many and require the resources of a modern state. Technologies for locking up super-dangerous or valuable items - from gold in Fort Knox to treasures in the Kremlin Armory - are well developed and tested. While challenging, a specific program of actions to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of the most dangerous groups is not beyond reach, if leaders give this objective highest priority and hold subordinates accountable for achieving this result.� As part of the global war against terrorism, the United States and its allies must establish a worldwide system of accountability for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In such a system, every nation that has weapons and materials of mass destruction must account for what it has, safely secure what it has, and demonstrate that no other nation or cell will be allowed access. If a nation lacks the means to do this, the international community must provide financial and technical assistance. This process will be expensive and painstaking, but international security and prosperity hang in the balance. We must commit the resources and political will required to preserve modern society and the futures of our children and grandchildren. Some nations, after witnessing coalition military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, may decide to proceed along a co-operative path of accountability regarding their weapons and materials of mass destruction. But other states may decide to test the will and staying power of the international community. Vigorous and timely joint diplomacy by the United States and all cooperative nations would greatly increase the likelihood of peaceful outcomes. When nations resist such accountability and when all diplomatic and economic tools fail, however, the United States and other responsible nations must not rule out the use of military force. While admitting this necessity, we should spare no effort to establish absolute accountability through peaceful means. In 1991, I joined with former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn to establish the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This initiative brought Americans and Russians together to ensure the safety and destruction of the huge stockpile of weapons and materials of mass destruction left over from the former Soviet Union that were in jeopardy of theft or accidental use. The program has demonstrated over the last decade that extraordinary international relationships are possible. The United States and the Russian Federation have accomplished something never before done in history. Superpowers, who squared off against each other for almost 50 years, laid aside a host of disagreements and forged a new cooperative relationship aimed at the control and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction. Working in concert, the United States and Russia have destroyed more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and dismantled hundreds of bombers, missiles, and submarines that were built to deliver them. The Nunn-Lugar Program, through the International Science and Technology Commission, is employing in peaceful pursuits tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists who are no longer tempted to sell their knowledge. The program also has made progress toward protecting nuclear material, biological weapons laboratories, and chemical weapons stockpiles. Beyond statistics, the program has served as a bridge of communication and cooperation between the United States and Russia for twelve years, even when other aspects of the relationship were sometimes in decline. It has improved military-to-military contacts and established greater transparency in areas that used to be the object of intense secrecy and suspicion. Now we must not only accelerate weapons dismantlement in Russia and the United States, we must replicate our work in as many countries as possible and build a global coalition to support non-proliferation. Questions have been raised about the security of Pakistan�s nuclear program and similar questions will be raised about India�s. The exact status of Iraq�s weapons and materials of mass destruction is still being investigated. North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, and perhaps other nations present unique and difficult proliferation challenges. We cannot afford to be defeatist. We must prove that the national security logic of weapons elimination is superior to one of covert acquisition. Using the Cooperative Threat Reduction model, we should attempt to forge relationships to discourage acquisition and/or to control weapons of mass destruction in previously reticent or hostile nations. It is historically important to note that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus utilized Cooperative Threat Reduction to eliminate all of their stocks of weapons of mass destruction. In this context, the decision by the G-8 nations to devote $20 billion to securing weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union over the next 10 years is an incredibly important development. The participation of the G-8 and other allied nations, such as Norway -- a leader in weapons dismantlement in the Arctic region -- will greatly improve the expertise and diplomatic strength that can be brought to bear on safeguarding weapons of mass destruction. We welcome not only the commitment of funds, but also the infusion of ideas from an increasingly committed alliance on how dismantlement efforts can be accelerated. I believe that the world has a window of opportunity to address proliferation threats. The next ten years must show how an increasing number of responsible nations worked together to make the safe storage, accountability, and destruction of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons a fundamental objective of international policy. Reasonable opportunities for peace, order, progress and perhaps even the continuity of our civilization depends upon our success. Return to Menu 3. Interview on The Charlie Rose Show (excerpted) [�] MR. ROSE: Without threatening the Russians so much that they would become -- SECRETARY POWELL: Charlie, sometimes people have to remember what happened. When we first came in, everybody was saying, "Those crazy Bushies, they're going to get rid of the ABM Treaty, we're going to have a major crisis in Europe." Every intellectual in Europe screaming and shouting -- MR. ROSE: Well, they don't respect the -- SECRETARY POWELL: But what do we do? We talked to the Russians. I talked to the Russians for nine months, talking about the ABM Treaty, and why it was a constraint, and why we didn't need it any longer, and why we should work on missile defense together. I was unable to get a solution, and the Russians said, "Now we really have a problem with this, we really think you ought to stay within the ABM Treaty." And I said "Well, you know, we've tried, we've talked about it for nine months, ten months," went on to 11 months. I said, "This isn't going to work. So let me tell you what we'll do. Let's find a way to do this as friends and partners. We're going to leave the ABM Treaty but it does not have to break apart our relationship." We listened to them for 11 months, they listened to us, and they realized the strength of our feeling, and they understood our position just as we understood their position, and we came to a disagreement. And I'll never forget the day that I visited President Putin in his office in the Kremlin, when I was -- when I told him that a day or two later President Bush would announce that we were going to be leaving the ABM Treaty. And President Putin looked across the table at me, and Foreign Minister Ivanov was there, and he said, "Well, Colin, I think it's wrong, I think it's bad, and I don't think you should do it. We disagree with you. But at least we won't have to talk about that anymore," he said, "and we will have a good strategic relationship with you anyway." Why? Because it's important. And lo and behold, that was in December of 2001, and six and a half, seven months later, we were out of the ABM Treaty, and we had signed a new treaty with the Russians to reduce strategic offensive weapons. And our strategic cooperation has continued in a splendid fashion ever since. Everybody said the world was going to come to an intellectual end with the end of the ABM Treaty. And it didn't happen. Why? We talked it through, and realized we couldn't agree on this, so let's move forward on that which we do agree upon, and get this irritant behind. We did that. [�] Return to Menu 4. The United States, Russian Federation, Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency Cooperate on Nonproliferation - Fresh HEU nuclear fuel shipped back to Russian Federation Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced today that on Sunday, September 21, 14 kilograms of fresh Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) were returned from Romania to the Russian Federation under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-funded Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Initiative. The HEU was airlifted from Bucharest, Romania to Russia where it will be down-blended and used for nuclear power plant fuel fabrication. The highly enriched nuclear fuel assemblies were originally supplied to Romania by the former Soviet Union for the Russian-designed 2 MW research reactor, located close to the Romanian capital, Bucharest. The reactor was shutdown in December 1997, and is being decommissioned. The fresh nuclear fuel was loaded in 8 fresh fuel transportation canisters provided by the Russian Federation. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspectors and U.S. DOE technical experts monitored the process of loading the fuel in the canisters. An IL-76 Russian cargo plane was used to complete the air shipment of the HEU fuel from Romania. "The RRRFR program exemplifies the strength of the U.S. and the Russian Federation partnership to reduce the threat of terrorism and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction," Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham said. "It reinforces President Bush's commitment to work with our partners in the region and take practical steps to improve the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking." The shipment of fresh research reactor fuel from Romania to Russia was part of a U.S.-led cooperative international effort to reduce, and if possible eliminate, the use in and storage of highly enriched uranium in civil nuclear activities. The Secretary said the Romanian Government has demonstrated leadership in the fight against global terrorism. Romanian authorities stored the fuel in a secure location until it could be securely repatriated. In 1996, DOE established the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, under which the United States accepts specified types of spent and unused fresh fuel containing U.S.-supplied uranium for management and disposition in the United States, on condition that operators agree to convert their reactors to low-enriched uranium as soon as practicable. This project with Romania represents the first step of a similar program that DOE has created jointly with Russia and the IAEA to return Russian-supplied HEU research reactor fuel for long-term management and disposition. The IAEA has played an instrumental role in arranging the shipment from Romania. Return to Menu 5. Speech at a meeting with the co-chairmen of the Russian-American energy business summit (excerpted) [�] In this sphere, it is not only administrators who work for us and for you; there are also specialists of the highest international standard. I think that with your help we will be able to solve issues which attract special attention of our countries and the international community. I mean problems of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I must say that the problem of non-proliferation, in my opinion, is one of the most important for mankind in the 21st century. A great deal has changed in relations between our countries. At some stage, we became partners, and as President Bush said, we will never be enemies. But we have not just become partners; we are becoming strategic partners and allies. And one of these spheres is non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [�] Return to Menu I. Links of Interest 1. Advancing American Interests and the U.S.-Russian Relationship Return to Menu 2. Russian-Ukrainian Missile Cooperation Return to Menu 3. Speech to the Second Moscow International Non-proliferation Conference: Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Regime Return to Menu 4. Radio Interview Return to Menu DISCLAIMER: Nuclear News is presented for informational purposes only. Views presented in any given article are those of the individual author or source and not of RANSAC. RANSAC takes no responsibility for the technical accuracy of information contained in any article presented in Nuclear News. RANSAC's Nuclear News is compiled two to three times weekly. 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