Threat Reduction: Reform and Revitalization Required
Threat Reduction: Reform and Revitalization Required
Kenneth N. Luongo and William Hoehn March 25, 2003
Over the past few weeks, Representative Duncan Hunter, Chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee, has taken aim at the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, a first line of defense against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). His assertion that the CTR program has "morphed into an open-ended, unfocused, and sometimes self-defeating venture" leaves the mistaken impression that threat reduction spending is not a cost-effective investment in protecting the homeland and global security. The facts argue otherwise.
Representative Hunter complained in the Washington Post that approximately $230 million was misspent on Russian rocket engine and fuel destruction projects. He then wrote in USA Today that CTR has stumbled because of problems with access to facilities, spotty cooperation from the Russians, and a diffusion of programmatic focus. The Chairman supports threat reduction but wants accountability in government-financed programs, as we all do.
But threat reduction's problems can only be solved if the Congress and the Bush administration act expeditiously to improve the effort rather than further bruising it. The Bush administration came into office and promptly cut key threat reduction program budgets. Congress has impeded implementation of key programs because of spending and reporting restrictions. We need leadership that focuses on clearing away obstacles and accelerating progress, not on increasing micromanagement and magnifying mistakes.
These programs are assigned the extremely difficult task of rapidly eliminating holdover Cold War threats in countries that were once our mortal enemies. Major goals are to destroy deadly weapons and improve security over the world's largest stockpile of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) materials. Most of these materials are stockpiled at highly sensitive military facilities that still operate under a Soviet-style security apparatus. Major parts of the Russian national security bureaucracy are still wary of the West and its interest in their defense materials and facilities. These circumstances can create friction and slow progress, and even lead to misjudgments and mistaken spending. But these problems can be managed through a regular and focused dialogue between high-level political leaders in both countries - a process that now does not exist.
By Representative Hunter's own calculations, the FSU possesses "99% of the world's potentially loose weapons of mass destruction." These are weapons that Al Qaeda and other terrorists and outlaws would like to get their hands on. They are the very materials we are fighting Iraq to destroy. We have been working on this problem for 11 years, and at the current pace there is still a decade of work to go. That is too much time in today's unpredictable threat environment. More political capital needs to be invested to speed the completion of this work.
And additional financial resources are required as well. Threat reduction cooperation with Russia and the FSU consists of dozens of separate, individual projects. The CTR program is run by the Department of Defense, but there are also many other threat reduction activities managed by the departments of Energy and State. The total budget for these activities is about $1 billion in U.S. government spending per year - or less than 0.3% of this year's defense budget.
Still, real progress is being made with this money. Over the past decade of nonproliferation cooperation between the United States, Russia, and the FSU states:
Roughly 6,000 nuclear warheads were removed from deployment.
More than 400 missile silos were destroyed.
Over 1,500 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers were eliminated.
Storage and transportation of nuclear material and weapons was made more secure.
150 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium was eliminated.
A major biological weapons production plant was eliminated.
About 50,000 chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile weapon scientists were provided with support to pursue peaceful research.
The $230 million in projects cited by Representative Hunter amounts to about 3% of the $7 billion that has been spent to date on all threat reduction activities. It is unfair to judge the performance of this broad and diverse nonproliferation agenda by isolating a few problematic projects.But Representative Hunter is right about one thing - the threat reduction agenda is in need of reform this year. Dangers are running high and the coming presidential election could preclude the opportunity for change next year.A threat reduction reform agenda, however, should not focus on additional expenditure restrictions and more onerous reporting requirements as a means of assuring accountability. These methods have produced limited results to date and reliance upon them places risk aversion over threat elimination.Many of the difficulties facing the threat reduction agenda are political and not technical in nature. Therefore, it is within the power of the Congress and the Administration to break down the real barriers to cooperation that have hamstrung the programs and to create the conditions for concrete and rapid progress.Taking action on the following key policy, financial, and procedural issues this year could break the threat reduction logjam.
Integrate cooperative threat reduction activities into the concept of homeland defense and the war on terrorism. These programs are a first line of defense against WMD threats to the U.S. and its allies, and they should be considered high-priority national security activities, not foreign aid. As former Senator Sam Nunn has noted, "homeland security begins abroad."
Provide permanent authority to the President to waive the annual certifications required for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and Freedom Support Act nonproliferation programs. The President has requested congressional action on this issue in 2003.
Establish a senior coordinator or focused coordination team that can prioritize, oversee, and facilitate threat reduction activities. This person or group must be more powerful than current interagency working groups and must have unfettered access to the President and his senior advisors.
Create bi-annual, performance-focused meetings between high-level U.S. and Russian political officials to comprehensively evaluate threat reduction progress, receive reports from program managers on advances and impediments in each program, and negotiate solutions to implementation obstacles.
Maintain funding levels for key programs. The FY 2004 budget submission cuts some essential nuclear material security programs to pay for new initiatives. While some of the programs targeted for reduction have funding backlogs, if implementation problems are resolved those backlogged funds could be spent rapidly.
Increase funding for smaller but essential programs, such as research reactor conversion, Second Line of Defense and border security, export control development, and the repatriation of sensitive nuclear reactor fuels to Russia.
Support new initiatives. The FY 2004 budget proposes useful new threat reduction initiatives, such as expanding cooperation with chemical weapons scientists, accelerating elimination of Russian weapon-grade uranium, providing security upgrades at Russian Strategic Rocket Forces warhead storage sites, and securing radiological materials. But there is also a need for a new initiative to eliminate weapon-grade uranium from vulnerable facilities worldwide. The authority to undertake this effort should be clarified and the funding for it provided.
Expand and refocus efforts to peacefully employ weapons scientists and specialists and reduce WMD complex infrastructure. Excess weapons scientists and workers are a major root cause of the proliferation threat given their expertise and access to weapons and materials. These efforts need more funding, greater flexibility, and new strategies in order to provide the career-changing opportunities that can further reduce, if not eliminate, the threat these scientists and workers pose.
Encourage Russia to improve the environment for threat reduction activities by providing the financial transparency, facility access, and legal protections that they need. If Russia is to be an equal partner in this process it must act to address these key issues that are primarily under its control.
Ensure that the G-8 nations meet their financial obligations under the Global Partnership initiative and focus their funding on priority proliferation issues. The G-8 has promised $20 billion for threat reduction over the next decade. One-half of this amount is projected to be funded by the U.S. but the remainder must be paid by our key allies. Also, consideration must be given to increasing the total above $20 billion and encouraging the further involvement of non-G-8 nations.
Continue to hold comprehensive hearings on threat reduction activities and include expert, non-governmental witnesses who can speak broadly but authoritatively on the progress and problems facing the Nunn-Lugar programs, including how threat reduction concepts and authorities can be expanded to include new nations.
Cooperative threat reduction is a vital effort that is essential to reducing 21st Century WMD threats. It needs to be updated, reformed, and expanded. The Congress and the Administration need to work together along with Russia and our other G-8 partners to make this reform a reality.
The dangers are acute. As President Bush has stated, "The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. … We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. … History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action."
If terrorists or hostile regimes should gain access to the world's largest exposed WMD stockpiles because of inertia, distraction, or risk aversion on the part of our leaders, our security will suffer despite other victories in the war on terrorism, and the judgment of history will indeed be harsh.
Kenneth N. Luongo and William Hoehn are, respectively, Executive Director and Washington Office Director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), a private research organization specializing in cooperative nonproliferation efforts between the United States and the former Soviet Union.
