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Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council

Issue Brief:  The Russian Biological Weapons Complex

Lauren Arestie, Research Assistant

March 2003

Russian development of biological weapons (BW) dates back to 1928, when the Red Army started research on methods to deploy typhus as a weapon.  The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), signed in 1972, alerted the Soviet Union to the sophistication of Western BW programs. Convinced that the signatories to the treaty would not comply with it, in 1973 the Politboro created Biopreparat, a network of biological research and production facilities.  Despite Soviet ratification of the BWC in 1975, Biopreparat continued its work on BW, and at its peak in the late 1980s, it employed nearly 60,000 people and commanded an annual budget of nearly $1 billion.  BW research continued until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The former Soviet BW complex consists of about 50 facilities, including at least six agricultural laboratories that developed diseases to attack livestock and crops.  Major facilities include Vector, located in western Siberia, which produced smallpox; Stepnogorsk, in Kazakhstan, and Vozrozhdeniye Island, located in the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan, which both generated antibiotic-resistant anthrax. 

Weaponized diseases produced by the Soviet Union include anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia, glanders, brucellosis, Marburg virus, Q fever, typhus, Ebola, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, foot-and-mouth disease and African swine fever.  Total stockpiles of biological pathogens are unknown, but an American team that visited Stepnogorsk in 1995 estimated that it could produce 300 tons of anthrax spores in less than one year.

The security of former BW facilities varies greatly by location.  Many laboratories are in poor physical condition and cannot maintain advanced biological containment measures, leading to the possibility that pathogens might be accidentally released.  There are also legitimate concerns about theft.  Some facilities, such as Vector, have erected fences and installed security cameras with U.S. assistance, but others are awaiting security overhauls, and some have yet to be visited by U.S. officials.  It is estimated that fewer than 40% of BW facilities have received any security upgrades.  And scientists at BW facilities are generally poorly paid, which may give them the motivation to steal or sell pathogens and weapons technology.

Most U.S. BW nonproliferation efforts focus on redirection of former BW scientists into mainstream scientific research.  In 1992, the United States and other countries established the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow to develop and fund science and technology projects.  A similar organization, the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, was founded in 1995.  The science centers and related scientist redirection efforts run by the State Department received $52 million in FY2003.  The Department of Energy’s Russian Transition Program, which oversees the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, serves a similar function, partnering former weapons scientists with industries to develop commercially viable projects.  The RTI program received $39.3 million in FY2003.

The Defense Department has three BW nonproliferation projects that address the destruction of BW facilities and development of BW defense mechanisms.  They are known collectively as the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program, run by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  The Security Enhancements program is designed to ensure secure storage and handling of biological pathogens at four laboratories in Russia.  The Cooperative BioDefense Research program works to develop BW defenses through cooperative research programs at two laboratories and three research institutes in Russia.  And the Dismantlement program is designed to eliminate BW infrastructure and equipment at four Russian laboratories.  Together, the three programs received $55 million in FY2003.

The major hindrance to U.S. cooperative threat reduction efforts is the lack of access to many Russian facilities.  Russian officials cite national security concerns and a lack of reciprocal visits to U.S. laboratories when denying entry to many sites.  And Russia has failed to honor a contract to supply samples of its anthrax in exchange for U.S.-funded vaccine research, ostensibly  because of export control laws that forbid the exodus of dangerous pathogens.  Collectively, this lack of access to the Russian BW program has raised concerns in the Bush administration that Russia may not be complying with the BWC. 

Where access has been granted, however, there is insufficient funding for nonproliferation programs.  With limited U.S. aid, many Russian facilities cannot afford to make security upgrades or adequately pay their employees.  Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) estimated that at current funding levels, some facilities might not be fully secure for 27 years. 

U.S. support of mainstream Russian scientific research can be worrisome, however, because of concerns about dual-use technology.  Technology associated with medical and pharmaceutical research can be used in the BW industry, and without adequate oversight, the United States risks inadvertently subsidizing a Russian BW program.  However, the General Accounting Office determined in an April 2000 report that significant safeguards were in place to mitigate the risk of funding dual-use programs.  The GAO came to the conclusion that the risk of proliferation through inattention and inadequate funding was greater than the risks posed by misallocated funds.

SOURCES:

Bryan Bender, “Lugar Pushes to Visit Closed Russian Facility,” Global Security Newswire (August 19, 2002).

Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Summary of Major U.S. Nonproliferation Programs—Fiscal 2003 Budget Request (http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/nukes/ prolifplans.html)

Christopher J. Davis, “Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq,” Emerging Infectious Diseases (July-August 2002).

Christopher Pala, “A Trip to Abandoned Anthrax Island,” The Moscow Times (January 14, 2003).

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Fact Sheet (http://www.dtra.mil/news/fact/nw_ctr.html).

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction Russia Programs (http://www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_russia.html).

Department of Defense, FY2003 Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation (http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/fy2003/budget/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/ fy03_CTR.pdf).

Global Security.org, Russian Chemical and Biological Weapons Facilities (http://www. globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/cbw_fac.htm).

Joby Warrick, “Russia’s Poorly Guarded Past: Security Lacking at Facilities Used for Soviet Bioweapons Research,” The Washington Post (June 17, 2001).

Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (Touchstone Books, 2002).

Kristen Philipkoski, “Russia’s Irksome Bioweapons Stock,” Wired News (February 24, 2003).

Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States (Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2002).

Peter Eisler, “U.S., Russia Tussle Over Deadly Anthrax Sample,” USA TODAY (August 19, 2002).

Seth Brugger, “Briefing Paper on the Status of Biological Weapons Nonproliferation,” Arms Control Association (September 17, 2002).

U.S. General Accounting Office, Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks (April 2000).