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Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council

Issue Brief:  The Russian Chemical Weapons Complex

Lauren Arestie, Research Assistant

April 2003

Russia’s chemical weapons (CW) program began in earnest after World War II, and by the time Soviet CW production ceased in 1987, Russia had amassed 40 thousand metric tons of chemical agents, the largest CW stockpile in the world.  The stockpile is stored at seven sites throughout Russia, six of them located west of the Ural Mountains. 

About 80 percent of the stockpile consists of the nerve agents VX, sarin and soman, which are stored in munitions such as warheads, artillery shells and spray tanks.  These munitions are located in five storage depots that often lack physical protection and are manned by poorly paid guards.  The chemical artillery shells are so small that three of them could be smuggled out in a briefcase, and although the shells are stored without their charges, terrorists could use plastic explosives to detonate them.

The remaining 20 percent of the Russian CW stockpile consists of the blister agents lewisite and mustard gas, and the choking agent phosgene.  The lewisite and mustard gas are stored in massive 80-ton containers at the Gorny and Kambarka storage depots, and the phosgene is stored in artillery shells at the Shchuch’ye depot.

Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on November 5, 1997.  Under the original terms of the treaty, all signatories were supposed to destroy 1 percent of their CW by April 2000, 20 percent by April 2002, 45 percent by April 2004 and all of it by April 2007.  When it became apparent that Russia lacked the funds to meet these deadlines, the CWC member states extended the initial deadline to 2002.  In October 2002 the deadline was extended yet again, to 2003, and Russia has requested that the deadline for total CW destruction be pushed back to 2012.  Such an extension will need the approval of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which oversees implementation of the CWC, and would require detailed progress reports.

The Russian chemical weapons destruction program is run by a civilian organization, the Russian Munitions Agency (RMA), which receives substantial financial assistance from the United States and Europe.  The RMA initially planned to build destruction facilities at each of the seven CW storage depots, at a total cost of $7 billion.  In an attempt to cut costs by 30 to 50 percent, however, the plans were scaled back to include three such facilities, one each at Gorny, Kambarka and Shchuch’ye.  The Gorny facility, built with funding from the European Union, became operational on December 19, 2002.

Most U.S. CW cooperative threat reduction (CTR) efforts are run by the Defense Department through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.  Major projects include the demilitarization of two CW production facilities at Novocheboksarsk and Volgograd, scheduled to be completed by 2007; security enhancement at the Shchuch’ye and Kizner CW storage depots, scheduled to be completed by Fall 2003; and the construction of a nerve agent destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. 

After initial construction of the Shchuch’ye facility began in 1999, the GAO issued a report indicating that the Russian government had not met the U.S. congressional certification requirements for CTR support.  In response, Congress denied funding for the project in FY2000, and instead allocated $20 million toward security enhancement projects at two CW storage sites.  These sites, however, only contain 35% of the total Russian CW stockpile.  In October 2002, President Bush waived the certification requirements and released two years’ worth of funding for Shchuch’ye as part of the FY2003 defense appropriations bill.

Other nonproliferation efforts have focused on the redirection of former CW scientists into mainstream scientific research.  The United States and other countries have established the International Science and Technology Center in Russia, and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, to develop and fund science and technology projects.  The science centers and related scientist redirection efforts, run by the U.S. State Department, received $52 million in FY2003.  In addition, the Department of Energy’s Russian Transition Initiatives program serves a similar function through its Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, which partner former weapons scientists with industries to develop commercially viable projects.  The RTI received $39.9 million in FY2003.

The greatest challenges to removing the Russian CW threat remain issues of money and access.  Russia lacks the funds to secure CW storage depots and build destruction facilities, and will need substantial foreign aid to meet its CWC deadlines.  But Russian officials are hesitant to allow U.S. inspections of CW sites, citing national security concerns, which makes it difficult or impossible for U.S. CTR projects to obtain the necessary certification for funding.  This problem will be alleviated if Congress votes to grant the president a permanent waiver authority, as has been sought in the FY2004 budget request.  Permanent waiver authority would assist in preventing delays at projects such as Shchuch’ye.

SOURCES:

“Chemical Weapons Destruction Begins at Gorny” Arms Control Today (January/February 2003).

“Russia Opens CW Destruction Plant” Arms Control Today (September 2002).

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Summary of Major U.S. Nonproliferation Programs—Fiscal 2003 Budget Request (http://armscontrolcenter.org/nukes/prolifplans.html).

Charles Digges, “U.S. Delegation Visits Embattled Shchuch’ye Chemical Weapons Storage Depot” Bellona Foundation (May 31, 2002).

Christina Kucia, “U.S. Funds Released for Shchuch’ye” Arms Control Today (November 2002).

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction Russia Programs (http:// www.dtra.mil/ctr/ctr_russia.html).

General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites (March 2003).

Government of the Russian Federation, On Approving the Federal Special Program “Chemical Weapons Stockpiles Destruction in the Russian Federation” (July 5, 2001).

Jonathan B. Tucker, “Russia’s New Plan for Chemical Weapons Destruction” Arms Control Today (July/August 2001).

Kerry Boyd, “Deadlines Extended for Russian Chemical Demilitarization” Arms Control Today (November 2002).

Russian Munitions Agency, Chemical Disarmament (http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/zapasho. html).