Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction on the Agenda

of the 2003 Group of Eight Summit in Evian-les-Bains, France

Michael Roston

Analyst

Some concern existed in the period leading up to the latest G-8 Summit that nonproliferation and threat reduction had been moved to a backburner as the French presidency prioritized issues of environmental protection and poverty reduction.  While it cannot be said that WMD-related issues were as central to the summit’s substance as the 2002 proceedings in Kananskis, a considerable amount of attention was devoted to matters of proliferation.  Ultimately, five official documents were released at Evian, focused on three different areas of WMD-related concern. 

The G-8 announced a new effort, labeled as “Securing Radioactive Sources.” The statement and the action plan’s four documents largely mirrored one another.  Their recommendations were grounded in the observation at the national level by all G-8 parties of the principles of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and the encouragement of other states taking the same action.  The parties agreed to cooperate on securing high-risk orphaned sources, including through greater support of IAEA actions in this area.  For the future, the statement guaranteed a review of G-8 member implementation of these activities at the 2004 Summit, and the convening in France of a 2005 conference to assess implementation of the US-Russia-IAEA 2003 conference on radioactive source security.

The second area was a “G-8 Declaration on the Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”  The nine items in the declaration recognized the proliferation threat and re-affirmed the utility of collaborative, international solutions built on treaty regimes, bodies like the IAEA and the OPCW, export controls, threat reduction efforts, and other diplomatic activities.  Finally, it urged North Korea to irreversibly eliminate its nuclear weapons program and pressed Iranian accession to the IAEA Additional Protocol.  Of all the documents released, this declaration appeared to be based primarily on dialog and negotiation that occurred in Evian, and less on preparatory activities for the summit.

The third area was a review of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.  An annual report of the Senior Officials Group was released.  The report stated that progress had been made in exempting donors from taxation and in changing rules for adequate access to worksites, but that liability protections were still being worked out.  Advancements for implementation of specific projects were highlighted in the report’s second section, with considerable attention focused on the results of various conferences in Vladivostok, Severodvinsk, and Brussels, although it was observed that faster progress and new projects could only be implemented with broadened and sustained efforts on the parts of the states involved.  Financial commitments were identified within expected ranges, in addition to the notice that the “Partners have appropriated in their budget of FY 2003 adequate funds for this year’s projects.”  Outreach was appraised highly by the SOG, including successful efforts to involve non-G-8 states in the GP.  The document noted agreement by all parties that the expansion of the effort to Ukraine could wait until later phases of GP implementation.  An updated Action Plan for the Global Partnership also included goals of meeting the $20 billion target with contributions from new donors and additional pledges from Partners, the overcoming of barriers to implementation, and the coordination of programs to avoid duplication of labor.

While all of these matters occurred in the foreground as the official statements of the G-8 Evian Summit on WMD issues, a background discussion occurred over the “Proliferation Security Initiative.” This interdiction proposal from the Bush administration was advanced as a response to the threat highlighted by the interception of a North Korean freighter containing ballistic missile technology bound for Yemen.  This proposal was ultimately excluded from any official G-8 documents.  While some suggestions that an unwillingness to be seen as accepting a US proposal at a French-hosted event were presented as the basis for rejection of the measure, it is also true that a hornet’s nest of international legal issues was brought up by the proposal.  Ultimately, more time to study the initiative was requested by France and other parties to the G-8.