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Untitled Document

Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council

 

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Issues at the

47th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

September 15-19, 2003, Vienna, Austria

Michael Roston, Analyst

September 30, 2003

 

The IAEA’s General Conference (GC) occurred at a time of great fluidity in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, reflected in the great diversity of its agenda.  While deliberations concerning advances in nuclear science, the development of nonproliferation safeguards, and standard procedural matters were evaluated at the 47th GC, delegates to the IAEA also concerned themselves with new and substantial areas of concern.  Significant amounts of time were given to deliberations over developments on the Korean peninsula, the role played by Israel’s undeclared nuclear capability in the Middle East, and the accession of longtime NPT-holdout Cuba to an IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.  A number of agenda items were also of direct relevance to the pursuit of nonproliferation and threat reduction activities in Russia and the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere.

 

During the GC’s General Debate sessions, IAEA member states took the opportunity in their various public statements to outline their commitment to cooperative nonproliferation activities in Russia and the former Soviet Union.  Canada, for instance, highlighted a US$2.9 million contribution to IAEA security activities as falling in line with its commitment to the G-8’s Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.  Similarly, Norway underlined the importance it placed in its $100 million contribution since 1995 to assist Russia in securing nuclear waste and spent fuel in its northern regions, and identified the IAEA’s Core Expert Group as an essential agent for successfully implementing Global Partnership goals, such as the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. 

 

US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham used the General Debate to discuss advances in US-Russia cooperative nonproliferation activity, and also to outline some future plans.  He praised his Russian partners for successful collaboration in securing nuclear materials and for shutting down Russia’s three remaining plutonium production reactors.  In discussing future efforts, Abraham highlighted the US commitment of $10 million to support the IAEA’s international safeguards work, efforts to complete US ratification of the Additional Protocol, the pursuit of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the $6 million budget to promote the deepening of the international nuclear export control system, as well as efforts to install radiation portal monitors throughout the world’s seaports and borders.  Abraham then gave special attention in his statement to the recently concluded agreement to provide Romania with $4 million to convert the nuclear research reactor at Pitesti to low enriched uranium fuel.  He also announced a US pledge of $3 million to support IAEA efforts to further this research reactor conversion work in other states.

 

Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev used the General Debate session to point out that although Russia continues to call for Iran to immediately accede to the Additional Protocol on safeguards, Russia found the Board of Governors’ resolution on Iran to be too negative, failing to acknowledge Iran’s positive steps in recent months.  He also defended the legality of all Russia-Iran nuclear cooperation.  These remarks were made despite the postponement of a planned meeting with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Chief Gholamreza Aghazadeh to negotiate the completion of the spent nuclear fuel return agreement required for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant to come on line. 

 

Discussing nonproliferation efforts more broadly, Rumyantsev emphasized the broader dangers of nuclear terrorism for international security, and called for cooperative international action to alleviate them.  He specifically identified Russian cooperation with Japan and various European states in the dismantlement of decommissioned submarines as an area of progress, although he did note that Russia still had major funding requirements to complete this work. 

 

At a broader level, the GC took actions to globally promote threat reduction and nonproliferation goals, in which the US, Russia, and the former Soviet Union will play important roles.  The Conference passed a resolution on September 19th seeking to heighten security on a global basis against the dangers of nuclear and radiological terrorism.  The resolution called on member states to upgrade security domestically, seek to locate and secure orphaned radioactive sources, accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to participate in the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database.

 

The resolution was complemented by a major growth in the IAEA’s budget for 2004-05, marking a $25 million growth over the zero real growth budgetary policy of the agency that has stood for fifteen years.  The Agency’s total budget amounted to $268.7 million.  An additional amount of approximately $80 million in extra-budgetary commitments by member-states was also made for 2004-05. 

 

Nuclear verification work was expected to account for $102.3 million of the IAEA’s funding.  Of interest, the IAEA continued to pursue implementation of the Trilateral Initiative for the verification of the weapons-origin of excess fissile materials from the United States and Russia, requesting $393,000 in funding for 2004-05 budget, with an expected additional amount of $618,000 in extra-budgetary support.

 

Nuclear Safety and Security activities included a request for $22.4 million in funding.  Within the Nuclear Safety budget for 2004-05, $706,200 was to be directed toward management of disused radioactive sources that might be useful in the creation of a terrorist “dirty bomb.”  Toward broader nuclear security activities, $11.4 million was requested, with funds directed toward nuclear security information management and coordination, various steps to enhance physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities globally, and the detection of and response to threats involving nuclear and radioactive materials.  This budgetary support was also enhanced by the supplementary Nuclear Security Fund, which garnered $23 million in commitments from 21 states and one donor organization, with over $13 million already received. 



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