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Summary and Accomplishments of the Bush-Putin Presidential Summit, May 2002 Ingrid Staudenmeyer Herbert J. Scoville Peace Fellow On May 24 Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in Moscow, formally agreeing to deep nuclear reductions and continuing the trend towards what many are calling a new and improved relationship between the United States and Russia. The agreement limits the number of each nation's strategically deployed warheads to between 1,700-2,200 by 2012. These reductions mark a 2/3 decrease from the current size of the American and Russian arsenals, which, in accordance with START I counting rules, presently consist of 6,000 and 5,500 strategic nuclear warheads respectively. The summit also led to the formation of the NATO-Russia Council in Rome and the establishment of two working groups aimed at cooperation on advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear materials reduction. While some have heralded these agreements as an unprecedented step towards progressive arms limitations, others believe the summit meetings did little to improve the present security framework and ultimately contributed little to the overall U.S.-Russia relationship. Pre-Summit Goals and Expectations Both sides entered the summit with a prearranged agenda for the talks in Russia. Bush's priorities were primarily related to the war on terror. First and foremost, he wanted to discuss the future status of Iraq and Russian arms sales to Iran. Russia has been Iraq's main ally in the UN Security Council over the last decade and the two nations have a great deal of shared assets: Baghdad has $8 billion in debts to Moscow, and Russian-Iraqi economic ties are estimated to total $40 billion. Experts believed a U.S. promise that a "regime change" in Baghdad would not sever Russian oil contracts in Iraq, or a renegotiation of some of Russia's debts to the West, could soften Putin's anticipated opposition to potential military activity in the region. Bush also put pressure on Putin to block Russian transfers of nuclear expertise and ballistic missile technology to Iran. Finally, the United States stressed the need for increased economic reform and its desire to cooperate closely with Russia on energy issues. Putin came into the discussions with a heavy economic agenda. Russia desperately wanted recognition as a market economy by the United States [N.B.: U.S. designated Russia as a "market economy" on June 6], which would bring greater trade privileges for Russian companies in both the United States and the global economy. Moscow has accused Washington of protectionism for the steel tariffs it imposed this past spring. With Moscow still desperate for more cash and owing large debts to Western countries, Putin urged Bush to consider debt renegotiation and steps to enhance Russian economic integration with the global market economy. With respect to the arms control agenda, Putin achieved his system of needing a signed accord on nuclear arms control, ensuring a legally binding treaty to govern the nuclear reductions. Summit Results The main products of the Bush-Putin summit came in the form of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the formation of the NATO-Russia Council, the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Advanced Nuclear Technologies, and the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Nuclear Material Reduction. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, also known as the Treaty of Moscow, sets targets for the United States and Russia to reduce warhead levels within 10 years to between 1,700 and 2,200 from the current 6,000 each side is permitted under the 1991 START I Treaty. The three-page treaty, however, defers key unresolved issues to the implementation phase, including the timetable for decommissioning warheads, how many will be destroyed versus placed in deep storage for possible redeployment at a later date, and how to protect the decommissioned warheads' fissile material from theft. As negotiators could not agree on how to verify the reductions, the treaty borrows the verification regime of START I and includes provisions for establishing a bilateral commission to ensure compliance and transparency of data exchanges.The treaty's lack of specificity poses a challenge to both the United States and Russia to finalize the terms and coordinate steps towards implementation by means that will advance the larger aim of strategic cooperation set forth in a joint declaration that the presidents also signed on May 24. Before its entry into force, the Treaty of Moscow requires approval by both the U.S. Senate and Russian State Duma. NATO-Russia Council Reflecting the transformed relationship between NATO and Russia, President Bush and the other NATO Heads of State and Government have agreed with Russian President Putin to establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The creation of the NRC is intended to open a new era in NATO-Russia relations, providing opportunities for consultation, joint decision, and joint action on a wide range of issues. The NRC will focus on specific, well-defined projects where NATO and Russia share common goals. NATO and Russia have agreed on an initial, specific work plan, which includes projects in the following areas: assessment terrorist threats, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, defense reform, civil emergencies, and new threats and challenges (including scientific cooperation and airspace management). The NRC does not affect NATO's existing responsibilities as a political and military alliance based on collective defense. The NRC does not provide Russia a veto over NATO decisions or action. The NATO allies retain the freedom to act, by consensus, on any issue at any time. NATO allies will decide among themselves the issues they will address in the NRC, as well as the extent to which they will take a common position on these issues. NATO has also established an Information Office in Moscow, where NGOs, academic institutions, and interested Russian citizens can obtain firsthand information about NATO. U.S.-Russia Working Group on Advanced Nuclear Technologies President Bush and President Putin have agreed to establish a joint experts group to develop recommendations for potential U.S.-Russian collaboration on advanced nuclear fuel cycle research and development. The working group is formed around the view that the development of advanced nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies that would reduce significantly the volume of waste produced from civil nuclear reactors, would be highly proliferation-resistant, and could be used in the longer term to reduce stocks of excess weapons-grade plutonium and other potentially dangerous nuclear materials. These benefits were highlighted in President Bush's National Energy Policy in May 2001. The joint experts group will be headed by Secretary of Energy Abraham and Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev and will be established immediately to develop recommendations for potential collaborative U.S. and Russian research and development on advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The group will present its recommendations within 60 days. Implementation of the recommendations will be in keeping with U.S. nonproliferation goals. U.S.-Russia Working Group on Nuclear Material Reduction Both the United States and Russia have recognized that one important means to keep nuclear weapons material out of the hands of hostile nations or terrorists is to reduce the amount of material available. Under existing agreements, the United States and Russia are committed to reducing the amount of nuclear weapons-grade material, through the elimination of 34 metric tons each of plutonium and through U.S. purchase of 500 metric tons of Russian highly-enriched uranium for use in commercial nuclear reactor fuel. More than 140 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium has already been delivered under the latter agreement. These programs will eliminate enough material for almost 25,000 nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, President Bush and President Putin agreed that they should seek to do more. Therefore, a joint experts group under Secretary of Energy Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev will examine near- and longer-term, bilateral and multilateral means to reduce inventories of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium still further. The joint experts group will begin work immediately, and report its findings to Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev within six months. It will consult closely with industry to ensure that commercial markets would not be adversely affected by any new recommended initiatives to eliminate more weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. Outstanding Issues Despite the measures that the summit has instituted to help improve the current U.S.-Russia nonproliferation situation, problems still remain. The primary worry associated with the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions is that it makes no provisions for what is to be done to the warheads once removed. Unlike past arms pacts, this treaty does not call for the destruction of the bombers, missiles, and submarines that carry the nuclear warheads. Like past treaties, it also has no provisions for ensuring the dismantlement of warheads removed from deployment. The Bush administration has indicated that it will be storing - not eliminating - its excess warheads. It plans to maintain 2,400 nondeployed warheads for what U.S. officials call a "responsive force." As a result, critics argue that the treaty does nothing more than rearrange the two nation's existing arsenals, since the U.S. could redeploy up to 4,600 nuclear weapons within months of the treaty's expiration date in 2012. If Russia were to do the same, this would only add to its poorly stored and poorly safeguarded existing arsenal and further compound proliferation concerns. Another issue that critics find troubling is that Russia's most powerful delivery system - the multiple-warhead SS-18 missile - can stay in the deployed arsenal as long as the total warheads drop to the 1,700-2,200 range. In accordance with the never-implemented START II provisions, Russia would have had to dismantle its entire stock of SS-18s. This has led some to believe that the new treaty actually is a step back from gains that would have been made in START II. The final concern with the treaty is that it does not deal with the issue of tactical weapons. The United States currently has tactical weapons which number in the hundreds, but Russia is believed to possess anywhere between 6,000 and 14,000. Tactical weapons housed in Russia have been identified as those which would be most likely to end up in the hands of terrorists because of their small size, with catastrophic results. There is no denying that the results of the Presidential summit have been, on the whole, positive. But the set of agreements seem to accomplish more politically than they do in actual nonproliferation terms do not adequately meet the current worldwide proliferation threat. Both nations must work towards further practical steps to reduce stockpile numbers. While the new pact has gone a long way to eradicate any lingering Cold War animosity, many more steps are necessary to fully deal with the threats and concerns associated with nuclear proliferation. Appendix Released by Office of the Press Secretary, White House May 24, 2002 Text of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship, Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties, Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability, Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms, Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington, Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads. Article II The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. Article III For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission. Article IV 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. 3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party. Article V This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary May 24, 2002 Text of the Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation The United States of America and the Russian Federation, Recalling the accomplishments at the Ljubljana, Genoa, Shanghai, and Washington/Crawford Summits and the new spirit of cooperation already achieved; Building on the November 13, 2001 Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia, having embarked upon the path of new relations for the twenty-first century, and committed to developing a relationship based on friendship, cooperation, common values, trust, openness, and predictability; Reaffirming our belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new foundation for our relationship; Determined to work together, with other nations and with international organizations, to respond to these new challenges and threats, and thus contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, and free world and to strengthening strategic security; Declare as follows: A Foundation for Cooperation We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts. To advance these objectives the United States and Russia will continue an intensive dialogue on pressing international and regional problems, both on a bilateral basis and in international fora, including in the UN Security Council, the G-8, and the OSCE. Where we have differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect. We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media, tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity. We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation. The further development of U.S.-Russian relations and the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust will also rest on a growing network of ties between our societies and peoples. We will support growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two countries and people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges. Political Cooperation The United States and Russia are already acting as partners and friends in meeting the new challenges of the 21st century; affirming our Joint Statement of October 21, 2001, our countries are already allied in the global struggle against international terrorism. The United States and Russia will continue to cooperate to support the Afghan people's efforts to transform Afghanistan into a stable, viable nation at peace with itself and its neighbors. Our cooperation, bilaterally and through the United Nations, the 'Six-Plus-Two? diplomatic process, and in other multilateral fora, has proved important to our success so far in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaida. In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United States and Russia reject the failed model of ?Great Power? rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in those regions. We will support economic and political development and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation on counterterrorism and counternarcotics. The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE's Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in these efforts. On November 13, 2001, we pledged to work together to develop a new relationship between NATO and Russia that reflects the new strategic reality in the Euro-Atlantic region. We stressed that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other contemporary threats. We therefore welcome the inauguration at the May 28, 2002 NATO-Russia summit in Rome of a new NATO-Russia Council, whose members, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will identify common approaches, take joint decisions, and bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. In this context, they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. They aim to stand together against common threats and risks to their security. As co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, the United States and Russia will continue to exert joint and parallel efforts, including in the framework of the "Quartet," to overcome the current crisis in the Middle East, to restart negotiations, and to encourage a negotiated settlement. In the Balkans, we will promote democracy, ethnic tolerance, self-sustaining peace, and long-term stability, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United States and Russia will continue their constructive dialogue on Iraq and welcome the continuation of special bilateral discussions that opened the way for UN Security Council adoption of the Goods Review List. Recalling our Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 on counternarcotics cooperation, we note that illegal drug trafficking poses a threat to our peoples and to international security, and represents a substantial source of financial support for international terrorism. We are committed to intensifying cooperation against this threat, which will bolster both the security and health of the citizens of our countries. The United States and Russia remain committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on January 31, 2002. Economic Cooperation The United States and Russia believe that successful national development in the 21st century demands respect for the discipline and practices of the free market. As we stated on November 13, 2001, an open market economy, the freedom of economic choice, and an open democratic society are the most effective means to provide for the welfare of the citizens of our countries. The United States and Russia will endeavor to make use of the potential of world trade to expand the economic ties between the two countries, and to further integrate Russia into the world economy as a leading participant, with full rights and responsibilities, consistent with the rule of law, in the world economic system. In this connection, the sides give high priority to Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization on standard terms. Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations demands that we move beyond the limitations of the past. We stress the importance and desirability of graduating Russia from the emigration provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, also known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. We note that the Department of Commerce, based on its ongoing thorough and deliberative inquiry, expects to make its final decision no later than June 14, 2002 on whether Russia should be treated as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade law. The sides will take further practical steps to eliminate obstacles and barriers, including as appropriate in the legislative area, to strengthen economic cooperation. We have established a new dynamic in our economic relations and between our business communities, aimed at advancing trade and investment opportunities while resolving disputes, where they occur, constructively and transparently. The United States and Russia acknowledge the great potential for expanding bilateral trade and investment, which would bring significant benefits to both of our economies. Welcoming the recommendations of the Russian-American Business Dialogue, we are committed to working with the private sectors of our countries to realize the full potential of our economic interaction. We also welcome the opportunity to intensify cooperation in energy exploration and development, especially in oil and gas, including in the Caspian region. Strengthening People-to-People Contacts The greatest strength of our societies is the creative energy of our citizens. We welcome the dramatic expansion of contacts between Americans and Russians in the past ten years in many areas, including joint efforts to resolve common problems in education, health, the sciences, and environment, as well as through tourism, sister-city relationships, and other people-to-people contacts. We pledge to continue supporting these efforts, which help broaden and deepen good relations between our two countries. Battling the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, ending family violence, protecting the environment, and defending the rights of women are areas where U.S. and Russian institutions, and especially non-governmental organizations, can successfully expand their cooperation. Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and International Terrorism The United States and Russia will intensify joint efforts to confront the new global challenges of the twenty-first century, including combating the closely linked threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We believe that international terrorism represents a particular danger to international stability as shown once more by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is imperative that all nations of the world cooperate to combat this threat decisively. Toward this end, the United States and Russia reaffirm our commitment to work together bilaterally and multilaterally. The United States and Russia recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The specter that such weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists and those who support them illustrates the priority all nations must give to combating proliferation. To that end, we will work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material. We will also continue cooperative threat reduction programs and expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material. In that regard, we will establish joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. We also intend to intensify our cooperation concerning destruction of chemical weapons. The United States and Russia will also seek broad international support for a strategy of proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The United States and Russia call on all countries to strengthen and strictly enforce export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and tighten border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Missile Defense, Further Strategic Offensive Reductions, New Consultative Mechanism on Strategic Security The United States and Russia proceed from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington. The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed nature of the strategic relationship between them. The United States and Russia acknowledge that today's security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War. In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems. They also intend to take the steps necessary to bring a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems into operation. The United States and Russia have also agreed to study possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense technologies, bearing in mind the importance of the mutual protection of classified information and the safeguarding of intellectual property rights. The United States and Russia will, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe. The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. A major step in this direction is the conclusion of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions. In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed. The United States and Russia agree that a new strategic relationship between the two countries, based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability requires substantive consultation across a broad range of international security issues. To that end we have decided to:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: Moscow May 24, 2002. Rome, Italy 28 May 2002 Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses. Consequently, we, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation are today opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to our security. As participants of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, we reaffirm the goals, principles and commitments set forth therein, in particular our determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible. We are convinced that a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation will constitute an essential contribution in achieving this goal. In this context, we will observe in good faith our obligations under international law, including the U.N. Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Charter for European Security. Building on the Founding Act and taking into account the initiative taken by our Foreign Ministers, as reflected in their statement of 7 December 2001, to bring together NATO member states and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty, we hereby establish the NATO-Russia Council. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It will operate on the principle of consensus. It will work on the basis of a continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate. The members of the NATO-Russia Council, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will take joint decisions and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. Each member may raise in the NATO-Russia Council issues related to the implementation of joint decisions. The NATO-Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary General of NATO. It will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and at the level of Heads of State and Government as appropriate. Meetings of the Council at Ambassadorial level will be held at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed, including extraordinary meetings, which will take place at the request of any Member or the NATO Secretary General. To support and prepare the meetings of the Council a Preparatory Committee is established, at the level of the NATO Political Committee, with Russian representation at the appropriate level. The Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often if necessary. The NATO-Russia Council may also establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate. Such committees and working groups will draw upon the resources of existing NATO committees. Under the auspices of the Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet. Meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, meetings at military representatives level at least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as needed. Meetings of military experts may be convened as appropriate. The NATO-Russia Council, replacing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council [PJC], will focus on all areas of mutual interest identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision to add other areas by mutual agreement. The work programmes for 2002 agreed in December 2001 for the PJC and its subordinate bodies will continue to be implemented under the auspices and rules of the NATO-Russia Council. NATO member states and Russia will continue to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies. This cooperation may complement cooperation in other fora. As initial steps in this regard, we have today agreed to pursue the following cooperative efforts: -- Struggle Against Terrorism: strengthen cooperation through a multi-faceted approach, including joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for example, to Russian and NATO forces, to civilian aircraft, or to critical infrastructure; an initial step will be a joint assessment of the terrorist threat to NATO, Russia and Partner peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. -- Crisis Management: strengthen cooperation, including through: regular exchanges of views and information on peacekeeping operations, including continuing cooperation and consultations on the situation in the Balkans; promoting interoperability between national peacekeeping contingents, including through joint or coordinated training initiatives; and further development of a generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. -- Non-Proliferation: broaden and strengthen cooperation against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means of their delivery, and contribute to strengthening existing non-proliferation arrangements through: a structured exchange of views, leading to a joint assessment of global trends in proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical agents; and exchange of experience with the goal of exploring opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on protection from nuclear, biological and chemical agents. -- Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures: recalling the contributions of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and reaffirming adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a cornerstone of European security, work cooperatively toward ratification by all the States Parties and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, which would permit accession by non-CFE states; continue consultations on the CFE and Open Skies Treaties; and continue the NATO-Russia nuclear experts consultations. -- Theatre Missile Defence: enhance consultations on theatre missile defence (TMD), in particular on TMD concepts, terminology, systems and system capabilities, to analyse and evaluate possible levels of interoperability among respective TMD systems, and explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation, including joint training and exercises. -- Search and Rescue at Sea: monitor the implementation of the NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue, and continue to promote cooperation, transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia in the area of search and rescue at sea. -- Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defence Reform: pursue enhanced military-to-military cooperation and interoperability through enhanced joint training and exercises and the conduct of joint demonstrations and tests; explore the possibility of establishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training centre for missions to address the challenges of the 21st century; enhance cooperation on defence reform and its economic aspects, including conversion. -- Civil Emergencies: pursue enhanced mechanisms for future NATO-Russia cooperation in responding to civil emergencies. Initial steps will include the exchange of information on recent disasters and the exchange of WMD consequence management information. -- New Threats and Challenges: In addition to the areas enumerated above, explore possibilities for confronting new challenges and threats to the Euro-Atlantic area in the framework of the activities of the NATO Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS); initiate cooperation in the field of civil and military airspace controls; and pursue enhanced scientific cooperation. The members of the NATO-Russia Council will work with a view to identifying further areas of cooperation. 24 May 2002 U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Advanced Nuclear Technologies Issued in conjunction with Bush-Putin summit May 24 Following is a White House fact sheet on U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Advanced Nuclear Technologies issued in conjunction with the May 24 Moscow summit between President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin: (begin fact sheet) The White House Office of the Press Secretary (Moscow, Russia) May 24, 2002 FACT SHEET U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Advanced Nuclear Technologies President Bush and President Putin have agreed to establish a joint experts group to develop recommendations for potential U.S.-Russian collaboration on advanced nuclear fuel cycle research and development. The United States and Russia share the view that their economic well-being and national security would be strengthened by the development of advanced nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies that would reduce significantly the volume of waste produced from civil nuclear reactors, would be highly proliferation-resistant, and could be used in the longer term to reduce stocks of excess weapons-grade plutonium and other potentially dangerous nuclear materials. These benefits were highlighted in President Bush's National Energy Policy in May 2001. Therefore, the Presidents have agreed that a joint experts group under Secretary of Energy Abraham and Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev will be established immediately to develop recommendations for potential collaborative U.S. and Russian research and development on advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies. The group will present its recommendations within 60 days. Implementation of the recommendations will be in keeping with U.S. nonproliferation goals. (end fact sheet) |
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