2/6/12 Home / Publications / Reports & Publications www PGS Printer Friendly Page   U.S. Senate Perspectives on US-Russia Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs During the Moscow Treaty Debate Michael Roston Analyst April 2003 On March 5 and 6, 2003, the United States Senate considered ratification of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which was signed in May 2002 by President George W. Bush and his counterpart in Russia, Vladimir Putin. On March 6, the Senate approved the resolution of ratification on a 95-0 vote. The Russian State Duma must now give its advice and consent to the treaty before Presidents Bush and Putin can formally exchange instruments of ratification and bring about entry-into-force of its provisions. During the Senate's consideration of and debate on the treaty, numerous references were made by Senators to US-Russia cooperative nonproliferation activities, frequently referred to as "Nunn-Lugar" or Cooperative Threat Reduction. Indeed, the Foreign Relations Committee's report to the full Senate included a condition requiring a significant role for Nunn-Lugar in the implementation of the treaty's requirements: Condition 1: Report on the Role of Cooperative Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation Assistance. This condition requires the President to submit to Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance Russia will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty. This document presents the statements made by many senators involved in the floor debate that were pertinent to threat reduction programs, as they were recorded in the Congressional Record. The following section of this report highlights some of the more prominent references to Nunn-Lugar programs, while the final section of the document includes more detailed floor statements. Abridged Highlights from the Senate Debate on the Moscow Treaty "It is important that Congress know how the CTR and nonproliferation programs can be used to help the Russian Federation with its treaty obligations. It is equally important for Congress to know what these programs require to realize their full potential for enhancing security." -Senator Daniel Akaka (D - HI), p. 5-9 "I am pleased that the administration accepts the need to use Nunn-Lugar and related programs in implementing this treaty, and that the 2004 budget request has a 9-percent increase for Nunn-Lugar. That increase is probably spoken for, however, by the cost of building--belatedly--a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. So I wonder, at least, whether enough funds are budgeted for Nunn-Lugar�. And I hope that the President will prevail upon his own party in the House to give him more than temporary authority to waive certification requirements for these programs." -Senator Joseph Biden (D - DE), p. 10-13 "The Moscow Treaty does not expressly deal with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program but the objectives of the treaty cannot be achieved without extending this assistance to Russia." -Senator Conrad Burns (R - MT), p. 14 "I hold in my hand a piece of metal that belonged to a bomber that presumably carried nuclear weapons that threatened every American. Did we shoot this bomber down? No, we did not. We sawed the wings off and destroyed the fuselage. How did we do that? Because we had a program called Nunn-Lugar, or Lugar-Nunn, that actually recognized it is a whole lot better to reach an agreement for arms reduction and then help pay for the destruction of a Soviet bomber or a Russian bomber, or the dismantlement of a missile or a submarine and the destruction of a warhead, than it is to exchange them or to try to shoot it down or to sink the submarine. So we appropriated taxpayers' money for this purpose. This is called peace." -Senator Byron Dorgan (D - ND), p. 15-16 "Russia is committed to meeting these reductions, but the question remains if Russia has the resources to meet them. The Nunn-Lugar program has been successful in assisting the former states of the Soviet Union to help reduce their nuclear arsenals. The Resolution of Ratification rightly includes Nunn-Lugar programs as instrumental in achieving lasting and durable arms reduction." -Senator Chuck Hagel (R - NE), p. 17 "I commend my colleagues on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees for engaging the administration in extensive discussions about continued support for [Cooperative Threat Reduction]. I strongly approve the administration's commitment to this program, and I will continue to support their budget for this." -Senator Orrin Hatch (R - UT), p. 18 "In 2001, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler commission concluded that for our efforts to secure Russia's nuclear weapons materials and expertise to succeed, we will have to spend $30 billion over the next 10 years. That is a challenge we ought to be meeting as a primary goal prior even to the implementation of this treaty." -Senator John Kerry (D - MA), p. 19-20 "I agree with President Bush that ``history will judge harshly those who saw this coming and failed to act.'' However, at a time when the international community needs leadership and guidance on this issue, the administration is virtually silent. Too often on arms control and non-proliferation, America has become a colossus that oscillates between pouting and shouting. In contrast, the resolution that my colleagues and I are introducing today gives this nation a strong, clear, and constructive voice on these critical issues�.We call for the full funding of all Federal non-proliferation and arms control programs to the levels prescribed by the Baker-Cutler report." -Senator Joseph Lieberman (D - CT), p. 21 "We had the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Quite frankly, some of us were a little leery of how that program would work and whether it was the right thing to do. But looking back on that time in history, there is no question but that was a really dynamic leadership effort that needed to be made. It has been helpful. It has not been perfect, of course. But I think it has helped our relationship with Russia, and I think it has also helped to control the escape of and the misuse of some of those nuclear weapon capabilities. I want to recognize Senator Lugar's past leadership in this area and thank him for working to get this Moscow Treaty ready." -Senator Trent Lott (R - MS), p. 22 "My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse we experienced over the Nunn-Lugar certification process last year. Each year, our President is required by law to certify that Russia is ``committed to the goals of arms control.'' In 2002, the administration requested a waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult. Meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and projects were permitted to continue, but no new projects were initiated and no new contracts were finalized." -Senator Richard Lugar (R - IN), p. 23-25 "Now with so many new nuclear weapons coming out of service, we must consider significant action to reduce proliferation to ensure that the American people and our friends and allies around the world will be safe. The most obvious way is to bolster the Nunn-Lugar programs." -Senator Bill Nelson (D - FL), p. 26-27 "These two events, the program review and the inability to certify, effectively stopped the Nunn-Lugar programs for approximately 2 years. The effectiveness of some of these programs has clearly been inhibited, if not damaged. The challenge now is to work to regain and then increase their effectiveness." -Senator Jack Reed (D - RI), p. 28-30 "�the bold foresight of Senators Nunn and Lugar to envision this program has reaped a great deal of mutual benefit for both nations and, indeed, perhaps the world at large, to further limit the proliferation of not only weapons of mass destruction but the materials by which those weapons are made." -Senator John Warner (R - VA), p. 31 Detailed Statements from the Senate Debate on the Moscow Treaty Senator Daniel Akaka (D - HI), March 6, 2003, p. S3229-3230, in colloquy with Senator Richard Lugar (R - IN) AMENDMENT NO. 254 Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I have an amendment I send to the desk. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA] proposes an amendment numbered 254. Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: (Purpose: To specify information to be included in the annual report on the role of Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance under condition 1 in section 2) At the end of the last sentence of condition 1 in section 2, strike the period and insert the following: ``, and shall include-- ``(A) an estimate of the funding levels required in the fiscal year following the year of the report to implement all Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other nonproliferation programs relevant to the Treaty and ensure that nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise in the Russian Federation are secure from theft and diversion; and ``(B) a description of any initiatives proposed by the President to address any matter covered by subparagraph (A) in order to improve the implementation or effectiveness of the Treaty.''. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii. Mr. AKAKA. Madam President, this amendment is the result of several hearings I chaired in the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and Proliferation on the importance of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to national security. The collapse of the Soviet Union left stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials vulnerable to theft and diversion. The Nunn-Lugar legislative initiative of 1991 established several threat reduction programs in the Departments of Defense and Energy to help dismantle weapons of mass destruction or improve their security. These programs, along with others in the State Department, are critical to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the diversion of material to terrorists. U.S. nonproliferation activities have accomplished a great deal. With American assistance, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. Our nonproliferation programs also prevent the recruitment by terrorists or other countries of WMD scientists and engineers. The CTR and other nonproliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation intends to reduce and destroy various weapons systems with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other nonproliferation programs. I strongly support language in the Moscow Treaty that directs the President to ``submit to Congress ..... a report and recommendations on how United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently. .....'' In November 2001, President Bush and President Putin met to discuss historic cuts to the nuclear stockpiles in the U.S. and in Russia. This discussion led to the Moscow Treaty before us today. After the first day of that summit, President Bush remarked that: [o]ur highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction ..... we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise. The CTR and other nonproliferation programs are the primary means we have to prevent weapons, weapon-usable materials, and expertise in the Russian Federation from falling into the hands of terrorists. Secretary of State Powell said, in testimony before the Senate, that the CTR program will be used to ``make warhead storage facilities more secure. Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty.'' The goals of the CTR and other nonproliferation programs are vital to national security. Getting there will be difficult. We must provide these programs with the funding necessary to accomplish their important and challenging task. I have joined my friend and colleague, Senator Lugar, in supporting adequate funding and high-level administration support for these programs for years. For this reason, my amendment would ensure funding estimates are included in this annual report on CTR contributions to Russian implementation of the Moscow Treaty. It is important that Congress know how the CTR and nonproliferation programs can be used to help the Russian Federation with its treaty obligations. It is equally important for Congress to know what these programs require to realize their full potential for enhancing security. AMENDMENT NO. 254, WITHDRAWN Madam President, I have had discussions with the distinguished chairman concerning my amendment. He has given me assurances that the intent of my amendment will be covered in the report mentioned in condition 1 and other reports already required by Congress. For this reason, I withdraw my amendment, and Senator Lugar and I will enter into a colloquy on this issue. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is withdrawn. The Senator from Indiana. Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Hawaii for his very important thoughts about threat reduction and about our mutual quest and support. Mr. AKAKA. I thank my friend, the Senior Senator from Indiana, for this opportunity to discuss with him the Cooperative Threat Reduction and other non-proliferation programs and their importance to effective implementation of the Moscow Treaty. I have chaired several hearings in the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, and undertaken several studies, on the importance of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction. Because of this work it was my intent today to offer an amendment to the Moscow Treaty to expand the report on Cooperative Threat Reduction and non-proliferation programs contained in the recommended resolution of ratification by including funding requirements. As my colleague knows, the collapse of the Soviet Union left stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials vulnerable to theft and diversion. The Senate and the Nation have benefited from the Senior Senator's leadership in the Nunn-Lugar legislative initiative of 1991 that established threat reduction programs in the Departments of Defense and Energy to help dismantle weapons of mass destruction or improve their security. These programs, along with others in the State Department, are critical to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the diversion of material to terrorists. My amendment would amend Condition One in the Resolution of Ratification so that the annual report on non-proliferation programs includes two important pieces of information. First, the report would include an estimate of funding levels necessary for the CTR and other non-proliferation programs relevant to the Treaty to ensure that nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise in the Russian Federation are secure from theft and diversion. Second, the report would include a description of any initiatives proposed by the President for the CTR or other non-proliferation programs that will improve the implementation or effectiveness of the Treaty. I understand through my conversation with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee that, while he appreciates my concerns and reasons behind my amendment, it should not be included in the resolution before us. U.S. non-proliferation activities have accomplished a great deal. With American assistance, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Our non-proliferation programs also prevent the recruitment by terrorists or other countries of WMD scientists and engineers. Mr. LUGAR. I agree with my friend. The CTR and other non-proliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation intends to reduce, destroy, and account for various weapons systems, materials, and expertise with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other non-proliferation programs. For this reason, the Foreign Relations Committee included Condition One to the Treaty to require the President to submit to Congress an annual report and recommendations on how Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance can best help the Russian Federation implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material. Mr. AKAKA. I strongly support this language. The Committee Report on the Moscow Treaty states that this report will include ``the role of Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance.'' Am I correct in my interpretation that the annual report will include the contribution of both the Department of Defense CTR program and other programs that are relevant to Treaty implementation and security and accounting of nuclear weapons and materials? Mr. LUGAR. Yes, this report is intended to establish the rationale for all U.S. non-proliferation programs insofar as they can be used to help Russia dismantle weapons or assure the security of those weapons and of the fissile material in them. The report also will include the amount of CTR assistance that the Russian Federation will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty. Mr. AKAKA. That is good to hear. I have joined with my friend in advocating for adequate funding and high-level administration support for these non-proliferation programs for years. For this reason, I was considering offering an amendment to include funding estimates needed to assist Russia meet its obligations under the Moscow Treaty. It is important that Congress know how the CTR and non-proliferation programs can be used to help the Russian Federation with its Treaty obligations and how best to fund these programs to meet Treaty obligations. Does my colleague believe it would be useful if such information was provided to Congress? Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I agree that such information is useful. However I believe that this information already is provided as part of the overall CTR annual report to Congress by the Department of Defense and annual reports by other non-proliferation programs. Specifically, the CTR annual report contains funding levels for individual projects as well as five-year cost estimates. I understand my colleague's concern that this report does not address Treaty-specific programs. The report required in the resolution of ratification could lay the groundwork for future cost and program requirements for non-proliferation that perhaps can be addressed in the Defense authorization bill. Mr. AKAKA. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I look forward to the opportunity to work with you in defining the amount and extent of information we need to adequately fund and support these important programs. I also understand your desire to keep paperwork and reporting requirements to a minimum for the small but hardworking staff of the CTR program. Accurate and timely reporting of this information is crucial for proper congressional oversight of these programs. It is my hope that the administration understands my concerns. In November 2001 President Bush remarked that ``[o]ur highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction ..... we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise.'' I know my friend shares my respect for the CTR and other non-proliferation programs that are the primary means we have to prevent weapons, weapons-usable materials, and expertise in the Russian Federation from falling into the hands of terrorists. The goals of the CTR and other non-proliferation programs are vital to national security. Getting there will be difficult. I know that by working together we can provide these programs with the funding necessary to accomplish their important and challenging task. Senator Joseph Biden (D - DE), March 5, 2003, p. S3133 An equal concern for me is the question of what the Russians will do with its reduced weapons. If it follows the lead of the United States, it will try to retain as many missiles and bombers as possible, and it will stockpile its downloaded nuclear weapons rather than dismantling them and disposing of the excess fissile material. Under this treaty, Russia can do whatever it wants with its so-called reduced weapons. But we have a stake in Russia's decision on this. That is because of the risk that Russia will not adequately protect the weapons and nuclear materials it has stockpiled. It is one thing for us to decommission, reduce our nuclear weapon and stockpile it. We have exceedingly tight security on such material. The Russians have incredibly, incredibly insecure facilities because they lack the money to be able to maintain these secure facilities. I worry that if Russia does not destroy them, that they will find themselves--and we will find ourselves--susceptible to the clandestine sale or the actual stealing of these materials, and they will fall into the hands of people who do not have our interests at heart. The only threat to our very existence is the accidental launch of Russian missiles, and that is why I still worry about the MIRV'd ICBMs. But perhaps the worst other threat to America is that some Russian nuclear weapons, or material with which they make them, could be stolen or diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups. The more weapons Russia stockpiles, the greater the risk not all of them will be properly safeguarded. To combat that danger, our chairman cofounded the Nunn-Lugar program to assist the Soviet Union--and now its successor states--in meeting their arms control obligations. Related programs in the Energy Department and the State Department help Russia to safeguard its sensitive materials, and to find civilian careers for its thousands of weapons scientists. These programs will have a major role to play in the years to come. With Nunn-Lugar, we can enable Russia to destroy its old delivery vehicles rather than mothballing them. Russian officials have already decided they want to move in that direction. Let me put something in focus, by the way. The entire budget for Russia for this fiscal year is roughly $40 billion. The entire Russian military budget is $9 billion. My neighboring States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey have budgets bigger than all of Russia. I suspect if you added up all their law enforcement and prison-related budgets, it probably exceeds the entire defense budget of Russia. Our defense budget, and I make no apologies for it, is between $350 and $400 billion. So I want us to keep this in focus. The ability of Russia to maintain and/or take the money to destroy this fissile material and mothball nuclear capacity is very limited, increasing the need for Nunn-Lugar, the threat reduction money, to be spent on American scientists with American contractors to go to Russia to destroy these weapons for them because they do not have the money to do it. U.S. assistance can also help Russia to secure and dispose of its excess fissile material. That is the stuff that makes nuclear explosions. That is the stuff that is the product from which chain reactions, nuclear chain reactions start. That is an urgent and continuing task, with or without this treaty. I think the administration understands this. The Secretary of State has laid it out: U.S. assistance helps to improve the security of Russia's nuclear weapons by improving their physical protection (fencing, sensors, communications); accounting (improved hardware and software); personnel reliability (better screening); and guard force capabilities (more realistic training). These improvements are particularly important because Russia faces a difficult threat environment--political instability, terrorist threats, and insider threats resulting from financial conditions in Russia. Translated: The Russian Mafia; translated: Departments seeking money to keep their folks employed doing things that are not in the interest of Russia, and clearly not in the interest of the United States. The Secretary of State also assured the Committee that: . . . we intend to continue to work with Russia, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction, CTR program, when and to the extent permitted by law, to make its warhead storage facilities more secure. Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty. The Secretary of State continued: If requested by the Russian Federation, and subject to the laws related to CRT certification, the Administration would be prepared to provide additional assistance for removing, transporting, storing, and securing nuclear warheads, disassembling warheads and storing fissile material, dismantling surplus strategic missiles, and disposing of associated launchers. I am pleased that the administration accepts the need to use Nunn-Lugar and related programs in implementing this treaty, and that the 2004 budget request has a 9-percent increase for Nunn-Lugar. That increase is probably spoken for, however, by the cost of building--belatedly--a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. So I wonder, at least, whether enough fund are budgeted for Nunn-Lugar; I hope they are but I don't think they are. And I hope that the President will prevail upon his own party in the House to give him more than temporary authority to waive certification requirements for these programs. Nunn-Lugar efforts cannot achieve their maximum effectiveness if every year or so the funds dry up for months at a time, while waiting for Congress to permit another presidential waiver. March 5, 2003, p. S3135 The arms reductions in it do not go far enough, in my view, but they are better than nothing. There is no verification provisions, but good faith, information from START verification activities, and Nunn-Lugar may be a good substitute for verification. March 5, 2003, p. S3135 Condition (1) requires an annual report to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on how U.S. cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to Russia can best contribute to enabling Russia to implement its side of the bargain. Reports subsequent to the initial report will be due on February 15 so that the Senate can take them into account as it considers the budget for programs for which the administration is calling. This is vital because U.S. assistance can bring about the weapons dismantlement the Moscow Treaty fails to achieve. March 5, 2003, p. S3135 I would note to my chairman that there may be a resolution unrelated to any amendment to this treaty calling for the Senate to go on record in a much more forceful way to support a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy and Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction efforts. As I said in the chairman's absence, without verification, there are only two things that give me real solace, and they are the insight we get from the Nunn-Lugar initiatives and cooperative threat reduction, as well as the remaining verification process that exists within the START treaty which will expire three years before this treaty expires. But it will not, I assure my colleague, be as an amendment. It will not be as a declaration which we cannot amend. It will not be as a condition to this treaty. March 5, 2003, p. S3145 It would be my expectation that a report called for on the activities pursuant to condition 8 to the START treaty resolution of ratification would only tell us there are no negotiations toward a bilateral agreement, even though there are useful efforts underway on the Nunn-Lugar related programs. We already have a condition to the resolution before us that requires the Nunn-Lugar report; in other words, progress on Nunn-Lugar initiatives. We are required to have a report. While I will join the Senator in a letter, and I agree with what the Senator is trying to do, I honestly--not out of pride of authorship of what we came up with, but I honestly believe that what we did as a condition on the Nunn-Lugar programs on this treaty is, quite frankly, more effective than going the route of the condition 8 requirements in the START treaty. I hope I made that clear. Again, there is no disagreement I have with the Senator from Illinois. The bottom line is that what he has pointed out is, in my view, a real deficiency in this treaty overall. His legitimate attempt to take condition 8 of START and use it as a vehicle to stand in for the absence of a verification requirement in this treaty is useful. Senator Conrad Burns (R - MT), March 6, 2003, p. S3239 I recently returned from Moscow where I was deeply impressed by the dramatic transformation underway in that huge country. While there is no doubt that Russia is on the track towards democracy and a free market economy, it is equally clear to me that the Russians are not at the stage where they can be given a blank check to implement the Moscow Treaty. Congress has authorized more then $4.7 billion for U.S. programs aimed at helping Russia and other newly independent states to reduce the threats from their weapons of mass production. The Moscow Treaty does not expressly deal with the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program but the objectives of the treaty cannot be achieved without extending this assistance to Russia. The only certainty about future costs to implement this treaty is that the costs are uncertain and that the uncertainty goes toward how much higher costs will be. According to a GAO report issued this week, ``. . ..a pilot facility to destroy 14 percent of Russia's chemical weapons over an 11-year period would cost the United States almost $890 million--an increase of about $150 million from the estimate . . .'' Higher program cost uncertainty is compounded by Russia's apparent inability to pay for its agreed-upon share of project costs. Another problem with an effective reduction of weapons of mass destruction is that Russia is not always willing to provide access to its sensitive national security sites. Access is essential to verify that the Parties are living up to their part of the agreement. According to the same GAO report, U.S. inspectors do not have access to the sites in Russia where 90 percent of the materials used in weapons of mass destruction are stored. Access issues largely revolve around trust, and, frankly, this treaty highlights the need for access; it does not solve the problem. Senator Byron Dorgan (D - ND), March 5, 2003, p. S3138-3139 I note that Senator Lugar is in the Chamber, the chairman of the committee. He might or might not know that yesterday when I spoke on these issues, I spoke about the general issue of threat reduction. I spoke about the Nunn-Lugar, or Lugar-Nunn, programs by which we were actually using taxpayer money in this country to dismantle delivery systems and weapons in the old Soviet Union and in Russia, the very success of those programs, and how much I thought those programs have contributed to moving in the right direction. We may not agree. I do not know. I suspect there are some who think this Moscow Treaty actually advances our interests. I think it probably does not, but I do not think it hurts anything. It is an agreement by which the United States and Russia decide that a number of nuclear weapons will be taken off the active delivery systems and put in storage, but at the end of the time during which this transition takes place, in 2012, we will have exactly the same number of nuclear weapons in Russia and in the United States as we have today, at least as a result of this treaty. This treaty does not propose that any nuclear weapons be disassembled or destroyed. It is simply putting nuclear weapons in storage facilities somewhere. Are they at the ready? Are they in storage? I think it is not a great distinction, or at least it is a distinction without much of a difference. While Senator Lugar is present, I want to mention, as I did yesterday, I have here a piece of a strut from a wing of a Soviet bomber. Some of my colleagues have been given pieces of this as a commemorative of a very successful effort we have made and continue to make with respect to arms reductions. I stress the word ``reductions'' of both nuclear weapons and delivery systems. I ask unanimous consent to use this old strut of a Soviet bomber to make the point. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. DORGAN. The point is this: I hold in my hand a piece of metal that belonged to a bomber that presumably carried nuclear weapons that threatened every American. Did we shoot this bomber down? No, we did not. We sawed the wings off and destroyed the fuselage. How did we do that? Because we had a program called Nunn-Lugar, or Lugar-Nunn, that actually recognized it is a whole lot better to reach an agreement for arms reduction and then help pay for the destruction of a Soviet bomber or a Russian bomber, or the dismantlement of a missile or a submarine and the destruction of a warhead, than it is to exchange them or to try to shoot it down or to sink the submarine. So we appropriated taxpayers' money for this purpose. This is called peace. This is another item I showed yesterday: Ground-up copper from a dismantled Soviet submarine that carried missiles with warheads aimed at American cities. This is called progress. This submarine does not exist any longer. Why? Because we had the foresight, particularly by Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, to say if we can have verifiable reductions in both delivery systems and nuclear weapons, and even help pay for that destruction, it is far better than having this continued standoff and actually having to fight at some point to try to knock down a Soviet bomber or destroy a Russian submarine. We are destroying them, all right, but peacefully, through a program that works. Because I think that is very important to understand, I made the point yesterday that there are thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons in this world. The bulk of them are contained in arsenals by Russia and the United States. Many of them are called theater nuclear weapons, lower yield, smaller nuclear weapons. Then there are strategic nuclear weapons, the larger nuclear weapons. There are thousands of each, and over time, through arms control agreements, we have reached some understanding that we want to reduce the number of warheads, the number of delivery systems. We have moved back and forth about exactly how we do that. In some cases, there has been great emphasis on dismantling or limiting the number of delivery systems, the missiles themselves, or the bombers or the submarines. They are mere delivery systems for a weapon of mass destruction. In some cases, we paid great attention to that. In other cases, we have paid attention to the number of warheads themselves. All of that is important. But I must say a treaty is not, at the end of the day, very important to us if it discontinues the effort to actually reduce the threat of war through dismantling weapons and delivery systems. We have made some progress in arms control, progress that I think is very important to the American people, but there is so much more to be done. A rumor that someone had stolen one nuclear weapon some many months ago caused great concern in this country. The loss of one nuclear weapon to a terrorist could hold hostage an entire American city or, for that matter, much of a country, and there are thousands and thousands of these weapons. It seems to me, if we wish to make this a safer world for our children and grandchildren, it is our job to aggressively stop the spread of nuclear weapons. God forbid other countries will become part of the nuclear club or that terrorists and terrorist organizations will acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We will stop the spread of nuclear weapons. And we must be the leader to do that. This country must be in the lead. It is our job. This responsibility falls on our shoulders at this time. Senator Chuck Hagel (R - NE), March 5, 2003, p. S3138 The second condition deals with the Cooperative Threat Reduction or Nunn-Lugar programs. Russia is committed to meeting these reductions, but the question remains if Russia has the resources to meet them. The Nunn-Lugar program has been successful in assisting the former states of the Soviet Union to help reduce their nuclear arsenals. The Resolution of Ratification rightly includes Nunn-Lugar programs as instrumental in achieving lasting and durable arms reduction. The Moscow Treaty should not be considered as the final chapter in U.S.-Russian arms control, but it is an important and historic step forward. The United States and Russia must do more to prevent the proliferation of dual use technology and weapons of mass destruction to Iran, North Korea, and other countries. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are crucial to our shared security interests in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. For us to succeed in making a safer world, Washington and Moscow must be strategic partners, not strategic adversaries. Senator Orrin Hatch (R - UT), March 6, 2003, p. S3240 The Treaty allows either party to ``determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms,'' meaning that we will be able to configure our triad according to the evolving needs of our nuclear posture review. The treaty does not link the objectives to our continued Cooperative Threat Reduction program, appropriately known as the Nunn-Lugar programs, recognizing all of the work the current chairman of Foreign Relations Committee and our former Democratic colleague have committed in their careers toward the cause of disarmament. I commend my colleagues on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees for engaging the administration in extensive discussions about continued support for this program. I strongly approve the administration's commitment to this program, and I will continue to support their budget for this. Senator John Kerry (D - MA), March 6, 2003, p. S3233-3234 Nuclear weapons, as we all know, are the legacy of the cold war, the most pressing single threat that we face today as we contemplate dealing with Saddam Hussein and as we wish we were dealing with North Korea. The most pressing threat, however, is really that nuclear weapons, or their lethal components, might fall into the hands of terrorists or irresponsible governments at the head of rogue regimes. This fact makes the provisions of this treaty even more troubling. Instead of requiring the dismantlement of warheads or launchers, the treaty simply requires that on one day in 2012, the sides are to have no more than the 1,700 or 2,200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons. The remaining thousands of weapons will be held in reserve, stockpiled for some other unforeseen need, a need, I might say, in the context of the threats we are looking at in the year 2003 that is extraordinarily hard to explain, particularly when those stockpiled weapons become the risk of stolen, bartered, sold, or blackmailed materials. By their continued existence, they present a tempting target for thieves and for terrorists. It is no secret that there are those who are eager to capitalize on a deadly market for weapons-usable nuclear materials. The GAO has documented numerous failed attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of Russia. I say to my colleagues that out of 20 of these incidents over the last decade, the materials involved in 13 of the 20 that we know about, and possibly as many as 15, were traced back to Russian sources. I will tell my colleagues from my experience as a law enforcement official that if you know you caught 20 and you know you are operating with limited capacities to detect, anyone ought to be asking the question, How many did we miss and how many will we miss in the future? The great security challenge of our day is to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of those who would do us harm, but this treaty only expands the stockpile of nondeployed warheads in Russia, and in this country for that matter. It may advance some old cold war calculus for arms control, but it is not a part of a broader comprehensive approach to our nuclear relationship with Russia, particularly in the area of threat reduction, and there I think the treaty runs the risk of increasing the danger of nuclear theft by stockpiling thousands of warheads. Obviously, it is the task of all of us to try to make the world more secure, not less secure. As I have said previously, we need to revitalize the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program by giving it the sustained leadership, attention, and funding it deserves. Over the last decade, the United States has spent about $7.5 billion to deactivate 6,000 warheads and destroy thousands of delivery vehicles. Why would we spend $7.5 billion to deactivate and destroy and then bring a treaty to the floor of the Senate which does neither? We have to make good on our pledge of $10 billion over the next 10 years to the G-8 threat reduction partnership, and we need to encourage the good faith participation of our allies. But we know that even those efforts are not going to be enough. In 2001, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler commission concluded that for our efforts to secure Russia's nuclear weapons materials and expertise to succeed, we will have to spend $30 billion over the next 10 years. That is a challenge we ought to be meeting as a primary goal prior even to the implementation of this treaty. Senator Joseph Lieberman (D - CT), March 5, 2003, p. S3146 Why has the administration failed to meet the Baker-Cutler funding benchmarks for nonproliferation and arms control programs? Why has the administration failed to fully invest in the Nunn-Lugar program? Where is the long-term strategy to diplomatically engage proliferating nations? I agree with President Bush that ``history will judge harshly those who saw this coming and failed to act.'' However, at a time when the international community needs leadership and guidance on this issue, the administration is virtually silent. Too often on arms control and non-proliferation, America has become a colossus that oscillates between pouting and shouting. In contrast, the resolution that my colleagues and I are introducing today gives this nation a strong, clear, and constructive voice on these critical issues. Here and now we call for the administration to rebuild the broad international coalition against proliferation that it has permitted, and even encouraged, to deteriorate over the past two years. We call for the full funding of all Federal non-proliferation and arms control programs to the levels prescribed by the Baker-Cutler report. We call for engaging North Korea in direct and full talks. We call for the expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to include additional states willing to engage in bilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. These would be acts of strength by the strongest nation in the history of the world and they would be acts of wisdom because these acts would increase our security. The bottom line: the United States must start now to rebuild the international community's consensus on stopping proliferation in its tracks. The measures outlined in our resolution will begin to do just that. On September 11, 2001, in a single fell blow, we learned just how vulnerable we may be if we do not act with foresight and urgency on containing weapons of mass destruction. Today, I believe everyone in this chamber understands that we cannot speak of homeland security without addressing non-proliferation. We cannot debate national security without including arms control. This Nation requires a coherent non-proliferation policy, and a clear voice on the matter in the international community. This resolution is the start. Senator Trent Lott (R - MS), March 5, 2003, p. S3146-3147 I remember specifically the work of the distinguished Senator from Indiana after the dissolution of the Soviet Union as we had Russia and other countries grow out of that. We had the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Quite frankly, some of us were a little leery of how that program would work and whether it was the right thing to do. But looking back on that time in history, there is no question but that was a really dynamic leadership effort that needed to be made. It has been helpful. It has not been perfect, of course. But I think it has helped our relationship with Russia, and I think it has also helped to control the escape of and the misuse of some of those nuclear weapon capabilities. I want to recognize Senator Lugar's past leadership in this area and thank him for working to get this Moscow Treaty ready. I had occasion last year to go to Russia, to St. Petersburg and Moscow, with a delegation of Senators to meet with foreign policy leaders, defense leaders, members from the Duma, members of the Russian Federation Council, and the chairman of the foreign relations committee there in the Federation Council. It was very interesting and very informative. I believe there is a growing opportunity for the United States to have a close working relationship with Russia. It has to be one of truths. It has to be one that covers the entire sphere of not only trusting each other when it comes to arms and treaties but also the economy and trade, foreign policy, and international issues such as the one we are working on right now. We see today that the vote of Russia and what they do at the Security Council is going to be important as we prepare to deal with the situation in Iraq. So we need to have a growing relationship and friendship with this important country. I think this treaty is a good one. It is one that certainly is timely. Russia's transformation to a market economy still faces a number of challenges, obviously--its interests, and the people there. Also, the United States is working to get through problems. There are still problems we are trying to deal with. But our strategic relationship with Russia provides a strong foundation of cooperation on issues regarding nuclear weapons reduction and security. Since 1992, the United States has spent over $3 billion in Cooperative Threat Reduction Program funds to help Russia dismantle nuclear weapons and ensure the security of its nuclear weapons, weapons-grade fissile material, and other weapons of mass destruction. This has been a very big program. It is one that I think has been very important. In 1998, both countries agreed to share information upon detection of a ballistic missile launch anywhere in the world and to reduce each country's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. As Russia and the United States continue to reduce the stockpile, we must stay vigilant in our collective effort to ensure that weapons-grade nuclear materials stay under lock and key. It is easy to say, but it is not a question of just turning the lock. There has to be an ongoing effort, there has to be verification, and there has to be a lot of cooperation. Senator Richard Lugar (R - IN), March 5, 2003,, p. S3130 Nevertheless, important questions remain and will be discussed during this debate. What happens to the nuclear warheads taken from dismantled Russian delivery systems? I have confidence in the United States storage procedures and appreciate the flexibility the treaty permits in our strategic systems, but I am concerned with the parallel Russian process. We must work with Russia to make certain that these dangerous weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. However, there are readily available means to address these deficiencies. The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing warheads to levels set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by warhead security is the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. Without Nunn-Lugar, it is unlikely that the benefits of the treaty will be realized. During consideration of the treaty, the committee heard testimony from Secretary Powell asserting that increased Nunn-Lugar assistance would serve as a foundation for the cooperation necessary to meet Russian obligations under the treaty and as additional means of verifying that those obligations are met. My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse we experienced over the Nunn-Lugar certification process last year. Each year, our President is required by law to certify that Russia is ``committed to the goals of arms control.'' In 2002, the administration requested a waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult. Meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and projects were permitted to continue, but no new projects were initiated and no new contracts were finalized. President Bush requested a permanent annual waiver to the Nunn-Lugar legislation so we could continue with important work. But some in Congress preferred just a 1-year waiver or no waiver at all. Without a permanent waiver, the President would be forced to suspend dismantling assistance each year pending congressional action to waive the requirement. This could lead to delays of up to 6 months or more, just as we experienced last year. Let me assure my colleagues, this is not a hypothetical situation. It just happened to us. For more than 6 months, submarines on the Kola Peninsula awaited destruction. Regiments of SS-18 missiles loaded with 10 nuclear warheads apiece were left standing in Siberia, and almost 2 million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively transportable shells awaited elimination at Shchuch'ye. But the Nunn-Lugar program was powerless to address these threats because of congressional conditions drafted over a decade ago. American dismantlement experts in Russia were forced to wait and watch as these dangerous weapons systems sat in their silos, docks, or warehouses while the conference committee process between the two Houses of Congress dragged on through the summer. Without the changing of congressional conditions on the legislation or the granting of a permanent Presidential waiver, the current situation could reoccur in the years ahead. To say the least, this would delay full implementation of the Moscow Treaty far beyond the envisioned 10-year time period; namely, 2012. Let me be clear. The Moscow Treaty alone is insufficient to meet our security needs. The treaty is part of the answer, but without cooperative threat reduction, dismantlement, and warhead security projects, the agreement will not reach its potential in a timely manner. March 5, 2003, p. S3143 The second point of verification is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Nunn-Lugar program. This has people from our country working with Russians on the ground in Russia. They are verifying precisely what they are doing. I want to mention the extent of this reporting and verification by pointing to the CTR report which was just published for the year 2002. It has, on the front, so that all Senators will be able to see, the CTR logo, and says: ``Cooperative Threat Reduction annual report, Fiscal Year 2002.'' Now, page by page, the report goes through a description of cooperative threat reduction activities carried out in fiscal year 2000 in the nuclear, chemical, and biological areas, project by project and objective by objective. It discusses the 5-year plan for destruction or containment, security of each of these materials or weapons systems. I mention this simply because that has been the objective of those of us who have tried to foster this Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; that in fact there be very close congressional scrutiny, dollar for dollar, area by area, all the way through. Now, Senator Biden was prescient in his amendment that the Senator from Illinois has cited. But this clearly influenced the subsequent work under cooperative threat reduction, and does to this day. The objectives that the Senator from Illinois has suggested that are especially important-and those were also mentioned by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan, early on--we are concerned about the tactical nuclear weapons. We have raised the question to Secretary Powell as to why this was not included. In essence, this is not a quote from the Secretary, but he said: It is a bridge too far. We raised this with the Russians. They are not prepared to come to agreement. Now, other countries are deeply interested in the Russians coming to agreement, the G-8 countries that have come together in the so-called 10 plus 10 over 10 program, which means $10 billion for each of 10 years from the countries in the G-8 other than the United States, thus matching essentially what we are doing under cooperative threat reduction. One of the objectives of the early meetings was clearly: What about the tactical weapons? These are very close to the Europeans. They are not long-range ballistic missiles. They are missiles on the continent in proximity to countries worried about their security. So we have friends, in a multilateral way, who are helping to pursue this situation. I have some confidence--because Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld, in their testimony, indicated this is a high priority for them, they will continue to raise it with the Russians--we will make some headway. But we have not thus far. I would just say to the distinguished Senator from Illinois, whether spurred by the Biden amendment years ago or various other activities, our activities as Members of the Senate and the House and on the ground in Russia have been vigorous. I think the Senator cited perhaps some of my trips. But one recently, last August, was an attempt to go to the biomilitary plant at so-called Kirov 200. I sought to go there because it was identified as one of four bioweapons facilities of which we believe the Russians are simply still in denial. They are not prepared to work with us, even though at 14 other sites we do now have active programs. Under the ISTC Program, the International Science and Technology Program, we are giving stipends to Russian scientists who now have left the weapons field and are working on HIV/AIDS or other ways to combat chemical weapons poisoning. I would simply say that the Kirov 200 situation, for me, was almost a bridge too far, even though I thought arrangements were available for our U.S. Air Force plane to convey me and the party out there. At the airport that morning, we were informed we would not be able to land. We could fly, but we were not going to land. So we began to work our way through the bureaucracy of the foreign office of Russia, unwilling to take no for an answer. In due course, we did fly the aircraft, and we did land in Kirov. Having gotten there, I would say that I did not see everything that I wished to see. But what I did find were retired Russians, retired at 55, who had come, from the plant that was denied to me, down to our activities and who, in essence, told me everything they were doing at either. So I think we have a pretty good insight. I just mention this because even as we legislatively will some things to happen, they do not happen without persistence and sort of doggedly pursuing those objectives. I am just testifying that is occurring, sometimes to the discomfort of our relationship with the Russians. But in this particular case, I reported all my activities to the defense minister, Mr. Ivanov, and at least mildly admonished him we ought to be beyond this. The whole idea of the Moscow Treaty should be a new relationship, a new trust between President Putin and our President Bush. And all of us on both sides need to be fostering that. So my response to the Senator from Illinois is to say that I think we are on the same side in pursuing congressional oversight, more vigor with regard to everything we are now doing, although I think it is fully reported annually by the Department of Energy, quite apart from CTR, and with goals to go where we have not been; namely, tactical weapons and future destruction. Senator Bill Nelson (D - FL), March 5, 2003, p. S3154-3155 This relationship with Russia has extended to NATO. We look forward to cooperating with Russia on issues affecting the security of Europe and our allies. But there is one area in which the United States can provide assistance to Russia while enhancing U.S. security. In this context of the Moscow Treaty, this is critically important. Earlier today Senator Biden said we must continue to move forward and provide adequate funding to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and related nonproliferation programs in the Departments of Energy and State. These programs collectively facilitate the destruction of nuclear weapons. They bolster the security of the facilities containing weapons-usable and fissile material. And these programs provide for retraining of scientists. These programs are very valuable. Yet they have not been adequately funded. This administration has not come forward with the adequate request for funding for the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. I will tell you, there is no one I have a greater respect for than my chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator DICK LUGAR. I think he will tell you the same thing. The spread of nuclear weapons and associated materials is a real threat. It is one particularly evident as we weigh the options available to us to deal with so many of the threats around the globe. Look at North Korea. It is one of those threats. We must provide resources to these programs to try to stop the spread and the proliferation of nuclear materials because they enhance our security by ensuring the adequate disposal of these weapons and their fissile material. Certainly now when we are engaged in this war against terrorists, when we are trying to prevent al-Qaida sympathizers and other terrorists from acquiring such deadly weapons, we should not lack in any resources. I again make a pitch to my colleagues in the Senate to adequately fund the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. These programs were evaluated in a report released in January 2001 by our former colleague and now the Ambassador to Japan--Howard Baker from the State of the Presiding Officer--and his partner in that report, Lloyd Cutler. Their report clearly said these threat reduction programs are being underfunded. They call the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable material to be ``the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today.'' That is what Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler said in their report to the Congress in 2001. That report was before an agreement was reached on the Moscow Treaty for reducing our nuclear arsenals. Now with so many new nuclear weapons coming out of service, we must consider significant action to reduce proliferation to ensure that the American people and our friends and allies around the world will be safe. The most obvious way is to bolster the Nunn-Lugar programs. Senator Jack Reed (D - RI), March 6, 2003, p. S3231-3232 The resolution we are considering today contains two important conditions. The first condition requires a report and recommendation on how cooperative threat reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to the efficient implementation of the treaty and maintain the security and accurate accounting of Russia's nuclear weapons and materiel. As I will discuss in detail later, the CTR program is the most effective tool to counter proliferation, and we must do all we can to maintain it. Secondly, the resolution requires an annual implementation report which will include, among other items, a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels for both parties, a detailed description on strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current year, and how these reductions will be achieved, verification and transparency measures taken or proposed by each party, and actions taken or proposed to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the treaty. There are also several nonbinding declarations, most of which request reports to Congress and encourage the President to continue to work to reduce nuclear weapons. These conditions and declarations make the treaty more substantial and, I believe, more effective. I will support this treaty strengthened by this resolution. I want to say to the administration, however, that this is simply not enough. The rise of rogue nations and rogue nonstate actors, has made the threat of proliferation even more urgent. One of the legacies of the cold war is the abundance of nuclear weapons and fissionable material that is no longer under the clear control of the Russian Federation or other former states of the Soviet Union. Moreover, many of these nuclear weapons are housed in nations which are struggling economically and are susceptible to offers from rogue actors to acquire these materials. As Graham Allison of Harvard, former dean at the Kennedy School, stated: The single largest threat to American lives and liberties going forward for the next decade is terrorism, particularly terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The one that I have been most concerned about is loose nukes. We must do everything possible to counter proliferation through protection, containment, and interdiction. In 1991, former Senator Sam Nunn and Chairman RICHARD LUGAR recognized the risk presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They created--history will record this--one of the most important initiatives that has been seen in this Senate, in this country in many years; that is, the counterproliferation program, the cooperative threat reduction program. The programs they established in the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, have had significant success in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through these programs, the United States has secured tons of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; helped deactivate, dismantle, or destroy thousands of Russian nuclear weapons and delivery systems; and helped provide employment for hundreds of Russian scientists and engineers with expertise in building nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, who otherwise might be tempted to sell their expertise to unfriendly nations or terrorist organizations. This is an extraordinary accomplishment, but so much needs to be done in addition. Even though only about $1 billion of the $400 billion defense budget is annually allocated to support these programs, they have been among the most successful of all nonproliferation efforts undertaken by this country. Given the success of the programs, it is difficult to understand why securing adequate funding has been a significant challenge in the Bush administration. I also want to add my voice to those of my many colleagues who believe the United States and the international community are capable of doing, and must do, much more in this regard. Let me quote once again from the expert, Senator Lugar, who in his article in the December 2002 issue of Arms Control Today, said: It is critical that the United States lead in establishing a global coalition capable of exerting pressure on states to cooperate with the safeguarding, accounting, and (where possible) destruction of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Given that a war is being contemplated with Iraq over the question of their weapons programs, it is reasonable to ask why more is not being done on a global scale to control other proliferation risks. I agree with the chairman. I also agree with his statement: We must not only accelerate dismantlement efforts in Russia, we must broaden our capability to address proliferation risks elsewhere and build a global coalition to support such efforts. Clearly, undeniably, there is a lot of work to be done in these programs, not the least of which is to make up for time lost to these programs over the past 2 years. The Bush administration put most of the nonproliferation programs on hold during fiscal year 2001, in order to conduct a review to determine the validity of the programs. Luckily, most of the programs survived the review, and some were even strengthened; but little progress was made as very little work was done during this yearlong review. Then, at the completion of the review, the fiscal year 2002, and all previous years, funds for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program were frozen for over a year because the Bush administration failed to make the required certification to spend the money. Just recently, these funds have been released as a result of waiver authority included in the fiscal year 2003 Defense Authorization Act. This is waiver authority that the Republicans in the other body wanted to severely restrict and limit to 1 year, but luckily, in the end, the Senate was able to prevail and provide an unrestricted waiver for 3 years. These two events, the program review and the inability to certify, effectively stopped the Nunn-Lugar programs for approximately 2 years. The effectiveness of some of these programs has clearly been inhibited, if not damaged. The challenge now is to work to regain and then increase their effectiveness. Senator John Warner (R - VA), March 5, 2003, p. S3147 On the subject of destructive weapons, the Nunn-Lugar program, I have had a strong interest and support for that program from the very day it was conceived. I remember Sam Nunn had a small breakfast and sat down. What an audacious concept. We stood there in awe, as the cold war was very much in evidence in those days. But I think the bold foresight of Senators Nunn and Lugar to envision this program has reaped a great deal of mutual benefit for both nations and, indeed, perhaps the world at large, to further limit the proliferation of not only weapons of mass destruction but the materials by which those weapons are made.

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