Preempting a Russian Nuclear Meltdown

By Kenneth N. Luongo and Matthew Bunn

As world attention focuses on Iraq and itsweapons of mass destruction, another proliferation crisis isbrewing. Six years of steady improvement in the security of Russia'snuclear stockpile threatens to unravel under thecrushing blow of that county's current economic crisis. Not since thecollapse of the old Soviet Union has the situation been sodire.

The realities are alarming. Weapon guards leavetheir posts to forage for food. Non-payment of bills resultsin the shut off of electricity for high-tech security systemsneeded to protect weapon uranium and plutonium. Young,under-trained security guards go on shooting sprees at nuclear plantsand submarines. Under these conditions, security cannot beassumed or assured.

The United States has a significant stake inthis problem because of the danger that nuclear weapons andmaterials could leak, causing a worldwide proliferationnightmare. Indeed, Iraq spent billions trying to producethe nuclear material for a bomb; nuclear theft couldprovide a shortcut to Saddam's dreamed-of bomb. So far, a combinationof U.S.-financed security programs and remarkablepatriotism and devotion to duty under deterioratingcircumstances by Russia's nuclear workers and militaryprofessionals have prevented catastrophe. But, the situation inRussia is worsening and it requires a swift, targeted response.

In the short term, the United States shouldtake four actions.

First, a portion of the money already providedby Congress to finance security upgrades must be directed toemergency assistance to help keep security systemsoperating and nuclear security personnel fed and on the job throughthe coming desperate winter. Second, aid from existingstockpiles of military rations, warm winter uniforms, andbackup power supplies (with diesel to run them) should beshipped -- in days or weeks rather than months -- to help Russiannuclear facilities maintain security.

Third, the United States should insist thatRussia spend a substantial fraction of the income that it willsoon get from U.S. uranium purchases to pay nuclear guards andworkers, and finance other steps to improve security. TheCongress set aside $325 million to help shore up the futureof the agreement under which the U.S. purchases diluted Russianweapon uranium, and these funds will be available assoon as the Russians complete a commercial agreement forthe sale of a portion of the uranium. This money gives theUnited States enormous leverage and the Russians substantialnew resources: the leverage should be used to target theresources where they will benefit U.S. security the most.

Fourth, the United States should underwrite alow-interest line of credit that Russia can draw on specificallyto support and improve its nuclear security forces andmeasures. The use of the money should be verified up front so thatprofiteers do not divert the funds. It would allow impoverishedfacilities to pay their electric bills and guards through thecoming winter, while discussions on future permanent remedies takeplace between governments.

As a first step in that larger dialogue, theassumptions and planning for projects already underway must bere-examined. While most of the myrdiad projects underwayremain worthwhile, priorities need to be set, and theeconomic crisis means that many projects will need additionalU.S. or outside funding and may take longer to complete.

More importantly, this discussion must focus onmoving U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation to anew level, tackling tough issues such as shrinking theRussian nuclear complex, consolidating bomb material in fewerfacilities, and professionalizing guard forces.

The Clinton administration and key members ofCongress have traditionally been responsive to the need towork with Russia on new frontiers in nuclear security. Many ofthese collaborations were unimagined during the ColdWar. Russia's economic meltdown has thrown into question pastplans that assumed the country was on a democratic andcapitalist trajectory, but the underlying objective ofpreventing nuclear proliferation is still an American securitypriority. Rapid action in support of this goal is now as urgentlyneeded in Russia as it is in Iraq.

* Kenneth N. Luongo, a former Senior Advisor tothe Secretary of Energy for Non-ProliferationPolicy, is the Executive Director of the Russian-AmericanNuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) and a Senior VisitingFellow at Princeton University. Matthew Bunn, a formeradvisor to the White House Office of Science and TechnologyPolicy, is a member of RANSAC and Assistant Director ofHarvard University's Science, Technology and PublicPolicy Program.

Loose Nukes Fears: Anecdotes of the Current Crisis

By Matthew Bunn, December 5, 1998

On Sept. 20, a Ministry of Internal Affairs(MVD) sergeant at the Mayak facility, where over 30 tons ofseparated weapons-usable civilian plutonium is stored,shot two of his MVD comrades and wounded another beforeescaping with an assault rifle and ammunition. The incidentreportedly led President Yeltsin to order a review of nuclearsecurity at the site.

In September, a U.S. team visiting theKurchatov Institute in Moscow was shown a building containing 100kilograms of highly enriched uranium -- potentially enoughfor several nuclear bombs -- that was totally unguarded,because the Institute could not afford the $200-a-monthsalary for a guard.

At some nuclear facilities, MVD guards haveleft their posts to forage for food. Others have been reluctant topatrol facility perimeters because they did not have winteruniforms to keep them warm on patrol. At some facilities,recently installed security equipment is not being used becausethere is no money to maintain it; at others, guards who hadnot been paid in months were expected to man unheated postsin sub-freezing conditions. At some facilities,entire security systems -- alarms, surveillance cameras, portalmonitors, etc. -- have been shut down because the facilities'electricity was cut off for non-payment of bills. At otherfacilities, guards have intentionally turned off alarm systems, or evencut their cables, because they were annoyed by frequent falsealarms.

In early September, Minister of Atomic EnergyEvgeniy Adamov told nuclear workers protesting monthsof unpaid wages that the government owed the ministryover $170 million and had not provided a single ruble intwo months. Some 47,000 unpaid nuclear workers joined inprotests at various locations around the country, over whatthe nuclear workers' trade union said was over $400 millionin back wages to workers in the nuclear sector.

In August, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyevissued an order to all military officers to "look for additionalsources [of sustenance for the winter] and assume personalcontrol." The Defense Ministry announced that trips would beorganized for all soldiers and officers to take to the fieldsto harvest mushrooms, berries, and other sources of foodfor the winter. In the Far East region of Khabarovsk, theterritorial administration has reportedly stopped providingbread to Far East military units, due to non-payment ofdebts.

On October 9, General Igor Volynkin, commanderof the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, incharge of security for nuclear weapons, told a pressconference that Russia was fully capable of protecting itsnuclear weapons, but acknowledged that the directorate's troops hadnot been given any higher priority in receiving pay than othertroops, that they had received the paychecks due them onlythrough July, and that the directorate was helping officers toget vegetables and potatoes for the winter in lieu of cash.

On Sept. 5, five soldiers from the 12th MainDirectorate at Novaya Zemlya -- Russia's only nuclear weaponstest site -- killed a guard at the facility, took anotherguard hostage and tried to hijack an aircraft. After seizing morehostages, they were disarmed by other Ministry of Defenseforces and Federal Security Service commandos.

On Sept. 11, a 19-year-old sailor went on arampage in Murmansk, killing seven people with a chiseland an AK-47 assault rifle aboard an Akula-classnuclear-attack submarine. He then barricaded himself for 20 hours in thetorpedo bay and threatened to blow up the submarine, withits nuclear reactor. Finally, he reportedly committedsuicide. Russian officials insisted there were no nuclearweapons on board at the time.

On October 12, Sergei Ushakov, a spokesman forRussia's Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, reportedthat some 20 servicemen serving in the Strategic RocketForces were discharged during 1997-1998 after beingdiagnosed with psychiatric disorders, and that some of thesewere responsible for guarding nuclear arsenals. The officeissued a report indicating the Strategic Rocket Forces, of allthe services in Russia's military, had the most rapid increasein its crime rate, 25 percent higher in 1997 than in 1996.

In late October, a Strategic Rocket Forcesofficer at a base for the Topol-M ICBMs -- the most modernweapons in the Russian strategic force -- was quoted onRussian television as saying that he had received his pay onlythrough July, despite promises that back wages would be paid inOctober.

In early October, Russian customs reportedlyintercepted 5 "Hip C" assault transport helicopters withweapons pods, apparently stolen by military officers, boundfor North Korea. The helicopters, valued at $300,000 each, werereportedly being sold for $20,000 apiece.

On September 3, Russian radio reported that themayor of Krasnoyarsk-45, one of Russia's closed "nuclearcities," where enough HEU for hundreds or thousands of bombsis located, had written to Krasnoyarsk Governor AlexanderLebed and Atomic Energy Minister Evgeniy Adamov warningthat unless urgent action was taken, a social explosion inthe city was unavoidable, as a cutoff in payments from theAtomic Ministry's bank meant that public sectorworkers had not been paid at all in August, and even basic medicalsupplies could not be purchased.

In September, at the closed Siberian nuclearcity of Krasnoyarsk-26, home to enough plutonium forhundreds or thousands of nuclear bombs, the heat was shutoff for weeks, because lack of money delayed shipments of fuelto the reactor that heats the city, and workers staged aprotest over unpaid wages at the plutonium processing facility.Shortly before this incident, the facility director wrote toMinistry of Atomic Energy headquarters in Moscow, warning that"wage payments are three months behind scheduleThesocial tension in the shops and factories has reached thecritical level, and its consequences are unpredictable."

On November 19, 3,000 workers staged a one-daystrike over unpaid wages at Chelyabinsk-70, one ofRussia's premier nuclear weapons design laboratories,complaining of "constant undernourishment, insufficient medical service,inability to buy clothing and footwear for children or to payfor their education."

* Matthew Bunn, a former advisor to the WhiteHouse Office of Science and Technology Policy, is a memberof RANSAC and Assistant Director of Harvard University'sScience, Technology and Public Policy Program.