Accomplishments of Selected Threat Reduction Programs in Russia
Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
Accomplishments of Selected Threat Reduction Programs in Russia, By Agency
May, 2001 Greg Marsh, Terry Stevens, and Kelly Turner
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Cooperative Threat Reduction) PROGRAMS
Strategic Delivery Vehicle Elimination (Russia and NIS):
May, 2001
2004 (proj.)
2007 (proj.)
Nuclear warheads deactivated
5,504
8,568
9,881
ICBMs destroyed
423
742
1,037
ICBM silos eliminated
383
430
565
Ballistic missile submarines destroyed
19
32
41
Sub-launched ballistic missiles eliminated
209
503
661
Strategic bombers eliminated
85
87
93
Long-range nuclear ALCMs destroyed
483
487
487
Nuclear test holes/tunnels sealed
194
194
194
(Source: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 2000.)
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security
This project assists Russia in enhancing security at its nuclear weapon storage sites. The assistance provided includes guard force equipment and training, personnel reliability screening equipment and materials, computer hardware and software for the development of an integrated weapons inventory control system, and physical security enhancements such as fencing, monitors, and other access control systems. A total of 123 "Quick fix" security sets - consisting of alarmed and non-alarmed high-security fencing - have been provided to Russia for installation at Ministry of Defense warhead storage facilities. More comprehensive upgrades will be implemented in the future.
Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security
This effort supports secure transport of Russian warheads from deployment to storage, and from storage to dismantlement locations. Examples of assistance provided include security upgrade kits for railcars, secure blankets, and "supercontainers" for warhead transport and storage.
Construction of Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility:
Construction on the first wing of the Mayak facility is to be completed in February 2002. This wing will store fissile material from more than 6,000 dismantled nuclear weapons. When completed, both wings of the building will store 25,000 containers of fissile material from approximately 12,500 dismantled nuclear warheads.
Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility Transparency:
Efforts continue on agreements for verification of all materials to be stored at Mayak within the framework of the Trilateral Initiative, a committee consisting of representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM). In September 2000, the three Principals met in Vienna, Austria to collaborate in drawing up a Model Verification Agreement. Under the agreement, the Russian Federation and the United States would both jointly submit to IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material. The Principals have agreed to meet again in September 2001 to evaluate progress toward completion of the agreement. (Source: IAEA statement following IAEA General Conference, Sep. 19, 2000.)
Plutonium Production Reactor Core Conversion
The Department of Defense began this program in 1997 to convert the cores of Russia's last three remaining plutonium producing reactors, so that they can continue to supply local energy needs without producing plutonium. Due to renewed technical and safety concerns about converting the reactor cores, an alternative approach is currently under study to construct fossil fuel power plants and allow for the shut down of the reactors altogether. The plan for moving forward with either conversion or replacement is being finalized.
Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction
Work is underway on plans to build a nerve-agent destruction facility at the Shchuch'ye site in Russia. Once operational, the facility would destroy about one-half of Russia's most modern artillery- and rocket-launched chemical weapons. Congress prohibited use of FY 2000 and 2001 funding for construction of the facility though some design and site preparation work continues. Funding is also being used to improve safety and security at critical Russian CW storage sites.
Biological Weapons (BW) Proliferation Prevention
Destruction of the former Soviet biological weapons production facility at Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan has begun; equipment has already been removed and demilitarized. Under CTR sponsorship, U.S. and Russian scientists are engaged in several collaborative research projects involving former Soviet BW facilities in Russia.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAMS
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
Relocated HEU from sites Kazakhstan to the U.S. in the 1995 under Operation Sapphire and from Georgia to the U.K. in 1997
Begun upgrades on two-thirds of the 850 MTs of Pu and HEU if Russia outside of weapons
Completed rapid upgrades on almost half of the 850 MTs
Completed comprehensive upgrades on 21% of the material
Eliminated approximately 2 MTs of Russian HEU by converting it to LEU
Hardened 80 trucks and 33 rail cars to facilitate secure transport and consolidation of nuclear materials within and between 25 sites
Established the capability at 20 sites to report full nuclear inventory to the Russian Federal MPC&A Information System (FIS)
Worked with Russian officials in the development of 12 new federal or agency level Russian regulations directly pertaining to critical MPC&A elements and continued to assist enforcement of the recently adopted MPC&A regulations
By June 2001, graduated 34 MPC&A Masters students from the MEPHI MPC&A Program, working in ten different nuclear facilities directly supporting upgraded MPC&A systems
Completed upgrades for all Pu and HEU in the non-Russian states
Trained personnel as needed at sites and also at the regional George Kuzmycz Training Center (GKTC) in Kiev, Ukraine
Continuing to monitor and sustain security upgrades through site inspections and systems warranty and training support
(Source: Correspondence with U.S. Government Official, March 2001)
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)
Opened the Sarov Open Computing Center (SAROCC) in October 1999. SAROCC employs over 75 former weapons scientists in the areas of software development and modeling complex systems through contract research with U.S. national laboratories and private companies
Opened an International Development Center (IDC) in Zheleznogorsk in November 1999 as a Russian non-profit organization to train residents in project management software, which directly resulted in Zheleznogorsk residents
Created two nonproliferation centers in the closed nuclear cities of Snezhinsk and Sarov. The establishment of the centers is part of a strategy for developing nonproliferation analysis and research as a form of alternative, non-weapons employment in the Russian nuclear weapons complex
Converted more than 10 acres of land and approximately 10 buildings within The Avangard Electromechanical Plant into an open industrial park. 500,000 square feet of weapons production space was converted to commercial use. NCI is facilitating the establishment of a major dialysis equipment manufacturing in this space
Opened an International Development Center (IDC) in Snezhinsk. IDC offers city residents resources to assist in economic diversification, such as a computer room, a 30 person meeting room, a computer facility, training, and professional staff
An Open Computing Center (OCC) was established in Snezhinsk. The Snezhinsk OCC provides contract research services to private companies and U.S. national laboratories, similar to the SAROCC. Initial software development demonstration projects at the OCC are funded from a combination of public and private financing
Sponsored and arranged for visits by Russian city officials and institute personnel to DOE National Laboratories, Western businesses, the Russian-American Investment Symposium, a computer software conference, a manufacturing conference, and various other private sector meetings
Aided companies like Motorola, Lucent Technologies, Oracle, General Atomics, Far West Company, and Animatek in gaining access to the closed cities and working with Russian officials and citizens to develop business initiatives and proposals
(Source: Correspondence with U.S. Government Official, March 2001)
$84 million contributed by U.S. industry, matching $55 million in IPP support for commercial partnership projects
$9.4 million and 260 long-term jobs generated by 7 commercialized projects
25 projects poised for commercialization by 2002
With other U.S. government agencies, established IPP civilian research programs at 20 former biological weapons facilities in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
(Source: IPP webpage)
Second Line of Defense
Five high-priority sites have been equipped with radiation monitors to detect illicit nuclear transfers
A mobile training platform has been deployed, complete with training materials, equipment, and video demonstrations
Training materials have been developed for use by the 30,000 Russian Customs field personnel
Nine additional sites have been surveyed for deployment of SLD training and equipment
Several different types of equipment have been evaluated at the U.S. National Laboratories for use in the program, including a unique Russian-built system for inspecting rail cars
Radiation detection equipment installation under way at six additional sites
(Source: Correspondence with U.S. Government Official, February 2001)
New Independent States Nuclear Export Control (NISNEC)
Since September 1996, the program has facilitated: scientific analysis of control lists of the multilateral nuclear regimes; training programs for Minatom enterprises; exchanges of experience and knowledge via seminars and consultation; and development of internal compliance mechanisms in Minatom enterprises
Since 1997, 10 major workshops involving approximately 75 exporting enterprises of Minatom to increase Russian familiarity with international norms for nuclear export control and internal export control programs
Assisted in the creation of a nuclear technical cadre to advise Minatom decision makers in export control risk assessments
Provided development of two Export Control Methodological Laboratories within Minatom, one with subject matter expertise in nuclear weapons and the other in the nuclear fuel cycle, that have led to a four-fold increase in volume of export reviews within Minatom's Export Council
Initiated a program of outreach to nuclear capable exporters in Russia that are outside Minatom's authority
Developed curriculum to teach Russian Customs officials to recognize nuclear-related dual use goods
(Source: Correspondence with U.S. Government Official, March 2001)
Plutonium Disposition
In September 2000, the U.S. and Russia signed an agreement to transform excess weapons plutonium into forms unusable for weapons, as announced by President Clinton and President Putin at the June 2000 Moscow Summit. This program will facilitate the final disposition of 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium in both Russia and the U.S.
Lab-Lab Warhead Dismantlement Transparency
Over 45 Lab-to-Lab Warhead Dismantlement contracts have been signed with Russian nuclear laboratories as part of an initiative designed to sustain a technical dialogue with Russian experts and to develop and support advocates for transparency within the Russian nuclear weapons complex. The program also provides the U.S. with an understanding of the Russian nuclear weapons dismantlement process and with insight regarding Russian technical views and approaches toward a potential warhead dismantlement monitoring regime.
Development and demonstration by Arzamas-16 of the following radiation measurement technologies for potential application to the dismantlement process: 1) "Passport System" to measure warhead radiation signatures at Russian storage facilities; 2) "Radiation Mark System" to uniquely tag and monitor warheads during the dismantlement process.
Chelyabinsk-70 has conducted transparency technology demonstrations to: 1) detect the presence of high explosives during the dismantlement process; 2) destroy high explosive removed from dismantled nuclear warheads; and 3) destroy nuclear warhead casings to confirm that the dismantlement process is irreversible.
The All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF) at Chelyabinsk-70 demonstrated and installed at Sandia National Laboratories a computer model of the "hypothetical" Russian dismantlement facility for use in analyzing and evaluating the candidate transparency technologies and methods
(Source: Program Webpage)
STATE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS
International Science and Technology Center
Through March 2001, ISTC has funded 1,250 projects valued at US$335 million, providing grant payments to over 30,000 individuals
(Source: International Science and Technology Center website.)
OTHER PROGRAMS
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement
As of January 2001, 3,243 metric tons of LEU fuel derived from 111 metric tons of Russian warhead HEU has been shipped to the United States, equivalent to approximately 4,454 nuclear warheads
